Votes Count but the Number of Seats Decides: A comparative historical case study of 20th century Danish, Swedish and Norwegian road policy by Boge, Knut
 Votes Count but the Number of 
Seats Decides  
A comparative historical case study of 20th century 
Danish, Swedish and Norwegian road policy 
 
by 
Knut Boge 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian School of Management  
for the degree of Dr. Oecon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series of Dissertations 4/2006 
 
 
BI Norwegian School of Management 
Department of Innovation and Economic Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
Knut Boge: 
Votes Count but the Number of Seats Decides - A comparative historical case study 
of 20th century Danish, Swedish and Norwegian road policy 
 
 
 
 
 
© Knut Boge 
2006 
 
 
 
 
Series of Dissertations 4/2006 
 
ISBN: 82 7042 750 0 
ISSN: 1502-2099 
 
BI Norwegian School of Management 
N-0442 Oslo 
Phone: +47 4641 0000 
www.bi.no 
 
 
Printing: Nordberg  
 
 
The dissertation may be ordered from our website www.bi.no   
(Research - Research Publications) 
iii 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation about Danish, Swedish and Norwegian 20th century road policy is 
an attempt of elucidating some puzzles: Why did Norwegian authorities pursue a 
road policy contrary to most other West European industrialized countries? Why 
were highly noticeable congestion, accident and environmental problems within and 
near Norway’s major population clusters overlooked or ignored for decades? 
Denmark and Sweden had almost completed their investments in national trunk road 
and motorway systems in 2006, while Norway still lacks modern trunk roads and a 
national motorway system. Denmark, Sweden and Norway were all among the 
exclusive group of countries that enjoyed modern economic growth from the second 
half of the 19th century. Norway was one of the world’s wealthiest countries in 2006 
measured in GDP per capita. Lack of economic leverage could thus not explain 
Norway’s current lack of modern trunk roads and motorways. 
 This is a historical comparative case study based on a most similar systems 
design. The annual variations in the Norwegian tax financed road investments 
between 1960 and 2000 and their geographical allocation were also subject to a 
statistical study. The case study’s analytical model was not formal but a heuristic 
device with one dependent variable, three intervening variables and a number of 
background variables. The intervening variables or intermediate institutions are 
denoted as the road polity. The road polity consists usually of legislature, executive 
and road administration. The dependent variable is the outcome of the policy 
processes or the road policy, which is materialized in the high-level road system; i.e. 
trunk roads and motorways. There are plenty of opportunities for variations in the 
road polities and background variables during time and across countries, which led 
to development of different national political economies. Different political 
economies may in turn explain some of the variations in the dependent variable, 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway’s road policies. The Danish, Swedish and 
Norwegian cases were examined during four time periods, prior to 1945, 1945-1959, 
1960-1981 and from 1981 until approximately 2005. 
 The theoretical and analytical framework is based on historical 
institutionalism supplemented with theories about collective goods, distributions of 
burdens and benefits and institutional change and development. The theoretical 
discussions led to development of four working hypotheses: 
 The main hypothesis or benchmark was roads perceived as national collective 
goods with road policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the 
common good. 
 The second hypothesis was roads perceived as local collective or private 
goods with road policy and road construction governed by the constituencies’ 
resource struggles. 
 The third hypothesis was roads perceived as local collective or private goods 
with road policy and road construction governed by the political parties’ rivalry. 
 The final hypothesis was road policy and road construction governed by path 
dependence. 
 A number of implications were derived from each hypothesis, and tested 
empirically against the evidence in the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian cases. What 
did the testing of the four hypotheses reveal?  
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 The findings concerning the main hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived 
as national collective goods, were partly ambiguous in Denmark prior to 1945 and 
clearly ambiguous in Sweden and Norway prior to 1945. The findings in Denmark 
and Sweden post 1945 significantly strengthened this hypothesis. The findings in the 
Norwegian were clearly ambiguous until the 1980s when a fundamental road policy 
shift took place, after the Labor Party accepted mass motoring. Examination of the 
Norwegian case revealed both significantly delayed and less construction of roads 
with national collective good characteristics compared to the Denmark and Sweden. 
Road policy and road construction were closely integrated with Danish and Swedish 
post World War Two trade and industry policies, but deliberately decoupled from 
Norwegian trade and industry policy by the Labor Party executive that came to 
power in 1945, even if the pre World War Two Labor Party executive had 
emphasized road policy and road construction prior to the German invasion in 1940.  
 The Danish and Norwegian cases strengthened the second hypothesis about 
roads perceived as local collective or private goods with road policy and road 
construction governed by the constituencies’ resource struggles. The Danish case 
strengthened this hypothesis until the 1953 constitutional reform replaced the 
bicameral system with a unicameral system and an election system based on one 
person – one vote. However, Denmark’s 1970 county and constituency structure 
reform gradually paved the way for new resource struggles between the 
constituencies. The Norwegian case significantly strengthened this hypothesis until 
the mid 1980s when road policy and road construction became far less contested, 
and the most acute resource allocation conflicts were mitigated through introduction 
of common turnpike financing rather than reallocation of the tax financed road 
investments. The 1989 election system reform improved also somewhat the most 
populated Norwegian constituencies’ political representation. Detailed examination 
of the Swedish case weakened this second hypothesis in all four time periods 
studied, because the bicameral system which governed Swedish policy for better or 
worse from 1867 until the 1970 election instituted a tradition for transcending 
parochialism and local egoism when allocating publicly financed infrastructure 
investments. 
 The Danish case significantly strengthened the third hypothesis about roads 
perceived as local collective or private goods with road policy and road construction 
governed by the political parties’ rivalry, particularly after introduction of the 
unicameral system in 1953. The Swedish case weakened this hypothesis until the 
second half of the 1960s and the 1970s, when the political parties started to use road 
policy and road construction to differentiate themselves from competing political 
parties. The Norwegian case strengthened this hypothesis prior to 1945 and between 
1960 and 1980. The findings in the Norwegian case were somewhat ambiguous 
between 1945 and 1959, but this third hypothesis was clearly weakened by the 
Norwegian case after 1981 when road policy and road construction became far less 
contested after most political parties recognized mass motoring. 
 The final hypothesis about road policy and road construction governed by path 
dependence was clearly strengthened by all three cases, despite significant 
institutional differences and variations in Denmark, Sweden and Norway during 
time. The Danish case revealed that leading civil servants established a tradition for 
major publicly financed road investments beneficial for the business community and 
Denmark Inc. already from the second half of the 18th century. The Swedish case 
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revealed similarly a tradition for publicly financed road investments governed by an 
autonomous State bureaucracy permeated by norms about State reason and efficient 
resource allocation since the interwar years. Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna had 
instituted this autonomous State bureaucracy and norms about State reason and 
efficient resource allocation already in the 17th century. The Norwegian case 
revealed a tradition for minuscule but often partly locally governed publicly 
financed road investments, where most of the investments were allocated in 
peripheral and rural constituencies. This development parth was established in the 
19th century by farmer legislators opposing the 1814-1884 civil servants’ regime, 
and instituted by the Liberal Party after introduction of parliamentary rule in 1884. 
The 1814 Constitution, legislator rule, national election systems not based on the 
principle one person – one vote and an exceptionally strong Ministry of Finance 
maintained this development path. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance’s economists 
has largely since 1945 overlooked roads and other transport and communication 
infrastructures’ importance for future economic growth, and considered usually 
roads and other transport and communication infrastructures as expenses rather than 
investments. The Danish and Swedish authorities prioritized investments in national 
collective goods such as trunk roads and motorways during the 1980s and 1990s’ 
State economic problems. The Norwegian authorities that never struggled with 
similar State economic problems, because of the oil revenues, prioritized publicly 
financed private goods rather than investments in national collective goods such as 
trunk roads and motorways. 
 So what? What are the practical and theoretical implications from this study? 
Both a minister ruled road policy such as in Denmark and an expert ruled road 
policy such as in Sweden from 1944 until the early 1980s and an executive and 
industrialist ruled road policy such as in Sweden since the early 1980s safeguarded 
construction of modern and functional trunk road and motorway systems all across 
the countries. The Danish road policy underwent a fundamental reorientation after 
introduction of the unicameral system and an election system based on one person – 
one vote in 1953. The Norwegian case indicate that legislator rule together with 
election systems never based on the principle one person – one vote, a partly locally 
governed road administration and tight budget constraints for road investments 
paved the way for a road policy governed by a political rather than an economic and 
technocratic logic. The result was often pork barrel politics, rent seeking and 
construction of narrow-gauge local roads rather than a modern and functional trunk 
road and motorway system all across Norway. These three cases illustrate thus 
clearly how the constitution and election system affect the national political 
economy, because the constitution determines the rules of the game, while the 
election system largely determines the executive and legislators’ geographical 
allocation of publicly financed national and local collective goods such as roads. 
Votes count – but the number of seats decides. 
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Chapter 1 – Why has Norwegian authorities pursued a 
road policy contrary to those in most other western 
industrialized countries? 
Norway was in 2002 the third wealthiest country in the world, according to OECD, 
with a GDP of 35.482 current PPP US dollars (USD) per capita. Luxembourg, the 
wealthiest, GDP per capita was 49.150 PPP USD. The second wealthiest country, 
USA, had 36.121 PPP USD per capita in GDP. The OECD average in 2002 was 
25.810 PPP USD per capita.1 But Norway lagged in 2005 between 30 and 60 years 
after most other industrialized countries with regard to construction of modern trunk 
roads and motorways between the regions and to the export markets. Denmark’s 
national motorway system was almost completed in 2000. Sweden has similarly 
Scandinavia’s most comprehensive motorway system measured in kilometers. The 
Danish and Swedish executives and legislators pursued a traditional road policy. 
They built roads from the crowded central and urban areas towards the sparsely 
populated peripheral and rural areas, and allocated the road investments according to 
an economic and industrial logic. The Norwegian executives and legislators on the 
other hand pursued a contrary road policy, and built roads from the desolate 
peripheral and rural areas towards the crowded central and urban areas, and 
allocated most road investments according to a political logic. Highly noticeable 
congestion, accident and environmental problems within and near Norway’s major 
cities were deliberately overlooked or ignored, even if the major population clusters’ 
inhabitants paid far more in vehicle and fuel taxes than they received in State road 
appropriations. How to explain these puzzle that may indicate both governance and 
policy failures? 
 How to explain the remarkably different road policies and road systems in 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway? The aim of this comparative, historical case study 
about Danish, Swedish and Norwegian road policy during the 20th century is first to 
provide an overview of the development during time, and second to explain the 
different outcomes concerning road policy in three otherwise quite similar countries. 
This study emphasizes the Norwegian case. The Danish and Swedish cases are used 
as yardsticks or benchmarks, to overcome taken-for-grantedness, to contrast the 
Norwegian case and to identify the critical differences that may explain the different 
road policies.  
 This introductory chapter starts with a discussion of why studies of road policy 
and road construction have common interest, and continues with some empirical 
observations and puzzles. The third section examines some common sense or 
popular explanations or conventional wisdom about the particular Norwegian road 
policy after World War Two. The fourth section presents the study’s analytical, 
theoretical and methodical framework, hereunder the four working hypotheses. The 
fifth section is a map for further reading. The final section summarizes this chapter’s 
discussions.
                                                 
1 OECD Factbook 2005: Macroeconomic trends - gross domestic product (GDP) - size of GDP [Online 
January 9th 2006] –URL: http://puck.sourceoecd.org/vl=49239/cl=40/nw=1/rpsv/factbook/02-01-01-
t02.xls. 
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Why have studies of road policy and road construction common 
interest? 
Infrastructure policy is an interesting study object, because roads, railroads, harbors, 
canals, airports, telephone systems, oil and gas pipelines, water and sewage systems 
and electrical power grids and other infrastructures have long-term consequences for 
the economic development, and for a society as such. A time horizon of 50 to 100 
years is often necessary to understand the consequences of roads taken or not taken, 
because infrastructures create literally path dependencies concerning urban and rural 
development, economic growth and decline. Infrastructures affect also a society’s 
distribution of benefits and burdens. Construction of particular infrastructures 
facilitates some paths of development and rule out others. Many decisions about 
building or not building infrastructures have almost irreversible consequences. 
Infrastructure investments is often synonymous with distributional conflicts 
Major infrastructure initiatives often entail political and distributional conflicts, due 
to resource constraints, the investments’ magnitude and long-term consequences, 
and because major infrastructure investments may crowd out minor investments. 
The economist Paul Krugman claims a government desiring increased national 
wealth level through increased productivity instead of or in addition to harvesting 
raw materials or natural resources can manipulate three parameters, namely the 
quantity of available capital for business enterprises, the society’s social overhead 
capital and the work force’s education.2 Krugman’s claims are based on so-called 
endogenous growth theory.3 Roads and other infrastructures are central components 
in a society’s social overhead capital, and provide spillovers or externalities to 
private sector enterprises.4 The social overhead capital together with other 
institutional changes was critical for the transformation from traditional, agricultural 
to modern industrial societies.5 Roads and other infrastructures are thus of great 
importance for a society’s long-term economic growth and prosperity. 
 Road policy and road construction is usually considered as low-politics and 
thus subject to tough resource struggles between different political parties, 
geographical areas and constituencies. Low politics is usually clearly distinguished 
from high-politics, which often is characterized by national consensus, because it 
concerns the nation state’s existence.  
 Most democratic and industrialized countries have relied on full or partial tax 
financing of roads, because the high-level road system has many collective goods 
characteristics. Collective goods differ from private goods because exclusion from 
consumption is neither possible nor desirable. Market failures lead usually to 
undersupply of collective goods. The marginal costs for providing collective goods 
for another individual are low. There is also costly to exclude users from consuming 
                                                 
2 Krugman (1994:125). 
3 Aghion and Howitt (1998); Kennedy (1997:98). 
4 Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001:224). 
5 Cf. Rostow (1990:24-29). 
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collective goods.6 National defense and lighthouses are two common textbook 
examples of pure collective goods. Private goods, where exclusion is easy and with 
high marginal costs for providing the good to another individual, can be supplied in 
a market, but private goods can also be supplied through public production.7 
Examples of private goods supplied through public production in many countries are 
higher education and health services. 
 The so-called New Public Management (NPM), which emerged after the neo-
liberal shift at the turn of the 1970s and 80s, has led to increased reliance in many 
countries on market mechanisms even for supply and allocation of collective goods.8 
But there are also countries where planning, construction and operations of high-
level roads have been outsourced to private or semi-public enterprises decades 
before NPM became fashionable, such as in Italy, France and Austria, which have 
relied on turnpike financing of their motorway systems. On the other hand, there are 
also examples of countries where market solutions enjoy very prominent positions in 
most aspects of life, such as USA, but where road construction has been one of the 
public sector’s most prominent tasks in addition to national defense, law 
enforcement, basic education and research. Finally, there are examples of countries 
where the market forces have been partly suspended or heavily constrained, such as 
in Norway after World War Two. The Norwegian politicians emphasized public 
production and supply of private goods, rather than investments in social overhead 
capital and collective goods such as roads and other transport and communication 
infrastructures. 
                                                 
6 See for instance Downs (1957:164-174); Olson (1965/71:13-15); Stiglitz (1986:119-127); Varian 
(1999:617-618) for discussions about collective goods, and Gustafsson (1987) about roads perceived as 
collective goods. 
7 See for instance Stiglitz (1986:124-131) for discussions about private goods and public production of 
private goods. 
8 See for instance Savas (1987); Walsh (1995) and Flynn (1997) for further discussions about New Public 
Management. 
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Figure 1: Denmark, Sweden and Norway’s location in northern Europe. 
 
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, [Online January 24th 2006] – URL: 
http://www.cia.gov  
Different categories of roads serve different purposes 
The roads’ main purpose is to facilitate communication and swift movements of 
persons and goods. Well-functioning transports are a “precondition for economic 
development”, according to the Swedish National Road and Transport Research 
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Institute.9 But the road policy is inherently complex, because of conflicts between 
effectiveness, road safety, regional policy, fairness and equity, due to budget 
constraints and usually limited resources. Roads connected into a road system 
provide also network externalities; i.e. the users’ utility from the road investments is 
dependent of how many others who consume the good, analogous to for instance 
telephones, fax machines and Internet. Network externalities are often collective 
goods.10 
 The public road system is here defined as physical roads; included bridges, 
tunnels and ferries open for all motorists. The public road system or road 
infrastructure can be understood as a hierarchy or tree-structure, or as the body’s 
blood system.11 The roads are usually divided into different classes or categories, 
according to the roads’ function, and according to the organizing of the 
responsibility for management, planning, financing, construction, maintenance and 
operations, etc.12 This is the case in most countries, even in Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway. 
 Trunk roads connect different regions within a country and neighboring 
countries, integrate major population centers, industrial, raw material and natural 
resource areas and domestic and foreign markets. Modern trunk roads have usually 
hard paving, level free crossings, high speed limits and high permitted payloads to 
ensure safe and efficient transportation of large volumes of passengers and goods, 
which reduces the trade and industry’s transaction costs and improve the society’s 
flexibility. Most modern trunk roads are designed and built according to the so-
called traffic engineering’s principles for traffic separation and traffic 
differentiation; i.e. with physical separation of hard and soft road users, and 
dedicated roads for remote and local traffic, for fast and slow-moving vehicle, etc. 
Most western industrialized countries’ trunk roads are built as four or six lane 
motorways in crowded areas, with physical separation between the directions of 
traffic and level free crossings. Less crowded trunk roads are often built as two lane 
expressways, without physical separation between the directions of traffic but with 
level free crossings or traffic circles. The trunk roads’ benefits are thus usually not 
restricted to a particular geographical area, because they improve the road safety and 
promote the trade and industry’s effectiveness through reduced transaction costs, 
which usually is beneficial for the entire society. Modern trunk roads are therefore 
perceived as national collective goods in most countries. Even modern trunk roads’ 
spillovers or positive externalities, such as improved road safety and environmental 
standards or improved competitiveness for the trade and industry can be understood 
as collective goods. The negative externalities from modern trunk roads such as 
increased traffic in case of economic growth and increased activity level, and 
thereby often entailing increases in air and noise pollution unless such problems are 
                                                 
9 Hultcrantz and Nilsson (2004:10-11). 
10 See for instance Varian (1999:606, 617-618); Samuelson and Nordhaus (2001:225) about network 
externalities. 
11 See for instance Eckhoff (1969:66 ff.). 
12 See for instance Arne Østgård, Utforming av vegsystemer, lecture for Den Norske Ingeniørforening, 
Kommunal og arbeidsdepartementet, Norsk institutt for by- og regionsforskning and Transportøkonomisk 
institutt, Kongsberg March 17-19th 1970, Institutt for veg- og jernbanebygging, Norges tekniske høgskole, 
Trondheim 1970, VDA. 
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reduced by improved technology, can similarly be understood as collective evils or 
burdens. 
 Highways connect different areas or places across the county borders similarly 
as the trunk roads. Some countries, such as Norway, define the most crowded or 
economically most important highways as trunk roads, and consider trunk roads as a 
subset of the highways. Other countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, define trunk 
roads as a particular class of roads. Highways, particularly those not defined as trunk 
roads, have often somewhat simpler technical standard, even if they might be 
crowded. Highways permit usually high payloads, but the crossings are usually 
level. The speed limits are similarly often below those on the trunk roads. Many 
highways pass through city hubs or residential areas. Highways are usually 
somewhere in between national and local collective goods, and are often considered 
as local collective goods, because of more geographically concentrated benefits 
compared to trunk roads. 
 Local roads, such as secondary highways, county roads, municipal roads, 
parish roads or city streets are usually internal connections within the counties or 
municipals, often to peripheral and rural areas. Local roads are usually less crowded 
than trunk roads and highways, and have usually considerably simpler technical 
standards for payloads, speed limits and road safety. Local roads vary from local 
collective to private goods, depending on how concentrated the benefits are. Local 
roads that serve a county or municipal is usually considered as local collective 
goods, while local roads that serve individual properties are usually considered as 
private goods. 
 There can also be drawn a distinction between roads as collective or private 
goods depending on the available road capacity. Sufficient road capacity can be 
understood as a collective good, because of no rivalry about the consumption and 
zero or almost zero marginal cost for providing road capacity for another user. A 
crowded or congested road on the other hand can be understood as a private good, 
because the marginal cost for providing road capacity for another user can be very 
high, particularly in urban areas. The available road capacity is hence also decisive 
for what kind of goods we are talking about. The roads’ characteristic may thus 
change during the day or week, from private goods characteristics during peak hours 
to almost pure collective goods characteristics during nights and weekends. The 
roads’ changing characteristics have been utilized among others in Singapore, 
London, Stockholm and Trondheim in Norway, where economic mechanisms, such 
as congestion fees or road pricing, are used to constrain the traffic in the city hubs. 
Congestion fees or road pricing is often introduced because further investments in 
new roads have not been considered possible or desirable of economic, 
environmental, political and/or ideological reasons. 
The road policy and road construction is usually determined by the political 
economy 
The trunk roads and highways’ externalities’ collective goods characteristics have 
made management and financing of trunk roads and highways to public tasks in 
most countries. Road policy and road construction is therefore usually a result of 
collective action in the legislature, unless the road policy and road construction is 
left entirely to the market, to autonomous professionals and/or local politicians or 
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administrators. Local roads are similarly managed and financed locally in most 
countries, due to their usually geographically concentrated benefits. 
 A country’s road policy and road construction is usually determined by the 
political economy. Political economy is the study of questions about how 
institutional and economic arrangements serves the interests of different groups, and 
how institutional arrangements evolve over time, in response to the incentives, 
strategies and choices of different groups and individuals.13 The political economy’s 
bottom line is distribution of benefits and burdens within a society. Peter A. Hall 
distinguished between interest-based, institution-oriented and idea-based studies of 
political economy, but these three approaches are only mutually exclusive in their 
most cultivated versions.14 This study is based on an institutional approach, but it 
includes also elements from the interests and idea-based approaches, and takes what 
Hall describes as an “electoral approach” from the interest-based perspective.15 
Because this study recognizes the politics’ primacy and the politicians’ desire for 
reelection, even if many politicians engage in politics because they care about the 
well being of their community and fellow citizens. Furthermore, this study 
recognizes the existence of possible political business cycles, and recognizes also 
the premise from the idea-based approach that ideas may have causal effects on 
formation of the actors’ preferences and thereby on development of institutions and 
policy outcomes.  
Empirical observations and puzzles – is there a Norwegian 
“Sonderweg” even with regard to road policy and road 
construction? 
The executives and legislators have so far not been able or willing to catch up 
Norway’s lag with regard to modern trunk roads and motorways compared to most 
other West European countries and soon also most East European countries. 
 About 27 percent of the Norwegian highways in 2000 were defined as trunk 
roads and carried out 47 percent of the traffic work. 36,1 percent of Norway’s road 
accidents 1993-2000 took place on these trunk roads. Head on collisions have been a 
common cause of sudden and violent death or disablement on Norway’s three most 
crowded trunk roads, E6 from the Swedish border at Svinesund to the capital Oslo, 
E18 from the Swedish border at Ørje to Oslo and E18 from Oslo to Kristiansand.16 
The risk for head on collisions on crowded roads without physical separations 
between the directions of traffic, for instance through construction of a center strip, 
increases more than the traffic, theoretically exponentially with the number of 
vehicles passing each other head on.17 These facts have not been reflected in 
Norwegian trunk road policy or road construction until recently. Figure 2 provides 
an overview of fatalities on Norwegian trunk roads 2002-2005. Notice there are 
hardly any fatalities on the motorways southwest and southeast of Oslo. Many 
                                                 
13 See for instance Alt and Alesina (1998:645); Hall (1997:174-175). 
14 Hall (1997:189). 
15 Hall (1997:178). 
16 See for instance Ragnøy and Elvik (2003:8-9, 11, 16); St. meld. nr. 24 (2003-2004) Nasjonal 
transportplan 2006-2015:78-80, 107, 130-131, 134-135, 142; Liv Ekeberg, “Norges ti verste veier”, 
Nettavisen, August 12th 2004 [Online June 19th 2005] – URL: http://pub.tv2.no/dyn-nettavisen. 
17 Schistad (2006 [Telephone interview]). 
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Norwegian cities and urban areas are still missing dedicated networks of bicycle 
lanes and footpaths, even if Norwegian politicians since the early 1970s have 
advocated use of public transports and bicycles rather than cars in central and 
densely populated areas.18 Sweden had 31.000 kilometers dedicated bicycle lanes 
and footpaths in 2003, more than the entire Norwegian highway and trunk road 
system.19 The Norwegian road policy has been consequential. About 60 percent of 
Norwegian transport and logistic enterprises and about 50 percent of the production 
and retail enterprises reported in 2003 they were harmed by congestion within and 
near the major cities. The rural areas’ poor road sections harmed similarly 50 and 
respectively 40 percent of these enterprises.20 Norwegian trade and industry 
dependent of road transport have therefore far higher transport costs than their 
competitors. 
                                                 
18 See for instance St. meld. nr. 9 (1978-79) Om trafikk og bymiljø – Norsk vegplan for byer og 
tettsteder:10-14, 18-21, 23-24; St. meld. nr. 24 (2003-2004) Nasjonal transportplan 2006-2015:97-98, 
107. 
19 Fakta om Vägverket, vägar och trafikk. Publikation 2003:48:6 [Online November 11th 2003] – URL: 
http://www.vv.se/publ_blank/bokhylla/arsrapport/fakta/Fickfakta.pdf. 
20 Dybedal and Ludvigsen (2003). 
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Figure 2: Fatalities on Norwegian trunk roads 2002-2005. 
 
Source: Directorate of Public Roads, National Road Data Base. 
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 The paradoxical situation is that Norway is more dependent of cars and road 
transports than almost any other West European country, because of dispersed 
settlement, poorly developed public transports, a long and narrow country and 
localization in Europe’s northwestern periphery. But the road policy and road 
construction have hardly reflected these facts, despite assumed rational and 
intelligent politicians. This is a puzzle, given a trade and industry facing initially 
European and later also global competition, and recently also global competition 
concerning the trade and industry’s location. Those trade and industries located in 
Norway’s peripheral areas struggle with significant time and distance handicaps 
compared to their competitors located in EU. The direct line from Oslo to Kirkenes, 
Norway’s northeastern town at the Russian border equals approximately the direct 
line from Oslo to Dublin, Beograd or almost to Rome. 
 Road transport of passengers and goods increased dramatically in Norway 
from October 1960, when the Labor Party executive liquidated its postwar car 
rationing. The number of cars of all categories increased from about 338.000 in 
1960 to 2,3 millions in 2000.21 Passenger cars carried out about 79 percent of the 
person transport in 2002, compared to 41 percent in 1960, 23 percent in 1950, 12 
percent in 1945 and 40 percent in 1939.22 The Labor Party executive’s postwar road 
and motoring policy after completing the initial reconstruction about 1948/49 
delayed further the shift from railroad to road transports that gained momentum in 
the second half of the 1930s, which was aborted by the German occupation 1940-45. 
Road transport is currently the dominant mode of land transport of goods. The goods 
volumes transported on Norwegian roads increased nine times 1960-2000.23 There 
seems to have been significant discrepancies between the realities and the 
Norwegian road policy and road construction during most of the postwar period.  
 Passenger cars carried out about 70 percent of the Swedish and Danish person 
transports in 2000, but the trend has been falling since 1970, instead of increasing as 
in Norway.24 Road transports are similarly the most important mode of land 
transport of goods in Denmark and Sweden, such as in Norway, even if railroads 
carry more goods in Sweden than in Norway and Denmark. The road transport’s 
relative share of land based goods transports are strongly increasing in Norway, 
slowly growing in Sweden and has been reduced in Denmark since 1970, after a 
peak in 1990.25 The actual Norwegian development has thus been contrary to the 
executives’ publicly stated goals since the 1970s, namely more goods transports on 
railroads and ships rather than on roads, and more public transports of passengers 
instead of use of passenger cars. The actual development with regard to transports of 
goods and passengers in Norway may indicate a policy failure, significant doses of 
symbol policy, or combinations thereof. 
                                                 
21 Bil- og veistatistikk 2002, Opplysningsrådet for Veitrafikken, Oslo 2002:Tabell 1-10, OVA. 
22 Cf. DB-DBA-PTW 1926-2002. 
23 St. meld. nr. 24 (2003-2004) Nasjonal transportplan 2006-2015:32 Table 3.2. 
24 European Union Energy & Transport in Figures 2003, European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport, in co-operation with Eurostat, Brussels: The calculations are based on data from 
table 3.5.4, 3.5.6, 3.5.7, 3.5.8, 3.5.9 and 3.5.11. 
25 European Union Energy & Transport in Figures 2003: The calculations are based on data from table 
3.4.5, 3.4.7, 3.4.9, 3.4.22, 3.4.23 and 3.4.25. 
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Modern roads facilitated economic growth and development after the 
depression and World War Two 
Development of national transport and communication infrastructure plans, 
hereunder road plans, was an international trend in the 1930s as well in the 1950s. 
Modern trunk roads and motorways were then considered important to safeguard 
development of future wealth, prosperity and competitiveness after the 1930’s 
depression and after World War Two. National road plans and road construction 
programs were completed in among others Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Holland, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and USA.26 
These countries’ executives and legislatures emphasized first and foremost 
development of national trunk road system, hereunder construction of motorways in 
the most crowded areas. Most new trunk roads were built outwards, from the major 
population and industrial areas towards the more sparsely populated peripheral and 
rural areas. 
 Europe and USA’s modern trunk road and motorway systems reduced the 
trade and industry’s transportation costs, due to increased permitted payloads and 
speed compared to the old highways, and improved also the labor markets’ 
flexibility because of increased commuting ranges given constant time consumption. 
The road safety was similarly radically improved compared to the old highways, 
because most new trunk roads and motorways were built according to the traffic 
engineering’s principles for traffic separation and traffic differentiation. Some 
countries built also dedicated road systems for pedestrians and bicyclists and solved 
also their urban areas’ congestion, accident and environmental problems, because 
the new trunk roads and motorways diverted or drained through traffic from the city 
hubs and residential areas.27 However, the flip side of the unconstrained mass 
motoring have in some instances been urban sprawl and collapsing city hubs, such 
as described in Owen D. Gutfreund’s study of some US cities.28  
A Norwegian “Sonderweg” even for the 20th century’s road policy? 
The economic historian Francis Sejersted explained development of Norway’s 
industrial capitalism during the 19th and 20th century as result of a Norwegian 
“Sonderweg”, due to Norway’s lack of major industrialists and bankers, a highly 
decentralized society and a State that partly compensated the lack of capitalists.29 
                                                 
26 See for instance Christiani & Nielsen, Højgaard & Schultz A/S, Kampmann, Kierulf & Saxild A/S, 
Motorveje med broer over Storebælt og Øresund:14-15; Christiani & Nielsen, Højgaard & Schultz A/S, 
Kampmann, Kierulf & Saxild A/S, Motorveje med broer over Storebælt og Øresund supplerende 
bemærkninger til forslag af 9. Marts 1936:13-16; SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och 
förslag samt kartbilagor:21-27; Betænkning nr. 294, Indplaceringen af de store trafikinvesteringer. 
Storkøbenhavns nærtrafik, Storebæltsbro, Øresundsbro i et samlet 20 års program for de offentlige 
trafikinvesteringer; Rallis (1992:112); Jørgensen (2001:290-295); Rae (1971:187-194); Rognan (1995); 
Cowan (1997:236-239); Altshuler and Luberoff (2003:77-88); Antila and Nenonen (2000:58 ff.); 
Gutfreund (2004:7-59); Mom (2005:762-770). 
27 See for instance Eckhoff (1969:27-87) about how traffic planning gradually became an integrated part 
of urban planning in most industrialized during the interwar years. There were also attempts of 
introducing these ideas in Norway during the 1960s, but they triggered soon resistance, among others 
from interest groups opposing centralization, urbanization and mass motoring. 
28 Gutfreund (2004). 
29 Sejersted (1991a). 
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Norway’s road system built during the 1970s and early 80s had many similarities 
with Norway’s 19th century’s narrow gauge railroads, and even with the Norwegian 
telephone system developed from the turn of the 19th and 20th century until about 
1920. Because the early 20th century Norwegian telephone system was a particular 
mixture of State owned and operated trunk lines and privately owned and operated 
cooperative local lines, which gradually were overtaken by the State Telephone and 
Telegraph Board.30 Many of Norway’s narrow gauge railroads were rebuilt to 
normal gauge early in the 20th century, when they became obsolete and had great 
difficulties competing with the early trucks and passenger cars’ flexibility and cost 
effectiveness.31 Norway’s “narrow gauge road system” built during the 1970s and 
early 80s was more a social welfare good than a transport infrastructure, because it 
was acceptable for passenger cars on sparsely trafficed road links, but constrained 
the possibilities for use of heavy trailer trucks.32 Norwegian executives and 
legislators prioritized also construction of local roads to trunk roads between the 
regions and cities, and roads from the peripheral and rural areas to the central and 
urban areas, rather than the opposite, even if most cars were located in the central 
and urban areas. The Norwegian road policy and road construction after World War 
Two differed thus fundamentally from most other western industrialized countries’.  
 Table 1 provides a historical overview of the tax financed road investments 
per capita in Denmark, Sweden and Norway 1950-2000 measured in 1990 PPP US 
dollar (USD). Table 1 does not include Danish or Norwegian turnpike financed road 
investments such as the Great Belt and Øresund Connections, which each were 
mega-projects in the order of magnitude of approximately a decade of tax financed 
road investments, or Norway’s numerous urban packages or mainland connections. 
Table 1: Danish, Swedish and Norwegian tax financed road investments per capita 
1950-2000 (1990 PPP USD). 
 Denmark Sweden Norway 
1950 22 28 14 
1960 44 97 45 
1970 116 135 106 
1980 98 95 120 
1990 32 73 82 
2000 66 58 73 
Sources: 33 
                                                 
30 Cf. Bergh (2004a:220-225, 243-285; 2004b); Rinde (2004:238-281; 2005:280 ff., 438-439). 
31 For a more detailed discussion about the Norwegian narrow gauge railroads see for instance Bergh 
(2004a:165-285; 2004b); see also Bjørnland (1989:117-147) concerning these railroads’ lack of 
competitiveness. 
32 Boge (2004). 
33 This table is based on investment data from Jørgensen (2001:433 Tabel V,3); Larsson (1993:242 Tabell 
6); Vägverkets årsredovisning 2000:29; Statistisk bilag til Årsrapport for 1950 fra Opplysningsrådet for 
Biltrafikken pr. 10/4-51 (Ajourført pr. 10/5-1951):6, OVA; Melding om vegvesenets virksomhet (1960); 
Vegvesenets virksomhet 1970; Vegvesenets årsberetning 1980; Statens vegvesen Årsberetning 1990; 
Nøkkeltall 2000, VDA. The number of inhabitants stems from Statistisk årbog 1951, Det Statistiske 
Departement, Copenhagen 1951:6-7 Tabel 7; Statistisk årbog 1961, Det Statistiske Departement, 
Copenhagen 1961:1 Tabel 1; Statistisk årbog 1971, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 1971:1 Tabel 1; 
Statistisk årbog 1981, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 1981:1 Tabel 1; Statistisk årbog 1991, Danmarks 
statistik, Copenhagen 1991:19 Tabel 1; Statistisk årbog 2000, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 2000:17 
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 Sweden made clearly the largest road investments per capita in 1950, 1960 
and 1970 according to Table 1. Denmark made the second largest road investments 
per capita in 1950 and 1970, and made almost equal investments per capita as 
Norway in 1960. Norway made the largest tax financed road investments per capita 
in 1980, 1990 and 2000 when Norway had become a wealthy oil producer. The 
Norwegian road investments were thus significantly delayed compared to those in 
Denmark and Sweden. The Norwegian road investments per capita were particularly 
small in the early 1950s. 
 Denmark invested heavily in the road infrastructure already during the 
interwar years. Most of Denmark’s highways and local roads were completed 
already prior to World War Two, and were paved with asphalt within 1960. Sweden 
invested similarly heavily in the 1960s to catch up its lag concerning modern trunk 
roads, motorways, highways and economically significant local roads. The 
Norwegian road investments per capita after 1980 was above those in Denmark and 
Sweden, but minuscule compared to Norway’s financial leverage and the trunk road 
system’s actual need for modernizing with regard to capacity, road safety and 
environmental standards. 
 Figure 3 provides an overview of construction of motorways in Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway between 1958 and 2005, and indicates clearly that Norway 
lagged behind Denmark and Sweden. However, Norway’s lag with regard to modern 
trunk roads and motorways may not be a coincidence, because only 131 kilometers 
or 3,26 percent of the 4.021 kilometers Norwegian railroad in 1999 had double 
tracks, the rest was single tracks.34 44 percent of the Danish and 17 percent of the 
Swedish railroad systems had double or more than double tracks in 2001.35 
Norway’s only modern high-speed railroad is the 66 kilometers long 
Gardermobanen completed in 1999 between Etterstad north of Oslo’s Central 
Station and the new airport at Gardermoen.36 Sweden had 330 kilometers modern 
high-speed railroads under construction in 2002, and an operational high-speed 
railroad between Stockholm’s Central Station and the airport at Arlanda. The 15 EU 
member countries had 2.853 kilometers operational high-speed railroads in 2002. 
High-speed railroads are according to EU defined as railroads specially built or 
upgraded for at least 250 kilometers per hour.37 Construction of modern land based 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
Tabel 1; Folkmängd efter region och tid [Online April 14th 2005] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp20054141005228BE0101E1.xls; Statistisk årbok 1993, 
Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger, 1993:38 Tabell 15; Statistisk årbok 2000, Statistisk 
sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger, 2000:69 Tabell 59.  
34 Statistisk årbok 2000, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger, 2000:417 Tabell 535. 
35 European Union Energy & Transport in Figures 2003, European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport, in co-operation with Eurostat, Brussels:Table 3.2.1.  
36 Historikk [Online January 20th 2006] – URL: 
http://www.flytoget.no/Templates/Informasjon.aspx?id=130. See for instance Boge (2000) about the 
political process leading to construction of the new airport at Gardermoen, and how Gardermobanen was 
used politically to facilitate construction of the new airport. 
37 European Union Energy & Transport in Figures 2003, European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport, in co-operation with Eurostat, Brussels:Table 3.2.2, Table 3.2.4. 
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transport and communication infrastructures have obviously not been Norwegian 
executives and legislators’ priority number one after World War Two or after 
Norway became a wealthy oil producer. 
Figure 3: Motorways in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, 1958-2005. 
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 The Danish and Swedish authorities’ construction of motorways have been 
comparable to that in most other EEC/EC/EU countries. The first 6 EEC member 
countries had 3.239 kilometers of motorways in 1958. The 15 EU member countries 
in 2002 had 53.267 kilometers of motorways.39 The Danish and Swedish motorway 
investments were somewhat reduced between 1973 and 1986 because of recession 
and State economic problems caused by the first oil price shock, OPEC 1, 1973-74, 
and the entailing stagflation, and the second oil price shock, OPEC 2, 1979-80, and 
the entailing deflationary policies. But the Danish and Swedish authorities 
prioritized investments in the trunk road and motorway systems from the second half 
of the 1980s, to safeguard the trade and industry’s future competitiveness and 
opportunities. The Norwegian authorities cancelled in practice further construction 
of motorways in 1973. The Norwegian tax financed road investments have so far not 
                                                 
38 50 years of figures on Europe. Data 1952-2001. 2003 edition. Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, 2003:113; Bil- og veistatistikk 1975. Opplysningsrådet for 
Biltrafikken, Oslo May 1975:146, OVA;”Nordic Statistics 1999”, CD-ROM enclosed Nordic Statistical 
Yearbook 1999. Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen 1999:Table trsp04 (* = 1980, ** = 1985); 
Årsmelding 1995 Statens vegvesen Vegdirektoratet. Vegdirektoratet, Oslo 1996, VDA: Årsmelding 
2001:Tabell 6 Motorveglengder [Online June 28th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.vegvesen.no/aarsmelding/2001/index.html. 
39 50 years of figures on Europe. Data 1952-2001. 2003 edition. Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg, 2003:113; Europe in Figures. Eurostat yearbook 2005, 2005 
edition. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2005:246.  
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regained the 1978 level, and the accumulated needs for catch-up both concerning 
trunk road and motorway investments and maintenance of the public road system is 
substantial, even if Norway became one of Europe’s wealthiest countries from the 
1980s because of the fast growing oil and gas revenues. Very few of these are 
invested in modern land based transport and communication transport infrastructures 
to safeguard Norwegian trade and industry’s future opportunities. 
 Table 2 provides an overview of the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian public 
road systems approximately 2005. The public road systems are here divided into 
trunk roads, hereunder motorways, highways and local roads. The table provides 
both an overview of the road systems and the different categories’ length measured 
in kilometers, and the different categories’ relative share of the respective public 
road systems. 
Table 2: The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian public road systems’ structure 
approximately 2005 (km / % of total public road system). 
 Denmark (km / %) Sweden (km / %) Norway (km / %) 
Public roads  72.247 / 100% 138.288 / 100% 91.919 / 100% 
Trunk roads  1.619 / 2,2% 4.893 / 3,5% 8.600 / 9,4% 
Hereunder motorways  990 / 1,4% 1.661 / 1,2% 213 / 0,2% 
Highways  9.702 / 13,4% 10.461 / 7,6% 18.532 / 20,2% 40 
Local roads  60.894 / 84,3% 122.934 / 88,9% 64.787 / 70,5% 
Sources: 41 
 Sweden has Scandinavia’s largest and Denmark the smallest public road 
system according to Table 2. This reflects partly the three countries’ areas, but only 
partly, because Denmark has only about 1/7th of Norway’s area, and only about 1/9th 
of Sweden’s area.42 Norway has most kilometers trunk roads, and the Norwegian 
share of trunk roads is far above that in Denmark and Sweden. This reflects largely 
Norway’s dispersed settlement and the fact that Norway is a long and narrow 
country. However, Norway differs fundamentally from Denmark and Sweden 
concerning motorways, because Norway has only about 1/7th of motorways 
compared to Denmark and 1/6th of motorways compared to Sweden, given the 
public road systems’ total length, even if none of the countries have more need for 
modern trunk roads and motorways than Norway, because of the time and distance 
handicaps. Norway has most highways, given the total road system’s length, even if 
trunk roads are accounted for separately in Table 2. Sweden has the smallest relative 
                                                 
40 Exclusive trunk roads, because trunk roads are defined as a subset of highways. 
41 Vejlengder fordelt på vejbestyrelser [Online May 11th 2005] – URL: 
http://webapp.vd.dk/interstat/isPrint.asp?PAGE_ID=757&THEME_ID=1&subjectFilter1=&viewID1=&d
isplayAs1=Table; Statistiska centralbyrån, Statistisk årsbok för Sverige 2004, Stockholm 2003:212 Tabell 
227 [Online May 11th ] – URL: 
http://www.scb.se/statistik/AA/OV0904/2004A01/OV0904_2004A01_BR_SV_A01SA0401.pdf 
(municipal roads); Information om "Vägkategori" på det statliga vägnätet. Aktuellt per 050331 [Online 
May 11th 2005] – URL: http://www20.vv.se/vdb/webb-sidor/vagkategori.htm; 41 Nøkkeltall. Årsmelding 
for 2003:15 [Online May 11th 2005] – URL: 
http://www.vegvesen.no/SVVvedlegg/Nokkeltallbrosjyre2003,0.pdf; Statens vegvesen, Forslag til 
handlingsprogram for investeringer på stamvegnettet 2006-2015, Februry 2005:5 [Online May 11th 2005] 
– URL: http://www.vegvesen.no/hprog/hp_stamv/1-16.pdf. 
42 See the Data Appendix’s Table 2.1-2.4, 3.1-3.4 and 4.1-4.4 for an overview of the three countries’ 
settlement structure and area. 
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share of highways. Sweden has largest share of local roads, Norway the smallest, 
even if most public roads are local collective or even private goods. The road 
system’s different structure and organizing reflect clearly different settlement, trade 
and industry structures, but reflect also different political priorities or national policy 
styles. 
 It is clearly evident from Figure 2 and 3 and Table 1 and 2 that Norwegian 
executives and legislators have reasoned and prioritized fundamentally different 
compared to Danish and Swedish executives and legislators, and even to the 
executives and legislators in most other EU member countries concerning modern 
trunk roads and motorways. First, Norwegian road investments after World War 
Two were delayed at least 10 to 15 years compared to most other West European 
countries. Second, most Norwegian road investments until about 1985 were 
allocated to secondary highways in peripheral and rural areas, not to trunk roads 
between the regions and within and near the major urban areas where most cars were 
located. Finally, construction of modern trunk roads and motorways came first on 
the Norwegian road policy agenda in the 1990s, almost 30 to 60 years later than in 
most other Western industrialized countries, after a brief attempt of building a 
modern road system between 1960 and 1965. How to explain these puzzles? 
 The Norwegian Directorate of Public Roads (Vegdirektoratet), which is 
responsible for management of trunk roads and highways, estimated in January 2003 
the need for future trunk road investments to about 200 billions NOK, 
approximately 15,62 billions 1990 PPP USD. These investments were necessary to 
remedy the existing trunk roads’ lack of compliance with the approved Road Design 
Manuals’ (Vegnormaler) requirements for road capacity and environmental and 
safety standards.43 Norwegian taxpayers and motorists have to prepare themselves 
mentally for significant future disbursements. Denmark, Sweden and most other 
Western industrialized countries had more or less completed their investments in the 
road infrastructures in 2003. Norway’s lack of functional trunk roads may be one of 
the factors explaining the accelerating deindustrialization after the neo-liberal shift. 
Some common sense or popular explanations about road policy 
and road construction 
Some of the most widely circulated common sense, popular explanations or 
conventional wisdoms about the particular Norwegian postwar road policy and road 
construction are wealth level and economic leverage, geography, terrain conditions, 
settlement structure, high construction costs, lack of a national automotive industry 
and social democratic rule. However, few of these explanations stands the test of 
closer scrutiny, even if some of them are discussed further later in the study. 
The first popular explanation – wealth level and economic leverage 
The governing Labor Party did not emphasize road construction or motoring from 
1945 until the early 1960s, but prioritized instead forced industrialization through 
politically governed investments in the export enclaves’ smokestack industries, to 
                                                 
43 Henriette Erken Busterud, “Sneglefart for stamvegutbedring”, Vegen og vi, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2003:9. 
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utilize the cheap hydro electric power.44 This policy delayed the mass motoring’s 
reemergence at least 15 years compared to Denmark and Sweden. One of the most 
common explanations of why this is the case, is Norway’s alleged poverty, because 
Norway had to be rebuilt after the German occupation between 1940 and 1945. 
Denmark was de facto occupied, but the Danish government collaborated with the 
Germans. Danish agriculture, trade and industry made plenty of business during 
World War Two. Sweden was similarly neutral. Even Swedish trade and industry 
made plenty of business during World War Two. Denmark and Sweden’s need for 
postwar reconstruction was therefore limited. 
 However, the Norwegian reconstruction was completed already in 1948/49. 
The 1939 GDP level were passed in 1946.45 The GDP per capita passed the 1938 
level in 1946 and the industry as such reached its 1939 production level in 1947.46 
But the road construction was minuscule until the late 1950s and early 60s, because 
the car rationing was first abolished October 1st 1960. The economic historian Angus 
Maddison’s calculations shows that Norway, Denmark and Sweden were among 
Europe’s rich countries in 1950, measured as GDP per capita, which is the most 
correct measure of a country’s wealth level, because it’s not obfuscated by the 
population’s size or growth. Norway’s 1950 GDP per capita measured in 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars, was 5.463 dollars, Denmark’s 6.743 and 
Sweden’s 6.739 dollars. The average GDP per capita in 1950 for the 12 West 
European countries was 5.018 dollars.47 Norway’s GDP per capita was well above 
the West-European average in 1950. Norway was definitely not one of Europe’s 
poor cousins, despite the popular belief. 
 The economist Simon Kuznets distinguished between “modern economic 
growth” and growth through learning through trial and error. The modern economic 
growth’s distinguishing features are “the combination of high rates of increase in 
population with high rates of increase in per capita product – with the obvious 
implication of enormous increases in total product.”48 Modern economic growth 
began in Great Britain in the early 18th century, in USA during the late eighteenth 
century and in France after the Napoleonic period, according to the economic 
historian Robert William Fogel. It diffused further to Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Holland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland within the mid 19th 
century, and reached Argentina, Russia and Japan at the turn of the 19th and 20th 
century. Italy and the remaining other West European countries did not experience 
modern economic growth until the first part of the 20th century.49 But Argentina and 
Russia demonstrate clearly that early modern economic growth is no guarantee for 
future wealth and prosperity.  
                                                 
44 See for instance Mjøset (1986:113 ff.); Knutsen (1995). 
45 Historisk statistikk 1994, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger 1995:532 Tabell 22.1; Angus 
Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003:51 Table 1b. 
46 Bergh (1981:59); Grønlie (1981:108-108). 
47 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003:62-65 Table 1c. 
48 Kuznets (1966:15, 63). See also Kuznets (1966:64-65 Table 2.5, 490-502) for further discussions about 
the concept modern economic growth. 
49 Fogel (2004:50): See also Kuznets (1966:64-65 Table 2.5, 106-107 Table 3.2, 139 Table 3.7, 147-148 
Table 3.8, 208-211 Table 4.5, 236-239 Table 5.3, 248-250 Table 5.5, 252-256 Table 5.6, 306-309 Table 
6.3, 312-314 Table 6.4, 352-353 Table 6.6, 360-363 Table 7.1, 396-397 Table 7.5) and Rostow 
(1990:xviii Chart 1, 4-12, 17-18) even if Rostow’s stage model’s foundations, explaining economic 
growth, is clearly ideologically biased. 
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 The economic historian Sverre Knutsen claims Norway’s alleged poverty in 
1950 is a staunch myth, brought forward by those who defended the particular 
Norwegian postwar economic policy. Norway was namely one of those 15-16 
countries in the world that experienced modern economic growth prior to the 
outbreak of World War One. Most of these countries are still among the wealthiest 
in the world.50 So, yes, it is true that Norway’s GDP per capita in 1950 was below 
those in Denmark and Sweden, but these were small differences among three 
wealthy countries. These small differences in GDP per capita cannot explain the 
different road policies and road systems in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, despite 
the popular belief that Norway was significantly poorer than Sweden and Denmark 
in the 1950s. Norway’s GDP per capita passed Sweden’s in 1980 and Denmark’s in 
1990, because of the oil and gas revenues. Norway was West-Europe’s wealthiest 
country measured as GDP per capita in 2000, according to Angus Maddison’s 
calculations. The US outside the country intelligence service CIA described in 
February 2005 Norway as a ”prosperous bastion of welfare capitalism” and “[o]nly 
Saudi Arabia and Russia export more oil than Norway”.51 Lack of financial leverage 
can hence not explain the particular Norwegian road policy and road construction, at 
least not after the 1980s, or why Norway did not catch-up Denmark and Sweden 
with regard to construction of motorways in the most crowded areas.  
 Finland is one example that a country’s wealth level or economic leverage is 
not sufficient to explain the road policy and road construction, because Finland had 
549 kilometers motorways in 2000.52 Finland was one of West Europe’s poorest 
countries until the 1980s, measured as GDP per capita.53 Finnish road construction 
in the 1950s was first and foremost relief works, and part of the postwar 
reconstruction. But Finnish executives and legislators emphasized development of a 
national motorway system from the 1960s, among others financed through three 
loans from the World Bank in 1964, 1967 and 1971. Finland more than doubled its 
kilometers of motorways from the 1980s when Finland caught up economically.54 
Finnish executives and legislators pursued hence a textbook road policy. First relief 
works during the reconstruction, thereafter construction of motorways to further the 
trade and industry’s competitiveness and increase Finland’s economic leverage, and 
finally completion of the motorway system because of Finland’s increased economic 
leverage, which in turn facilitated further economic growth after Finland in 1995 
joined EU. The Finnish road policy was clearly in line with endogenous growth 
theory, public investments in the social overhead capital that provided spillovers to 
private sector enterprises. 
 Other examples of West European countries which have performed less well 
economically than Norway during the postwar period, measured as GDP per capita, 
but have built modern motorways and trunk roads are among others Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. More recent examples are Lithuania, which in 2000 had 
417 kilometers of motorways. Slovakia had 296 kilometers of motorways, and 
                                                 
50 Sverre Knutsen, “Hvorfor ble Norge rikt?”, Aftenposten, morning edition, June 28th 2004. 
51 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2004, revised February 10th 2005: Norway, Economy 
- overview [Online April 4th 2005] – URL: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/no.html. 
52 European Union Energy & Transport in Figures 2003, European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport, in co-operation with Eurostat, Brussels: Table 3.2.7. 
53 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003:63-65 Table 1c. 
54 Antila and Nenonen (2000:58-61, 64-66). 
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Slovenia had similarly 435 kilometers in 2000.55 These three small, East European 
former communist countries have all prioritized investments in national collective 
goods such as trunk roads and motorways, after the end of the cold war, despite their 
economic backwardness compared to the Scandinavian and other Western European 
countries. Lithuania’s GDP per capita in 2000 was about the same as Norway’s in 
1955/56.56  
 Wealth level or economic leverage alone cannot explain road policy and 
development of the road infrastructure, particularly not construction of motorways 
and other trunk roads, which are of great importance for future economic 
development. But lack of resources and need for development may explain why 
other countries have emphasized construction of modern trunk roads and 
motorways. The Norwegian economy was fairly comparable to most other West 
European countries’ until the early 1980s, except for the dominant export enclaves 
engaged in production of commodities and bulk products for the international 
markets. But Norway’s economy transformed gradually to an oil economy from the 
late 1970s. The Norwegian executives and legislators did not emphasize 
construction of modern trunk roads and motorways to facilitate further development 
of alternative trade and industries neither during the export enclave’s heydays 
between 1950 and 1977 nor after the transition to an oil economy after the neo-
liberal shift. But abundance of resources, particularly from the 1990s, may explain 
why Norwegian executives and legislators have not prioritized investments in 
modern trunk roads and motorways. The oil and gas export revenues have made it 
possible for the Norwegian executives and legislators to offer the voters generous 
private social welfare goods, cash transfers and redistribution instead of common 
investments in social overhead capital and collective goods that would have 
improved Norway Inc.’s long-term competitiveness. It is tempting to compare 
Norway’s oil revenues with Spain’s silver from the Latin-American colonies, 
because the oil and gas revenues seem to have crowded out investments in social 
overhead capital and collective goods, such as roads, from the 1980s. However, the 
oil and gas revenues can hardly explain the lack of road investments prior to the 
1980s, and particularly not the road investments’ actual allocation. 
Geography, terrain conditions and settlement – the second popular explanation  
Another popular explanation of the particular Norwegian postwar road policy and 
road system is geography, terrain conditions and settlement structure, because 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway differ concerning these variables. Denmark consists 
of a peninsula on top of the European mainland, Jutland, and a number of islands 
located between Jutland and Sweden. Sweden and Norway make up the 
Scandinavian Peninsula located northwest and northeast of Denmark, separated from 
Denmark by Øresund, Kattegat and Skagerak’s seas. Denmark has the smallest area, 
approximately 43.000 square kilometers, and the second largest population, about 
5,3 millions in 1997. Sweden has the largest area, approximately 450.000 square 
kilometers, and the largest population, about 8,8 millions in 1997. Norway’s area is 
                                                 
55 European Union Energy & Transport in Figures 2003, European Commission Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport, in co-operation with Eurostat, Brussels: Table 3.2.7. 
56 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003: 65 Table 1c, 105 
Table 3c, 110-111 Table 3c. 
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second largest, approximately 324.000 square kilometers, and the smallest 
population, about 4,4 millions in 1997. Denmark is most densely populated, with an 
average of 123 inhabitants per square kilometer, while Sweden and Norway are 
most sparsely populated, with respectively 15 and 14 inhabitants per square 
kilometer.57  
 The terrain conditions in Denmark, Sweden and Norway differ. Denmark is 
level, with small hills, but with many islands, fjords and streams, and hardly any 
rocks. The Swedish terrain is somewhere between the Norwegian and Danish 
extremes, with large level areas, particularly in the south, many forested areas, and 
several major lakes. But there are also mountainous and forested areas and major 
rivers, particularly in the sparsely populated northeastern Sweden. Norway has 
numerous mountains, particularly in the inland, large forested areas, many deep 
fjords, particularly in west and north, and a large number of inhabited islands 
scattered along the western and northern coast.  
 But terrain conditions per se are not a critical difference concerning road 
policy or road construction. First, the majority of Danes and Swedes live in areas 
where road construction is relatively straightforward. But the same is partly true in 
Norway, particularly in the densely populated Oslofjord-area in Norway’s 
southeastern corner, near Kristiansand and Stavanger along the southern and 
southwestern coastline, and in Trøndelag.58 Second, European countries with similar 
or even worse terrain conditions than Norway, such as Switzerland, Italy, Austria 
and Spain, have all well-developed trunk road and motorway systems. Switzerland 
had 1.669 kilometers, Italy had 6.621 kilometers, and Austria 1.633 kilometers, and 
Spain had 9.049 kilometers of motorways in 2000.59 Third, if terrain conditions were 
a critical difference concerning road policy or road construction, then it would be 
reasonable to assume the road construction would have been concentrated to densely 
populated areas with easy terrain conditions. But that has definitely not been the 
case in Norway, but has largely been the case in Denmark and Sweden. Finally, 
engineers have developed numerous technical fixes to overcome difficult terrain 
conditions, such as bridges, tunnels, sub sea road tunnels or ferries. 
                                                 
57 Statistisk årbok 2000. Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger, 2000:512. 
58 See the Data Appendix’ Table 2.1-2.4, 3.1-3.4 and 4.1-4.4. 
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Figure 4: Some of the Nordic countries’ settlement. 
 
Source: Statens kartverk and Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
 The Danish population live scattered all across the country, even if most 
Danes live within and near the major cities Copenhagen in east on Sjælland, Odense 
in south on Fyn, Århus at mid Jutland’s eastern coast and Aalborg north on Jutland. 
Most Swedes live south of Uppsala within a kidney shaped belt across Sweden 
delimited by Stockholm and Uppsala in northeast, Gothenburg in west and Malmø 
in southwest. Most of Norway is inhabited, similarly as Denmark, except for the 
most mountainous inland areas in Southern and Northern Norway. About 50 percent 
of the Norwegians live in the southeastern Oslofjord area up to Lake Mjøsa’s 
northern part, which includes the capital Oslo. Most other Norwegians live along the 
coastline from the Oslofjord up to Trøndelag in Norway’s lower middle, which 
includes the other three major cities Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger. Only 10,5 
percent of the Norwegians lived north of Trøndelag in 2000, but the three 
northernmost counties contain about 35 percent of Norway’s area.60 The terrain 
conditions where most Norwegians lives are relatively level, particularly in the 
Oslofjord, Stavanger and Trøndelag areas. But some of the middle and peripheral 
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areas have very difficult terrain conditions, particularly in the western and northern 
regions. 
 But the population’s settlement is not a critical difference concerning road 
policy, because roads are needed for domestic transports of passengers and goods, 
no matter the physical localization of the country or the population’s settlement, 
unless there are well-developed alternative means of transport, such as for instance 
ships. But concentrated settlement reduces the need for roads, particularly the 
number of road links and kilometers of roads, and vice versa. Settlement is thus not 
a critical difference for the road policy, even if the settlement structure largely 
explains the road systems’ physical structure and layout.  
 Sea transport is an important alternative to roads in Norway, particularly for 
the coastal areas’ traditional smokestack exports industries producing commodities 
or other bulk products, because the railroads serve only a fraction of the country and 
is also partly obsolete. Sea transport is also an alternative to road transport in 
Denmark and Sweden’s coastal areas, but Sweden and partly even Denmark have 
relatively modern and well-developed railroad systems compared to Norway. Air 
transport covers similarly some of the passenger transport, particularly the long-
distance transports between Norway’s northern and southern regions, but cannot 
compete with cars and buses on short and medium distances where most travels take 
place.  
Construction costs, automotive industry and social democratic rule – the 
ultimate popular explanations 
The Norwegian roads’ construction costs per meter are usually far higher than in 
Denmark, because of plenty solid rocks in Norway and hardly any rocks at all in 
Denmark. Hard frozen soil is similarly a problem in Norway, but seldom an issue in 
Denmark. The Swedish roads’ construction costs vary between those in Denmark 
and Norway, depending on where in Sweden the road construction takes place. The 
terrains usually represent more obstacles and challenges in Norway than in 
Denmark, even if there are exceptions, such as Denmark’s need for bridges. 
Denmark has two of the world’s large bridges, namely the suspension bridge across 
Great Belt’s Østrænden, and the cable stayed bridge across Øresund.  
 Norway has a large number of road tunnels, because of the mountainous 
terrain, among others world’s longest road tunnel, Lærdalstunnelen, which measures 
24.505 meters. But modern construction technology has reduced the costs for 
tunnels almost to the same level as ordinary roads in rocky terrain. Sub sea road 
tunnels are often more cost effective than bridges, because of significantly lower 
construction cost per meter. On the other hand, sub sea road tunnels are often 
significantly longer than bridges, to avoid unnecessary steep slopes. What is most 
cost efficient or technically feasible is usually determined by the terrain and sub sea 
conditions. Denmark, Sweden and Norway all have sub sea road or railroad tunnels, 
even if Norway has far more of these then Denmark and particularly Sweden. 
Norway has also a large number of bridges, because of numerous inhabited islands, 
but Norway has no bridges near the Great Belt or Øresund Connections’ order of 
magnitude.  
 Construction costs alone can hence not explain the different road policies, 
even if high construction costs are one of the popular explanations of the particular 
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Norwegian road policy and road system. Norwegian executives and legislators have 
emphasized road construction in peripheral and rural areas during most of the 
postwar period. Many of these roads have been built in difficult terrains, usually 
with tunnels, bridges and/or sub sea road tunnels, often at high costs, with few 
potential users and poor cost/benefit ratios. Norwegian executives and legislators 
delayed in addition deliberately mechanization of the road construction and 
maintenance until the 1960s and 70s. The result was far higher construction and 
maintenance costs than necessary, compared to Denmark and Sweden that 
mechanized their road construction and maintenance far earlier. Construction costs 
and cost/benefit ratios can thus not be of significant concern in Norway. If that had 
been the case, then the road construction would have been concentrated in level 
areas with little or no rocky terrain, with low construction costs per meter and many 
potential users such as in Denmark and Sweden. But this has definitely not been the 
case in Norway. 
 Denmark’s giant bridges, Switzerland, Italy, Austria or Spain’s motorways in 
mountainous areas and many of Norway’s so-called mainland connections and sub 
sea road tunnels demonstrate clearly that construction costs seldom are decisive for 
whether roads are built or not. Politicians are usually able to mobilize the necessary 
financial resources if they fancy particular projects. Construction costs alone are 
hence not sufficient to explain the different road policies or road systems in 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway, even if the construction costs are decisive for the 
road construction’s progress, given the budget constraints.  
 Some claims the Swedish automotive industry explains why Sweden has a 
functional and why Norway has a dysfunctional trunk road system, because Norway 
has never had any significant automotive industry. Neither have Norwegian 
executives and legislators emphasized construction of safe and efficient modern 
trunk roads and motorways such as Swedish executives and legislators. But how to 
explain that executives and legislators in countries like Denmark, Finland, 
Switzerland, Austria and others without major automotive industries have 
emphasized construction of safe and efficient trunk roads and motorways? Lack of a 
major national automotive industry does hence not rule out the possibility of safe 
and efficient trunk roads and motorways, and is thus not sufficient to explain the 
particular Norwegian postwar road policy or road construction.  
 Finally, some have claimed that social democracy explains the particular 
Norwegian road policy and road construction, because the social democratic Labor 
Party governed Norway most of the postwar period. But the prewar Labor Party 
executive prioritized modernizing the 19th century trunk roads 1935-40, even if the 
postwar Labor Party executives deliberately delayed mass motoring and road 
construction until 1960. However, the Danish and Swedish postwar Social 
Democratic Party executives championed construction of modern trunk roads and 
motorways when their Norwegian sister party argued against motoring and road 
construction per se. But the Danish and Swedish Social Democratic Parties seemed 
to be far more concerned with development of efficient, flexible and safe transports 
of passengers and goods than preserving particular means of transport, compared to 
the Norwegian Labor Party. Social democracy per se can hence not explain 
Norway’s particular postwar road policy and road construction. 
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Most popular explanations and conventional wisdom are weakened or refuted 
This section has weakened or refuted some of the most popular explanations or 
conventional wisdoms about the particular Norwegian postwar road policy and road 
construction. Wealth level, financial leverage, geographical localization, population, 
terrain conditions, construction costs, lack of an automotive industry or social 
democracy are not sufficient to explain why the Norwegian road policy and road 
construction have differed fundamentally from Danish and Swedish road policies 
and road construction. 
 Norway’s dispersed settlement and trade and industry structure dictates in 
practice construction of a high number of road links and a lengthy road system, 
given the all-party desire for maintenance of dispersed settlement. But Norway’s 
dispersed settlement does not explain the lack of modern trunk roads and 
motorways, rather the opposite. The puzzle is why haven’t Norwegian executives 
and legislators invested in modern, safe and efficient trunk roads and motorways 
such as in Denmark and Sweden to reduce the time and distances handicaps for 
those trade and industries dependent of road transports of passengers and goods? 
One tentative explanation may be the election systems that have given the 
inhabitants in Norway’s peripheral and rural areas strategic control of the political 
system. But this explanation sounds counterintuitive. Because why have many 
legislators representing the peripheral and rural areas pursued a road policy that in 
practice has prevented or constrained development of viable and competitive trade 
and industries dependent of road transports in their own constituencies? 
Analytical, theoretical and methodical framework 
The weakening or refutation of many common sense or popular explanations or 
conventional wisdoms about of Norway’s particular road policy and road 
construction in the previous section means that Norway’s road policy and road 
construction have to be explained otherwise, but how? This section examines first 
some former studies about Norwegian road policy and road construction. The 
second part presents the study’s analytical model, hereunder some fundamental 
concepts and assumptions about cause-effect relations. The next four parts are 
theory discussions linked with the study’s four working hypotheses, which are 
attempts of explaining the puzzles. The final part is about methodical questions and 
considerations. 
Some former studies about Norwegian road policy and road construction 
There are written numerous books about Norwegian road administration and road 
construction.61 Most of these have been initiated by the various local road 
administrations, and written by former road administrators, engineers or journalists, 
usually with a local or county perspective. The political and economic context is 
often overlooked or taken for granted. None of these books have an explicit 
comparative perspective. But this literature has been very useful as introductory 
reading and secondary sources. 
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 The economist Axel Dammann was very critical to the Norwegian executive’s 
postwar transport and communication policy already in 1955. Dammann questioned 
the “railroad cult” that reemerged after World War Two, and claimed the transport 
and communication policy was more governed by regional, military, social or other 
concerns than promoting economic growth and development.62 Bjørn Larsen, one of 
the Ministry of Finance’s economists during the 1950s and 60s, described Axel 
Dammann as a “square plug in a round hole”.63 Axel Dammann was namely a 
monetarist during the so-called Oslo School of Economics’ heydays, and largely out 
of tune with those days’ professional discourse. Dammann engaged therefore later in 
banking and finance rather than in further transport economic studies.64 However, 
Axel Dammann’s 1955 study found several indications of governance and policy 
failures within the transport and communication sector if the aim was effectiveness, 
competitiveness and economic growth. Axel Damman had first hand knowledge 
about road policy and road construction, because he was one of the first economists 
employed by the Directorate of Public Roads. 
 The transport economist and transport and communication historian Dag 
Bjørnland and others at the Institute of Transport Economics made several studies 
about the Norwegian transport and communications development during the 1970s 
and 80s.65 Dag Bjørnland claimed Norwegian transport and communication policy; 
hereunder the road policy and road construction was governed by “ideology”. 
Because ideology governed the capital accumulation, and technology and capital 
accumulation governed in turn the development of transport and communication 
infrastructures. The politicians’ concern for “geographical equalization of terms of 
life and production” had a privileged position, and lead to particular emphasis on 
investments in sparsely populated areas. This policy was founded on a “stable power 
base”, according to Bjørnland, who explained the Norwegian road policy as one 
example of regional policy. The absence of an urban policy led similarly to 
“transportation impasse” in the major cities.66 Dag Bjørnland’s findings in the 1970s 
and 80s supported largely Axel Dammann’s findings in the 1950s, even if their 
views about economy and economic policy were highly divergent, particularly 
during the 1950s and 60s. Dag Bjørnland graduated as a follower of the Oslo School 
of Economics, but revised later some of his views on transport economy and road 
investments. But Dag Bjørnland’s claims about ideology governing the road policy 
and road construction were not supported by detailed empirical studies. The 
ideology was more an exogenous given variable. 
 The technology historian Per Østby studied the mass motoring’s reemergence 
in Norway after World War Two. Østby considered cars as known technology in the 
1950s, even if the delayed reintroduction of cars after World War Two led to import 
of international conceptions and ideas about how to organize and adapt the society 
to mass motoring. Østby gave professionals and technocrats such as road engineers 
and transport economists a prominent position in his story about this import and 
translation process.67 However, Per Østby overlooked partly the institutional 
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framework that defined the rules of the game for these import and translation 
processes, such as emphasized by Dag Bjørnland and partly also by Axel Dammann. 
Per Østby claimed initially the Norwegian road and car lobby was weak and 
fragmented, but claimed later that Karl Olsen was appointed as Road Director 1962, 
because of the technocrats and scientists’ claims that “rational knowledge […] could 
replace politics”. Per Østby portrayed Karl Olsen as the executive’s savior from the 
“squeeze” between the legislators’ numerous horse trades, even if the peripheral 
areas resisted the technocrats’ “reinterpretation” through scientific models, and 
claimed also the political struggles changed arena from Stortinget to the experts’ 
settlement forecasts.68 Per Østby overlooked seemingly the fact that Norwegian 
politicians most likely utilized these experts as pieces in their resource struggle 
games in Stortinget and in the County Councils. Per Østby overlooked also the fact 
that Norwegian road engineers’ attempts of importing and implementing 
technologies facilitating mass motoring, road safety and transport economy was a 
failure compared to Denmark and Sweden where such technology was taken for 
granted already in the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s. Many Norwegian 
politicians do still not consider traffic engineering ‘house-trained’ or politically 
correct. 
 Per Østby’s study became very consequential, because it propped up the myth 
about a very powerful Norwegian road administration with an abundance of 
resources. Per Østby’s study inspired among others the historian of ideas Rune 
Slagstad, who in 1998 designated Road Director Karl Olsen and the Directorate of 
Public Road’s head of planning Arne J. Grotterød as so-called “national strategists”. 
Slagstad, with his prominent position in the academic and public discourses, claimed 
also the road administrators developed a “system with a long time horizon and 
economic generosity any other sector, except the armed forces, could envy”.69 But 
this chapter’s initial discussions as well as Axel Dammann and Dag Bjørnland’s 
earlier findings have listed plenty of reasons to question Slagstad’s claims about 
Karl Olsen and Arne J. Grotterød as national strategists and the road sector’s 
claimed generous resources. Slagstad’s claims were clearly not based on empirical 
research. 
 The sociologist Andreas Hompland and others published in 2001 a study about 
Norwegian road policy and area planning in urban areas. Chartered engineer Gustav 
Nielsen concluded the “delayed” reintroduction of mass motoring in Norway after 
World War Two gave a mismatch between urban and area planning, urban growth 
and development of transport systems compared to for instance Sweden. The 
Norwegian road policy developed during the 1960s gave also delayed urbanization 
compared to Sweden.70 It was hence clearly evident the governing Labor Party’s 
road and motoring policy during the 1950s had long-term consequences. This 
formative period that delayed the mass motoring’s reemergence in Norway is 
discussed further in detail in chapter 4. 
 The economist Victor D. Norman from Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration (Norges Handelshøyskole) in Bergen, who served as 
minister of labor and government administration 2001-04 and who tried to 
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streamline the public sector, used Norwegian road policy to illustrate several 
political paradoxes and public sector problems. Norway’s particular road policy was 
according to Norman a result of among others political populism, geographical 
distribution of political representation, the political parties’ gravitation towards the 
median and the “small issues tyranny”. Victor D. Norman mentioned also 
ministerial rule disguised as parliamentary rule, the Ministry of Finance’s obsession 
with short-term budget balance combined with perverse incentives, and the 
ministries’ many Sir Humphreys.71 However, Victor D. Norman’s list was not based 
on systematic examination of empirical evidence, but rather a list of anecdotes. 
Claims like the small issues’ tyranny are strictly speaking not an explanation, but 
rather lack of such.  
 The economic historian Sverre Knutsen and the political scientist Knut Boge 
claimed in 2005 Norwegian road policy and road construction after World War Two 
had been “piecemeal and partitioned”. Some of their findings supported Norman’s 
anecdotes, because Knutsen and Boge’s main explanations were first the Labor 
Party’s economic policy between 1945 and 1960, second, an aggressive 
“distributional coalition” in Stortinget that funneled resources from the central and 
urban to the peripheral and rural areas, and finally, the Ministry of Finance that 
considered roads as costs, not investments, and constrained the road investments.72 
The question is how is Norwegian road policy compared to Danish and Swedish 
road policy through time, and how to explain possible differences or national policy 
styles? 
Analytical model 
This study’s analytical model is not formal but a heuristic device with one 
dependent variable, three intervening variables and a number of background 
variables. The idea is that background variables determine the context for the 
political processes that take place within the intervening variables, or intermediate 
institutions, which mitigates the relations between the background variables and the 
dependent variable, the outcome of the policy processes or the road policy, the high-
level road system. Settlement, trade and industry structure, hereunder the population 
and the trade and industry’s dependence of road transports are some of the most 
important background variables. Other important background variables are GDP per 
capita, economic growth rates, the road investments’ order of magnitude, and last 
but not least the business cycles’ crises, booms and busts. The business cycles affect 
the State’s revenue and budget balance, and thereby often the road policy and road 
construction. Historical institutionalists such as Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen 
claim that study of intermediate institutions provides increased analytical leverage, 
because intermediate institutions mediate the macro structures.73 The intermediate 
institutions are thus decisive for the political economy. 
 The intervening variables or intermediate institutions are here denoted as the 
road polity. The road polity consists usually of legislature, executive and road 
administration. The legislature is here understood as the parliament or national 
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assembly, including possible committees responsible for road policy in particular 
and transport and communication policies in general. The legislature is usually a 
democratic society’s top-level institution for collective action, where two or more 
persons and/or interest groups have to cooperate to safeguard the common 
interests.74 The legislature’s election system, chamber and committee structure is of 
particular interest. Because the committee system is crucial for development of vote 
trades or so-called logrolls, due to the legislators’ different preference intensities.75 
Ellen M. Immergut’s comparative study of the Swedish, French and Swiss and 
health care systems unveiled how different decisive moments or “veto points” in the 
political processes, where different interest groups could block or alter budgets or 
legislation, gave three very different health care systems.76 The legislature and 
particularly the committees may also represent important veto points in the road 
political decision processes. Veto points lead typically to swift institutional changes 
at relatively high costs. Investments lead similarly to delayed institutional changes at 
relatively low costs. Coordination may result in institutional change processes 
somewhere in between veto points and investments, according to Paul Pierson.77 
The road polity’s institutional design and mechanisms affect hence the policy 
processes as well as the policy outcomes and consequences for the polity. 
 The legislature’s ability to amend the executive’s proposals has varied during 
time and across countries and polities, and is therefore one of the keys for 
understanding the political economy, which in turn governs the road policy and road 
construction. The legislature determines usually the supply, allocation and financing 
of collective goods such as roads. Fundamental questions concerning road financing 
are among others tax financing or turnpike financing or combinations thereof, fiscal 
fuel and vehicle taxes or fuel and vehicle taxes dedicated to a Road Fund with long-
term balance between road appropriations and the motorists’ payments of vehicle 
and fuel taxes. Discount rates, time horizon, geographical allocation, and whether 
time savings and accident costs have been included in considerations about choice 
between competing road projects are similarly of interest for understanding the road 
policy. 
 The executive consists of the cabinet with ministries. The legislature usually 
delegates some of its prerogatives to the executive in case of parliamentary rule. 
This study emphasizes particularly those ministries responsible for road policy and 
road construction. The Ministry of Finance, or its equivalent, is also of interest, 
because the Ministry of Finance monitors usually the executive’s total spending, 
budget balance and allocation of resources between different sectors and ministries. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance has in many instances been a super ministry, 
supervising and overruling the sector ministries. The organization, power and 
influence of the executive have varied significantly over time and across countries 
and polities. Important questions concerning road policy and road construction are 
among others: First, who have had strategic control of the political system? Second, 
have the road projects been initiated from above, as part of nation building, 
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modernization and efficiency improvement efforts or for facilitating development of 
a particular trade and industry structure, or from below to serve local rather than 
national needs? 
 The road administration is here defined as public administration(s) 
responsible for supervising, planning, construction, operation and maintenance of 
the public road system. The road administrations’ organizing has varied across 
countries and over time, but has usually been most related to the responsible 
ministry. However, the road administrations may also be subject to influence from 
for instance the Ministry of Finance, local and regional politicians and other external 
interest groups, such as motorists, trade and industry, finance institutions, 
construction companies, consulting companies and trade unions. Important questions 
concerning the road administration are organization and structure, hereunder 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities between the road administration and other 
government agencies or private consulting and construction companies. Another 
interesting question is the road administration’s degree of professional autonomy. 
Has the road engineers and transport economists’ professional standards, laws and 
codified Road Design Manuals governed the management of the road system, or has 
it been micro-managed by the politicians? 
 The road polity can be understood and analyzed as a chain of principal-agent 
relations. The most important principal-agent relation is between voters and 
politicians; i.e. between voters and legislature and between voters and executive. 
The second principal-agent relation is between politicians and bureaucrats, and 
determines the relations within the executive, particularly between the ministers and 
the ministries’ bureaucrats, and the relations between the ministries and the road 
administrations’ bureaucrats. There is also a third principal-agent relation in case of 
parliamentary rule, namely that between the legislature and executive. Delegation of 
authority from voters to politicians, from politicians to bureaucrats and from 
legislature to executive is rather similar to separation of ownership and control 
within private enterprises.78 Delegation from voters to politicians in a democracy 
usually takes place through candidate selection and elections. The delegation from 
politicians to bureaucrats similarly takes place through appointment of high-ranking 
civil servants and employment of lower ranking public sector employees.79 
Democracy makes it possible for the voters to elect new politicians. A basic 
assumption is that most politicians desire reelection. Another assumption is that the 
politicians’ chance for reelection is determined by a combination of political party 
and voters. The politicians first have to please their party bosses to be nominated, 
and thereafter to please their constituents to be reelected.80 The voters discipline 
thereby the politicians and safeguard their interests through reelection of established 
or election of new politicians. The politicians similarly discipline the bureaucrats 
through appointments, hiring, firing and promotions. The party bosses in turn 
discipline their subordinated politicians through nominations.  
 Most political systems are “skewed” in the sense they favor particular interest 
groups, social classes and/or geographical areas. Because political systems, and 
particularly the election systems, are usually results of historical tugs of war and 
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bargaining processes during constitutional and formative periods, and may result in 
malapportionment of particular interest groups, social classes or geographical areas 
in the legislature.81 The degree of malapportionment indicates how far the election 
system deviates from the principle one person – one vote. Malapportionment do, all 
other things equal, increase the malapportioned areas, interest groups or social 
classes’ political bargaining power, and can explain the inclination to rent seeking, 
pork barrel politics, and partly also explain the road investments’ geographical 
allocation. 
 These discussions about this study’s analytical model have indicated plenty 
opportunities for variations in the road polities and background variables during 
time and across countries. Such variations may in turn create different national 
political economies. Different political economies may in turn explain some of the 
variations in the dependent variable, the development of Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway’s high-level road systems. Because these are all results of the road policy 
and road construction governed by the political economies and the entailing national 
policy styles. 
Primary working hypothesis – roads perceived as national collective goods with 
road policy and road construction governed by legislators who pursue the 
common good  
As mentioned initially, trunk roads and partly even highways can be considered as 
national collective goods, because they facilitate flexible, safe and efficient 
transports of passengers and goods between the regions, between raw material and 
industrial areas and integrate also domestic and foreign markets. A well-developed 
high-level road system is of utmost importance for a society’s economic growth and 
development, according to endogenous growth theory, and benefits most inhabitants, 
even if many trunk roads and even highways may acquire private goods 
characteristics during the peak hours, particularly in densely populated areas. There 
are reasons to assume broad legislature majorities approve national collective goods, 
because national collective goods benefit most voters, no matter their constituencies. 
A logical implication of roads perceived as national collective goods is allocation of 
roads investments in projects that either contributes most to economic growth, 
and/or reduces the transaction costs, environmental problems or accident risk, no 
matter these investments’ geographical location. 
 However, there are reasons to question whether the executive and legislators 
actually consider trunk roads and partly highways as national collective goods. So-
called pork barrel politics can be understood as national collective goods’ 
diametrical opposite, because the benefits from pork barrel projects are concentrated 
to a defined geographical area, while the costs are distributed among all taxpayers.82 
Rational political actors will usually try to minimize the tax price for collective 
goods, with marginal utility equal to the marginal costs. A constituency that pays 
less than 1/N of the total tax revenues faces low marginal tax costs for tax financed 
goods, and demand more goods, while a constituency that pays more than 1/N of the 
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total tax revenues usually demand less goods because of high marginal tax costs.83 
The constituencies’ tax price may hence explain the demand even for national 
collective goods. Constituencies with low tax price will usually demand more 
collective goods than constituencies with high tax price, all other things equal. The 
result is often common pool problems, even for national collective goods, 
particularly in those instances where the political system’s incentive structure 
rewards parochialism and punishes national concerns.  
 But some empirical studies indicate that legislators actually take national 
concerns and common good into consideration, even within typical pork barrel 
policy areas despite the common pool problems. John A. Hird’s empirical study of 
133 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ pork barrel projects in the U.S. Congress found 
that legislators took “public interest” into consideration through concerns for equity 
and efficiency, because cost/benefit ratios were important for rank ordering and 
choice of projects.84 The cost/benefit calculus weeded out the most inefficient 
projects. Hird’s findings indicate clearly that legislators may consider some projects 
as national collective goods. David Soherr-Hadwiger established similarly, based on 
R. Douglas Arnold’s idea about some projects’ “general benefits”; a continuum from 
distributive projects with few general benefits to projects with many general benefits 
and few distributive benefits.85 Soherr-Hadwiger’s study of U.S. domestic military 
construction programs found programs with projects that gave many constituencies 
nothing, but they still received universal support because of their general benefits.86 
The notion about general benefits may explain Soherr-Hadwiger’s findings that 
legislators vote against inefficient political pork barrel deals in their own 
constituencies and support political pork barrel deals in other constituencies.87 Even 
Soherr-Hadwiger’s findings indicate that legislators may take general benefits or 
common goods into consideration. Roads perceived as national collective goods can 
thus not be ruled out. 
 This brings us to the primary working hypothesis, namely roads perceived as 
national collective goods with road policy and road construction governed by 
legislators who pursue the common good, independent of their constituencies, 
political parties and political cleavages. This hypothesis makes it possible to derive 
four empirically testable implications: 
 
1. Modern trunk roads all across the country, even in areas where these 
investments are most costly and most needed because of congestion, 
accidents and environmental problems, to safeguard efficient, flexible, safe 
and environmental friendly transport of passengers and goods. 
2. There may be discussions about budget constraints and financing, but 
legislators who take general benefits, public interests, common good and 
requirements for equity and effectiveness into consideration exclude road 
projects with unreasonable cost/benefit ratios, unless there are other 
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significant reasons such as national security, industrial development or 
social justice. 
3. The legislators perceive road policy and road construction in variable sum 
terms. 
4. Stable and reasonably predictable road policy and road construction 
governed by cost/benefit ratios or other professional standards 
independently of the legislature’s political balance and/or the government’s 
political affiliation. 
 
 The empirical evidence presented in this chapter’s first sections indicate 
clearly the notion of trunk roads as national collective goods have been more 
prevalent in Denmark and Sweden than in Norway. An interesting puzzle, given 
David Soherr-Hadwiger’s findings about general benefits, is why seems the norm 
about general benefits to be stronger in Denmark and Sweden than in Norway?88 
Given similar human nature in different countries, how to explain these differences? 
Are there critical institutional differences within the road polities? This question is 
discussed further in chapter 5. 
Second working hypothesis – roads perceived as local collective or private 
goods with road policy and road construction governed by the constituencies’ 
resource struggles 
Most roads are local collective or private goods rather than national collective 
goods, because of geographically concentrated benefits and costs that can be 
collectivized. Such concentrated benefits make roads excellent bargaining chips in 
the legislatures. Such bargains are usually a result of pork barrel deals established 
through vote trades or logrolls, which in turn often are governed by geographical 
cleavages between the center and periphery and/or the urban-rural cleavages, which 
Stein Rokkan denoted the territorial dimension.89 The territorial dimension was 
particularly prevalent prior to establishment of formal political parties in the 19th 
century, but may still govern the legislatures’ resource allocation in case of weak 
political parties, poor party discipline or in matters of major significance for 
particular geographical areas or constituencies. 
 Mancur Olson claims individual politicians; political parties or other interest 
groups may establish so-called distributional coalitions. A distributional coalition is 
a kind of collusion or cartels to increase their own or their constituencies’ share of a 
society’s goods.90 Distributional coalitions may be organized according to political, 
industrial, professional, social or geographical principles, or combinations thereof. 
Distributional coalitions may be found in the elected political system as well in the 
corporative negotiation system. Distributional coalitions can be very stable and 
durable. Collective goods such as roads can be understood as positive inducement 
for the distributional coalitions’ members.91 Distributional coalitions can be found 
both in a legislature’s plenary as well in the committees. The legislatures may thus 
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contain virtual or meta parties in addition to or instead of the formal political parties 
that govern the vote trades, for instance if roads are perceived as local collective or 
private goods and used as pork barrel projects. This is often the case if the 
legislatures have weak or non-existent political parties. 
 The legislators’ vote trades may lead to establishment of what William H. 
Riker denoted minimum winning coalitions (MWCs), which can be understood as 
efforts to maximize the spoils or pay-off from coalitions or vote trades pursuing 
pork barrel projects.92 MWCs provide usually largest pay-offs to the initiators, 
because majority rules concentrate the benefits and collectivize the costs.93 Those 
constituencies not part of the MWCs receive nothing of the goods but have to share 
the costs.94 The paradox with vote trading and MWCs is that everybody included the 
vote traders are worse off in the long run.95 Riker’s theory about MWCs is grounded 
in empirical and game theoretical evidence. The ideal MWC is half plus one if the 
decision rule is majority, and similarly the supermajority plus one in casa of 
requirements for supermajorities. MWCs are the extreme version of legislature 
distributional coalitions, based on a majoritarian logic where the winners take all. 
 The MWCs’ majoritarian winner-takes-all logic brings us to the other extreme 
in case of weak or non-existent political parties in the legislatures, namely so-called 
universalism or political pork barrel. Universalism is broad political compromises 
or oversize majority coalitions supporting publicly financed collective goods such as 
roads, harbors, dams and bridges to many constituencies. Universalism or political 
pork barrel is well known from the U.S. Congress and many other legislatures.96 
However, universalism or political pork barrel must not be confused with roads or 
other goods perceived as national collective goods, because universalism or political 
pork barrel deals may rule out one or more constituencies from the deals. 
Universalism guarantees neither fair distribution nor distribution according to the 
need for those goods in question, such as in those instances where roads are 
perceived as national collective goods. 
 But why should legislators engage in universalism or political pork barrel 
rather than MWCs such as postulated by Riker, if universalism reduces the 
initiators’ benefits or pay-off?97 Barry R. Weingast formal model published in 1979 
postulated that risk aversive legislators seeking reelection and desiring particular 
goods for their constituencies prefer universal coalitions to MWCs, because 
universalism reduce the legislators’ transaction costs and uncertainty. The legislators 
are in the long run often better off with safe universalism instead of uncertain 
MWCs, because they can’t be sure about being part of the MWCs. Whether 
universalism or MWCs prevail is determined by the legislature’s institutional 
arrangements and procedural rules, according to Weingast.98 Universalism can thus 
be understood as risk aversive legislators’ countermeasure against risky MWCs. 
 William H. Riker’s postulates about MWCs and Barry R. Weingast’s 
postulates about universalism were supplemented by David P. Baron and John A. 
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Ferejohn’s game theoretical studies bargaining processes in legislatures. Baron and 
Ferejohn argued that a legislature deciding according to closed rules, which not 
permitted amendments of the proposals on the floor, encouraged establishment of 
MWCs, because MWCs concentrate the benefits to the coalition members. Baron 
and Ferejohn argued similarly that legislatures deciding according to open rules 
encourage universalism. They claimed also that impatient legislators pave the way 
for universalism, while patience pave the way for MWCs, because patience 
facilitates strategic considerations. However, weak political parties or other 
coordinating bodies for the legislators’ actions encourage impatience and thereby 
universalism, the same does linking of issues.99 Open rules, impatient legislators 
and/or weak coordinating bodies in the legislatures encourage hence universalism, 
according to David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn.  
 Even Clifford J. Carruba and Craig Volden’s game theoretical studies 
challenged William H. Riker and Barry R. Weingast’s predictions about MWCs and 
universalism. Carruba and Volden postulated establishment of so-called minimum 
necessary coalitions (MNCs), which are oversized compared to MWCs, because that 
makes it easier to sustain the cooperation, but smaller than universalism, because 
that reduces the coalition costs.100 Even Carruba and Volden’s game theoretical 
reasoning indicated hence drift towards universalism rather than MWCs, with 
MNCs as a very likely outcome. 
 To summarize the discussion about coalition building: Universalism seems to 
be more likely than MWCs in the legislatures, particularly in case of weak or non-
existent political parties or otherwise weak coordinating bodies or mechanisms. 
Melissa P. Collie’s empirical study of the U.S. House of Representatives 1921-80 
revealed a pattern where universalism or political pork barrel deals could be a result 
of unstable political coalitions. Collie claimed that universalism or political pork 
barrel flourished when there were no stable MWCs, such as in periods with reduced 
political polarization or few interparty conflicts.101 Collie’s findings supported 
Weingast’s initial universalism hypothesis. But Collie’s findings supported also 
partly Baron and Ferejohn’s postulates about universalism in case of weak 
coordinating bodies, because political polarization and interparty conflicts serve as 
coordination mechanisms for the legislators’ voting. 
 Henry Valen, Hanne Marthe Narud and Olafur Hardarson’s study of 
geography and political representation in Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 
inspired by Stein Rokkan’s research, inspired even this study’s division of Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway into center, middle and periphery.102 Valen et al. assumed the 
territorial issues were most prominent in the peripheral areas, and expected similarly 
the territorial dimension to be more prominent in young nation states such as 
Norway and Finland, than in old nation states such as Denmark and Sweden.103  
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Table 3: Territorial partition of Denmark, Sweden and Norway in center, middle 
and periphery. 
Country/Partition Center Middle Periphery 
Denmark Greater Copenhagen. The islands, except Greater 
Copenhagen. 
Jutland  
Sweden Svealand, except 
Värmland and Dalarna 
Counties. 
Götaland, except Kalmar, Gotland 
and Blekinge, plus Dalarna 
County in Svealand. 
Norrland, plus Värmland Gotland, 
Kalmar and Blekinge Counties. 
Norway The Oslofjord counties. Those counties not included the 
center or periphery. 
Nord-Trøndelag, Nordland, Troms, 
Finnmark, Hedmark, Oppland and 
Sogn and Fjordane Counties. 
 
 Classification of the constituencies as center, middle and periphery 
respectively, such as proposed by Valen et al. simplifies the examination of possible 
legislature geographical alliances concerning road policy and road construction. The 
center is here defined as the capital area and other constituencies closely related to 
the capital area. The periphery is similarly defined as those constituencies located 
far away from the capital area, sparsely populated and/or backward economically. 
The middle is those constituencies not defined as center or periphery. Categorizing 
the constituencies into center, middle and periphery such as in Table 3 facilitates 
four possible and mutually excluding geographical coalition patterns in the 
legislatures, namely center – middle, middle – periphery, center – periphery, or 
center – middle - periphery, given none of the three geographical areas control the 
legislature’s majority. The alliance patterns center – middle, middle – periphery or 
center – periphery will most likely be MWCs or MNCs. The alliance pattern center 
– middle – periphery will most likely be a kind of universalism. 
 This brings us to the study’s second working hypothesis, namely roads 
perceived as local collective or private goods with road policy and road construction 
governed by the constituencies’ resource struggles or by legislators who pursue their 
constituencies’ interests on the community’s expense through geographical 
alliances. This second hypothesis makes it possible to derive five empirically 
testable implications: 
 
1. Excellent roads in constituencies participating in the distributional 
coalitions and congestion, accidents and environmental problems, and/or 
turnpikes in those constituencies omitted from the distributional coalitions. 
2. Significant variations in the constituencies’ tax prices for roads because the 
coalition partners share the spoils and shift the costs to those constituencies 
omitted from the coalitions. 
3. More pronounced geographical distributional conflicts in Norway than in 
Denmark and Sweden. 
4. The legislators perceive the road investments’ budget constraints and 
geographical allocation in zero-sum terms. 
5. Tight budget constraints for road investments because the coalition 
members have few if any incentives to increase the budget constraints for 
roads when their constituencies have harvested the spoils. 
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 Mancur Olson claimed distributional coalitions are mainly negative, because 
they lead to rigidity and prevent policy and institutional adjustments.104 Was Olson 
right, or is it possible to nuance Olson’s perspective on distributional coalitions? 
This question will be discussed further in chapter 5. This study faces also another 
theoretical puzzle, because Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico claims 
proportional election systems split the spoils among the legislators according to their 
share of the votes, while winner-take-all systems concentrate the spoils of office to 
the winners.105 Norway, Denmark and Sweden have all proportional election 
systems, but the empirical evidence outlined initially in this chapter indicates many 
similarities with a winner-take-all system in Norway, compared to Denmark and 
Sweden. Are there institutional differences that explain this anomaly? Even this 
puzzle is discussed further in chapter 5. 
Third working hypothesis – roads perceived as local collective or private goods 
and road policy with road construction governed by the political parties’ 
rivalry  
Political parties coordinate the policies across the constituencies in most 
parliamentary democracies. The party discipline is usually enforced through various 
sanctions against those legislators not working according to the party manifesto or 
that otherwise violates party discipline or the party line. Roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods and with concentrated benefits make road policy and 
road construction excellent means for the political parties’ tactical dispositions, 
because rational political parties try to maximize their political power and influence. 
The road to maximum political power and influence is usually not maximum 
number of votes, but maximum number of seats in the legislature in case of 
parliamentary rule. This is where road policy and road construction comes in, 
particularly through creative political utilization of roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods. Donald Wittman, who belongs to the so-called Chicago-
school, claimed that “democratic political markets are organized to promote wealth-
maximizing outcomes”, because politicians have to maintain their reputation. 
Wittman claims also “self-interest will lead to efficient results”.106 Does Wittman’s 
hypothesis hold with regard to road policy and road construction? 
 Political parties are usually governed by ideology, which according to 
Anthony Downs serves as a compass, both for the voters and for the legislators in 
case of issues not specified by the parties’ political platforms.107 Anthony Downs 
furthered Harold Hotelling and Arthur Smithies’ spatial market models to an 
economic model for democracy, where political parties in a two party system 
gradually would loose their ideological profile and converge towards the center and 
the median voter, given economically rational voters with single peaked preferences. 
Downs postulated the parties would maintain their ideological positions in case of 
multiparty systems, even if the middle parties would converge towards the center 
and the median voter.108 But there is seldom possible to reduce politics to a one-
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dimensional activity on a left-right continuum without losing important distinctions 
and nuances, because politics is usually simultaneous games in multiple dimensions, 
particularly in multiparty systems. There are similarly few voters with single-peaked 
preferences.  
 Most political parties are organized according to the left-right cleavage or 
what Stein Rokkan denoted the functional dimension.109 Rokkan’s functional 
dimension was based on the cleavages between employer and employee interests, 
and producer and consumer interests. There is often possible to identify a median 
position on the functional or left-right continuum both within the legislature’s 
committees and plenary and within the executive. There is also the environmental 
dimension or so-called old politics versus new politics; i.e. economic growth or 
materialism versus environmentalism or post-materialism, that emerged in many 
industrialized countries from the turn of the 1960s and 1970s.110 The result was 
often establishment of new populist and/or environmentalist political parties and/or 
changes within the established political parties that responded to the voters’ 
changing moods.  
 The median position is very often pivotal, such as postulated by Anthony 
Down’s economic democracy model. Kaare Strøm and Jørn Y. Leipart’s study of 
Norwegian governments between 1945 and 1990 found convergence or gravitation 
towards the political median. This explains why Norway’s numerous minority 
executives since 1961 have been surprisingly stable contrary to conventional 
wisdom about minority executives.111 Strøm and Leipart’s study, which examined 
the left-right or functional dimension, found also the Labor Party executives’ 
policies often were closer to the so-called middle parties’ ideal positions than the 
Labor Party’s own ideal positions compared to the parties’ manifestos.112 Strøm and 
Leipart’s findings indicate gravitation towards the median position between 1961 
and 1990, but even 1945 and 1961 when the Labor Party held the majority, because 
the Labor Party was the median party during its majority terms. There are reasons to 
expect similar patterns even in Denmark and Sweden. 
 One implication of Kaare Strøm and Jørn Y. Leipart’s findings is that interests 
represented by the political party in the pivotal median position come close to what 
Thomas Schelling denote “focal points” or clues that coordinate negotiations or 
policies.113 Policy outcomes are usually resultants of the institutional arrangements 
and procedures, power relations and the actors’ preferences and interests. The 
median political party or median group’s preferences are similarly highly dependent 
of domestic settlement and trade and industry structure, and will often reflect the 
interests concerning settlement, trade and industry structure. Political parties may 
also represent particular geographical areas or constituencies; this is particularly the 
case in multi party systems. Such parties in the legislature and executive’s median 
position are highly consequential for the net road policy, all other things equal.  
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 The relevant legislature committees’ members’ positions and actions are 
similarly of great importance for the policy outcomes, because of the committees’ 
agenda power and the information asymmetry between the committee members and 
the plenary.114 Do the committee members utilize their specialization and 
knowledge? Are members of the relevant committees sector-enthusiasts, local 
egoists, or loyal followers of their parties? Joel A. Thompson’s empirical study of 
pork barrel politics in North Carolina’s State legislature found the bacon was used to 
safeguard the committee-leaders’ position and to maintain party discipline. North 
Carolina’s State legislature is of general interest because it is a mixture of single seat 
and multi member constituencies. Thompson found that pork barrel deals first and 
foremost were the committee-leaders’ turf. Urban areas were these deals’ losers, and 
the Republicans, who then were in minority, redefined these pork barrel deals from 
distributive to redistributive policy.115 The losers can hence perceive the dominant 
political party’s distributive universalism as redistributive and highly controversial.  
 Many of the legislatures’ distributional coalitions are often organized 
according to an economic logic, even if the political parties coordinate the road 
policy across the constituencies. Frances E. Lee’s study of the US Senate’s road and 
transport political decisions during the 1990s found that senators representing states 
with few inhabitants can sell their votes cheaper measured in need for road 
appropriations than senators representing more populous states. Because Senators 
representing populous states need larger appropriations to provide their voters and 
constituencies with equal amounts of collective goods, all other things equal 
compared to senators representing sparsely populated states.116 A similar logic can 
be introduced even for political parties, because road investments are usually far 
more costly in urban, densely populated and crowded areas than in rural and 
sparsely populated areas. Economic fundamentals exclude thereby some legislators 
as coalition partners, even if they very much would like to be a part of the coalition 
and harvest their share of the spoils. Frances E. Lee found that senators representing 
some of the more populous states, but not the most populous, could create packages 
or deals in the Senate through support from the least populous states that excluded 
the most populous states, and made them to financiers of the deals.117 This finding 
explains why some states or constituencies end up financing the others’ local 
collective goods such as roads, with few or any road investments in return for their 
payments of vehicle and fuel taxes.  
 Frances E. Lee’s findings that some constituencies are more ‘coalitionfähig’ 
than others, makes it possible to rephrase Stein Rokkan’s well known adage 
somewhat; votes count but the number of seats decides.118 Because rational political 
parties do not maximize the number of votes but the number of seats in the 
legislature, and the election system determines the constituencies’ number of seats. 
The election system’s rules of the game have thus profound political implications, 
particularly for the total resource allocation. Because an election system not based 
on the principle one person – one vote leads to malapportionment. The extreme case 
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with regard to malapportionment is the US Senate, where each state has two seats, 
no matter the number of inhabitants. Malapportionment means that seats can be 
‘bought’ cheaper in some constituencies than in others. Money spent in 
constituencies with few inhabitants or voters per seat buy more seats given the 
money spent all other things equal. This was demonstrated clearly by Frances E. 
Lee’s study of the US Senate’s road and transport political decisions during the 
1990s. An election system based on one person – one vote means similarly the price 
per seat is almost equal in all constituencies. Money spent in the most populated 
constituencies improves the likelihood of buying more seats, all other things equal, 
in those instances with one person – one vote.  
 The election system’s seat allocation principle is thus decisive for how rational 
political parties allocate public spending such as road investments. Constituencies 
without any pronounced preferences for particular political parties may be easier to 
swing through increased road investments than constituencies where most voters 
have firm party preferences, all other things equal. The same is largely the case if 
some constituencies prefer road investments to other kinds of public spending. 
Because increased road investments may, all other things equal swing the voters in 
the direction of a particular political party. There are thus reasons to assume the 
political parties allocate the road investments in the different constituencies 
according to their party tactical considerations, for instance where roads perceived 
as local collective or private goods buys most seats.  
 This study’s third working hypothesis is roads perceived as local collective or 
private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry. This third hypothesis makes it possible to derive four empirically 
testable implications: 
 
1. The median party or median group’s preferences is highly dependent of 
domestic settlement and trade and industry structure. The road policy and 
road construction is biased towards those interests represented by the 
legislature’s pivotal party in the relevant committees, plenary and within 
the executive. 
2. The committee leaders use pork barrel deals to strengthen their own 
position and to maintain party cohesion and discipline. 
3. The political parties’ allocation of the road investments is contingent the 
election system. The political parties prioritize road investments in 
constituencies with few inhabitants and voters per seat if the election 
system is not based on one person – one vote, and prioritize similarly road 
investments in constituencies with many seats if the election system is 
based on one person – one vote. 
4. The political parties allocate the road investments strategically. The 
political parties prioritize road investments in constituencies with strong 
preferences for roads rather than other local collective or private goods, and 
prioritize similarly road investments in ‘swing-constituencies’ with weak 
party identification rather than in ‘safe’ constituencies with strong party 
identification.  
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Final working hypothesis – road policy and road construction governed by path 
dependence 
The road policy and road construction is usually fairly stable during time, among 
others because of more or less irreversible physical, economical and institutional 
factors, which constrain possible future policy outcomes. The infrastructure 
investments’ order of magnitude creates also facts on the ground. The bottom line 
here is the assumption about path dependence, that pre-existing institutional 
structures or former decisions influence later or contemporary policy outcomes.119 
Path dependence and lock in arguments are according to Arthur L. Stinchcombe 
variations of the historians’ “sunk-costs historicist causal structure”.120 Many 
choices or decisions become almost irreversible, because high change costs and 
vested interests rule out other and in some cases more attractive or efficient 
institutions or policy alternatives.121 The executive and legislators’ feasible set of 
institutions or policies are in other words often constrained by former decisions, 
because path dependence rules out many attractive options. All policy outcomes are 
thus not equally likely. 
 The idea of path dependence challenges clearly Donald Wittman’s claim about 
political markets promoting efficient institutions and policies.122 First, because there 
are many examples of road policies and road construction based on suboptimal 
resource allocation disregarding cost/benefit ratios or other economic fundamentals. 
Such allocations lead to collective welfare losses compared to a textbook road 
policy. Second, if Wittman was right, all polities, regulating regimes and policies 
should be the same all over the world. But the idea about similar polities, regulating 
regimes and road policies is clearly challenged by this chapter’s initial discussion. 
This idea will be further challenged in the three forthcoming empirical chapters. 
Finally, different institutional arrangements lead to different transaction costs and 
economic incentive structures, which in turn influence road policy and road 
construction. The ideals about wealth-maximizing and efficient outcomes have thus 
slim chances. Path dependence is one explanation of why seemingly inefficient or 
dysfunctional institutions and/or policies persist, despite more efficient alternatives. 
 But how to study the possibility of road policy and road construction governed 
by path dependence, without falling into determinism and thereby and ruling out the 
possibilities for historical and political contingencies? One answer is historical 
institutionalism, because historical institutionalists consider politics ”a process that 
unfolds over time”, with the political implications ”embedded” in the institutions, 
and where ”timing, sequence and critical junctures” are of particular interest.123 
Historical institutionalists assume political conflict and policy outcomes are 
structured by pre-existing institutional structures, and support thereby the idea about 
path dependence.124 The time dimension distinguishes similarly historical 
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institutionalism from other static and ahistoric new institutional theories.125 The time 
dimension is essential for understanding development of institutions and policies, 
hereunder roads taken or not taken. The time dimension is similarly crucial for 
development of causal explanations. 
 Are there other explanations of path dependence than change costs, vested 
interests and physical and institutional infrastructures that funnel the development in 
particular directions and the development’s inertia? The increasing returns 
mechanism is the idea about path dependence’s micro fundament, and explains why 
early, small events determine the development path later on.126 Douglass C. North 
claim the “increasing returns mechanisms […] reinforce the direction once on a 
given path”.127 If a particular institution, policy or equilibrium doesn’t provide 
increasing returns for one or more interest groups, geographical areas, political 
parties or business sectors; then it’s not possible to explain its persistence as result of 
path dependence. 
 But how is it possible to explain institutional change in case of increasing 
returns and path dependence? Path dependence, sunk costs and increasing returns 
explain usually institutional stability and why seemingly inefficient trajectories of 
development prevail and persist.128 The politicians’ limited time horizons and the 
institutions’ status quo bias are usually serious obstacles preventing institutional and 
policy changes.129 But shifts from decreasing to increasing returns, for instance 
through learning, political, technical or social innovations, combined with the 
interplay between technical, economical, organizational and institutional conditions 
may explain institutional change and emergence of new development paths.130 Path 
dependence does hence not rule out the possibility of institutional changes, but there 
are often significant obstacles. 
 Another explanation of institutional change in case of path dependence is 
Stephen D. Krasner’s so-called “punctuated equilibrium”; an idea borrowed from 
the biologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould.131 Krasner distinguishes 
between formative periods of “institutional creation” and periods of “institutional 
stasis” or stability, and explains institutional change as a result of crisis that 
punctuate the equilibrium and thereafter development of new equilibriums that later 
face new crises, and so on. Exogenous shocks, for instance because of a major 
economic crisis, revolution, war or other kinds of system breakdown may thus 
explain development of new institutions and equilibriums.  
 A third explanation of institutional change in case of path dependence is 
increasing mismatch between the institutions and policies governed by path 
dependence and the environment that develops in a different direction. Significant 
mismatch between institutions, policies and environment may result in crises, 
                                                 
125 See for instance Peters (1999:63-77); Scott (2001:83-89); Pierson (2004:167-178); Immergut 
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institutional breakdown and/or policy revisions, which in turn improve the match 
between institutions, policies and environment and establishes a new equilibrium. 
 But established institutions or structures do not necessarily vanish in case of 
institutional changes. They may persist and develop further through new challenges, 
new environments and new institutions and structures, and so on.132 There are also 
examples of “cumulative effects of ongoing but often subtle changes in institutional 
arrangements that persists over long stretches of time”.133 Such subtle and 
incremental changes do in many instances not change the institutions or policies 
fundamentally until passing thresholds that topple the established equilibrium.134 
Institutional changes may result in what Kathleen Thelen described as Institutional 
Layering. Institutional layering is a result of interplay between lock-in and 
institutional innovations, where combinations of old and new institutional elements 
coexist, typically in long lived institutions such as constitutions and pension 
systems, which often have strong institutional biases against change.135 Paul Pierson 
postulates institutional layering in those instances where strong status quo bias and 
high conversion costs back up institutions. Situations with weak status quo bias and 
high conversion cost results similarly in institutional isomorphism.136 The 
institutional environment is thus decisive for the institutional change processes and 
their outcomes. Path dependence may create its own dynamic that reproduces the 
political power relations and resource allocation, until sudden changes because of 
breakdown in the established equilibria, either because of external shocks or 
implosion from within because of mismatch. The result is either development of 
entirely new institutions or institutional layering. 
 This study’s final working hypothesis is that the road policy and road 
construction is governed by path dependence. This hypothesis makes it possible to 
derive five empirically testable implications: 
 
1. The constitution’s status quo bias hereunder the election system, reproduce 
or maintain the road polity’s power relations, hereunder the legislature’s 
established equilibrium for resource allocation. 
2. Institutional conditions within the road polity such as the legislature’s 
chamber and committee structure, the executive’s internal power relations 
and the road administration’s organization and degree of autonomy 
reproduces the road polity’s power relations, road policy and road 
construction. 
3. A feedback loop via settlement and industry structure reproduces the road 
polity’s power relations and resource allocation. 
4. The physical road infrastructure equals facts on the ground or non-
renegotiable agreements, and reproduces the settlement and industry 
structure that maintains the road polity’s power relations and resource 
allocation. 
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133 Thelen (2003:210). 
134 Pierson (2004:83-95, fig. 3.1-3.3). 
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5. The road polity, road policy and established resource allocation is 
maintained until sudden breakdown and establishment of new equilibriums 
in the road polity and concerning road policy and resource allocation. 
 
 An interesting theoretical question is whether inefficient institutions, policies 
or equilibriums’ persistence is a result of political fundamentals, path dependence or 
combinations thereof? Is path dependence a result of prior variables that create 
spurious effects that determines whether roads are considered as national collective, 
local collective or private goods? Is path dependence similarly a result of whether 
the road policy is governed by politicians pursuing the common good, the 
constituencies’ resource struggles or the political parties’ rivalry?137 Another 
interesting question is why have roads often been used as bargaining chips in 
Norwegian distributional politics, but seemingly not so often in Denmark and 
Sweden? It would have been far more efficient to build the necessary roads in 
Norway’s central and urban areas, and to compensate the peripheral and rural areas 
with cash transfers instead of building many poorly utilized roads. These questions 
are further discussed in chapter 5.  
Methodical considerations 
This study is carried out as a historical, comparative case study.138 Case studies are 
based on an experimental instead of a statistical logic. The researcher can seldom 
control the stimulus in case studies such as in actual experiments, but experiments 
and case studies can answer “how and why” questions.139 Case studies facilitate 
studies of explanatory mechanisms and contexts in detail, and are therefore excellent 
for development of plausible explanations and insights about complex phenomena, 
such as the institutional and political processes through time leading to the different 
Danish, Swedish and Norwegian road policies and road systems. But spurious 
effects because of prior variables as mentioned recently may represent a methodical 
challenge. 
 Humanities and social sciences are definitely not deductive, axiomatic systems 
such as logic and mathematics even if some neo-classical economists and rational 
choice theorists follow this path. Case studies are better suited for a pragmatic 
middle position, switching between inductive and deductive research strategies. Karl 
Popper advocates falsification instead of verification, because of the logical 
asymmetry between verification and falsification.140 Deductive inferences from (a 
priori) theoretical concepts, which are tested against empirical evidence and 
corroborated, for instance through a hypothetical-deductive strategy, is in other 
words a kind of generalization.141 This study’s aim is development of simple and 
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robust explanations of Norway, Denmark and Sweden’s different road policies and 
road construction during time. 
 This study’s analytical model consists of background, intermediate and 
dependent variables as previously mentioned. The background variables’ effects are 
mitigated by the intermediate institutions or road polity, which in turn affects the 
dependent variable, the high-level road system that is a result of the road policy and 
road construction. This study is carried out according to a most similar systems 
design, to identify the critical factors or differences that explain Norway, Denmark 
and Sweden’s radically different road policies and road construction, despite 
seemingly similar political systems.142 This study is also based on “analytic 
generalization” according to so-called “Level Two Inference”.143 Level Two 
Inferences, which is common in case studies mean confronting the findings with 
rival theories and policy implications. The sampling strategy has therefore 
emphasized the need for sufficient variation in the critical variables, to test the 
hypotheses. Multiple data sources and methods, or triangulation have similarly been 
used as far as possible to improve the study’s validity. The research has similarly 
been carried out as systematically and tidily as possible to ensure reliability.144 One 
problem with path dependence arguments according to Barbara Geddes is that each 
node or critical juncture may be instances of different phenomenon. Other problems 
with path dependence arguments are whether the proposed explanations are correct, 
whether the observed outcome was result of choices at the critical junctures or 
branching points, and finally how to identify the critical junctures or branching 
points in series of choices?145 Path dependence hypothesis may hence represent a 
number of methodical challenges. 
 This study’s most important analytical methods are pattern matching, 
chronologies, and process tracing and causal narratives.146 Pattern matching is used 
for comparing the three cases’ different dimensions or variables with each other 
during time that makes it possible to eliminate explanatory factors and develop more 
parsimonious explanations.147 The events’ temporal order or chronology is 
necessary to distinguish causes from effects, because causes with logical necessity 
have to take place prior to effects. Chronologies facilitate thereby development of 
causal explanations. But development of causal explanations through case studies is 
not a straightforward matter, because of the asymmetry between causes and 
correlation. All causes are correlation, but correlation is not necessarily causes, 
because a statistical relation does not logically imply a causal relation.148 There is 
also the problem with prior variables and spurious effects as mentioned earlier. 
 Another challenge concerning development of causal explanations of 
institutional development and policy processes is that policy outcomes often are 
results of interactions between different institutions and/or policies. There is also the 
problem with multiple causation and even examples of strategic interaction.149 Case 
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studies are not able to distinguish between necessary and sufficient conditions. 
There is thus not possible to make correct inferences through inductive logic 
because of the control problem. Only analytical control – through empirical and 
theoretical grounding – can protect against fallacies when case studies are used for 
development of causal explanations.150 Process tracing makes it possible to 
distinguish between spurious effects and causal correlation. Causal narratives make 
it possible to compare events and sequences across cases and during time for 
identification of causal patterns.151 The chosen comparative design and applied 
analytical methods answers thereby many of the methodical challenges. 
 The Norwegian case is first and foremost based on archive studies of written 
primary sources, such as letters, documents, reports, government bills and legislature 
negotiations. But even written secondary sources and literature have been used for 
research economic reasons, particularly concerning context and background 
variables. Oral primary sources have also been important for the study of the 
Norwegian case, first and foremost as comments to and supplementary 
interpretations of findings in the written primary and secondary sources. But oral 
sources are in some cases the only sources. Information about matters not covered 
by written primary or secondary sources have as far as possible been sought verified 
by different independent oral sources. The oral sources have also provided clues 
about which ideas have been taken for granted in the different periods.  
 The Danish and Swedish cases are primarily based on studies of written 
secondary sources and literature, which have been supplemented with examination 
of some primary sources, particularly concerning the decisive branching points 
where choice between fundamentally different alternatives have been on the agenda. 
Official statistics and accountings have also been used as primary sources for the 
three cases, even if one has to be aware of their composition and limitations. Web 
sites have also been used as sources for the last decade, because the legislatures, 
executives and road administrations have published many documents and reports on 
their web sites since the second half of the 1990s. Even some old primary sources 
and literature have been published electronically on websites.  
 The written primary sources have been examined and analyzed according to 
historical methods, so-called critical examination.152 Critical examination has also 
been used for secondary sources and literature. Primary sources insure the study’s 
quality, but use of primary sources is rather time and resource consuming. Use of 
high quality secondary sources saves time, but the selection and examination of 
these are critical for the study’s trustworthiness and similarly for the risk of transfer 
of biases.  
 Contemporary history represents a particular challenge for parts of this study, 
because many actors are still alive, and have strong interests concerning their 
posthumous reputation and the history writing. Most oral materials have been 
collected through semi-structured, qualitative interviews and discussions with 
informants that have been directly involved in the political and administrative 
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processes concerning road policy and road construction.153 Almost every interview 
has been taped. Each interview has also been documented through field notes made 
during the interview. Some interviews of informants living far from Oslo have been 
carried out by telephone, but even these interviews have been taped if permitted by 
the informants. The interviews have been analyzed though critical examination, 
similarly as the written sources, to identify the informants’ possible motives for 
telling or not telling what and why they did, and to uncover possible ‘monument 
building’. 
 This study is not based on detailed examination of the Danish, Swedish and 
Norwegian legislators’ voting and committee behavior 1945-2005 concerning road 
policies and road construction of research economic reasons. Detailed examination 
and formal analyses of the legislators’ voting and committee behavior concerning 
road policy and road construction during 60 years is a study by itself and a possible 
follow-up of this study’s findings. This study has only examined the Norwegian 
legislators’ voting and committee behavior concerning some of the most central 
policy documents 1945-2005, because the road policy outcomes in Denmark, 
Sweden and Norway are all clearly documented by facts on the ground through 
roads built or not built. 
 Most monetary terms in this study have been converted to 1990 PPP USD to 
make plans and actual investments comparable between Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway, and across time, because PPP USDs are corrected for purchase power in 
the different countries.154 Angus Maddison’s GDP figures are used as is, because 
they are in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars.  
A map for further reading  
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 contains the empirical studies of the Danish, Swedish and 
Norwegian cases. Denmark is discussed first in chapter 2, because the study 
revealed soon that Denmark came close to the road policy textbook case. Sweden is 
similarly studied in chapter 3, because it has been a commonly held belief in 
Norway that development of Sweden’s modern road system was a straightforward 
matter and a smooth, rational and streamlined process. However, this study revealed 
soon that was far from the case. Sweden is therefore denoted as the catch-up case 
because Sweden’s starting point was rather similar to Norway. The comparison with 
Denmark and Sweden revealed finally that Norway, which is discussed in chapter 4, 
differed fundamentally. Norway is therefore denoted the deviant case. 
 Chapter 5 summarizes and discusses the empirical findings about the road 
polities, political economies and entailing road policies and road construction during 
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time in Denmark, Sweden and Norway and compares the empirical findings 
concerning the four hypotheses. This final chapter discusses also possible critical 
differences that can elucidate and explain why Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
settled for fundamentally different road policies and road construction despite 
seemingly similar political systems, together with the findings’ theoretical 
implications. The study includes also a comprehensive Data Appendix. 
Summary and preliminary conclusions 
Why have studies of road policy and road construction common interest? Roads and 
other infrastructures are often considered part of a society’ social overhead capital, 
and such collective goods have far reaching consequences for a society’s economic 
development, the trade and industry’s competitiveness and the society’s distribution 
of benefits and burdens. Major infrastructure initiatives are often synonymous with 
political and distributional conflicts. A society’s supply and allocation of collective 
goods is usually determined through collective actions in the political system’s 
institutions or polity. Whether infrastructure projects are carried out, and how and 
where they are carried out and financed is usually determined by the national 
political economy. 
 Most western industrialized countries developed national road plans and built 
national trunk road and motorway systems during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to 
safeguard the reconstruction, promote economic growth and solve the problems 
entailing the mass motoring. Danish and Swedish executives and legislators 
emphasized investments in profitable or industrially necessary trunk roads and 
motorways in the most crowded areas, and built usually roads from the crowded 
central and urban areas to the desolate peripheral and rural areas. The Danish and 
Swedish road policies were also integrated parts of the national trade and industry 
policies, largely in accordance with endogenous growth theory.  
 Norwegian road policy and road construction on the other hand seems to have 
been decoupled from the trade and industry policy, because Norwegian executives 
and legislators prioritized opposite compared with many other Western 
industrialized countries. Norwegian executives and legislators preferred construction 
of unprofitable substandard roads in desolate areas until the 1980s, despite 
congestion, accident and environmental problems in those areas where most 
Norwegians lived and traveled. Norwegian executives and legislators built usually 
roads from the desolate peripheral and rural areas towards the crowded central and 
urban areas instead of opposite, even if most cars were located in the central and 
urban areas. 
 Denmark and Sweden completed most of their trunk road and motorway 
systems during the 1980s and 1990s. Norwegian taxpayers and motorists have to 
prepare for significant future road investments, because the trunk road and 
motorway system has significant imperfections with regard to capacity, road safety 
and environmental standards. The puzzle is that few other European countries are 
more dependent of road transports of passengers and goods than Norway, because of 
dispersed settlement, poorly developed public transports and localization in 
Europe’s northwestern periphery. But these realities were hardly reflected in the 
road policy and road construction until about 1995, which may indicate possible 
governance and policy failures.  
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 Common sense, popular explanations or conventional wisdoms such as wealth 
level, financial leverage, geographical localization, population, terrain conditions, 
and construction costs, lack of an automotive industry or social democracy are not 
sufficient to explain the particular Norwegian road policy and road construction. 
There must be other explanations. This study’s analytical framework is based on 
historical institutionalism, which threats institutions as independent variables, and is 
carried out as a historical, comparative case study based on a most similar systems 
design.  
 The study’s main hypothesis or benchmark is roads perceived as national 
collective goods with road policy and road construction governed by politicians 
pursuing the common good. The second working hypothesis is roads perceived as 
local collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by 
the constituencies’ resource struggles. The third working hypothesis is roads 
perceived as local collective or private goods with road policy and road construction 
governed by the political parties’ rivalry. The final working hypothesis is road 
policy and road construction governed by path dependence. 
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Chapter 2 – Denmark – the textbook case 
Denmark is here denoted as the textbook case, because Danish road policy and road 
construction has largely been according to the road engineers and transport 
economists’ scientific and professional recommendations, even if the ministers of 
public works or minister of traffic and the county mayors usually have been in the 
driver’s seat. The road political lodestar has been what is beneficial for Danish trade 
and industry in the long run. Responsible politicians have usually considered 
modern roads as national collective goods and acted accordingly. But why and how 
were Danish politicians able and willing to pursue this rational development path, 
rather than more opportunistic trajectories? This chapter presents first background 
and context prior to 1945. The second, third and fourth sections are about Danish 
road policy and road construction 1945-59, 1960-80 and 1981 until about 2005. 
These sections’ structure is first a presentation of the political system and the 
economic development, thereafter the road policy and road construction, and finally 
a conclusion. The final section is a summary with discussions of the empirical 
findings concerning the four working hypotheses and some preliminary conclusions 
concerning the Danish case. 
Background and context 
Denmark had a centralized, French-inspired military road administration 1764-1867, 
when the Danish State built the first national trunk road system to facilitate further 
economic development. This road administration and road system was largely 
results of minister of foreign affairs Johan Hartvig Ernst Bernstorff’s initiative in 
1761 that led to a Royal Decree signed by King Frederik V about construction of a 
national trunk road system. Bernstorff had been ambassador to France in the 1740s, 
and noticed how the chaussées’ connected the country. Count Christian Ditlev 
Reventlov, with a position fairly similar to later ministers of public works, wrote in 
1791 a study that outlined the future road policy and paved the way for a new Road 
Act. Denmark’s 1793 Road Act introduced a three-tier road administration, where 
the State was responsible for the trunk roads, the counties (amtene) responsible for 
highways and the municipals responsible for city streets and local roads. The 1867 
Road Act downgraded the trunk roads to highways when Denmark’s first national 
trunk road system was completed and made road policy and road construction the 
counties and municipals’ responsibility.155 The architect behind this policy shift was 
Jacob Brønnum Scavenius Estrup, a very conservative landowner from Jutland who 
was minister of interior 1865-69 and headed the King’s executive 
(konsejlspresident) 1875-1894. The reason for Estrup’s policy shift was that 
railroads and steamships took over the long distance traffic and heavy transports.
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Estrup prioritized therefore construction of railroads and harbors rather than 
roads.156 Roads remained thereafter largely local transport infrastructures until cars 
began to substitute railroads and horses after World War One. 
Denmark’s elites opposed democratization and established a very strong 
executive based on minister rule and local autonomy 
The Danish State solved many of its financial crises by selling off properties. The 
leading civil servants were closely related to the urban elites, particularly 
Copenhagen’s merchants and those involved in agricultural exports. The 
conservatives were initially civil servants and nobility loyal to the King. Denmark’s 
liberals opposed the autocracy.157 The radical June 5th 1849 Constitution replaced 
the autocracy with an executive appointed by the King, organized similarly as 
Germany or France’ minister rule rather than the former autocracy’s collegium rule, 
and a legislature, Rigsdagen, with two equal chambers, the popularly elected 
Folketinget equal to the House of Commons and Landstinget, equivalent to the 
House of Lords or the Senate. Rigsdagen was initially a blueprint of the Belgian 
legislature. However, the 1866 Constitution, introduced after Denmark lost the 1864 
war against Germany, when the small farmers’ cooperated with the landowners 
against the urban national liberals, maintained most of the 1849 Constitution but 
gave Landstinget veto power and some members appointed by the King.158 This 
institutional change had profound and long lasting political implications, and was 
decisive for Denmark’s political economy.  
 Jacob Brønnum Scavenius Estrup became well known as head of the 
landowner’s executive, due to his staunch opposition against the Liberals’ demand 
for parliamentary rule originating from Folketinget, because the 1866 Constitution 
made Estrup’s executive almost dictatorial. Folketinget responded with the so-called 
“withering policy” during the 1880s and ‘buried’ the executive’s proposals, and 
refused approving the annual budgets (Finansloven). Estrup’s response was 
governing through provisory finance laws sanctioned by Landstinget. Landstinget 
approved the first provisory law 1877. Estrup’s executive governed thereafter 
through provisory laws from 1885 until 1894, when the provisory rule ended after a 
major political compromise between moderates in the Conservative (Højre) and 
Liberal (Venstre) Parties. Estrup resigned a few months later.159 The 1894 
compromise convinced the Conservative Party to abstain from further governing 
through provisory laws. The voters’ message to the Conservative Party in the 1901 
Folketing election led to the King’s appointment of the first Liberal executive, and 
thereby de facto introduction of parliamentary rule in Denmark, originating from 
Folketinget, exactly as required by the Liberal Party.160 Denmark had thus well-
established political parties prior to introduction of parliamentary rule, but the 
tradition with minister rather than collegiate rule persisted, despite introduction of 
parliamentary rule, and was an example of path dependence. 
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Figure 5: Danish counties 1999, an overview. 
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, from Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of 
Texas [Online January 24th 2006] – URL: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/denmark_pol99.jpg.  
 The 1894 compromise between the Conservative and Liberal Parties and 
introduction of parliamentary rule in 1901 weakened the Ministry of Finance’s 
dominant position since 1848, because the sector ministries were from then 
permitted to visit Folketinget’s Finance Committee and get approval of expenses in 
addition to those included in the State’s annual budget. Folketinget’s Finance 
Committee became almost superior to Rigsdagen 1917-18 when the supplementary 
appropriations were about twice as large as the State’s annual ordinary budget. 
Folketinget’s Finance Committee became soon known as the “fifteen good 
Samaritans”.161 Lobbyists could in many instances bypass the minister of finance via 
Folketinget’s finance committee, which in turn weakened the economic discipline.  
 About 75 percent of the Danish population lived in rural areas in 1875, but the 
urbanization process accelerated. More than 50 percent of the Danes lived in urban 
areas in 1916.162 The Liberal Party’s core was a traditional liberal economic policy, 
and the core voters were farmers engaged in export agriculture. The Radical Party 
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(Radikale Venstre), a social liberal party with support from rural cotters and later 
mostly urban intellectuals, splintered from the Liberal Party in 1905, because of 
disagreement about defense matters. The Conservative Party reorganized itself in 
1915 to a modern Conservative Party, and shifted its attention from the nobility and 
landowners to the urban areas’ new middle class of manager owners and white-
collar workers. The Social Democratic Party’s (Socialdemokraterne) core voters 
were first and foremost the urban areas’ many blue-collar employees.163 Denmark’s 
Social Democratic Party was founded already in 1871.164 Denmark’s modern party 
system with its new alliance patterns was hence largely established under and 
immediately after World War One. 
 Denmark’s new party system was largely a result of the 1915 Constitution, a 
compromise between the Social Democratic, Radical, Liberal and Conservative 
Parties, that introduced universal suffrage and a democratic elected Landsting with 
eight years terms. Folketinget’s 93 single seat districts were supplemented with 24 
extra proportionally elected seats in Copenhagen and 23 supplementary seats, plus 
one seat from the Faeroes. Folketinget’s former seat allocation had favored the rural 
areas and thereby the Liberal Party. The 1915 Constitution’s conservative 
guarantees were referendums in case of Constitutional Amendments. At least 45 
percent of those with the right to vote had to approve the proposed Constitutional 
Amendments. However, Landstinget maintained its veto power.165 Only about 14 
percent of the Danes were permitted to vote before the 1915 Constitution came into 
power in 1918, and only half of those entitled to vote used their right.166 The 1915 
Constitution changed thereby gradually the Danish political system’s character, and 
paved the way for mass politics, but upheld the bicameral system. The result was 
partly a new political economy, because the political parties could not afford to 
overlook large voter groups such as urban workers.  
 King Christian X fired the Prime Minister without appointing an acting Prime 
Minister during the Easter 1920, because parliamentary rule was not written into the 
1915 Constitution. But the Social Democratic and Radical Parties considered the 
King’s move a coup d’état. Imminent labor market conflicts and nationalists who 
did their best to regain Slesvig or to make Slesvig an area under international 
administration caused the King’s intervention. The King reconsidered his move and 
appointed a new executive a few days later, and abstained thereafter from further 
direct political actions. Denmark underwent three elections to Folketinget in 1920, 
and introduced proportional elections to Folketinget (PR) with seat allocation 
according to d’Hondt’s method after a Constitutional Amendment because of the 
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reunion between Denmark and northern Slesvig prior to the third Folketing’s 
election in September 1920.167  
 The Social Democratic Party overtook the Liberal Party’s position as 
Denmark’s leading party from 1924, and emphasized a responsible economic policy, 
governed by minister of finance C.V. Bramsnæs.168 The Social Democratic Party’s 
responsible course was partly a result of Folketinget’s Finance Committee’s 
overruling of the executive and the Ministry of Finance. The Social Democratic and 
Radical Parties established in 1929 their second coalition headed by Thorvald 
Stauning that governed until the German assault in 1940. The executive was then 
expanded to a national coalition. Stauning was Denmark’s strong man from 1929 
until his death, and knew how to maneuver through the interwar years’ politically 
foul waters, when the democracy came under question and for instance the 
Conservative Party’s Youths marched with black boots, shirts and armlets and 
saluted like others south of the border.169 However, the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties upheld their control of Landstinget until 1936, when Landstinget lost most of 
its political relevance.170 The Conservative Party proposed thereafter a 
Constitutional Amendment that abolished Landstinget and established a unicameral 
system. Even the Social Democratic and Radical Parties endorsed this amendment 
but a minority within the Liberal Party opposed it. This Constitutional Amendment 
was rejected in the 1939 referendum with the smallest possible margin because only 
44,45 percent of those with the right to vote supported it.171 Denmark was then 
11.762 votes from a new Constitution and a unicameral system. Prime Minister 
Thorvald Stauning and the Conservative Party’s Christmas Møller lost face and 
considerable amounts of political capital.172 The Liberal Party represented first and 
foremost the rural areas that dominated Landstinget, and a unicameral system could 
shift Denmark’s geographical political balance permanently, and thus weaken the 
Liberal Party.  
 Denmark became industrialized already from the middle of the 19th century 
when many craftsmen introduced industrial methods and means of production. This 
development accelerated from about 1870 and Denmark had soon urban national 
industries that supplied consumer goods; tools, machines and production equipment 
that came in addition to the export-based agro-industrial complex that developed in 
parallel with the new domestic trade and industries. Denmark’s new trade and 
industries grew about 50 percent per decade from 1914. Denmark was largely 
industrially self sufficient about World War One, even if the agricultural exports still 
dominated, but the emerging industries grew faster and engaged also in exports. 
Most of Denmark’s emerging trade and industries were small and medium 
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enterprises (SME), but there where also major enterprises such as the concrete 
producer and concrete production equipment producer F. L. Smidth & Co.173  
 Denmark reintroduced the gold standard in 1924, which had been suspended 
in 1914. Gold parity was restored in 1926 at a price of 21-22 percent unemployment 
in 1926 and 27. The 1920s’ deflationary crisis was largely self-inflicted through the 
executive’s economic policy and Denmark Nationalbank’s currency policy, 
similarly as in Norway, because many other countries went on full blast until the 
Wall Street crack in 1929 that triggered the depression.174 Great Britain’s abolition 
of the gold exchange standard through devaluation of the British pound September 
21st 1931 was a fourth severe economic blow for Denmark, after the 1920s crisis and 
deflationary policy and the Wall Street crack, because about 2/3s of Denmark’s 
exports went to Great Britain. Denmark’s National Bank gave up the gold exchange 
standard September 29th.175 Abolition of the gold exchange standard meant also 
abolition of the liberal trade regime. Most counties had given up the gold exchange 
standard in 1936. The nazi regime that came to power in Germany in 1933 
established an almost closed economy based on regulated trade.176 Denmark 
struggled thus economically during the 1920s and 30s, and these struggles had, as 
we soon will see, significant road political implications. 
 The Danish executive left its traditional liberal economic policy in 1932 when 
the depression peaked or bottomed, and established the so-called Clearing Center 
(Valutasentralen), which regulated the imports, because Denmark lacked foreign 
currency due to reduced agricultural exports which were Denmark’s primary foreign 
currency source. The business organizations administered the import quotas among 
their members via the corporative system. The import regulations were initially 
proposed by the Liberal Party as an alternative to tariff barriers, but Landstinget’s 
non-socialist parties refused approving the Clearing Center, among others because 
the Conservative Party claimed the regulations favored already established 
enterprises. The Social Democratic and Radical executive’s response was a call for 
election to Folketinget, and the governing parties won the voters’ approval. The 
Conservative Party accepted thereafter the regulations, among others because the 
Industry Council (Industrirådet) supported the import regulations, which protected 
Denmark’s infant industries. A labor-agrarian social compromise, or rather horse 
trade, in January 1933 between the Social Democratic, Radical and Liberal Parties, 
the so-called “Kanslergade agreement”, named after Stauning’s private address, 
removed many of the social tensions, and furthered the 1920’s class compromise 
after introduction of common suffrage and collective bargaining, and established 
thereby a new social contract. The executive’s payback to the farmers was 24 
percent depreciation of the Danish kroner (DKK), which gradually improved the 
agricultural exports, through reduced relative prices for the Danish agricultural 
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products.177 The 1936 Denmark National Bank Act transformed Denmark’s National 
Bank from a limited liability company to an independent institution overseen by a 
board of directors with 25 members, hereunder 2 appointed by the executive, 8 by 
Rigsdagen and the rest by the board of directors.178 The 1930s’ economic crises 
established thus regulated trade, corporative arrangements, a broad class 
compromise and a highly autonomous central bank. Many of these institutional 
changes had profound long-term policy implications. 
 How was Denmark’s economic position during the interwar period? Angus 
Maddison’s calculations show that Denmark’s GDP per capita measured in 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars was 3.992 dollars in 1920, 5.341 in 1930 and 
5.116 in 1940. The averages for the 12 West European countries were 3.305 dollars 
in 1920, 4.289 in 1930 and 4.984 in 1940.179 Denmark was in other words well 
above the West European average in 1920, 1930 and 1940. The State’s annual 
budget increased from 325 millions DKK or 775,54 millions 1990 PPP USD in 1929 
to 550 millions DKK or 1.260,35 millions 1990 PPP USD in 1939, despite only 10 
percent inflation during these years.180 The State budget’s growth measured in real 
terms was in other words significant, and indicates clearly that Thorvald Stauning’s 
executive carried out a counter cyclic and Keynesian policy during the 1930s. 
Maddison’s calculations indicate similarly that Denmark did very well during the 
1920s, despite the deflationary crisis but could most likely have performed better. 
But Denmark was hit severely by the depression and particularly Great Britain’s 
abandonment of the gold standard, because Denmark’s 1940 GDP per capita was 
less than in 1930. Denmark was West Europe’s fourth wealthiest country measured 
in GDP per capita in 1920, 1930 and 1940. The Danish economy recovered during 
the Second World War and the second half of the 1940s.  
Danish road policy and road construction prior to World War Two – 
decentralized control and swift transition from railroad to road transports 
Each Danish county employed a County Road Inspector (Amtsvejinspektør), which 
overlooked the road construction when the 1867 Road Act made trunk roads to 
highways and closed down the centralized military State road administration. The 
State’s Chief Road Inspector (Overvejinspektør), which belonged to the armed 
forces, could only watch but not interfere with the counties’ road policy and road 
construction.181 The very conservative Jacob Brønnum Scavenius Estrup 
strengthened thereby the municipal autonomy and made road policy and road 
construction the counties and municipals’ matters when the first national trunk road 
system was completed, but Estrup was no reactionary anti-modernist, at least not 
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concerning transport and communications, because he shifted the State’s emphasis 
from roads to construction of railroads and harbors, which was a rational move when 
railroads and steamships gradually replaced horse and cart for heavy hauls and long 
distance transports. 
 The Danish counties and municipals emphasized road construction and road 
maintenance between 1910 and 1939, but the counties and municipals lacked 
sufficient financial muscles to carry out the necessary road investments when cars 
and road transports began to substitute railroad transports of passengers and goods. 
Rigsdagen approved therefore in 1910 the first reimbursement arrangements from 
the State to the counties and municipals through a Road Fund (vejfond), financed by 
the vehicle taxes, and Copenhagen abolished its turnpikes in 1915.182 The Danish 
legislators established hence indirectly user financing of road construction and 
maintenance in the motoring’s childhood through introduction of partly dedicated 
taxes and fees. This reform abolished Copenhagen’s direct user financing of road 
construction and maintenance through turnpikes. 
 The Ministry of Public Works (Ministeriet for Offentlige Arbejder), which was 
spun out from the Ministry of Interior (Indenrigsministeriet) in 1894, redistributed 
initially half the State’s vehicle tax revenues to the counties and municipals, but 
increased the redistribution to 85 percent from 1913. The vehicle tax revenues 
became dedicated to road purposes from 1924.183 The Road Fund was dedicated to 
construction of highways from 1927. The allocation key was 60 percent to the 
counties, 25 percent to the rural municipals and the remaining to the major cities and 
provincial towns. The number of cars determined 2/3s of the provincial towns’ 
allocations from the Road Fund; the rest was determined by the city streets’ relative 
share of the highway system.184 The Road Fund reimbursements’ allocation 
reflected clearly Rigsdagen’s rural bias, because almost 5/6 of the reimbursements 
went to rural areas even if most cars were located within and near the major cities.  
 The 1920s became a transition period, because buses and passenger cars took 
over more of the passenger transports due to its flexibility and improved cost 
effectiveness compared to railroads, particularly in sparsely populated areas. Trucks 
took similarly over the short distance goods transports, even if railroads and ships 
still dominated the long and heavy hauls. Passenger cars transported more 
passengers than railroads measured in passenger kilometers from the late 1930s. 
Construction of new railroads was therefore gradually replaced by closing down 
obsolete railroads.185 This shift from railroads to roads was also reflected through 
increased road investments and investments in new bridges that facilitated the 
transition from railroad to road transports. Denmark invested about 715 millions 
DKK, or approximately 1.804,5 millions 1990 PPP USD in new roads from the 
fiscal year 1924/25 to the fiscal year 1934/35. In addition came about 100 millions 
DKK, or approximately 252,4 millions 1990 PPP USD to major bridges during the 
same period. Approximately 551,5 millions DKK or 1.391,85 millions 1990 PPP 
USD were allocated to rural areas, while 163,5 millions DKK or 412,63 millions 
1990 PPP USD were allocated to cities and urban areas. The counties received about 
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372 millions DKK or 938,84 millions 1990 PPP USD in reimbursement from the 
Road Fund.186 Denmark invested thus about 800 millions DKK or approximately 
2.019 millions 1990 PPP USD in new roads and bridges from mid 1920s until the 
mid 1930s. Rigsdagen’s establishment of the Road Fund had two important effects; 
first road policy and road construction was decoupled from the legislature’s 
deliberations. Second, the road investments were linked directly to the motorists’ 
payments of vehicle and fuel taxes. This linking safeguarded almost proportional 
increase in the road investments given the number of cars, and safeguarded also 
swift construction of a modern road system. However, the Danish counties and 
municipals’ road construction during the interwar years was initially more social 
than trade and industry policy, because of the 1920s and 30s’ economic crisis. 
 The counties’ uncoordinated allocation of road investments became an 
increasing problem, because the Road Fund’s reimbursements went not necessarily 
to those roads with most urgent need for updates, but to those roads fancied by the 
county mayors and the local politicians.187 The Ministry of Public Works permitted 
therefore in 1931 individual applications for reimbursement from the Road Fund.188 
The State Railroad’s Bridge Office was usually responsible for construction of 
major bridges, and the Road Fund usually financed them.189 The 1931 
reimbursement reform was obviously one of the Stauning executive’s first attempts 
of safeguarding construction of industrially necessary roads and bridges, without 
challenging the counties and municipals’ autonomy, which the Liberal Party’s 
members of Landstinget governed eagerly. Individual reimbursements increased 
also the employment, which was of utmost importance for Stauning’s executive. The 
Ministry of Public Works’ governing of the reimbursement safeguarded construction 
of a highway system with reasonable uniform technical standard, despite the 
decentralized road administrations, because the counties and municipals were only 
eligible for reimbursements if the highways were built according to the approved 
technical standards and requirements. The counties and municipals were for instance 
required to build dedicated bicycle lanes and footpaths or sidewalks from 1939.190 
Common technical standards and road design manuals substituted thus partly a 
centralized road administration as coordination mechanism prior to World War Two, 
and can be understood as one institutional measure for bypassing the 1867 Road 
Act. 
 The executive’s second move for safeguarding a more rational and 
coordinated road policy came in 1933, through appointment of a commission for 
development of a new Road Act, but the Road Act issue was not settled until 
1957.191 The fact that it took 24 years before the Road Act issue was settled, is 
clearly evidence that road administrations and road financing were incendiary 
matters, because a new Road Act and establishment of a State road administration 
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could reduce the local autonomy established through the 1867 Road Act. A new 
Road Act would also most likely undermine Rigsdagen’s regional distributional 
coalitions. The 1867 Road Act and the local autonomy were clearly reproduced 
through path dependence upheld by Landstinget’s veto power, the rural areas’ 
malapportionment and other principles established by the 1866 Constitution. 
 Political pork barrel deals or logrolls were common in Rigsdagen in the 1920s 
and 30s, because most of Denmark’s major bridges had their accompanying projects 
in either eastern or western Denmark. The Small Belt, Storstrøm and Limfjord 
Bridges were of greatest significance for the road traffic. Folketinget approved the 
Small Belt Bridge, from Fyn to Jutland, in 1924. Rigsdagen’s two chambers 
enlarged the project in 1927 because of increased road traffic. The Small Belt Bridge 
was built 1929-35. Folketinget approved similarly in 1931 construction of the 
Storstrøm Bridge from Sjælland to Lolland and Falster, towards Rødbyhavn. The 
Storstrøm Bridge was then Europe’s longest bridge. Construction of the Storstrøm 
Bridge was linked to construction of a bridge across Oddesund in Limfjorden 
northwest on Jutland. The Storstrøm Bridge was built 1933-37. Aalborg city north 
on Jutland received also new bridges across Limfjorden for road and railroads 
respectively in 1930 and 1935. These bridges were local projects, but with favorable 
State funding, because they were relief works. The Alssund and Oddesund Bridges 
completed in 1925 and 1935 were combined road and railroads bridges. The 
Guldborgsund Bridge was competed in 1934. The bridges across Aggersund and to 
Møn, in Limfjorden, were completed in 1942 and 1943.192 The engineer Tom Rallis, 
who studied Danish transport and communications’ historical development, 
concluded that political linkages of different road and bridge projects was usually 
the rule in Rigsdagen.193 Danish bridge policy in the 1920s and 30s were thus 
governed by the legislators’ vote trades or log rolls, which strengthen the hypothesis 
about roads and bridges considered as local collective or private goods, and road 
policy and road construction governed by the constituencies’ resource struggles. The 
economic historian Steen Andersen claimed similarly the interwar years’ relief 
works created very favorable conditions for the Danish engineering and construction 
companies, and established also close ties between Danish and German engineering 
and construction companies.194 
 The Storstrøm Bridge demonstrates clearly the Danes were far more hucksters 
than their Swedish and Norwegian neighbors, because the Storstrøm Bridge was not 
only a result of pork barrel deals or logrolls in Rigsdagen, but also a bilateral horse 
trade between Denmark and Great Britain. Great Britain was Denmark’s most 
important export market, and Great Britain’s liquidation of the gold standard 
September 21st 1931 was a severe blow for Danish agricultural exports. Rudolf 
Christiani, head of the engineering and construction company Christiani & Nielsen, 
which lost the competitive bidding about construction of the Small Belt Bridge, and 
who was member of Rigsdagen 1932-35 and 1939-43 for the Liberal Party and who 
also was Denmark’s representative in the League of Nations 1934-38, started his 
own private diplomacy for forced construction of the Storstrøm Bridge prior to 
Rigsdagen’s approval in April 1932. Christiani was later one of those who made the 
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Danes aware of John Maynard Keynes’ The General theory of Employment Interest 
and Money. Christiani established a consortium with the British steel construction 
company Dorman, Long & Co, and arranged a one million British pound (GBP) 
loan to the Danish State. Bank of England restricted foreign loans after liquidating 
the gold standard, and approved only 3 millions GBP in foreign loans between 1932 
and 36, but one of these went to Denmark due to Rudolf Christiani’s initiative. The 
final deal about the Storstrøm Bridge was struck in 1933 by minister of finance C. 
V. Bramsnæs, and linked Danish purchase of British steel with Danish agricultural 
exports to Great Britain, and gave also Christiani & Nielsen the contract for the 
bridge pillars and embankments.195 Construction of the Storstrøm Bridge was not 
only results of national but also international pork barrel deals and log rolls, and 
Rudolf Christiani orchestrated the most important deal. We will later hear more 
about Rudolf Christiani and his engineering and construction company Christiani & 
Nielsen. 
 Denmark’s public road system in 1910 measured 44.800 kilometers. About 
6.800 kilometers were defined as highways and managed by the counties. About 
2.200 kilometers of these were former trunk roads built prior to the 1867 Road Act. 
The cities and rural municipals managed 38.000 kilometers local roads and city 
streets. About 30 percent of these were gravel roads in 1910. Denmark had 
approximately 52.600 kilometers public roads in 1930. About 7.600 kilometers of 
these were highways. The remaining 45.000 kilometers were defined as city streets 
and local roads. Only 10 percent of these were gravel roads in 1930.196 Denmark had 
about 7.730 kilometers highways in 1936. Approximately 75 percent of these were 
paved. 16 percent had asphalt or concrete seals, or paving stones. Only 9 percent of 
Denmark’s highways were gravel roads in 1936.197 Denmark’s public road system 
was thus far more developed and had far better standard than for instance Sweden 
and Norway’s contemporary public road systems. The 1934 car density was 200 cars 
per 1000 inhabitants in USA, 47 in France, 42 in England, 34 in Denmark, 24 in 
Sweden, 21 in Norway, and 12 in Germany.198 The number of cars per 1000 
inhabitants in 1935 increased to 204 in USA, 52 in France, 53 in England and 42 in 
Denmark.199 Denmark’s density of cars during the interwar years was also above 
that in Sweden and Norway, and Denmark’s car density increased quickly when the 
economy recovered after the depression, and reflected clearly Denmark’s prewar 
wealth compared to Sweden and Norway. The historian Bo Lidegaard claim that 
Denmark’s civilian investments during the interwar years in among others transport 
and communication infrastructures, instead of military armament against Germany, 
was a deliberate policy “to provide employment, connect the country, and pave the 
way for new and better times”.200 
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Danish engineering and construction companies championed construction of a 
national motorway system and bridges across Great Belt and Øresund prior to 
World War Two 
The Danish Road Laboratory’s (Vejlaboratoriet) 1934 traffic survey revealed that 
about 93 percent of the road traffic was motor vehicles. Horse vehicles carried out 
only 7 percent of the road traffic work. About 850 kilometers of the Danish 
highways carried out 1/6 of the traffic work. Denmark had about 14.000 road 
accidents in 1935. 294 persons were killed, 3.751 were seriously and 3.483 lightly 
injured. The bulk of accidents took place on the most crowded highways, which 
often were former trunk roads.201 The Road Laboratory had been established in 1928 
after an initiative from the county road engineers.202 The main reasons for 
Denmark’s fast rising number of road accidents were mixed pedestrian, bicyclist, 
horse and car traffic, and level crossings between roads and railroads. Denmark’s 
most crowded highways went also through city hubs and urban areas, usually with 
housing and nearby settlement. There were finally the highways’ passing accidents, 
head on collisions between fast moving vehicles.203 The interwar years’ congestion, 
accident and environmental problems triggered a search process among motorist 
organizations, road engineers, engineering and construction companies, road 
administrators and politicians, not only in Denmark but in most other industrialized 
countries that experienced the mass motoring’s flip side. The aim was safe and 
efficient roads that made it possible to utilize the road transports advantages, and to 
avoid congestion, accidents and environmental problems. The executives, legislators 
and road administrations in many countries, hereunder in Denmark, accepted thus 
the mass motoring’s emergence as a matter of fact, and did their best to utilize the 
mass motoring’s advantages and mitigate the entailing problems. 
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Figure 6: The Danish Road Laboratory’s 1934 traffic survey. 
 
Source: Christiani & Nielsen, Højgaard & Schultz A/S, Kampmann, Kierulf & Saxild A/S, Motorveje 
med broer over Storebælt og Øresund, Copenhagen, March 9th 1936:16 Figur 10. 
 The first parkways, roads closed for slow moving trucks or lorries, were built 
in USA in 1916. The first autostrada, from Milan to Varese in Italy, was completed 
in September 1924 after an initiative in 1922 from the building contractor Piero 
Puricelli from Milan that convinced Italy’s strong man Benito Mussolini about the 
necessity of construction of a network of roads dedicated for cars from Milan to the 
lakes in northern Italy. This first autostrada was not a real motorway but an 
expressway, because it was only 10 meters wide, lacked a center strip and had only 
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one lane in each direction. But it had no level crossings or any buildings or housing 
in the vicinity. This first autostrada inspired the Germans that in 1926 established 
the consortium HAFRABA, for construction of a north-south motorway from the 
Hansa cities south of Denmark, via Frankfurt am Main to Basel in Switzerland. 
Construction of the section from Bonn to Cologne began in 1929. Konrad Adenauer 
opened the expressway from Bonn to Cologne in 1932. The Americans built 
similarly expressways in New York and Chicago during the 1930s, often on pillars 
or columns, above street level, similarly as the urban railroads. Holland approved a 
national trunk road plan in 1932, for construction of a network of motorways. Some 
of these were completed in 1937. Albert Thomas in the League of Nations who also 
was the first head of the League of Nation’s International Labor Organization 
proposed similarly construction of 14.000 kilometers of European motorways as 
relief works financed through the Bank of International Settlements as a European 
New Deal. The same did Piero Puricelli who then was senator and proposed 
construction of about 31.000 kilometers European motorways. The Nazi regime that 
came to power in Germany in 1933 dissolved HAFRABA and established instead 
Gesellschaft zur Vorbereitung der Reichsautobahnen, GEZUVOR, headed by 
engineer and Road Inspector General Fritz Todt. The nazi regime approved also the 
Reichsautobahnen Act June 28th 1933, for construction of 7.000 kilometers 
motorways within 6-7 years. Adolf Hitler opened the first Reichsautobahn in 1935 
between Frankfurt and Darmstadt, with four lanes and center strip. The International 
Chamber of Commerce’s congress in Paris in 1935 encouraged similarly 
construction of a European network of motorways and trunk roads, regulated 
through international conventions, because modern roads were assumed to promote 
economic growth and the common good. France’s first motorway was completed in 
the mid 1930s, and a new motorway from Paris to Calais was in the pipeline prior to 
World War Two. The Spanish executive planned similarly a motorway from Madrid 
to Valencia. Even the Czech and Belgian executives planned motorways in the 
1930s. USA’s first real motorway, Pasadena Freeway in California, was ready for 
traffic in 1938. The Germans built 3.860 kilometers Reichsautobahn 1933-45.204  
 Road engineers and transport economists in many industrialized countries 
came hence to rather similar conclusions about how to utilize the mass motoring’s 
advantages and how to mitigate its problems. Motorways separated hard and soft 
road users and fast and slow moving vehicles, and drained through traffic from 
urban areas. Motorways meant also level free crossings between roads and railroads, 
no direct entrances from properties and physical separation between the directions of 
traffic, and prevented thereby head on collisions between fast moving vehicles. This 
became clearly evident in the German 1937 road statistics, because the new 
motorways had only 1/6th of the accident rates compared to the former highways, 
and hence considerable less risk for fatalities. The new motorways improved also 
the old parallel trunk roads or highways’ road safety, because the motorways 
drained through traffic from the highways and urban areas.205 It was thus evident 
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already prior to World War Two that motorways made it possible to combine mass 
motoring with safe and efficient transports of passengers and goods. Motorways 
gave also significant fuel and time savings because of higher and more constant 
traveling speeds compared to the old trunk roads and highways, and improved all 
other things equal the environmental conditions because of reduced fuel 
consumption and thereby less emissions from the vehicles. 
 The motorways and expressways’ emergence was also consequential for the 
public road administrations’ organizing. Italy and Germany established centralized 
State road administrations during the interwar years. The same did Great Britain, 
because the 1936 Trunk Road Act defined about 4.500 miles of Britain’s most 
crowded highways as trunk roads managed by the Ministry of Traffic.206 Great 
Britain had until 1936 a strong tradition for local road administrations, similarly as 
for instance Denmark and Sweden. But the motorway investments’ order of 
magnitude and need for coordination to utilize these investments fully increased the 
pressure on those days’ usually decentralized and local road administrations. 
 Denmark came close to being one of those European countries that built 
motorways prior to World War Two, because the motorist organization FDM, the 
Ministry of Public Works and many engineering and construction companies were 
all strongly influenced by the development south of the border, concerning how to 
solve the 1920s and 30’s sharply rising road traffic with entailing road safety and 
environmental problems. Denmark’s Royal Automobile Club started lobbying for 
construction of the Beeline (Fuglefluktslinjen) in 1934 when Chairman E. J. Ipsen 
contacted Road Inspector General Fritz Todt, who expressed interest for linking the 
Danish road system with the German Autobahns. Rudolf Christiani, the engineering 
and construction company Christiani & Nielsen’s managing director furthered 
DRAC and Ipsen’s initiative in 1935.207  
 Three of Denmark’s leading international engineering companies Christiani & 
Nielsen, Højgaard & Schultz A/S and Kampmann, Kierulff & Saxild A/S 
(Kampsax) proposed March 9th 1936 construction of a national network of 
motorways all across Denmark. The Swedish engineering and construction 
companies A-B Armerad Betong, Byggnads AB Contractor and A-B Skånska 
Cementgjuteriet were co-sponsors of this initiative, because the plans included also a 
combined motorway and single-track railroad bridge across Øresund. The 
engineering companies’ motorway and bridge plan was also coordinated with the 
Swedish and Norwegian executives.208 Private initiatives for major publicly 
financed infrastructure investments were not uncommon in Denmark, because 
private interests had initiated several of those railroads built since the middle of the 
19th century.209 But as we soon will see, the 1936 motorway initiative created 
considerable political turmoil. Chartered engineer Knud Højgaard, Højgaard & 
Schultz A/S’ merchant and financial officer, who was clearly inspired by the 
German and Italian infrastructure projects, and who admired Portugal’s dictator 
Salazar, launched the motorway plan publicly in the Engineers’ Association 
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(Ingeniørforeningen) March 25th 1936.210 This motorway and bridge plan was 
obviously made with the Stauning executive’s quiet consent. 
Figure 7: The engineering and construction companies’ 1936 motorway and bridge 
plan. 
 
Source: Christiani & Nielsen, Højgaard & Schultz A/S, Kampmann, Kierulf & Saxild A/S, Motorveje 
med broer over Storebælt og Øresund, Copenhagen, March 9th 1936. 
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 The engineering and construction companies that made this grand plan were 
not ‘anybodies’. Several Danish engineering companies specialized in advanced 
concrete constructions for harbors, railroads, tunnels and bridges prior to and after 
World War One, and became soon multinational enterprises, because the Danish 
home market was small and limited the engineering and construction companies’ 
growth opportunities. Denmark had also an engineer surplus during the interwar 
years. About 400 Danish engineers were in 1939 employed abroad by Danish 
engineering companies. Many of the Danish engineers that established engineering 
and construction companies involved in business abroad had studied at Denmark’s 
Technical University (Polyteknisk Læreanstalt) under Professor Asger S. 
Ostenfeldt.211 Christiani & Nielsen was founded 1904. Højgaard & Schultz A/S and 
Kampsax were both founded in 1918. Christiani & Nielsen built a major railroad 
installation and parts of Cherbourg’s quays in France in 1928, Rio de Janeiro’s 
airport and a railroad in Caracas, Venezuela. Højgaard & Schultz A/S built harbors 
in Gdynia in Poland, and Setubal and Madeira in Portugal. Kampsax built 850 
kilometers railroad in Turkey between 1927 and the early 1930s, and began 
similarly construction of the Trans Iranian Railroad in 1933.212 Danish engineering 
companies expanded hence internationally during the interwar years, when Denmark 
struggled economically, and became soon recognized as leading in advanced 
concrete constructions. 
 Germany became Christiani & Nielsen’s most important and profitable market 
after Adolf Hitler’s takeover in 1933, because construction of motorways played a 
crucial role in the nazi-executive’s counter cyclic policy. About 124.000 Germans 
were engaged in construction of motorways in 1936, even if the number went down 
to 81.000 in 1939 and 19.000 in 1940. Christiani & Nielsen built 68 kilometers of 
the Hansa motorway between Hamburg and Lübeck in 1934-35, a section in the 
former HAFRABA project, and one of the first sections on the “Straßen des 
Führers”. Christiani & Nielsen was awarded further contracts for construction of 
German motorways from 1935 until the outbreak of World War Two, and had in 
1939 completed about 120 kilometers motorways. Christiani & Nielsen was thus one 
of the major players on the German market. Germany’s largest construction 
company, Phillip Holzmann, had completed about 300 kilometers when the 
Autobahn construction was suspended in 1942. Christiani & Nielsen was partly 
forced to reinvest its profits in Germany, because the Nazi executive restricted 
transfers to Denmark.213 
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Figure 8: The revised proposed motorway H, June 1937. 
 
Source: Christiani & Nielsen, Højgaard & Schultz A/S, Kampmann, Kierulf & Saxild A/S, Motorveje 
med broer over Storebælt og Øresund supplerende bemærkninger til forslag af 9. Marts 1936, 
Copenhagen, June 17th 1937:36 Fig. 28. 
 The Danish engineering and construction companies’ plan outlined 
construction of three four-lane 19,5 meters wide concrete motorways north south 
and east west all across Denmark, with a total length of 684,56 kilometers, almost 
similarly as Denmark’s first national trunk road system built 1763-1867. Motorway I 
from Copenhagen in east to Esbjerg in west, with a combined motorway and dual 
track railroad bridge across Great Belt, via Fyn and Odense, across the Small Belt, 
and thereafter across Jutland. Esbjerg provided ship connections to among others 
Great Britain; one of Denmark’s most important export markets. Motorway II went 
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from Kruså in southern Jutland, at the German border, to Hirtshals on Jutland’s 
almost northernmost point, and made Jutland the link between Norway and the 
European mainland via ferries. Motorway III from Copenhagen, across Falster down 
to Rødbyhavn on Lolland, linked eastern Denmark to Germany via a ferry across 
Fehmarn, alternatively via a bridge across Fehmarn, and established the planned 
Beeline.214 These three motorways became the starting point for what was later 
became known as the motorway H. 
 The three motorways with bridges would lead to significant timesaving 
compared to the existing highways and ferry connections. Motorway I from 
Copenhagen to Esbjerg would reduce the traveling time from 7,5 to 3,5 hours given 
construction of the Great Belt Bridge. Motorway II from Kruså to Hirtshals would 
similarly reduce the traveling time from 7,5 to 3,75 hours. And motorway III from 
Copenhagen to Rødbyhavn would reduce the traveling time from 4,5 to 2 hours.215 
Motorway III with a ferry Rødbyhavn – Fehmarn would similarly reduce the 
average driving time from Copenhagen to Hamburg from more than 11 hours via 
Gedser – Warnemünde to 4,5 hours given a speed of 100 kilometers per hour on the 
motorways. The Øresund Bridge would similarly reduce the traveling time with train 
from Malmø to Hamburg from 13 hours via Gedser – Warnemünde or 11,25 hours 
via Trälleborg – Sassnitz to 4,75 hours with an express train, and 6 hours with a 
steam train.216 The proposed motorways and road and railroad bridges would thus 
increase Denmark’s efficiency considerably, improve the infant Danish trade and 
industry’s competitiveness and largely pay for themselves through timesaving and 
increased employment. On top of the timesaving came significantly improved road 
safety. The proposed motorways would simply make Denmark smaller, similarly as 
the 19th century’s transition from horse and cart and sailing vessels to railroads and 
steamships. 
 The engineering and construction companies recommended organizing and 
financing their project through what they denoted as Denmark’s Motorway and 
Bridge Fund (Danmarks Motorvejs- og Brofond). The estimated construction costs 
were about 628 millions 1936 DKK or 1.526,9 millions 1990 PPP USD, hereunder 
565 millions DKK or 1.373,7 millions 1990 PPP USD in Denmark, because the 
Øresund Bridge’s costs were supposed shared with Sweden, because southern 
Sweden would benefit greatly. The estimated cost for the three motorways was 219 
millions DKK or 532,5 millions 1990 PPP USD, 257 millions DKK or 624,9 
millions 1990 PPP USD for the Great Belt Bridge and 152 millions DKK or 369,6 
millions 1990 PPP USD for the Øresund Bridge. The engineering and construction 
companies recommended accomplishing the plan within ten years. Annual 
investments of approximately 56,5 millions DKK or 137,4 millions 1990 PPP USD 
would provide employment for about 12.000 workers annually with related 
multiplier effects. The engineering companies recommended financing the 
motorways and bridges with 30 years State loans carried by Denmark’s Motorway 
and Bridge Fund, and proposed also a 50/50 split of the interest payments and loan 
amortization between the motorists’ fuel and vehicle tax payments to the Road Fund 
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and annual appropriations from Rigsdagen.217 Increased employment was not an 
insignificant argument, because road construction had been one of the Danish 
executive, counties and municipals’ most important means against unemployment 
during the 1920s and 30s, and explains largely why Denmark had one of Europe’s 
best-developed road systems in 1940.218 Investing 565 millions DKK or 1.373,7 
millions 1990 PPP USD in new roads was a lot, but the average annual Danish road 
and bridge investments 1924/25-1934/35 had been about 80 millions DKK or 201,9 
millions 1990 PPP USD. The engineering companies’ proposal of investing about 
56,5 millions DKK or 137,4 millions 1990 PPP USD annually were thus well below 
the former annual road investments, even if Denmark in 1936 struggled with State 
economic problems due to the depression’s repercussions and significantly reduced 
agricultural exports, because of the gold standard’s collapse and the increasing 
tendency to politicized trade based on bilateral agreements. The engineering and 
construction companies’ proposal of lower annual road investments than the 
preceding decade may have been part of the motorway and bridge plan’s marketing 
efforts. 
 However, the motorway and bridge plan came almost immediately under 
attack, most likely because it challenged Denmark’s road policy status quo and the 
municipal autonomy. The engineering and construction companies claimed 
Denmark’s decentralized road administration lead to uncoordinated road 
investments, inefficient utilization of the motorists’ payments to the Road Fund and 
a road system with poor road safety records.219 The engineering and construction 
companies were here in line with the Stauning executive, because they 
recommended establishment of a centralized road administration similarly as in 
Italy, Germany and Great Britain. But the engineering and construction companies’ 
recommendation could be interpreted as a cutthroat attack on the counties, the 
County Road Inspectors that often were local petty kings as well as Rigsdagen’s 
distributional coalitions. Danish Road Journal (Dansk Vejtidsskrift), edited by 
Professor A. R. Christensen from Denmark’s Technical University (Danmarks 
Tekniske Højskole), Bornholm’s County Governor P. Chr. von Stemann and the 
Ministry of Public Work’s S. Garde, considered the proposed motorways and 
bridges as overkill given the road traffic.220 The three engineering and construction 
companies were hence correct professionally but missed the mark politically, despite 
the executive’s tacit support, because they overlooked the mayors, County Road 
Inspectors and Rigsdagen’s distributional coalitions. This miscalculation may have 
been a result of among others Knud Højgaard and other leading Danish engineers’ 
contempt for democracy during the interwar years. 
 The three engineering and construction companies response to the 
traditionalists’ opposition against the 1936 motorway and bridge plan was a revised 
and reduced proposal in June 1937, based on partly turnpike financing of the Great 
Belt Bridge, instead of complete tax financing, or fast ferries instead of a bridge, and 
a road bridge only across Øresund, rather than a combined railroad and road bridge. 
The Øresund Bridge could also be organized as a private enterprise with State 
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guaranteed loans and fully user financed through turnpikes. The engineering 
companies proposed also to substitute some of the 19,5 meters wide four lane 
motorways with 13 meters wide two or three lane expressways on the least crowded 
sections, because expressways reduced the construction costs about 22 percent per 
meter, but of course at the cost of reduced road safety. The expressways could later 
be expanded to motorways, but at the price of increased total construction costs.221 
However, the engineering and construction companies stressed the only foresighted 
and sustainable solution of Denmark’s fast growing congestion, accident and 
environmental problems were construction of adequately equipped motorways.222 
The proposed motorways and bridges would also make Denmark the hub in 
Scandinavia’s future road transport system, which would benefit Denmark 
economically. The proposed motorways and bridges was the only cost efficient 
solution in the long run, compared to Denmark’s existing crowded highways and 
ferries. 
Danish road policy and road construction during World War Two 
Germany assaulted Denmark April 9th 1940 similarly as Norway, but Denmark was 
not occupied de jure such as Norway, even if most Danes were well aware the actual 
power relations. It was therefore seemingly business as usual for the elected 
executive and Rigsdagen, even if Thorvald Stauning’s Social Democratic and 
Radical Parties coalition was expanded to a national coalition supplied with 
technocratic ministers from July 8th 1940. Businesspersons and technocrats like the 
engineers Knud Højgaard and Peer Kampmann, ship owner A. P. Møller and Prince 
Axel, the so-called Højgaard circle, considered themselves better fit to govern 
Denmark than the elected politicians because of the extraordinary situation, to avoid 
a Nazi executive. Erik Scavenius, civil servant and former Radical Party member, 
who also had served as Denmark’s technocratic minister of foreign affairs during 
World War One, was appointed as new minister of foreign affairs. Public prosecutor 
Harald Petersen was appointed minister of justice. Erik Scavenius served also as 
Prime Minister from November 9th 1942 until May 5th 1945, after democratic 
executive resigned August 29th 1943 and was replaced by civil servant rule.223 More 
than 60.000 Danes worked in Germany in 1941. There was also a large but 
unspecified number of Danes who were employed by the Germans for construction 
of airports and fortifications in Denmark during World War Two.224 
 Gunnar Larsen served as technocratic minister of public works July 8th 1940 – 
August 29th 1943. Gunnar Larsen graduated as engineer in chemistry from 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1926 and worked thereafter as head of the 
cement and cement production equipment manufacturer F.L. Smidth & Co’s New 
York subsidiary until 1932 when he returned to Denmark to assist his father Poul 
Larsen’s governing of F.L. Smidth & Co. Gunnar Larsen became partner and 
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managing director in F.L. Smidth & Co when his father died, and was even 
Cementcentralen’s managing director.225 F.L.Smidth & Co had monopoly on 
production of cement in Denmark throughout most of the 20th century, and was also 
Denmark’s single largest industrial export enterprise in the 1920s and 30s. Many of 
F.L. Smidth & Co’s export projects were accomplished in close cooperation with 
Denmark’s internationally oriented engineering and construction companies.226 
Gunnar Larsen belonged to the same network as the three engineering and 
construction companies that made the 1936-37 motorway and bridge initiative, and 
had also been a part of the Højgaard circle. The “national conservative” Højgaard-
circle’s ideal was the French Vichy-regime.227  
 The Germans suggested in July 1940 construction of a motorway from 
Germany to Sweden, via Rødbyhavn, Copenhagen and Helsingør. This motorway, 
except the leg from Copenhagen to Helsingør was identical to the three engineering 
and construction companies’ Motorway III proposed in 1936, and the Beeline 
championed by the motorist organizations since the early 1930s. Gunnar Larsen met 
with Reichsminister Fritz Todt in Berlin in August 1940. Rudolf Christiani, head of 
Denmark’s largest engineering and construction company Christiani & Nielsen and 
member of Rigsdagen, headed Rigsdagen’s committee that processed the law about 
the Lolland motorway. But the Liberal Party’s Oluf Kragh opposed this project in 
Rigsdagen’s committee according to the economic historian Steen Andersen, 
because Kragh considered this motorway a “major invasion route for Germany”. But 
the Liberal Party came to an agreement with the other collaborating parties, and the 
Danish Ministry of Public Works and the German Ministry of Traffic signed April 
8th 1941 the agreement about construction of ferry harbors in Rødbyhavn and 
Fehmarn with entailing motorway and railroad connections south and north of the 
border. Denmark’s four major parties agreed also about construction of a motorway 
across Lolland and Falster April 17th 1941, another section of the Beeline. The 
Lolland-Falster motorway from Rødbyhavn to the Storstrøm Bridge, hereunder a 
new bridge across Guldborgsund, was managed by the Ministry of Public Work’s 
new department Technical Central (Teknisk Central). Establishment of Technical 
Central was motivated by the Social Democratic Party’s desire for employment and 
checking the private construction companies’ political influence, according to Steen 
Andersen, even if Technical Central was staffed by engineers from the major 
construction companies and F.L. Smidth & Co. The spade broke September 14th 
1941 when minister of public works Gunnar Larsen launched construction of the 
Lolland motorway. One of the guests that witnessed the broken spade was Fritz 
Todt. Many Danes considered this broken spade an omen concerning the 
collaboration policy. The Danish motorway was planned and built by the 
construction companies Monberg & Thorsen, and N.C. Monberg. The construction 
companies Christiani & Nielsen and Højgaard & Schultz were also involved in 
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planning and construction of the Beeline, but on the German side of the border.228 
Gunnar Larsen did his best to maintain the employment and activity level after the 
German invasion. One result was construction of Denmark’s first motorways.  
 The engineering and construction companies’ downsized 1937 plans did not 
change Danish Road Journal’s view on the project, rather the opposite, because 
Danish Road Journal defended status quo, particularly the local road 
administrations and the County Road Inspectors. The Ministry of Public Work’s 
individual reimbursement and the Chief Road Inspector was more than sufficient 
centralization, according to Danish Road Journal, which considered the existing 
road system adequate given the traffic. Possible motorway sections could be built 
later on if or when needed. Folketinget shelved most of the 1936-37 motorway and 
bridge plans, during its deliberations about a new Road Act during the spring 1941, 
even if Knud Højgaard and others engaged in lobbying for a centralized and expert 
governed road administration.229 These deliberations made it evident that neither 
Thorvald Stauning’s executive nor the engineering and construction companies that 
advocated construction of motorways was satisfied with the 1867 Road Act that 
made construction of trunk roads, which were national collective goods, local 
responsibilities rather national responsibilities such as in Germany, Italy and Great 
Britain. Motorways were then defined as highways in Denmark, which were local 
responsibilities according to the 1867 Road Act. However, the Danish motorway 
enthusiasts headed by Gunnar Larsen and Knud Højgaard were not able to change 
the rules of the game during World War Two. Rigsdagen’s majority defended status 
quo. 
 The engineering and construction companies Christiani & Nielsen and 
Højgaard & Schultz planned and built German sections of the Beeline until Fritz 
Todt’s successor Albert Speer in 1943 postponed further works.230 Rudolf Christiani 
used also the opportunity under an official Danish visit in Berlin in November 1941, 
headed by minister of public works Gunnar Larsen, to propose construction of a 
bridge across Great Belt, financed through the German accounts in Denmark’s 
Nationalbank. But Christiani’s initiative enraged the Social Democratic Party’s 
minister of finance Vilhelm Buhl, because Rudolf Christiani was not only member 
of Folketinget but also Christiani & Nielsen’s managing director. Christiani 
interfered here directly in the Danish-German relations, which was the executive’s 
turf.231 The Danish executive was hence well aware Rudolf Christiani’s particular 
mixture of politics and business, hereunder his attempts of utilizing the German 
presence to his own company’s advantage on the taxpayers and the executive’s 
expense. 
 Gunnar Larsen was one of Erik Scavenius’ “most loyal supporters” and 
bridged the gap between the “increasingly skeptical politicians” according to the 
historian Bo Lidegaard, because a growing number of Danes began to question the 
collaboration policy.232 Erik Scavenius and Gunnar Larsen initiated in October 1941 
establishment of a private association which was constituted December 11th 1941 as 
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The Working Party for Promotion of Danish Initiatives in Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe (Arbejdsudvalget til Fremme af dansk Initiativ i Øst- og Sydøsteuopa) 
headed by Aarhus Oliemølle’s director Thorkild Juncker, who was well connected 
with Danish Nazis and conservative industrialists such as Knud Højgaard. Gunnar 
Larsen and Thorkild Juncker visited Port Kunda in Estionia in April 1942 to study 
whether it was possible to reopen F.L. Smidth’s cement factory that had been 
nationalized after the Russians occupied Estonia in 1940. The factory came in 
production in 1942, and produced cement for the Germans until February 1944. The 
factory was manned by Jewish slave laborers from a nearby concentration camp 
from October 1943, when the Danish managers left the factory, according to Bo 
Lidegaard who studied Danish politics during the interwar years and during World 
War Two, and the journalist Søren Ellemose who wrote F.L. Smidth & Co’s history. 
The Working Party for Promotion of Danish Initiatives in Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe became later the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Eastern Commission 
(Østrumsudvalg). Its main purpose was, according to the economic historian Steen 
Andersen, to reestablish Danish business interests in the Soviet areas occupied by 
the Germans. However, the Eastern Commission’s existence was not publicly 
known until January 1943. The Eastern Commission was wound up in October 
1943.233 Gunnar Larsen fled to Sweden August 30th 1944, because he feared being 
liquidated by the National Resistance Movement.234 The governing Danish civil 
servants made hence some organizational adjustments when the military balance of 
power between the Germans and the allied nations started to shift. Gunnar Larsen 
understood somewhat later that others questioned some of his political moves after 
the German invasion. 
 The German invasion in April 1940 created a window of opportunity for the 
Danish engineering and construction companies’ 1936-37 plans for a national 
motorway and bridge system. The German invasion created also a window of 
opportunity for entrepreneurs like Gunnar Larsen and Rudolf Christiani with 
rightwing nationalist sympathies, who combined politics, collaboration and personal 
profits through publicly financed infrastructure projects in Denmark and abroad. 
Their maneuvering through the foul waters 1940-45 facilitated also construction of 
Denmark’s first motorway sections from 1941 on the so-called Beeline, and 
similarly construction of harbors and motorway sections on the German part of the 
Beeline until 1943. Rudolf Christiani brought even the proposed Great Belt Bridge 
on the agenda, but this initiative fell to the ground, among others because of minister 
of finance Vilhelm Buhl’s unhesitating intervention against Christiani’s combined 
private diplomacy and project acquisition. 
Conclusions 
Where do these discussions bring us concerning this study’s four working 
hypothesis with regard to the Danish case prior to 1945? First, this study’s main 
hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road 
policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good 
was both strengthened and weakened prior to 1945 because the Danish State’s 
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construction of a national trunk road system 1761-1867 to facilitate economic 
growth and development was strong evidence about trunk roads perceived as 
national collective goods. The late 18th century Danish executive imported these 
ideas from France. But the 1867 Road Act made road policy and road construction 
the counties and municipals’ responsibility when the first trunk road system was 
completed. The 1867 Road Act’s institutional arrangement facilitated first and 
foremost construction of roads that were local collective or private goods. But 
Rigsdagen’s establishment of the Road Fund and the executive’s approval of 
individual applications for reimbursements from 1931, when road transports 
substituted railroad transports, increased the executive’s ability to coordinate the 
counties and municipals’ road policy and road construction. The Danish engineering 
and construction companies’ 1936-37 plans for construction of a national motorway 
system with bridges across Great Belt and Øresund, developed with the executive’s 
tacit consent, indicated clearly the Danish executive considered modern trunk roads 
and motorways national collective goods similarly as in Italy, Germany and Great 
Britain, but Rigsdagen’s majority defended status quo and the local road 
administrations. Denmark’s engineering and industry moved into the executive 
when F.L. Smidth & Co’s managing director Gunnar Larsen became technocratic 
minister of public works July 8th 1940 – August 29th 1943. Gunnar Larsen used this 
window of opportunity to combine politics, collaboration and business and launched 
in September 1941 construction of Denmark’s first motorway sections from 
Rødbyhavn to the Storstrøm Bridge. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was strengthened prior to 1945, after the 1867 
Road Act came into power, because the bicameral Rigsdagen’s seat allocation led to 
establishment of distributional coalitions that governed the Road Fund’s allocation 
key. 5/6 of the Road Fund’s reimbursements went to highways in rural areas, even if 
most cars were located in urban areas. Rigsdagen’s distributional coalitions 
championed also the decentralized road administrations’ maintenance. Most Danish 
bridges built during the interwar years were result of pork barrel deals or logrolls in 
Rigsdagen. Almost every major bridge was linked to bridges in other parts of 
Denmark. Rudolf Christiani’s private diplomacy in Great Britain for construction 
and financing of the Storstrøm Bridge in the early 1930s succeeded, but Christiani’s 
private diplomacy in Germany in November 1941 for construction of the Great Belt 
Bridge was not equally successful, even if Christiani during the spring 1941 
managed to convince the other Liberal Party legislators to approve construction of 
the Beeline and Denmark’s first motorway.  
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was strengthened prior to 1945, because the Liberal Party was a 
particularly staunch defender of the counties and municipals’ autonomy with regard 
to road policy and road construction, and the Road Fund’s allocation of the highway 
reimbursements reflected clearly the Liberal Party’s preferences. The Danish prewar 
motorway enthusiasts were first and foremost engineers with rightwing nationalist 
sympathies, but even the Social Democratic and Radical Parties’ executive prior to 
World War Two desired a road policy governed by the executive to safeguard 
national rather than local interests. The minister of public works used road 
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investments strategically in the Social Democratic and Radical Parties’ core areas to 
remedy the unemployment. Denmark had Scandinavia’s highest density of cars and 
Europe’s most developed public road system prior to World War Two. Many roads 
were built, upgraded and/or paved as part of the executive’s counter cyclic policy 
during the interwar years to reduce the unemployment, because Denmark was 
severely hit by the 1920s’ crisis and deflationary policy, the early 1930s’ depression 
and the 1931 liquidation of the gold exchange standard. 
 The final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Danish case prior to 
1945. First, Denmark’s 1849 Constitution replaced the autocracy’s collegial rule 
with German-French style minister rule. The minister rule persisted even after 
introduction of parliamentary rule in 1901. The introduction of minister rule in 1849 
explains Denmark’s very powerful executives throughout the 20th century, even after 
introduction of parliamentary rule, and is clearly an example of path dependence. 
Second, the 1866 Constitution gave the Conservative and Liberal Parties’ increasing 
returns until they lost control of Landstinget in 1936, even if the 1915 Constitution 
and 1920 Constitutional Amendments changed the polity’s rules of the game and 
paved the way for mass politics, and changed thereby Denmark’s political economy 
fundamentally. Denmark had well-established political parties prior to introduction 
of parliamentary rule in 1901. Third, the Danish Ministry of Finance lost its 
dominant position after the 1894 compromise between the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties and introduction of parliamentary rule, and was overruled by Rigsdagen until 
the 1920s, when the Social Democratic Party’s minister of finance did his best to 
reestablish a responsible economic policy. The Danish Ministry of Finance had a 
weaker position than the Swedish and Norwegian Ministries of Finance prior to 
1945. Finally, the 1867 Road Act abolished partly the 1793 Road Act’s road polity, 
downgraded trunk roads to highways and made road construction and road policy 
the counties and municipals’ responsibility. This equilibrium came under pressure in 
1927 when Rigsdagen dedicated the Road Fund’s reimbursements to construction of 
highways, and even more in 1931 when the executive permitted individual 
applications for reimbursements. The equilibrium came further under pressure in 
1933 when the executive appointed a commission for development of a new Road 
Act and even more in 1936-37 when the engineering and construction companies 
forwarded their own national motorway and bridge plans with the executive’s tacit 
consent. However, the 1866/67 equilibrium persisted, because the voters rejected the 
Social Democratic, Radical and Conservative Parties’ proposed new Constitution in 
the 1939 referendum with the smallest possible margin. The engineering and 
construction industry governed the Ministry of Public Works from July 1940 until 
August 29th 1943, but was not able to alter the road polity formally. 
1945-59 – Political and economic reconstruction and adaptation to 
mass motoring 
1945-59 was first and foremost characterized by political and economical 
reconstruction after World War Two, and Denmark’s transition from an agricultural 
to a diversified industrial economy. The first postwar period became also the mass 
motoring’s definite break through, and necessitated fundamental reforms within the 
road polity as well with regard to road policy and road construction. 
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Political and economic reconstruction after the collaboration 1940-45  
The Germans financed their stay in Denmark with payments from two accounts in 
Denmark’s Nationalbank guaranteed by the executive.235 The executive paid hence 
for the Germans by printing money, because the Germans enjoyed unlimited cash 
credit in Denmark’s Nationalbank. But the Germans were not able to pay for these 
loans that among others had been spent on purchasing goods and services from 
Danish farmers, merchants, manufacturers and construction companies.236 
Denmark’s Nationalbank replaced therefore all bank notes July 23rd 1945.237 This 
money substitution reduced the postwar money supply significantly, because the 
money supply had increased fourfold 1940-45.  
 The voters punished the Social Democratic and Radical Parties for their 
collaboration in the October 1945 election that brought the Liberal Party to power. 
But the postwar Liberal executive’s economic policy was no success. Their attempts 
of increased export prices for agriculture products combined with free imports lead 
to reduced exports, increased imports of consumer goods and lack of foreign 
currency to pay for the imports. The answer to these problems was import 
regulations and continued rationing until about 1953. The Liberal Party’s attempt of 
regaining Slesvig from Germany led to a new election in 1947 that brought the 
Social Democratic Party back in position.238  
 The Danish economic policy 1945-53 shifted back and forth depending on 
who was in position. The Liberal Party believed in a small state and annual budget 
balance. The Social Democrats believed initially in an active state, and in 
nationalization and socialization of the means of production, but moderated their 
economic policy after the agreements with the Conservative and Liberal Parties in 
1932 and 1933, but used plenty of radical rhetoric in their 1945 political platform, 
Future Denmark (Fremtidens Danmark).239 This radical rhetoric was first and 
foremost for containing the Communists that had strengthened their position, 
particularly in urban industrialized areas during the war. But Future Denmark’s 
substantial content was a Keynesian economic policy for increased employment and 
wealth.240 The bottom line was development of a bigger pie after the liberation that 
facilitated increased redistribution to the Social Democratic Party’s core voters. 
 The Social Democratic Party believed in a more regulated economy than the 
Liberal Party, and established in November 1947 the Economic Secretariat (Det 
Økonomiske Secretariat) headed by former Prime Minister, minister of finance and 
then minister without portfolio Vilhelm Buhl, who also headed the Ministerial 
Committee for Economic Coordination and Supplies (Ministerudvalg for 
Økonomisk Samording og Forsyning). Buhl became soon the executive’s strong 
man concerning economic policy, on the Ministry of Finance’s expense.241 
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However, the Ministry of Finance’s weak position, Folketinget’s Finance 
Committee’s strong position and its approval of extra appropriations and the 
Economic Secretariat’s strong position made it difficult to limit the postwar public 
spending.242 The net result became a stop-go policy throughout the 1950s. 
 Denmark joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and participated in the 
postwar periods fixed exchange rate system established through the 1944 Bretton 
Woods agreement.243 Denmark received Marshall Aid between 1948 and 53, but the 
Liberal Party was skeptical to the Marshall Aid, because it introduced what many 
liberals considered as a planned economy. But the Marshall Aid moderated the 
Social Democratic Party’s economic policy further, because Denmark had to join 
OEEC, lift the import regulations and introduce economic long-term planning, 
hereunder national budgets. The Danish executive made its Long Term Program in 
1949.244 The DKK was devaluated about 30 percent September 19th 1949 after Great 
Britain September 18th devaluated the GBP 30 percent, once again to safeguard 
Denmark’s agricultural exports to Britain.245 
 A Liberal and Conservative coalition headed by the Liberal party’s Erik 
Eriksen came to power after the 1950 election, and governed until 1953. Erik 
Eriksen’s two most significant achievements, according to the historian Søren 
Mørch, were that he became Prime Minister and that he piloted the 1953 
Constitution through Rigsdagen and the referendum.246 Denmark’s four major 
parties agreed finally about the new Constitution, even if the Liberal Party’s former 
Prime Minister Knud Kristensen with followers opposed it. The voters approved the 
1953 Constitution with the smallest possible margin, because only 45,76 percent of 
those with the right to vote voted yes.247 Erik Eriksen managed hence to get the 
voters’ approval, which slipped for Thorvald Stauning in 1939, because Erik Eriksen 
utilized the female succession politically. Most voters did not have a clue or were 
not particularly concerned about the political implications of introducing a 
unicameral system, parliamentary rule by law and an election system based on one 
person – one vote, even if these issues triggered most political parties’ tactic and 
strategic considerations. But most voters understood that female succession would 
make princess Margrethe Queen of Denmark.248 Erik Eriksen was thus the right 
person in the right position in the decisive moment, and understood, unlike for 
instance Knud Kristensen, that Denmark’s political balance and political economy 
had been fundamentally altered already in 1936 when the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties lost control of Landstinget. Erik Eriksen understood also the bicameral 
system could keep the Liberal Party out of power for decades. Because the 
bicameral system that had safeguarded the Liberal Party’s influence until 1936 could 
also do the opposite, similarly as in Sweden where the bicameral system kept the 
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Social Democratic Party in position and reduced the non-socialist parties to 
powerless opposition. 
 The 1953 Constitution reshaped thereby the Danish polity fundamentally, even 
if it still maintained conservative guarantees such as referendums in case of 
constitutional amendments or surrender of national sovereignty and the possibility 
for rejection of laws approved by Folketinget through referendums, except the 
State’s annual budget.249 The 1953 Constitution instituted also adjustments of 
Folketinget’s geographical allocation of the 135 district seats every 5th year, 
according to the census of population, and introduced also a similar procedure for 
adjustment of the geographical allocation of Folketinget’s 40 supplementary 
seats.250 The 1953 Constitution strengthened the party discipline and party bosses 
significantly, because of more frequent elections, abolition of Landstinget with eight 
years terms and because common members of Folketinget that deviated from the 
party line risked their forthcoming nomination.251 
 The Social Democratic Party regained power in September 1953, and 
governed thereafter uninterrupted until February 1968 either alone or in 
coalitions.252 The so-called triangle executive established after the 1957 election, 
consisting of the leftwing Social Democratic Party, the middle Radical Party and the 
rightwing Georgistic Justice Party (Retforbundet), and changed Denmark 
fundamentally, because the triangle executive initiated and carried out structural 
reforms that transformed the Danish economy from almost unilateral dependence of 
agricultural exports to diversified trade and export industries. These structural 
reforms paved the way for Denmark’s economic miracle throughout the 1960s.253 
The Ministry of Economy became permanent from April 1st 1958, and the Radical 
Party’s Bertel Dahlgaard headed the ministry until 1961. Dahlgaard had been 
minister of interior 1929-40 in Stauning’s executive.254 The triangle executive was 
Denmark’s first postwar majority executive.255 This explains why the triangle 
executive was able to accomplish substantial reforms that earlier had been politically 
impossible. 
 Denmark’s 1950 trade and industry structure came close to the Western 
average with 22 percent employed in the primaries, 37 percent in the industry and 41 
percent in the services.256 Iron and metal industry replaced food and beverages as 
Denmark’s leading industries 1947-56.257 But the Danish economic policy 
throughout the 1950s differed fundamentally from those in Sweden and Norway 
because of liberal credit markets. Denmark’s private credit institutions and savings 
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and loans were permitted to issue bonds. Denmark’s Nationalbank emphasized also 
a high-interest policy, with interests above the international capital markets, and 
encouraged the trade and industry to utilize the international capital markets, to 
compensate for Denmark’s almost permanent balance of payments deficits, because 
the dominant agricultural sectors blocked further industrialization.258 The Swedish 
and Norwegian executives pursued low interest policies with partial credit rationing 
in Sweden and politically governed credit rationing and politically governed 
allocation of major investments in Norway. 
 The Danish agriculture experienced 8,3 percent annual growth 1947-50, and 
thereafter 2,3 percent annual growth until 1957. Danish industry experienced 
similarly 9,4 percent annual growth 1947-50 and thereafter 2,4 percent annual 
growth until 1957. The Danish construction sector experienced 8,4 percent annual 
growth 1947-50, and thereafter 2,1 percent annual growth until 1957. The tertiary 
sector experienced 3,5 percent annual growth 1947-50 and thereafter 3,0 percent 
annual growth until 1957. The total annual economic growth 1947-50 was 5,0 
percent, and thereafter 2,7 percent.259 The DKK became convertible towards the US 
dollar in 1958.260 The Danish economy performed very well during the initial 
reconstruction 1947-50, but went thereafter into a phase of relatively slow growth, 
until the long-term boom that facilitated the transformation from agricultural to 
industrial exports began in 1958. Most of the initial postwar growth took place in 
traditional primary and secondary sectors; i.e. production of edible or tangible 
goods.  
 How was Denmark’s absolute and relative economic performance 1945-59? 
Angus Maddison’s calculations show that Denmark’s GDP per capita measured in 
1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars were 5.066 dollars in 1945, 6.943 in 50 
and 8.637 in 59. The average for the 12 West European countries was 4.154 dollars 
in 1945, 5.018 in 50 and 7.184 in 59.261 Denmark was in other words well above the 
West European average both in 1945, 50 and 59, as West Europe’s fourth wealthiest 
country measured in GDP per capita in 1945, third wealthiest in 50 and second 
wealthiest in 59.262 But the price was significant unemployment, and the sop-go 
policies gave also relatively low growth until the boom started in 1958. 
Denmark’s postwar road policy – facilitating the transformation from one-
sided agricultural dependence to diversified trade and export industries 
Denmark’s national resistance movement arrested Gunnar Larsen, technocratic 
minister of public works July 8th 1940 – August 29th 1943, May 12th 1945 when he 
returned from his exile in Sweden.263 Gunnar Larsen had supported Erik Scavenius’ 
signing of the Antikomintern Treaty in Berlin November 25th 1941, even if 
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Rigsdagen’s majority and the remaining executive opposed this move.264 The 
Antikomintern Treaty made the neutral Denmark a de facto partner of Germany, 
Italy and Japan, even if other Danes did their best to minimize the damages. Gunnar 
Larsen was exonerated by the Circuit Court in 1947 and by the Supreme Court in 
1948 from the accusations about economic treason, among others because the 
British Lord Selborne claimed Larsen had cooperated with SOE during the war, 
even if Larsen’s cooperation was limited to forwarding information after two visits 
to Germany in September 1939 and March 1940 prior to the German invasion of 
Denmark. But the other founding families among F.L. Smidth & Co’s owners 
considered obviously Gunnar Larsen as a debit, despite the court’s exoneration. 
Gunnar Larsen was namely forced to sell his stocks in the holding company to his 
sisters, and became thereafter in 1954 managing director and chairman of the board 
for F.L. Smidth’s subsidiary in Ireland. Gunnar Larsen became later also Irish 
citizen.265 Gunnar Larsen was hence exonerated by the courts, but punished by his 
own family and business partners who clearly considered him a debit and bad for 
F.L. Smidth & Co’s future business opportunities. 
 Rudolf Christiani, the engineer, entrepreneur and legislator, who was one of 
the 1936-37 motorway and bridge plans’ champions, was denoted as “a notorious 
German collaborator” by New York Times, and the US authorities blacklisted his 
company Christiani & Nielsen in 1944.266 Rudolf Christiani was forced to resign as 
Christiani & Nielsen’s managing director December 18th 1946 by among others 
Handelsbanken, and was succeeded by his son Alex Christiani who headed 
Christiani & Nielsen’s French subsidiary during the war together with the German 
engineer Emil Blunk, who headed Christiani & Nielsen’s construction of motorways 
in Germany prior to World War Two. Emil Blunk joined the German Nazi Party in 
1935, cooperated closely with Organisation Todt during the war, and had a crucial 
role in Christiani & Nielsen’s construction of submarine bunkers along France’s 
Atlantic coast during the German occupation. Rudolf Christiani was in 1946 charged 
for economic treason, but the case was dismissed in 1949. Rudolf Christiani was 
back in business in 1948 when he once again became part of Christiani & Nielsen’s 
head of affairs, after Christiani & Nielsen had been reorganized from a personally 
owned partnership to a joint stock company.267 Two of those in the Danish 
engineering and construction industry that personified the collaboration policy 1940-
45 were both back in business at the turn of the 1940s and 50s, even if Gunnar 
Larsen was de facto deported by his business associates. 
 The summer of 1945, immediately after the liberalization, was characterized 
by lack of goods, increasing unemployment and lack of housing. One of Carl 
Petersen’s first decisions in 1945, as Social Democratic Party minister of public 
works in the liberation executive, was to freeze the Lolland motorway’s ongoing 
construction that had been approved by Rigsdagen in 1941. Carl Petersen had then 
no desire for further improvement of the roads to Germany. About 35 kilometers of 
the Beeline was almost completed in 1945, except for the paving. The Lolland 
motorway was first completed after the Danish executive and the German federal 
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executives in 1958 signed a new Beeline agreement.268 The worst fumes from the 
collaboration had then evaporated. The Danish engineering and construction 
companies were forgiven. The same was largely the prewar motorway enthusiasts’ 
rightwing and nationalist sympathies. 
 The Danish executive did not impose long lasting rationing and regulations of 
passenger cars, to save foreign currency, such as in Norway, but used instead the 
voter’s wallets as rationing device. The Conservative minister of trade Ove Weikop 
introduced also a particular tax from January 1951 to reduce the profits on sale of 
used cars, due to record high prices on used cars because the demand by far 
exceeded the supply.269 Denmark’s density of passenger cars in 1955 was 48 per 
1000 inhabitants, compared to Norway’s 36 per 1000 inhabitants. The Social 
Democratic governed Sweden, which then had no restrictions on import and sale of 
passenger cars, had 89 passenger cars per 1000 inhabitants.270 All Danish import 
restrictions on trucks and lorries were abolished in 1952, similarly as in Norway. 
The Danish import of passenger cars increased similarly significantly from 1952 
when the executive permitted financing of import of passenger cars with export 
dollars. All Danish restrictions on imports of passenger cars were liquidated in 1957, 
after introduction of very high vehicle taxes that later have been further increased.271 
The usually governing Danish Social Democratic Party relied hence far more on 
market mechanisms than direct regulations during the reconstruction, compared to 
their Norwegian sister party that more relied on direct regulations and rationing after 
World War Two. Denmark’s lack of a national automotive industry made also cars 
an almost perfect tax object, because the legislators could impose very high taxes 
with limited risk for retaliations from other countries. Sweden, which had far fewer 
vehicles per 1000 inhabitants than Denmark prior to World War Two, passed 
Denmark in the early 1950s, because most regulations were lifted prior to 1950 due 
to the non-socialist opposition parties’ resistance against a tightly regulated 
economy, and because the very high Danish vehicle taxes imposed from1957 limited 
the number of cars, even if Denmark later became one of the wealthiest countries in 
the world. 
 The Danish Ministry of Public Works established the so-called Great Belt 
Commission (Storebæltskommissionen) in 1948, because cold winters 1939-40 and 
1947 divided Denmark in two isolated partitions. The Great Belt Commission 
submitted its first report in 1956, which mainly was a discussion about technical 
problems.272 But Denmark’s future need for a ferry-free connection across Great 
Belt was hardly questioned after World War Two. 
 The Social Democratic executive established also the Directorate of Public 
Roads (Vejdirektoratet) April 1st 1949, as an integrated part of the Ministry of Public 
Works, according to the so-called Danish model. This new centralized State road 
administration originated from the former Liberal executive’s 1947 initiative about 
decentralizing the central administration, even if the outcome differed somewhat 
from the Liberal Party executive’s intentions. The Directorate of Public Roads was a 
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merger of the Ministry of Public Work’s two Road Departments, the Road Office 
and the Chief Road Inspector’s Office. Technical Central, which had been manned 
by engineers from among others Christiani & Nielsen, Højgaard & Schultz A/S, 
Kampsax and F.L. Smidth & Co during the war, became somewhat tainted, among 
others because of its involvement in the Lolland motorway. Technical Central was 
therefore renamed to the Directorate of Construction (Anlægsdirektoratet) in 1945, 
and subordinated the Directorate of Public Roads from 1951, where it took care of 
construction issues, particularly motorways.273 Technical Central was integrated in 
the new State road administration after the charges against Gunnar Larsen and 
Rudolf Christiani had been sorted out and the air had been cleared from the worst 
fumes of collaboration. 
 Carl Petersen, who served as Social Democratic minister of public works for 
the second time, appointed the lawyer Kaj Bang as the Directorate of Public Road’s 
first head. The Directorate of Public Road’s main task was planning a national 
motorway system, which then was a well-established idea, among others from 
Germany, Italy, Holland and the Danish engineering and construction companies’ 
1936-37 plans that had been partly approved during the war.274 Kaj Bang, who had 
headed one of the Ministry of Public Work’s Road Offices since 1942, governed the 
Directorate of Public Roads until 1972. The appointment of a lawyer, and not a 
chartered engineer was obviously a bitter pill for many of the engineering and 
construction companies, but they soon learned to live with Kaj Bang, because 
Bang’s long-term goal was a National Road Plan. Bang introduced systematic use of 
cost/benefit analyses in the Directorate of Public Roads almost from day one. Kaj 
Bang must have been a cunning administrator and careful general, because he did 
seemingly not challenge the counties’ established autonomy concerning road policy 
and road construction. But the fact that the Directorate of Public Roads was 
subordinated the Ministry of Public Work’s permanent undersecretary, and not the 
minister directly created sometimes tensions both within the ministry and 
directorate.275 The leading Danish chartered engineers and motorway enthusiasts’ 
well-known rightwing and nationalist sympathies during the interwar years and 
1940-45 made it obviously easier for the Social Democratic Party executive to 
appoint a lawyer instead of a chartered engineer as head of the new Directorate of 
Public Roads. 
 The Directorate of Public Roads became Denmark’s new central road 
administration, even if it then didn’t plan or manage any road construction, because 
road construction and maintenance was still the counties and municipal’s 
responsibility according to the 1867 Road Act. The Road Act commission had been 
in action since 1933, but was still far from an agreement. The Directorate of Public 
Roads became instead responsible for the State’s Road Fund and the counties’ 
reimbursement, even if the Directorate of Public Roads so far had no authority – 
whatsoever – to obstruct or prevent the counties’ accomplishment of particular road 
projects.276 But many perceived the executive’s establishment of the Directorate of 
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Public Roads as an attempt of changing Denmark’s road polity and road policy 
status quo. 
 The Danish and Swedish engineering and construction companies that made 
the 1936-37 motorway and bridge plans revised the planned ferry-free connection 
across Øresund in 1952. The revised plan included a bridge or a tunnel between 
Helsingør and Helsingborg, the so-called H-H alternative, and a tunnel from Amager 
to Saltholm and a tall bridge from Saltholm to Malmø, the so-called K-M 
alternative. Both alternatives were proposed built with four-lane motorways and 
dual track railroads. The Swedish legislature Riksdagen discussed the proposal in 
1952, and the Nordic Council of Ministers (Nordisk råd) encouraged the Swedish 
and Danish executives to further investigating the proposal in 1953.277 The Danish 
and Swedish executives respectively appointed the Øresundscommission 
(Øresundsudvalget) and The Swedish Öresundsdelegation (Svenska 
Öresundsdelegationen) with technical and traffic technical work groups March 12th 
1954. Kaj Bang, head of the Directorate of Public Road, took part in the Danish 
commission, and headed also the traffic economic work group. The Swedish Road 
and Water Construction Board’s Director General Karl-Gustav Hjort took similarly 
part in the Swedish delegation.278 Road and railroad connections with national 
collective good characteristics in both countries came clearly high on the road policy 
agenda both in Denmark and Sweden after World War Two. 
 Kai Lindberg, the Social Democratic Party’s minister of public works from 
August 1955 until November 1966, established the Traffic Economic Commission 
(Det Trafikøkonomiske Udvalg) September 15th 1955, headed by the Ministry of 
Public Work’s permanent undersecretary Palle Christensen. Other members were 
among others Kaj Bang and the heads of the State Railroads, Postal and Telegraph 
Services, the Telephone Inspection and the permanent undersecretary in the 
executive’s Economic Secretariat. The commission’s task was to outline Denmark’s 
need for high-level transport and communication infrastructures the forthcoming 20 
years.279 Kaj Bang was obviously not satisfied with Denmark’s existing high-level 
transport and communication infrastructures and lack of policy coordination, due to 
the counties and municipals’ prominent roles with regard to road policy and road 
construction. 
 Kai Lindberg opened Denmark’s first motorway from Jægersborg to 
Brådebæk on northern Sjælland in 1956. Even the construction of this motorway had 
been approved in 1942, but was later postponed because of the war. This motorway 
was later extended towards Helsingør, and became the northeastern leg of on the 
motorway H.280 The national motorway system proposed by the private construction 
and engineering companies 1936-37 was thus not shelved after World War Two, 
such as similar plans in Norway outlined during the German occupation. 
 Denmark’s road policy turn started in 1957 when Folketinget approved the 
Road Act that had been in process since 1933. The 1957 Road Act replaced the 1867 
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Road Act, reintroduced trunk roads 90 years after Jacob Brønnum Scavenius Estrup 
downgraded them to highways and made road policy and road construction the 
counties and municipals’ turf. The 1957 Road Act authorized the Ministry of Public 
Roads to reclassify roads, and authorized also the minister of public works to 
demand construction of particular new roads or upgrading existing roads, according 
to the minister’s own discretion. The 1957 Road Act gave similarly the counties 
financial incentives to further construction or upgrading of trunk roads, through 
increased reimbursements compared to the other road classes. The 1957 Road Act 
made also the motorway H proposed by the engineering and construction 
companies’ 1936-37 template for Denmark’s future motorway system, and 
safeguarded the Directorate of Public Road’s development of a National Road Plan 
by law. The 1957 Road Act established finally the so-called Road Council 
(Vejnevn), a corporative body. But the Road Council became never a strong 
institution, despite members from the Ministry of Public Works, Ministry of Interior 
and Ministry of Housing, in addition to ten members from the counties, rural 
municipals, cities and magistrates.281 The 1957 Road Act changed hence the rules of 
the game, and punctuated the road policy equilibrium established by Jacob Brønnum 
Scavenius Estrup, and initiated dismantling of the municipal regime that had 
governed Danish road policy and road construction since the 1867 Road Act came 
into power. The 1953 Constitution that abolished the bicameral system paved the 
way for the 1957 Road Act because of Folketinget’s revised seat allocation.282 
 The next Danish road political institutional change took place in 1958, when 
Folketinget approved the 1958 Road Reimbursement Act, which replaced the 1931 
Road License Act that permitted individual applications for reimbursements. The 
1958 Road Reimbursement Act increased the counties’ reimbursement, and 
decoupled partly the Road Fund’s annual reimbursement from the annual vehicle 
and fuel tax revenues, because it permitted the counties and municipals to initiate 
projects exceeding the expected annual reimbursements, and introduced also 
allocation of the reimbursements after negotiations between the Ministry of Public 
Works, the Directorate of Public Roads and the county mayors, the so-called 
“MAMBO-meetings”. The 1958 Road Reimbursement Act gave the counties 75 
percent reimbursement of the approved road costs, but the counties could apply for 
further reimbursement limited to 85 percent of the highways and local roads’ 
construction costs, and up to 100 percent of the motorways’ construction costs, 
except for a minimum county contribution of 50.000 DKK or 47.146,4 1990 PPP 
USD per kilometer motorway.283 The 1958 Road Reimbursement Act opened 
literally the floodgate for construction of new and modern trunk roads, particularly 
motorways. The counties initiated many trunk road projects, exactly as anticipated 
by minister of public works Kai Lindberg and others who championed the 1957 
Road Act and the 1958 Road Reimbursement Act. Construction of modern trunk 
roads and motorways was some of the executive’s means to facilitate Denmark’s 
transition from an agricultural to a diversified industrial economy. 
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 Many major Danish roads built during the 1930s were paved with concrete. 
However the 1950s’ concrete shortage prevented further construction of concrete 
roads, even if many of the 1930s’ concrete paving lasted until the 1970s.284 Most of 
Denmark’s highways and local roads were paved with asphalt within 1960, and had 
often far better standard than comparable Norwegian highways and local roads 25-
30 years later. This paving was possible because many Danish asphalt companies 
provided favorable loans to the counties and municipals throughout the 1950s.285 
The Danish counties and municipals carried thereby out significant loan financed 
improvements of the highways and local roads in the 1950s, that both reduced the 
counties and municipals’ maintenance costs and the road users’ transport times and 
costs. 
 However, not everything was hunky-dory in Denmark during the second half 
of the 1950s, even if the executive did far more for developing a modern road 
infrastructure than for instance in Norway. The head of the Directorate of Public 
Road’s Road Planning Department since 1956, Anders Nyvig, resigned in protest in 
1959, because the Directorate of Public Roads overlooked the cities and urban areas, 
and favored construction of roads in rural areas. Only 1/6th of the reimbursements 
were allocated to the cities and urban areas because of the Road Fund’s allocation 
key established in the 1920s, even if the urban areas had the largest population, most 
cars and the most serious congestion, accident and environmental problems. But 
Nyvig’s resignation was not in vain. The Traffic Economic Commission noticed 
it.286 The urban areas limited road investments in the second half of the 1950s 
reflected clearly the former bicameral Rigsdagen’s geographical seat allocation and 
power relations, because of the rural constituencies’ pivotal position in Landstinget 
prior to introduction of the unicameral system in 1953. 
Conclusions 
Where do these discussions bring us concerning this study’s four working 
hypothesis with regard to the Danish case between 1945 and 1959? First, this 
study’s main hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods 
with road policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the 
common good was clearly strengthened between 1945 and 1959, because 
establishment of the Directorate of Public Roads in 1949, appointment of the 1954 
Øresund Commission, the 1955 Traffic Economic Commission, and Folketinget’s 
approval of the 1957 Road Act and the 1958 Road Reimbursement Act are evidence 
that Denmark’s Social Democratic Party postwar executives and the majority of the 
legislators considered modern trunk roads and motorways national collective goods 
and necessary for the desired transformation from an agricultural to a diversified 
industrial economy. Engineers with rightwing nationalist or even fascist sympathies 
advocated construction of motorways prior to World War Two, but the Danish 
Social Democratic Party’s bosses and economists understood soon that motorways 
could be a useful mean to fuel the growth. Denmark’s numerous minority executives 
1945-59 did not rule out an emphasis on development of national collective goods, 
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because the institutional design safeguarded the common good despite minority 
executives. Many Danish engineering and construction companies were somewhat 
tarnished after World War Two, because of their combination of politics, business 
and collaboration 1940-45, but they were soon forgiven, because their services were 
urgently needed during the reconstruction and postwar boom. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was weakened between 1945 and 1959, because 
the Liberal Party’s Prime Minister Erik Eriksen piloted the 1953 Constitution 
through Rigsdagen and the entailing referendum. The 1953 Constitution liquidated 
the bicameral system and weakened the constituencies’ primacy concerning road 
policy, road construction and particularly concerning resource allocation, even if 
road policy and road construction still remained the counties and municipals’ 
responsibility because of the 1867 Road Act that still governed Denmark’s road 
policy and road construction.  
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was clearly strengthened between 1945 and 1959, because the 1953 
Constitution and introduction of the unicameral Folketinget instead of the bicameral 
Rigsdagen strengthened the political parties’ power and influence on the 
constituencies’ expense. Denmark’s new election system based on one person – one 
vote made it very costly politically for the parties to overlook the most crowded 
constituencies’ voters. This fundamental shift paved the way for a forthcoming 
change of the Road Fund’s reimbursement allocation key. The Social Democratic 
Party used also road policy and road construction deliberately as a mean for 
increased economic growth, which in turn facilitated future redistribution to the 
Social Democratic Party’s voters. The Social Democratic Party’s motivation for 
advocating construction of modern roads differed thus fundamentally from the 
rightwing nationalists’ during the interwar years, because the Danish engineering 
and construction companies championed first and foremost motorways because of 
the business opportunities. The Social Democratic Party considered modern roads as 
a mean for increased economic growth, and thereby future opportunities for 
increased redistribution to the Social Democratic Party’s core voters. Kai Lindberg, 
minister of public works 1955-66, became the architect and executor of the Social 
Democratic Party’s high-growth road policy, which partly reflected Denmark’s post 
1953 political economy. 
 This study’s final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Danish case between 
1945 and 1959. First, the 1953 Constitution’s unicameral system and new election 
system based on one person – one vote punctuated the equilibrium established by 
the 1866 Constitution that had been partly upheld by the 1915 Constitution and the 
1920 Constitutional Amendment. Second, the Danish Ministry of Finance had a 
weak position even after World War Two, a fundamental difference compared to 
Sweden and Norway, but largely a result of path dependence established as a result 
of the 1894 compromise, because of the Ministry of Finance’s close relations with 
the Estrup regime. Third, the executive’s establishment of the Economic Secretariat 
in 1947 together with the Ministerial Committee for Economic Coordination and 
Supplies, and the establishment of the Directorate of Public Roads in 1949 together 
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with the new 1953 Constitution made the 1867 Road Act’s days numbered. The 
1957 Road Act reintroduced trunk roads, and the 1958 Road Reimbursement Act 
gave the counties financial incentives for construction of motorways or other trunk 
roads. The lack of road investments in the most crowded areas that struggled with 
serious congestion, accident and environmental problems was then questioned 
publicly. Finally, the Road Fund’s reimbursement key was upheld because of path 
dependence, because the pre 1949, 1953 and 1957-58 road polity gave the rural 
areas increasing returns, but even this institution’s days were numbered because of 
the new election system based on one person – one vote established through the 
1953 Constitution.  
1960-80 – Boom and crises 
The period 1960-80 was first and foremost characterized by Denmark’s economic 
miracle that ended shortly before the first oil price shock 1973-74. The Danish road 
policy during the 1960s paved the way for construction of the motorway H and 
parked many of the local interests that had governed Danish road policy and road 
construction since the 1867 Road Act came into power. However, the early 1970s’ 
green tide combined with the State economic crisis and stagflation entailing the two 
oil price shocks distinguished soon Danish road policy and road construction.  
Denmark’s postwar economic miracle – and crash landing 
The Danish political system was very stable and predictable, despite frequent 
changes of executives. Minority executives became the rule, rather than the 
exception 1960-80. Only the executives in power from January 1960 until 
September 1964, February 1968 until October 1971 and August 1978 until October 
1979 were majority executives.287 The Social Democrats governed alone or in 
coalitions until 1968, when a coalition between the Liberal, Radical and 
Conservative Parties, headed by the Radical Party’s Hilmar Baunsgaard, Denmark’s 
first “TV politician”, came to power.288 The Social Democratic Party’s Jens Otto 
Krag from Randers on northern Jutland was one of the architects of Denmark’s 
postwar economic policy. Krag’s aim since the 1950s, particularly after he became 
Prime Minister in 1962, was Danish membership in EEC.289 However, Krag’s 1966-
68 executive was dependent of the leftwing populist Socialist People’s Party 
(Socialistisk Folkeparti), and became soon known as the “red cabinet”.290 The non-
socialist executive that came to power in 1968 can be understood as the voters’ 
protest against the increasing welfare state; seemingly strongly increasing taxes, the 
Social Democratic Party’s 1966-68 embracing of the leftwing populists, and against 
the interest organizations’ increasing influence. The non-socialist executive can also 
be explained as a result of the voters being fed up with the Social Democratic Party 
that had governed Denmark most of the time since 1929. Jens Otto Krag regained 
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the power in 1971, but resigned immediately after almost 2/3 of the Danes approved 
Danish membership in EEC in the October 2nd 1972 referendum. Krag handed over 
the power to his preferred successor Anker Jørgensen, a former trade union boss.291  
 Denmark’s 1973 election became a political earthquake, similarly as Norway’s 
1973 election, and paved the way for leftwing and rightwing populist and protest 
parties, among others because of the 1968-72 tax increases.292 The 1973 election 
punctuated partly the postwar equilibrium and established a new and less tidy 
political landscape. The Communist and the Justice Parties reappeared in 
Folketinget. The Christian People’s Party (Kristelig Folkeparti), rather similar to its 
Norwegian sister party got 4 percent of the votes and 7 seats. The Center Democrats 
(Centrumsdemokraterne, CD), a rightwing splinter from the Social Democrats that 
mainly represented the suburban areas’ motorists and row house owners, got 7,8 
percent of the votes and 14 seats, and became later one of Denmark’s leading parties 
with regard to road policy and road construction even if it often struggled with the 
election system’s limit. Mogens Glistrup’s rightwing populist Progress Party 
(Fremskridspartiet) got 15,9 percent of the votes, and became Folketinget’s second 
largest party with 28 seats. The Social Democratic Party lost 24 seats, and had only 
46 left.293 The Liberal Party headed by Prime Minister Poul Hartling governed until 
February 1975 when the Social Democrats and Anker Jørgensen regained power and 
remained in position until September 1982. Anker Jørgensen governed even in 
coalition with the Liberal Party 1978-79, until the coalition collapsed because of the 
economic crisis.294 But Anker Jørgensen was no success as Prime Minster, because 
he remained mentally a trade union boss according to the historian Søren Mørch, 
and emphasized pragmatic and incremental short-term solutions rather than bold 
strategic moves.295 Anker Jørgensen’s executives stumbled from crisis to crisis, even 
if the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties coalition obviously was an attempt of 
recreating the 1930s’ social compromise between the labor and agrarian interests. 
 Denmark experienced constant economic growth from 1958 until the first oil 
price shock in 1973-74, OPEC 1. But the growth was not equally distributed among 
the sectors. The agriculture experienced 0,9 percent annual decline from 1958 to 
1970, while the secondary sector experienced 7,2 percent annual growth. The 
tertiary sector, including the public services, experienced 4,7 percent annual growth. 
The average annual growth for the entire Danish economy from 1958 to 1970 was 
5,0 percent.296 The Danish executive constrained from 1973 construction of housing 
through a tighter fiscal policy.297 The housing boom explains partly the overheating 
of Danish economy in the late 1960s and early 70s, because construction of housing 
crowded out more profitable investments, for instance in the export industries. The 
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same did partly the fast growing public expenses. Almost every interest group in 
Denmark experienced “increasing returns” during the 1960s because of the 
economy’s high growth rate, but the relative distribution between the sectors 
remained almost unchanged. Denmark went thereby on full blast during the 1960s, 
until the executive put on the brakes. Denmark missed therefore partly the raw 
material boom between 1972 and 1974 that benefited most other Nordic countries. 
The recession hit Denmark severely 1974-75, the first years since 1945 with 
negative economic growth, even if the Danish economy was instable already prior to 
the OPEC 1 shock.298 Denmark joined the so-called Currency Snake in 1972 and the 
European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979 to stabilize the currency fluctuations.299 
 The Danish economy recovered somewhat after 1975, even if the growth rates 
were meager compared to 1958-73. Denmark was hit by a new economic crisis in 
1979, because of the second oil price shock, OPEC 2. Mass unemployment returned 
to Denmark. The unemployment rates increased from about 1 percent in 1973 to 5 
percent in 1975 and 10,5 percent in 1983, until it peaked with 12 percent in 1993.300 
The mass unemployment led to increasing public spending and decreasing tax 
revenues. But the executive assumed it was a short-term crisis, not a structural 
problem, and borrowed heavily to facilitate a traditional Keynesian counter cyclic 
policy in some sectors, combined with reductions in others. The result became an 
indebted Denmark. The national debt’s interest payments would be burdensome 
even if the business cycles shifted in Denmark’s favor.301 The period 1960-80, that 
started with a very long boom ended thus with crisis and public indebtedness. 
 But the Danish economy came in a somewhat paradoxical situation throughout 
the 1970s and early 80s, because the membership in EEC created some optimism, 
even if the Danish executive soon returned to the 1950s’ stop-go policy because of 
almost constant balance of payment problems amplified by the DKK’s revaluation 
because of the German Mark’s revaluation, because of Denmark’s participation in 
the Currency Snake. However, Denmark was the only Nordic country that 
maintained the same economic growth during the second half of the 1970s as during 
the first half, except for Norway where the oil sector grew strongly during the 
second half of the 1970s. But Denmark’s numerous SMEs fared reasonably well 
during the second half of the 1970s, because of their flexibility and ability to adapt 
to the turbulent conditions. The Danish interest rates increased from about 10 
percent for 10 years State bonds in 1969 to about 20 percent in 1980. The very high 
interest rates crowded out the housing and agricultural sector that had crowded out 
the more profitable export industries in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Denmark’s 
industry structure with largely SMEs exposed to the market forces gave hence 
Danish economy an excellent starting point for the 1980s, despite the 1970s’ 
crisis.302 The paradoxical situation was in other words that the second half of the 
1970s’ high interest rates and economic crisis carried out many of those structural 
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adjustments that had been politically impossible to accomplish in the 1960s and 
early 70s. 
 How was Denmark’s economic ability during the 1960s and the 1970s? 
Denmark’s GDP per capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars 
was 8.812 dollars in 1960, 12.686 in 70, 13.945 in 73 and 15.227 in 80. The 
averages for the 12 West European countries were 7.607 dollars in 1960, 10.959 in 
70, 12.156 in 73 and 14.057 in 80.303 The Danish economy was among West 
Europe’s top performers. Denmark was number two in 1960, number three in 70, 
and again number two in 73 and 80, measured as GDP per capita, despite the late 
1970’s crisis. The Danish economic miracle was based on hard work and the ability 
to utilize opportunities entailing the memberships in EFTA and later also in EEC. 
The triangle executive’s attempt of transforming the economy from almost one-
sided dependence on agriculture exports to more diversified trade and industry after 
the 1957 election paid off handsomely during the 1960s and 70s, despite domestic 
overheating, partly reintroduction of the 1950s’ stop-go policy, high interest rates 
and increasing unemployment. 
Paving the way for the motorway H 
Denmark’s road policy during the 1960s can be summarized as paving the way for 
the motorway H approved through the 1957 Road Act, even if most kilometers 
motorways were built from the early 1970s until about 2000.  
 The Traffic Economic Commission forwarded its recommendations to the 
Ministry of Public Works October 2nd 1961. Anders Nyvig, who left the position as 
head of the Directorate of Public Road’s Planning Department in 1959 because of 
disagreement about the skewed allocation of the Road Fund’s reimbursements, 
joined the commission’s final spurt. The Traffic Economic Commission’s 
recommended investing 33,715 billions 1961 DKK or 30,17 billions 1990 PPP USD 
during the forthcoming 20 years in new roads, railroads, harbors, airports and 
improved telephone and postal services. 2,1 billions DKK or 1,88 billions 1990 PPP 
USD were suggested invested in bridges across Great Belt and Øresund, 18,98 
billions DKK or 16,98 billions 1990 PPP USD in roads and 4,86 billions DKK or 
4,35 billions 1990 PPP USD in new railroads. 1,12 billions DKK or approximately 1 
billion 1990 PPP USD of the railroad investments were recommended allocated in 
Greater Copenhagen to facilitate commuting, while 3,65 billions DKK or about 3,27 
billons 1990 PPP USD were recommended allocated to remote traffic.304 The 
recommended investments’ order of magnitude indicate clearly the Traffic 
Economic Commission did not foresee half hearted tightwad measures, but complete 
and permanent modernization of Denmark’s high-level transport and communication 
infrastructures. 
 The Traffic Economic Commission allocated 10,18 billions DKK or 9,11 
billions 1990 PPP USD of the total recommended road investments to new roads 
and 8,8 billions DKK or 7,87 billions 1990 PPP USD to maintenance, upgrades and 
minor projects. 3 billions DKK or 2,68 billions 1990 PPP USD were allocated to 
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new roads in Greater Copenhagen. 1,4 billions DKK or 1,25 billions 1990 PPP USD 
were allocated to motorways in rural areas. The Traffic Economic Commission 
recommended similarly construction of 548 kilometers four lane motorways in areas 
with 2.000 vehicles in each direction per hour, 40 kilometers six lane motorways in 
areas with more than 3.000 vehicles per hour, and 410 kilometers four lane trunk 
roads in areas with 1.000-1.500 vehicles per hour.305 The Traffic Economic 
Commission stressed that construction of the new transport and communication 
infrastructures had to utilize “every kinds of modern facilities” to achieve maximum 
“work productivity” to minimize the construction costs and to “safeguard the 
economic progress”.306 The Traffic Economic Commission warned hence strongly 
against any ideas about establishment of spade and wheelbarrow brigades, because 
that would delay the new transport and communication infrastructures, make them 
unnecessarily costly and postpone the community’s harvesting of the benefits. The 
rationale behind the Traffic Economic Commission’s recommendations was the total 
time saving, and a more cost efficient and competitive Denmark through modern 
transport and communication infrastructures.307 Improved road safety came on top 
of that as a bonus; similarly as promised by the engineering and construction 
companies in their 1936-37 national motorway and bridge plan. Development of 
viable and competitive enterprises was sustainable welfare policy, and development 
of modern national transport and communication infrastructures in Denmark 
facilitated viable and competitive enterprises. 
 The Traffic Economic Commission expanded the recommended motorway 
system to 800 kilometers already in 1962. Per Milner, then head of the Directorate 
of Public Road’s Motorway Department, who became head of the Directorate of 
Public Roads in 1972, outlined the motorway H July 21st 1962 in the journal 
MOTOR. Milner’s motorway H was almost a blueprint of the engineering and 
construction companies’ 1936-37 motorway and bridge plans, except for the added 
‘fingers’ radiating from Copenhagen included a northern branch to Helsingør, and 
the missing link between Aalborg and Hirtshals.308 Per Milner graduated as 
chartered engineer in constructions from Denmark’s Technical University in 1951. 
Per Milner emigrated in 1955 to USA, where the consultative engineering company 
Meyer employed him and Seagold in San Francisco. Per Milner returned to 
Denmark in 1956 where he was employed by the engineering and construction 
company Kampsax. Milner went thereafter to Iran for Kampsax, where he stayed 
until 1962, when he returned to Denmark and became head of the Directorate of 
Public Road’s Motorway Department.309 The motorway H was, according to Per 
Milner based on the US Highway Capacity Manual and AASHO Geometric Design – 
Rural Roads and AASHO Geometric Design – Urban Roads.310 The Danish 
Directorate of Public Road’s planners utilized thus the road engineers’ bible’s 
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receipts developed for the US Interstate and Defense Highway programs’ 
construction of about 65.000 kilometers of motorways, similarly as their Swedish 
colleagues in the Road and Water Construction Administration. 
 However, accomplishment of the Traffic Economic Commission’s 
recommended trunk roads and motorways as national collective goods necessitated a 
new regime. The executive’s official reason for changing the established rules of the 
game was to safeguard common technical standards on the new motorways, which 
until then had been built by each county and financed through reimbursements from 
the Road Fund. The 1958 Road Reimbursement Act gave the counties a chance to 
invite to dinner while the State picked up the bill. Svend Horn, the Social 
Democratic Party’s road political spokesperson in Folketinget and orchestrator of 
the 1963 road political reform preferred the State forwarding the invitations since 
the State had to pay for the party anyway. Only the Liberal Party, which was a 
staunch defender of the counties and other local interests, opposed this institutional 
reform, because the local road administrations were one of the Liberal Party’s 
‘sacred cows’. Svend Horn became minister of public works in November 1966 
when Kai Lindberg resigned, and was also the Social Democratic Party’s axe man 
against the counties’ interest organization and the Liberal Party. Horn considered the 
counties’ interest organization’s opposition against the 1963 road political reforms 
as struggles against “windmills”. Horn concluded that if Folketinget in 1867 had 
known that roads would take over much of the long distance traffic already 50 years 
later, Folketinget would then not have spent time discussing the counties’ road 
administration in 1963.311 The counties were forced to accept the reform.  
 However, Folketinget did not overrun the counties, but settled for a 
compromise, because the executive agreed the Ministry of Public Roads should stay 
away from highways and local roads.312 Denmark did hence not introduce a Swedish 
style road administration responsible for almost all public roads, but limited the 
State’s responsibility to roads with national collective good characteristics. The 
1963 Trunk Road Act and the 1963 Public Road Act liquidated many principles 
established by the 1867 Road Act. The Ministry of Public Works became 
responsible for construction and management of trunk roads that became 100 
percent financed by the Road Fund. The State would also finance the trunk roads’ 
maintenance, and construction of highways, which otherwise was the counties’ 
responsibility.313 Even the 1963 Road Acts were facilitated by the 1953 Constitution 
and the new election system based on one person – one vote.314 Folketinget’s 
decisions came most likely very close to the executive’s preferences, because 
transferring the responsibility for trunk roads and motorways from the counties to 
the Ministry of Public Works safeguarded swift construction of a small but modern 
and functional trunk road and motorway system. It prevented also the Road Fund’s 
means from being spread thinly across many kilometers of highways, such as for 
instance in Norway. Further State financing of highways was most likely a 
concession to the Liberal Party and the powerful county mayors. 
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 The Social Democratic and Liberal Parties’ compromise included also a 
promise from minister of public works Kai Lindberg, that the State would not 
establish its own organizations for construction of motorways. But the Ministry of 
Public Works forgot this promise when Svend Horn succeeded Lindberg in 1966. 
Even the Liberal Party ignored this promise when it came to power in 1968. The 
Directorate of Public Roads established first a motorway office in Viby near Århus 
on middle Jutland in 1967, thereafter a second motorway office in Næstved on 
southwestern Sjælland in 1968 and finally the third motorway office in Birkerød on 
northern Sjælland in 1970. Fyn maintained its county road administration until 
1975.315 The Directorate of Public Road’s regional motorway offices brought 
Denmark one step further towards realization of the Traffic Economic 
Commission’s recommendations, and established also a partly decentralized 
centralized State road administration responsible for the trunk roads and motorways. 
But the Directorate of Public Roads did not establish its own construction or 
maintenance units after the State takeover in 1963, such as the Swedish Road and 
Water Construction Administration or Norway’s Combined Road Administration, 
but bought instead construction and maintenance services from the counties’ road 
administrations or from private construction companies. 
 The 1960s’ second big road political issue was localization of the motorways, 
and Jutland’s north-south motorway was the most controversial. The Directorate of 
Public Roads proposed in 1962 locating Jutland’s north-south motorway along the 
eastern coast, similarly as proposed by the engineering and construction companies 
in 1936-37 because most of the Jutlanders lived along the east coast. However, 
Professor Johs. Humlum, an ethno geographer from Århus University, who 
considered the motorway more a regional political undertaking than a transport 
infrastructure, proposed locating the motorway along the middle of Jutland, because 
Humlum opposed centralization and development of only a few major urban areas. 
The 1960s’ so-called Humlum-debate was very similar to the Danish railroad 
debates in the 1840s and 50s, but the Directorate of Public Road’s transport 
economic calculations finished off Humlum’s proposal. A motorway in the middle 
of Jutland, such as proposed by Humlum, would lead to significant more driving, 
hereunder increased fuel and time consumption, increased pollution and transport 
costs, and would also increase the driving time about 20 minutes in average per 
vehicle for distances between 100 and 200 kilometers. Folketinget approved the 
Directorate of Public Road’s proposed eastern line in 1965, despite the Liberal 
Party’s protests.316 The only of Humlum’s ideas that survived, as we will se later, 
was construction of motorways north of Aalborg to Frederikshavn and Hirtshals, 
almost as proposed by the engineering and construction companies in 1936-37. 
 The Great Belt Commission submitted its second report in December 1959, 
and concluded ferries would be sufficient until about 1980, which proved to be fairly 
accurate. Folketinget’s approval of the motorway H led to appointment of a new 
work group for the Great Belt Connection in December 1960 headed by Kaj Bang, 
head of Directorate of Public Roads. Folketinget’s Traffic Economic Committee 
approved further work with the Great Belt Connection in 1961. The aim was an 
operational connection in 1975. The work group submitted its three volumes 
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recommendation in November 1968, which outlined 6 alternatives across Great Belt, 
ranging from pure bridges to pure tunnels and combinations thereof.317 A ferry-free 
connection across the Great Belt was still on the agenda and clearly one step closer 
to realization. 
 The Øresund-connection’s work groups submitted similarly their report in 
November 1962, and recommended construction of a combined motorway and 
railroad connection between Helsingborg and Helsingør, the former mentioned H-H 
alternative. This connection would be economically viable given similar prices for 
the travelers as the ferry tickets, and could be organized as a Danish-Swedish State-
private joint venture similarly as the airline SAS. The traffic across Øresund 
increased sharply during the 1950s, from 4,9 millions passengers in 1952 to 14,2 
millions in 1961, and from 170.000 vehicles in 1962 to 586.000 vehicles in 1961. 
However, the railroad’s goods volumes increased only from 800.000 tons in 1952 to 
1,2 million tons in 1961.318 A new report in October 1967 emphasized the need for a 
future ferry-free connection across Øresund, but advised against construction of 
ferry-free railroad connections only both via Helsingør-Helsingborg and 
Copenhagen-Malmø, because only a four-lane motorway connection between 
Copenhagen and Malmø would be profitable. But a ferry-free motorway connection 
between Copenhagen and Malmø would aggravate the Copenhagen-area’s 
congestion problems, because of increased local traffic between southern Sweden 
and Greater Copenhagen.319 The Copenhagen-area struggled with increasing 
congestion problems in the second half of the 1960s because of the counties’ 
emphasis on road investments in rural areas rather than in urban areas. 
 The period from 1963 to 1968-69 was first and foremost used by the 
Directorate of Public Roads to prepare construction of the approved motorway H. 
The Danish transport and energy infrastructures were namely overloaded in the late 
1950s and early 60s, and constrained hence further growth and development.320 Both 
the Ministry of Public Works and the Directorate of Public Roads took the political 
and economical realities into consideration, because they started construction of the 
motorway H’s most crowded sections in all three of Denmark’s regions, such as 
driveways to Copenhagen, a new Small Belt Bridge between Jutland and Fyn and 
the Limfjord Tunnel in Aalborg on northern Jutland.321 The Ministry of Public 
Works and the Directorate of Public Road’s adapted also the road policy and road 
construction to the political parties and the most crowded constituencies’ 
strengthened position in Folketinget, because the Social Democratic, Radical and 
Conservative Parties had their strongholds in the major cities. But realization of the 
Traffic Economic Commission’s recommendations gave something to everybody all 
across Denmark, which also indicates the Danish executives and legislators 
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considered trunk roads and motorways as national collective goods, and not only 
local collective goods for particular constituencies. 
From the motorway H to the motorway h 
The 1970s started with a significant institutional reshuffling, because the Radical, 
Liberal and Conservative Parties’ coalition reshaped literally Denmark’s political 
landscape in 1970. The Baunsgaard executive reduced the number of counties from 
25 to 14, and similarly the number of municipals from 1.064 to 277. The executive’s 
aim was streamlining Denmark’s public sector, to save costs and to improve the 
municipals’ abilities as service providers, because the counties and municipals were 
responsible for production of most of the Welfare State’s services.322 The non-
socialist executive that came to power in 1968, was largely the counties’ executive, 
but faced soon the economic realities. The executive’s response was a 
comprehensive reorganizing of Denmark to make the Welfare State more efficient. 
Folketinget’s majority approved these structural reforms.323 A side effect of these 
structural reforms was increased relative power to the peripheral counties and 
constituencies, because they became fewer and with more seats in Folketinget. The 
central counties and constituencies remained relatively small and fragmented. 
 The Baunsgaard executive’s county and municipal reform affected also the 
road administration, and finished almost off the Liberal Party’s localist tradition. 
Because the Liberal Party’s minister of public works from 1968, Ove Guldberg, a 
construction engineer and lawyer from middle Jutland, perceived transport and 
communication issues more from a technocratic than a political perspective. 
Guldberg concluded soon the 1958 reimbursement system missed the target given 
the Traffic Economic Commission’s 1961 recommendations. Significant parts of the 
Road Fund’s reimbursements were still allocated to construction of highways and 
local roads rather than to trunk roads and motorways. The investments in Greater 
Copenhagen’s public transports were also far too small. The Ministry of Public 
Works made therefore a 15 years plan for the fiscal years 1970/71-1984/85, about 
construction of the motorway H approved by Folketinget in 1957, hereunder the 
Great Belt and Øresund Connections such as outlined by the Traffic Economic 
Commission in 1961 and the engineering and construction companies in 1936-37, 
which also included improvements of Greater Copenhagen’s public transports.324 
The 1963 Road Acts had not been able to punctuate completely the 1867 Road Act’s 
equilibrium. 
 Ove Guldberg’s most consequential move, as minister of public works was 
clearly the 1971 Road Act that liquidated the Road Fund and the 1958 Road 
Reimbursement Act and instituted a new financing and governance system for the 
Danish road sector. The motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes went from 
1972 directly into the State’s coffer, which was governed by Folketinget, instead of 
to the Road Fund governed by the Ministry of Public Works and the Directorate of 
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Public Roads. The counties and municipals’ reimbursements from the Road Fund 
were replaced by lump sum allocations. The 1971 Road Act reintroduced thereby 
Denmark’s 1793-1867 three-tier road administration where each administrative level 
managed and financed its own roads. However, Ove Guldberg gave the counties a 
small concession. The Directorate of Public Roads would not establish its own 
production or maintenance units, such as in the Swedish and Norwegian State road 
administrations.325 The Radical, Liberal and Conservative Parties’ executive gave 
thereby Folketinget direct influence on road policy and road construction, which 
until then had been the Ministry of Public Works, the Directorate of Public Roads 
and the counties and municipals’ turf.  
 The 1971 Road Act that came into force April 1st 1972 made also the 
Directorate of Public Roads an autonomous public administration, almost according 
to the Swedish model. The State’s Road Laboratory was integrated in the new 
Directorate of Public Roads. Kaj Bang resigned as head of the Directorate of Public 
Roads because of health problems. Per Milner, who then was known as “Mr. 
Motorway”, became head of the new integrated and autonomous Directorate of 
Public Roads. The new Directorate of Public Roads established its own staff for 
planning those motorways not yet commenced by the counties.326 The 1971 Road 
Act’s intentions, according to Per Milner, was modernizing the entire Danish public 
road system, through implementation of a new road policy governed by concerns for 
among others road safety, environmental conditions and transport economy. Traffic 
engineering was one of the means to achieve these goals. The 1971 Road Act made 
in practice the State to the counties and municipals’ “guiding dog”, because the new 
Directorate of Public Roads developed norms and standards for all categories of 
roads that governed even the counties and municipals’ management of their parts of 
the public road system.327  
 Denmark’s new governance system for the road sector instituted by Ove 
Guldberg was based on Folketinget’s governing of the annual road appropriations 
and of investments in motorways. The formerly approved motorway H determined 
the entire motorway system’s layout. Folketinget approved therefore usually 
construction of 30-40 kilometer long sections. The minister of public works 
governed similarly allocation of all other trunk road investments given Folketinget’s 
budget constraints, based on the Directorate of Public Roads’ professionals’ 
recommendations and plans. The counties and municipals governed construction of 
highways and local roads, often in dialogue with the Directorate of Public Roads.328 
This new governance system safeguarded hence national interests because 
Folketinget engaged only in construction of motorways, which were national 
collective goods. All other trunk roads, which also were national collective goods, 
were governed directly by the minister of public works. The counties and municipals 
governed construction of roads with local collective or even private good 
characteristics. The new governance system reduced seemingly the risk for pork 
barrel deals in Folketinget. 
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 Per Milner emphasized the Directorate of Public Roads’ new role after the 
1972 reform, which was to serve as the minister of public works’ adviser. The 
Directorate had to remain loyal towards the minister but also to maintain an 
independent position, and to furnish the minister with professionally founded 
alternatives concerning road policy and road construction.329 The Danish Ministry of 
Public Roads was hence not supposed to work as the minister or the legislators’ 
microphone stand. This was a fundamental difference, at least compared to Norway 
in the second half of the1960s and 70s. 
 The 1970 county and municipal reform, the 1971 Road Act and the 
Directorate of Public Road’s 1972 reform had at least one contra entry, namely 
establishment of Folketinget’s standing subject matter committees, hereunder a 
Traffic Committee. Folketinget’s only permanent committee prior to 1972 had been 
the Finance Committee. All other committees had been ad hoc.330 But there is one 
distinguishing feature between Folketinget, Riksdagen and Stortinget. Folketinget 
reshuffles its committees annually.331 This annual reshuffling reduced all other 
things equal the likelihood of development of sector specialists and enthusiasts, 
strengthened the political parties and weakened the constituencies’ position. 
Folketinget’s Traffic Committee became therefore in practice far weaker than for 
instance Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, which 
had a tradition for very or even exceptionally long tenure and development of sector 
specialists and enthusiasts.  
 Ove Guldberg’s 1971 Road Act and new governance system established 
thereby a fundamentally new road polity with a Traffic Committee in Folketinget, a 
new integrated and autonomous Directorate of Public Roads, and the already 
established municipal and county road administrations. This new governance system 
abolished also the Road Fund that had dedicated the motorists’ payments of vehicle 
and fuel taxes to road purposes since World War One. The Road Fund had been 
dedicated to highways since 1927, and safeguarded linking of the vehicle and fuel 
tax revenues to road purposes. Denmark maintained thereby the centralized and 
minister governed trunk road administration established from the late 1950s until the 
early 1960s even after this reform, which safeguarded the national interests. 
However, it is somewhat paradoxical that the Liberal Party, which traditionally had 
been the counties’ advocate, increased the State’s governing of the road policy, 
although indirectly, via the Directorate of Public Roads’ norms, standards and 
dialogues, even if each administrative level managed and financed its own roads. It 
was thereby the Liberal Party’s minister of public works Ove Guldberg who 
punctuated the 1867 Road Act’s equilibrium. 
 The Social Democratic Party became partly an environmentalist and populist 
party during its opposition from February 1968 to October 1971, after having 
embraced the leftwing populists 1966-68. Because the Social Democratic Party’s 
bosses did obviously their best to minimize the voter leaks to the numerous popular 
movements that emerged on their left flank from the late 1960s, and adopted many 
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of the leftwing populist and environmentalist ideas during the late 1960s and early 
1970s.332 Jens Kampmann, the Social Democrats’ combined minister of public 
works and environmental protection from October 1971 to December 1973, reduced 
the motorway investments, which then already were 5-6 years delayed, compared to 
the Social Democratic Party’s former long-term plan. All road investments were 
then significantly reduced because the Danish economy was in trouble already prior 
to the first oil price shock. The Danish welfare State was heading toward crisis. 
Folketinget’s Traffic Committee cancelled or postponed several proposed 
motorways in the Greater Copenhagen area, and omitted also alternative investments 
in railroads.333 Folketinget’s new Traffic Committee choked hence Greater 
Copenhagen’s growth through omission of road and railroad investments 
recommended by among others the Traffic Economic Commission in October 1961. 
 The first oil price shock 1973-74 affected Danish construction of motorways. 
The Liberal Party’s combined minister of public works and ecclesiastic matters, 
Kresten Damsgaard, cancelled further construction of motorways in 1974. The 
Social Democratic Party’s minister of public works from February 1975 to February 
1977, Kjell Matthiassen abandoned in 1975 the approved motorway leg north of 
Århus and transformed thereby the approved motorway H to a motorway h, and 
sacrificed partly future development of Denmark’s peripheral areas north of Århus. 
Kjell Matthiassen ordered also the Directorate of Public Roads to plan a downsized 
motorway system. The official reason for fewer kilometers motorways was the 1974 
road plan, based on 1973 forecasts prior to the oil price shock. The Social 
Democratic, Radical, Christian People’s, Communist and Socialistic People’s 
Parties and the Left Socialists supported all reduced road investments. Only CD, the 
Liberal, Conservative and Progress Parties opposed reduced road investments.334 It 
was hence a clear division between left and rightwing parties with regard to road 
policy and road construction in the 1970s.  
 The mid 1970s’ struggles concerning the Danish trunk road and motorway 
investments’ order of magnitude can also be understood as struggles between 
proponents for so-called “New Politics” and “Old Politics”; i.e. environmental 
protection against economic growth.335 An alternative interpretation is of course lack 
of resources, because of the oil price shock and entailing stagflation, even if Social 
Democratic Party’s environmentalism and embracing of the leftwing populists partly 
explains why some of the party’s proponents for old politics headed by Erhard 
Jakobsen established CD prior to the 1973 election. A third interpretation, in 
addition to lack of resources and environmentalism, according to Per Milner, was 
revised transport forecasts because of increased oil prices. Both the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Public Works estimated namely the future traffic work 
                                                 
332 Mjøset (1986:179-184). 
333 Toft et al. (2000:124-125); Mjøset (1986:176-177, 181). 
334 Jørgensen (2001:349, 389-390); Toft et al. (2000:125); Milner (2005 [Inerview]). 
335 Knutsen’s (1988; 1993) studies about a new socio-cultural cleavage was inspired by Inglehart’s (1977) 
theory about changed value preferences along a materialistic/postmaterialistic dimension. Togeby’s 
(1989:98, 123 ff.) study about the Nordic grass root movements in 1987, was similarly inspired by 
Inglehart’s theory, and found strong indices of development of Danish grass root movements in the late 
1960s and 1970s, and that postmaterialistic values were of importance in all the Danish political parties. 
Togeby (1989:124) and others found also that the Danish voters’ postmaterialistic attitudes in the 1980s 
were highly correlated with the traditional left/right cleavage. 
Chapter 2- Denmark – the textbook case 
98 
would be reduced 20-40 percent. The future need for motorways was therefore 
reduced accordingly.336 
 One direct result of the 1970s’ reduced traffic forecasts, were the executive’s 
attempts of converting formerly approved motorway sections to expressways. But 
Denmark’s leading motorist organization, FDM, mobilized heavily against this 
proposal, because expressways would be detrimental for the road capacity as well as 
the road safety. FDM’s campaign succeeded. Folketinget decided therefore in 1977 
that both the southern Sjælland and Jutland motorways should be built as narrow 
four-lane motorways, with 3 instead of 12 meters center strips.337 These low-budget 
motorways, often without a shoulder, were rather similar to the ‘narrow gauge’ 
motorways introduced in Norway from about 2000. But the Danish Directorate of 
Public Roads ceased construction of narrow gauge motorways as soon the State 
economy recovered. Another cost saving measure introduced in the late 1970s was 
the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties’ executive’s decision in 1978 about 
postponing construction of the Great Belt and Øresund connections, even if they 
were profitable undertakings. These projects were also postponed late in 1973, after 
Folketinget had approved these projects in June 1973.338 The 1970s’ State economic 
problems became hence very consequential for Danish road policy and road 
construction, and the width of the Danish motorways’ center strip indicated clearly 
the 1970s’ business cycles and State economic conditions. 
Conclusions 
Where do these discussions bring us concerning this study’s four working 
hypothesis with regard to the Danish case between 1960 and 1980? First, this 
study’s main hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods 
with road policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the 
common good was clearly strengthened between 1960 and 1980, because the Traffic 
Economic Commissions’ October 1961 recommendations about high-level transport 
and communication infrastructure investments the forthcoming 20 years, and the 
1963 Road Acts made construction and financing of trunk roads and motorways a 
State responsibility. This shift paved the way for completion of motorway H 
approved in 1957, which the executives and most legislators considered a national 
collective good. However, State economic problems already prior to the first oil 
price shock 1973-74 jeopardized partly the motorway construction. The entailing 
stagflation and State economic problems in 1975 triggered the Social Democratic 
executive’s transformation of the approved motorway H to a motorway h through 
omission of the motorway north of Århus. The executive settled later for 
construction of narrow gauge motorways because of State economic problems. 
However, the numerous minority executives 1960-80 did not rule out the executive 
or the legislators’ emphasis on national collective goods such as motorways, the 
motorway construction was upheld despite State economic problems. 
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 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was both weakened and strengthened between 
1960 and 1980. Because the 1970 county and municipal reform strengthened some 
of the peripheral counties’ position in Folketinget compared to the more centrally 
located counties, but the 1971 Road Act that came into force in 1972 reintroduced 
partly the 1793 road polity where each administrative level managed and financed 
its own roads. Folketinget’s establishment of a standing Traffic Committee in 1972 
strengthened similarly the constituencies’ influence on the road policy and road 
construction, even if the committee was reshuffled annually. This reshuffling 
strengthened the political parties’ position on the constituencies’ expense. 
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was clearly strengthened between 1960 and 1980 because the 
political parties strengthened their control of the road policy and road construction. 
The 1971 Road Act liquidated the Road Fund. Folketinget allocated from then the 
annual tax financed State trunk road appropriations. Folketinget’s establishment of a 
standing Traffic Committee in 1972 strengthened the political parties’ position 
because of the annual reshuffling. Road policy and road construction was frequently 
used to position the political parties throughout the 1970s, particularly after the 
Social Democratic Party abandoned its former high-growth policy and embraced and 
adopted many of the leftwing populist and environmentalist ideas about road policy 
and road construction. This shift made road policy and road construction a highly 
visible distinction between the Danish left and rightwing parties in the second half 
of the 1970s. 
 The final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Danish case between 
1960 and 1980. First, the 1963 Road Acts furthered the pressure on the road political 
equilibrium established by the 1867 Road Act, and instituted minister governed 
allocation of the trunk road and motorway investments. Minister rule had been a 
tradition in Denmark since 1849. The 1963 Road Acts were largely a result of the 
new unicameral system instituted by the 1953 Constitution and the new election 
system based on one person – one vote. However, the 1867 equilibrium punctuated 
first when the 1971 Road Act championed the Liberal Party’s minister of public 
works Ove Guldberg came into power in 1972. The 1867 Road Act’s equilibrium 
gave the counties and municipals increasing returns. But Ove Guldberg, who 
reasoned more as a technocrat than a politician, recognized that local governance of 
national collective goods gave dysfunctional transport and communication 
infrastructures, particularly in the crowded Copenhagen area, because the counties 
and municipals prioritized roads with local collective or private goods characteristics 
rather than roads with national collective goods characteristics. This practice was 
largely a result of path dependence established through the former bicameral system. 
Second, the Danish Ministry of Finance struggled even during the 1960s and 70s 
compared to the Swedish and Norwegian Ministries of Finance that had far more 
dominant positions. One result was an economic stop-go policy even during the 
1970s. Third, the 1971 Road Act abolished the Road Fund, made construction of 
motorways subject to Folketinget’s approval and budget constraints. Folketinget 
established a Traffic Committee that was reshuffled annually to prevent 
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development of specialists and sector enthusiasts. The Traffic Committee governed 
usually allocation of the motorway investments. Allocation of all other trunk road 
investments were governed by the minister of public works based on the Directorate 
of Public Roads’ professional advises given Folketinget’s budget constraints. This 
organizing safeguarded usually the national interests. The counties and municipals 
governed similarly construction of highways and local roads with local collective 
good characteristics given their own budget constraints. The result was development 
of both a new road polity and new road policy equilibrium from April 1972, when 
the 1971 Road Act came into power. 
1981 – From Social Democracy to neo-liberalism – accomplishing 
the motorway H 
Denmark underwent an economic turnaround during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
that came close to the austerity in Thatcher’s Great Britain, due to introduction of 
relatively tough neo-liberal policies. However, the Danish executives and 
Folketinget emphasized completion of national collective goods such as the 
motorway H, hereunder ferry-free connections across Great Belt and Øresund to 
safeguard Denmark’s attractiveness as future location for trade and industry and to 
improve the trade and industry’s competitiveness.  
Reestablishing Danish trade and industry’s growth and competitiveness and 
preparing for the Single European Market 
Denmark’s neo-liberal shift can be dated rather exactly. The Social Democratic and 
Liberal Parties’ executive reduced the counter cyclic policy from 1978, almost 
similarly as in Norway, but Denmark was indebted and in serious State economic 
problems when the Conservative Party’s Poul Schlüter came to power in September 
1982. The first Schlüter executive that consisted of the Conservative, Liberal and 
Christian People’s Parties and CD carried out an economic turnaround compared to 
the former Social Democratic executives’ counter cyclic policy. Even the Radical 
and Progress Parties supported the Schlüter executive’s policy. Poul Schlüter 
governed until January 1993, when the Social Democratic Party’s Paul Nyrup 
Rasmussen came to power and governed until November 2001. Nyrup Rasmussen’s 
executives furthered largely the Schlüter executives’ policy. The same did largely 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s current Liberal and Conservative coalition.339 Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen’s success was partly a result of Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen’s transformation of the Liberal Party from an almost dedicated 
rural and agricultural party to a modern liberalistic and urban party throughout the 
1980s.340 Anders Fogh Rasmussen carried out an inverse Blair prior to the 2001 
election, and reoriented the Liberal Party towards the political center. Denmark’s 
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only majority executive 1980-2005 was Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s first executive 
from January 1993 until September 1994.341 
 Poul Schlüter’s executives instituted a “paradigmatic shift” in the finance 
policy compared to the former Social Democratic executives, among others through 
imposition of significant elements of NPM ideas through decentralization, 
introduction of more market and less State, net State budgets and strengthened 
thereby the Ministry of Finance’ position.342 The Schlüter executive pegged also the 
DKK to the German Mark in 1982, and punctuated thereby Denmark’s traditional 
devaluation policy. The exchange rate between the German Mark and the Euro 
remained unchanged from January 1987.343 The four Schlüter executives scrutinized 
the welfare state, but the single most important measure was the so-called “Potato 
Cure” (Kartoffelkuren). The balance of payments deficits from 1985 forced the 
executive to rather draconian actions. Consumption-reducing measures were 
introduced during the Christmas 1985 and Easter 1986, and the tax system was 
revised in 1987. The Potato Cure began in late 1986, and was an attempt of reducing 
the loan-financed consumption. Some kinds of loans were taxed by a 20 percent 
interest charge. The Potato Cure reduced the consumption, but also other economic 
activities. Indebted persons came in troubles, and the real estate prices dived, but 
gave also the industry a strong impetus for increased exports and improved 
productivity. The price was increased unemployment. About 350.000 persons were 
unemployed during the peak in 1993, but the high unemployment reduced the wage 
level and wrought thereby the inflation out of the Danish economy.344 The Potato 
Cure was bitter medicine but restored the Danish trade and industry’s 
competitiveness. The Danish State had surplus on the balance of payments for the 
first time in 27 years in 1990, and began thereafter amortization of the State’s 
foreign debt.345 Many in the 1980s and early 90s had to reconsider their opinions 
about Poul Schlüter, because Schlüter managed to keep the Conservative Party’s 
group in Folketinget together, and carry out substantial policy shifts, because the 
Danish Conservative Party’s members of Folketinget had until then, according to the 
historian Søren Mørch, spent most of their time since 1915 “embarrassing each 
other”.346 Poul Schlüter was clearly more than a perfume salesman, one of the labels 
attached to him by his political opponents. 
 The German unification in 1990 led to increased German domestic spending 
because of the reconstruction of former East Germany that in turn led to increased 
inflation. Germany’s Bundesbank responded with increased interest rates, which in 
turn created problems for the other EMS member countries. The high German 
interest rates combined with a recession because of the Gulf War 1990-91 caused in 
practice the EMS’ collapse August 2nd 1993, when Italy and Great Britain withdrew 
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after speculations against the GBP.347 However, the EMS’ collapse gave reduced 
interest rates and new optimism, and became thus an economic turning point. 
 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s Social Democratic coalitions furthered the Schlüter 
executives’ neo-liberal policies. The Social Democratic minister of finance Mogens 
Lykketoft was determined to carry out a responsible economic policy, similarly as 
C.V. Bramsnæs did in the 1920s and 30s. Nyrup Rasmussen’s executive introduced 
in 1996 similar accounting principles for the public administrations as in private 
enterprises, and introduced also long-term contracts between the sector ministers 
and the heads of the subordinated public administrations, and reorganized many 
public administrations to State owned joint stock companies, to bypass Folketinget’s 
annual budget constraints.348 Many of the Schlüter executives’ finance policy shifts 
persisted and were furthered by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s Social Democratic 
executives, and indicated clearly the neo-liberal ideas’ impact in Denmark, even 
within the Social Democratic Party. 
 How was Denmark’s economic ability during the 1980s and the 1990s? Angus 
Maddison’s calculations shows that Denmark’s GDP per capita measured in 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars, was 15.096 dollars in 1981, 18.452 in 1990 and 
23.010 in 2000. The average for the 12 West European countries was 14.045 dollars 
in 1981, 16.872 in 1990 and 19.806 in 2000.349 Maddison’s calculations indicate 
clearly the Danish economy struggled somewhat during the early 1980s, as 
mentioned above, but Denmark recovered, among others because of the Potato Cure. 
Denmark was number four in 1981, number three in 1990 and number two in 2000, 
measured as GDP per capita. Only Norway had higher GDP per capita in 2000. But 
the Danish economy’s performance was remarkable, because the Danes earned their 
high GDP per capita selling pork, beer cans, consumer goods and services, not by 
harvesting raw materials or natural resources such as Norway but that benefited 
from significant oil and gas revenues. 
Completing the motorway H 
The joint Danish-Swedish 1975 Øresund Commission concluded in June 1978 that 
ferry-free connections across Øresund at Helsingborg-Helsingør or Copenhagen-
Malmø would be profitable, given 8 percent discount rate, 3,5 percent annual GDP 
growth and turnpike costs half the ferry tickets or 2 percent annual GDP growth and 
turnpike fees equal to the ferry tickets with 20, 30 or 40 years time horizon.350 
However, the deal between the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties prior to 
establishment of the August 1978 coalition executive postponed construction of the 
Great Belt and Øresund Connections. The same deal prioritized also Great Belt to 
Øresund, because Great Belt connected Denmark, while Øresund first and foremost 
benefited the other Scandinavian countries.351  
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 The executive’s postponement of Great Belt and Øresund in August 1978 
finished almost off the Great Belt project, because the Ministry of Public Works’ 
Bridge Office established in 1973 was closed down. The engineers that had planned 
the Great Belt Connection went instead to the Danish State’s oil and natural gas 
company DONG. However, a new report in 1982 and two further new reports in 
1985 revived the project. The 1985 conclusion was that a railroad tunnel, with rail 
ferries for cars, similarly as under the English Channel, would be sufficient in the 
short run. But the only viable long-term solution was a combined motorway and 
railroad connection. The Ministry of Public Works, which became the Ministry of 
Traffic after the Schlüter executive came to power, was not willing to settle for a 
short-term solution in a project of the Great Belt Connection’s order of magnitude. 
Arne Melchior, minister of traffic and one of CD’s founders, championed the Great 
Belt connection, and managed to establish a political compromise in June 1986 
between Schlüter’s four party coalition and the Social Democratic Party’s group in 
Folketinget. The Great Belt connection would be realized as a combined motorway 
and railroad bridge across Vestrænden, and a motorway bridge and railroad tunnel 
across Østrænden. The project was supposed organized so the railroad connection 
would be completed with a three years advance.352 The deliberately delayed 
completion of the motorway made the project edible for the Social Democratic 
Party’s hinterland in the Danish State Railroads, and for the party’s leftwing 
populists and environmentalists. This political compromise safeguarded realization 
of a project that would be a national collective good and of utmost importance for 
Denmark’s future development.  
 However, the Great Belt project demonstrated not only how the political 
parties orchestrated a great deal across the party lines, but also how legislators 
representing Denmark’s peripheral constituencies accomplished their political horse 
trade or pork barrel deal of the century. Because the major parties’ members of 
Folketinget representing northern Jutland’s constituencies’ support of the Great Belt 
Connection was highly conditioned, even if Jutland would benefit substantially from 
closer economic integration with eastern Denmark. Some legislators representing 
northern Jutland’s constituencies demanded first transformation of the 1975 
motorway h to the initially approved motorway H, and construction of two new 
motorways, one from Aalborg to the ferry harbor Frederikshavn and one from 
Aalborg to the ferry harbor Hirtshals.353 The Jutland legislators’ political price for 
approving the Great Belt Connection was hence completing the engineering and 
construction companies’ 1936-37 motorway plans between Århus and Aalborg 
combined with professor Humlum’s proposed motorway north of Aalborg from the 
early 1960s.  
 The political orchestrators of the Great Belt Connection’s horse trade was first 
and foremost the so-called “Jutland Mafia” consisting of the Social Democratic 
Party’s Jens Risgaard Knudsen, who served as minister of public works 1979-81, the 
Conservative Party’s Kaj Ikast, who served as minister of traffic 1989-93, and the 
Liberal Party’s Svend Heiselberg. The Social Democratic Party’s Helge Mortensen 
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replaced later Jens Risgaard Knudsen in the Mafia.354 Jens Risgaard Knudsen 
masterminded the Great Belt deal.355 The Jutland Mafia was, according to 
Slangerup’s Liberal Party mayor Bent Lund, a consequence of the Radical, Liberal 
and Conservative executive’s 1970 county and municipal reform. Slangerup is a 
municipal located in the crossing between the road from Helsingør and Roskilde, 
and the road between Copenhagen and northern Sjælland. The 1970 county and 
municipal reform created some very powerful constituencies on Jutland, with 
sufficient political muscles to divert resources from the Greater Copenhagen area, 
because the wealthy constituencies on northern Sjælland were not always able or 
willing to agree and cooperate in Folketinget such the constituencies on Jutland 
often did.356 The Liberal Party did not abandon its position as the counties’ advocate 
in 1970, even if they changed the rules of the game, but advocated instead the 
peripheral counties’ cause with other means. The 1970 county and municipal reform 
changed namely Folketinget’s seat allocation, and made it possible for legislators 
who considered roads as local collective or private goods, and who worked 
geographically across the party lines, similarly as under the bicameral system, to 
establish distributional coalitions and carry out political horse trades or pork barrel 
deals. However, the Great Belt deal has few parallels in Scandinavia, because of its 
order of magnitude. The Great Belt deal is also an interesting case because the 
legislators representing Denmark’s peripheral constituencies struggled for safe and 
efficient connections with Denmark’s major cities, crowded areas and mainland 
Europe, and reasoned thus fundamentally opposite from many of their Norwegian 
opposite numbers, at least prior to the middle of the 1990s. 
 Folketinget approved the Great Belt Connection formally June 10th 1987. The 
Great Belt Connection’s approval coincided with the Potato Cure. The Schlüter 
executive was clearly inspired by Margaret Thatcher’s privatization efforts, and 
decided therefore in January 1987 to organize the Great Belt Connection as a State 
owned joint stock company, fully loan financed via the international capital market 
with State loan guarantees, accounted separately from the State’s ledger and fully 
user financed through turnpikes.357 The Schlüter executive looked to Britain, but 
looked also back in time because some of the Great Belt Commission’s former 
reports and the engineering and the engineering and construction companies’ revised 
1937 plan proposed user financing with State loan guarantees as one of the options. 
Loan financing of the Great Belt Connection and accounting for the projects outside 
the State’s ledger made clearly political sense, because the Great Belt Connection’s 
construction costs were more than ten times the total ordinary annual tax financed 
State, county and municipal road investments in 1987.358 All other Danish road 
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investments remained tax financed, but the Great Belt Connection was a mega 
project, and was organized different from the other Danish trunk road and motorway 
projects, to avoid politically costly reallocations and/or imposition of new taxes. 
 The Danish Directorate of Public Roads introduced a new model for allocation 
of the trunk road appropriations in 1981 based on rational criteria that received 
international attention. The model’s parameters were among others transport time, 
transport costs, accident costs, maintenance costs, consequences for the agriculture, 
noise, air pollution, barrier effects, construction costs and road paving. The total 
costs were divided 50/50 between quantifiable and difficult quantifiable costs, and 
each of the elements in the models was weighted.359 The Directorate of Public 
Roads used this model to prioritize between non-motorway trunk road investments 
governed by the minister of public works. Per Milner presented in June 1981 a list of 
27 rank ordered non-motorway trunk road projects all across Denmark for the Social 
Democratic Party’s minister of public works Jens Risgaard Knudsen. Risgaard 
Knudsen accepted the list without discussions. CD’s minister of traffic Arne 
Melchior was presented for a similar list with 25 rank ordered non-motorway trunk 
road projects in July 1984, and even Melchior accepted the Directorate of Public 
Roads’ list without amendments.360 Allocation of the non-motorway investments 
according to a formalized rational model safeguarded the annual road appropriations 
efficient utilization, and the minister of public roads/minister of traffic’s governing 
of these investments according to the Directorate of Public Roads’ professional 
advises prevented similarly road policy pork barrel deals in Folketinget. Because the 
executive’s task was to safeguard the national concerns, the legislators were usually 
more concerned with their own constituencies.  
 Even the Øresund Connection proposed by the engineering and construction 
companies 1936-37 was finally accomplished. The Danish executive’s tight 
financial policy from 1978 similarly as in Norway was eased somewhat in 1984. 
Even here was CD’s minister of traffic Arne Melchior one of the champions. The 
Schlüter executive’s somewhat eased financial policy created a window of 
opportunity even for new negotiations between the Danish and Swedish executives 
that established the so-called Øresund Commission, which in 1985 recommended 
construction of a ferry-free four-lane road connection between Copenhagen and 
Malmø, and a ferry-free dual track railroad connection between Helsingborg and 
Helsingør. This recommendation triggered a report from the European Roundtable 
of Industrialists (ERT), a lobby organization consisting of Europe’s leading 
industrialists, established by Volvo’s CEO Pehr G. Gyllenhammar in 1983. ERT 
issued in 1985 the report Missing Links, about the gaps in Europe’s transport and 
communication infrastructures, and demanded construction of a combined 
motorway and railroad connection across Øresund as part of the so-called ScanLink 
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project. ERT published further reports about Europe’s transport infrastructures in 
1987 and 1989.361  
 The Danish Social Democratic Party preferred in 1989 a railroad tunnel 
between Copenhagen and Malmø. The Øresund Commission issued a new report in 
1991 about the Øresund area’s environment and outlined what later became the 
finally approved solution: A tunnel from Kastrup airport to an artificial island near 
Saltholm, thereafter a low and then a tall bridge across Flintrænden to Limhamn 
south of Malmø. The Swedish and Danish executives agreed finally March 23rd 1991 
about the connection between Copenhagen and Malmø, instead of Helsingborg-
Helsingør. The Copenhagen-Malmø connection could create a very strong Øresund 
region, and would also improve the utilization of Kastrup airport. The political 
orchestrator of the final agreement between the Danish and Swedish executive in 
March 1991 about the Øresund connection was the Conservative Party’s minister of 
traffic Kaj Ikast from northern Jutland.362 Kaj Ikast was then a well-known member 
of the Jutland Mafia because of his involvement in the Great Belt deal. The 
agreement with the Swedish executive was based on an agreement in Folketinget 
between CD, the Conservative, Liberal and Social Democratic Parties that usually 
considered modern trunk roads and motorways as national collective goods. 
Sweden’s legislature Riksdagen approved the Øresund connection in June 1991. 
Folketinget approved it in an extraordinary session August 14th 1991. Even 
construction of the Øresund Connection was organized and financed similarly as the 
Great Belt Connection, through a state owned joint stock company, fully loan 
financed via the international capital market with State loan guarantees, and 
amortized by the users through turnpikes. The only difference was that Øresund was 
a joint venture between the Danish and Swedish States.363 Even the Øresund 
Connection was a mega project compared to the Danish ordinary tax financed road 
investments, almost 15 times the Danish State, counties and municipals’ ordinary 
total tax financed road investments in 1991.364 It made definitely sense for the 
executive and legislators to keep even the Øresund project separate from the State’s 
ledger, unless they were willing to substantial reallocations and/or imposing new 
taxes. The Øresund Connection was not result of a pork barrel deal similarly as the 
Great Belt Connection, according to Per Milner, because most legislators considered 
Øresund a logical extension of the Great Belt Connection.365 
 Per Milner was summoned to the Social Democratic Party’s minister of traffic 
Jan Trøjborg June 11th 1996, and informed that minister of finance Mogens 
Lykketoft had agreed with the County Association’s (Amtsrådforeningen) leader, 
Kresten Philipsen, that 2/3 of the trunk roads, which then were the Directorate of 
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Public Road’s responsibility, would be downgraded to highways and transferred to 
the counties. The Directorate of Public Roads would only maintain the motorways 
and the most crowded other trunk roads, and was ordered to develop its own 
organization for planning, management and maintenance. The Directorate of Public 
Roads was not permitted to further the established cooperation with the counties and 
municipals’ road administrations. This agreement between the Nyrup Rasmussen 
executive and the County Association was a result of the municipals’ dissatisfaction 
with the 1971 Road Act. The counties that mainly were responsible for schools and 
hospitals had since 1972 downgraded most highways to local roads, and thereby 
shifted the costs to the municipals.366 The counties had transformed many roads that 
largely were national collective goods to local collective or private goods through 
reclassification and thereafter shifted the responsibility to the municipals. However, 
the executive that first and foremost was concerned about the national interests made 
sure that motorways and trunk roads, which were national collective goods, 
remained so, because they were still supposed managed by the Directorate of Public 
Roads. Per Milner claimed the forthcoming reform was an attempt from the County 
Association to maintain its power and to prevent a municipal reform, and regret that 
minister of finance Mogens Lykketoft was fooled by Kresten Philipsen.367 The 
forthcoming road policy reform was hence about division of the tasks between the 
State, counties and municipals, not about road policy as such. 
 Per Milner retired, and was succeeded by Henning Christiansen January 1st 
1997. Henning Christiansen graduated from the University of Roskilde as 
Cand.tech.soc., a cross disciplinary study in science and social planning. 
Christiansen was Roskilde municipal’s technical director before he became head of 
the Directorate of Public Roads.368 The Directorate of Public Road’s first head had 
been a lawyer, the second a chartered engineer and the third was a public planner 
and management expert. It seems the Danish executives’ choice of heads of the 
Directorate of Public Roads were contingent the directorate’s tasks and institutional 
environment. 
 The 1996 compromise between the Nyrup Rasmussen executive and the 
County Association was reflected in the 1997 Road Act that came into force January 
1st 1998. The State’ road system, the trunk roads and motorways, shrank to 1.650 
kilometers, included the Great Belt Connection and the Øresund motorway on 
Amager east of Copenhagen, which was a part of the not yet completed Øresund 
Connection. The other trunk roads were, as agreed in 1996, reclassified to highways 
and transferred to the counties.369 The Danish State withdrew hence partly from road 
construction when the motorway H was almost completed, similarly as in 1867, and 
shifted the maintenance tasks to the counties. The 1971 Road Act had served its 
purpose, because it facilitated and safeguarded construction of the motorway H, 
hereunder the desired Great Belt and Øresund Connections, in addition to 
modernizing of the entire public road system. The 1997 Road Act had many 
similarities with Estrup’s 1867 Road Act, and was clearly an example of path 
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dependence, because the Danish State involved itself in major infrastructure tasks, 
but withdrew as soon the projects were completed and handed over most of the 
responsibility for maintenance and operations of the public roads to the counties and 
municipals, particularly those roads with local collective or private good 
characteristics. 
 The Great Belt connection was completed June 14th 1998. However, the 
agreed three years advance for the railroads was not possible, because construction 
of the railroad tunnel had been significantly delayed. The railroad tunnel was first 
completed June 1st 1997, but the Danish State Railroads were compensated 
economically.370 The motorway H was almost accomplished in 1998, when the 
motorway from Århus to Aalborg was completed. The construction of the Øresund 
Connection’s Danish on shore installations, 9 kilometers of motorway and 18 
kilometers railroad, began in September 1993, and was completed in September 
1998, and the entire Øresund Connection was completed July 1st 2000.371 Jutland’s 
two northernmost motorways, from Aalborg to Frederikshavn and from Aalborg to 
Hirtshals, which were used as bargaining chips in the Great Belt deal together with 
the motorway from Århus to Aalborg, were similarly also more or less completed in 
2000.  
 The so-called motorway H, first outlined in the three Danish and the three 
Swedish engineering and construction companies’ national motorway and bridge 
plan of March 1936, came hence through, even if the proponents of status quo prior 
to World War Two did their best to torpedo their plans. But the responsible Danish 
political parties considered obviously the motorway H as a national collective good. 
The completed motorway H made Denmark the hub in the Scandinavian road 
system exactly as promised by the engineering and construction companies in their 
revised 1937 proposal. The motorway H has obviously been consequential for 
Denmark’s settlement, because the relative distribution of settlement between 
central, middle and peripheral constituencies was almost unchanged from 1950 to 
2000.372 The peripheral constituencies increased actually their relative share of the 
settlement, a fundamental difference compared to Sweden and Norway. Functional 
transport and communication infrastructures, such as the motorway H, is most likely 
one of the explanations of why the Danes have been able to maintain and even 
increase peripheral constituencies’ relative settlement. 
Danish road policy post 2000 – how to prepare for global competition? 
What about Danish road policy and road construction post 2000, after completing 
the motorway H? One of the most prominent road political debates has been 
Sjælland and Greater Copenhagen’s congested roads and railroads, and how to 
maintain Greater Copenhagen’s future attractiveness as location for trade and 
industry.373 A ferry-free connection across Fehmarn Belt, the Beeline’s 19 
kilometers missing link between Rødbyhavn and Puttgarden in northern Germany, 
                                                 
370 Jørgensen (2001:446-449). 
371 Historik [Online September 10th 2004] – URL: 
http://osb.oeresundsbron.dk/library/index.php?obj=1274&menu=474  
372 See the Data Appendix’ Table 2.1-2.4.  
373 Karsten Madsen, “Behov for langsigtet debat om Hovedstaden”, søndagskommentar, Berlingske 
Tidende, January 27th 2002. 
Chapter 2- Denmark – the textbook case 
109 
will connect eastern Denmark and the motorway H’s most crowded southeastern leg 
directly with the German motorway system and the Hamburg area. Such a project 
will similarly connect southern and western Sweden and southeastern Norway 
directly with mainland Europe via ScanLink and the Øresund Connection.  
Figure 9: The Danish national motorway and trunk road system in 2005. 
 
Source: Statens veje [Online January 26th 2006] – URL: URL: http://www.vejdirektoratet.dk. 
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this project less cost efficient then the established ferry lines.374 The federal German 
executive spent most of the 1990s rebuilding former East Germany’s worn down 
infrastructures, but the dream about a ferry-free connection across Fehmarn Belt was 
still there. The Danish and German ministers of traffic signed December 6th 2000 an 
agreement about further studies of a ferry-free connection. The Fehmarn Belt 
connection was in 2001 included on EU’s list of 17 so-called Trans-European 
Network (TEN) projects.375 The TEN-projects are one of the EU Commission’s 
attempts of improving Europe’s competitiveness through removal of bottlenecks 
from the road and railroad infrastructures, and is one result of among others ERT’s 
persistent lobbying since the 1980s.  
 Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Liberal-Conservative executive and Schleswig-
Holstein’s union state executive agreed in June 2002, but Gerhard Schröder’s federal 
executive hesitated because of Germany’s ailing State economy and the European 
Central Bank’s requirements for budget balance.376 Schröder’s executive refused to 
commit itself further until after the 2002 election.377 Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s 
executive argued in November 2002 for organizing and financing the Fehmarn Belt 
Connection similarly as the Great Belt and Øresund Connections, because State loan 
guarantees would reduce the transport users’ costs and a joint stock company and 
user financing through turnpikes would keep the project away from the State’s 
ledger.378 The idea about the ferry-free Fehmarn Belt Connection came close to 
death during the first half of 2003, because Gerhard Schröder’s executive allocated 
nil Euros to it in its long-term traffic plan to 2015, even if Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s 
executive had proposed 100 percent user financing. The German’s were also 
skeptical to State loan guarantees.379 This skepticism pleased among others the 
Danish Socialistic People’s Party.380 The Socialistic People’s Party opposed often 
mobility as such, and particularly development of modern transport and 
communication infrastructures. 
 EU’s transport commissioner Loyola de Palacio revived the dream about the 
ferry-free Fehmarn Belt Connection ultimo June 2003, when EU’s workgroup for 
TEN-projects headed by former transport commissioner Karel van Miert 
recommended completion of 18 projects within 2010, hereunder Fehmarn Belt. 
Øresund was that far one of the few completed TEN-projects.381 EU’s premiers 
decided similarly in December 2003 to invest about 1.600 billions DKK or 
approximately 138,85 billions 1990 PPP USD within 2010 to improve Europe’s 
economic growth. The Fehmarn Belt Connection was considered eligible for up to 
20 percent EU financing, and that increased its chances of completion, according to 
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Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.382 The Danish executive worked thereby 
the EU system, despite the leftwing populists and environmentalists’ resistance 
against modern transport and communication infrastructures and the Danes’ 
skepticism to EU in many other policy areas. 
 The Danish Ministry of Traffic concluded in March 2004 that a cable stayed 
bridge across Fehmarn Belt with a four-lane motorway and a dual track railroad 
completed in 2015 would provide 7 percent internal rate of return and a net present 
value of 14,4 billions DKK or 1,23 billion 1990 PPP USD 50 years after 2015, given 
66 billions DKK or 5,66 billions 1990 PPP USD in construction, financing and 
operating costs, 81 billions DKK or 6,95 billions 1990 PPP USD in gains, zero EU 
contributions, 6 percent discount rate and user costs equal to the ferry tickets.383 The 
Danish executive planned the Fehmarn Belt Connection with a 50 years time 
horizon, similarly as the Great Belt and Øresund Connections, and seemed thereby 
to be looking farther ahead than for instance the Norwegian executive and Ministry 
of Finance. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance looked usually only 10-15 years 
ahead when planning road infrastructures, and reduced the time horizon further in 
2003 through imposition of 8 percent discount rate for road investments. 
 Both the EU Council and the European Parliament approved the proposed 
TEN-project list in April 2004, which included the Fehmarn Belt Connection. EU’s 
approval paved the way for an agreement between the Danish executive and the 
federal German executive June 23rd 2004 about construction of a four-lane 
motorway and dual track railroad, either as a cable-stayed bridge or tunnel, similarly 
as the 1958 agreement about the Beeline, but financed similarly as the Great Belt 
and Øresund Connections. The Danish and German ministers of traffic ruled also 
out possible use of private investors and so-called PPP or Public Private 
Partnership contracts, because the private investor’s demand for a risk premium and 
profits would increase the road users’ costs significantly.384 Both the Danish and 
German executives desired hence construction of a cost effective ferry-free 
connection across the Fehmarn Belt, and ruled out PPP contracts such as introduced 
for outsourcing of planning, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of 
Norwegian trunk roads from 2003.385  
 Both the Danish and German executives understood that buying roads through 
installment plans was very costly. The Schlüter executive’s model for financing the 
Great Belt Connection established a pattern for future projects, first across Øresund 
and soon also most likely also across Fehmarn Belt, and was clearly an example of 
path dependence. Because the Schlüter executive’s financing model provided 
increasing returns to the executive and legislators because it kept these fully user 
financed mega projects away from the State’s ledger and prevented major budget 
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reallocations and/or tax increases. The Schlüter executive’s financing model gave 
also the road users increasing returns, because State loan guarantees and financing 
via the international capital markets saved costs compared to financing through 
domestic finance institutions. Organizing through a non-profit State owned joint 
stock company saved similarly costs compared to PPP contracts. The Schlüter 
executive’s financing model protected also the ordinary tax financed road 
investments against imposition of common turnpike financing in addition to the 
established vehicle and fuel taxes, such as in Norway, and was thereby an example 
of institutional layering. The Schlüter executive’s financing model gave finally the 
taxpayers increasing returns because it prevented tax increases. The Schlüter 
executive’s financing model gave thereby the executive, legislators, road users and 
taxpayers, but not the domestic finance institutions or road investors, increasing 
returns. 
 The Fehmarn Belt connection is so far not finally approved, but Folketinget’s 
Jutland’s Mafia was ready for new pork barrel deals, among others through attempts 
of linking Fehmarn Belt to new motorways on Jutland.386 The Danish daily 
Politiken‘s editorial writer accused the Jutland’s Mafia in September 2004 for being 
myopic and pursuing “pork barrel” politics, because the Øresund, Great Belt and 
Fehmarn Belt connections were important for safeguarding Denmark’s future as 
interesting location for trade and industry. These ferry-free connections were also 
important for transforming Denmark from the agricultural age, where progress was 
measured according the harvesters’ speed, to an open, international economy, where 
progress was measured according to the inhabitants’ cleverness.387  
 Had the 1971 Road Act and the 1972 reforms of the Directorate of Public 
Roads and the road sector’s governance system any effects? The road safety on 
Danish roads was significantly improved between 1972 and 2005. This was largely a 
result of systematic removal of so-called “black spots” from the public roads, areas 
with an unexpected high number of accidents. The road investments to remedy 
problem areas were rank ordered according to the costs. Those projects that were 
most cost efficient; i.e. prevented most accidents given the costs accomplished first. 
The Directorate initiated this work more than 30 years ago. More than 1.100 persons 
were killed on Danish roads in 1972 when the road traffic was only about 1/3 of that 
in 2005. 369 persons were killed on Danish roads in 2004. The risk was hence 
reduced to almost 1/12 compared to 1972.388 Systematic removal of black spots, 
construction of safe roads and completing the motorway H gave significant 
improvements of the Danish road safety, exactly as promised by the three 
engineering and construction companies in their 1936-37 national motorway and 
bridge plans. 
 Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s first Liberal and Conservative Parties executive 
proposed in April 2004 streamlining Denmark through transforming the 13 counties 
plus Copenhagen and Frederiksberg Boroughs and Bornholm’s Region Municipal 
into five new regions.389 The Fogh-Rasmussen executive and the rightwing populist 
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) agreed about the new structure in June 
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2004.390 The executive’s 2004 structural reform had also far-reaching implications 
for the organizing of the public road system and the road administrations, because 
the county roads were agreed divided between the State and the municipals. Trunk 
roads and motorways would remain the State’s responsibility.391 The forthcoming 
reform distinguished hence between roads with national collective and local 
collective good characteristics. 
 Fogh Rasmussen’s executive and the Social Democratic and Radical Parties 
and Danish People’s Party agreed similarly March 3rd 2005 about Denmark’s new 
municipal structure, which will enter into force January 1st 2007, and reduce the 
number of municipals to 102.392 Denmark’s forthcoming two-tier road system will, 
according to the minister of traffic, consist of about 5 percent or 3.260 kilometers 
managed by the Directorate of Public Roads, which are estimated to carry out about 
35 percent of the future traffic work. The remaining 95 percent or 68.760 kilometers 
public roads will be managed by the municipals.393 The forthcoming Danish two-tier 
road system has almost inverse relations between State and municipal managed 
roads compared to Sweden, which also has a de facto two-tier road system. Because 
Swedish Road Administration managed in 2004 about 71 percent of the public roads 
while the municipals managed the remaining 29 percent.394 The Danish 2004-05 
settlement combined elements from the 1793, 1867, 1963, 1971 and 1997 Road 
Acts, and established a small but high-standard network of roads with national 
collective good characteristics managed by the Directorate of Public Roads, 
similarly as prior to 1867 and since 1963, which consolidated the investments in the 
most profitable or industrially necessary roads. The 2004-05 settlements established 
also a large system of roads with local collective or even private good characteristics 
managed by the municipals, similarly as according to the 1793, 1867, 1963, 1971 
and 1997 Road Acts, which located the responsibility for the local roads among 
those who harvest most benefits from these roads. 
Conclusions 
Where do these discussions bring us concerning this study’s four working 
hypothesis with regard to the Danish case from 1981 until about 2005? First, this 
study’s main hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods 
with road policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the 
common good was significantly strengthened from 1981 after the neo-liberal shift, 
because of completing the motorway H, included the Great Belt and Øresund 
Connections, even if Denmark struggled with significant State economic problems. 
Even the planned Fehmarn Belt Connection indicates the Danish executive and 
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legislators emphasized national collective goods. Denmark had only minority 
executives 1981-2005 except January 1993 – September 1994, but the numerous 
minority executives did not rule out significant investments in national collective 
goods such as motorways and major bridges that made Denmark smaller and gave 
the rest of Scandinavia a ferry-free connection to mainland Europe. Even the 
forthcoming Danish structural reform facilitates further emphasis on national 
collective goods, because the most crowded 5 percent of the public road system with 
national collective good characteristics will remain State roads managed by the 
Directorate of Public Roads. The remaining 95 percent with local collective or 
private good characteristics will be managed locally by the municipals. 
 The second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective or 
private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was strengthened after 1981. Folketinget’s pork 
barrel deal about the Great Belt Connection in June 1987 demonstrated clearly that 
even motorways could be understood as local collective or private goods and the 
resource allocation could be governed by the constituencies’ resource struggle, even 
in Denmark after introduction of the unicameral system and introduction of the 1972 
road policy governance system. The Great Belt deal was facilitated by the 1970 
municipal reform that created some very strong counties and constituencies on 
northern Jutland, which were able to divert resource from the constituencies on 
Sjælland that not always were able or willing to cooperate in Folketinget such as the 
constituencies on Jutland often did.  
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was strengthened after 1981 because the Schlüter executive’s 
compromise with the Social Democratic Party’s group in Folketinget’s in June 1986 
about the Great Belt Connection was facilitated by introduction of a three years 
advance for the railroads. This compromise demonstrates clearly the political 
parties’ rivalry could be decisive for the resource allocation. Even the Schlüter 
executive’s financing model for the Great Belt and later also for the Øresund 
Connection demonstrate the political parties’ rivalry governed the resource 
allocation. The Schlüter executive’s financing model kept namely these mega 
projects away from the State’s ledger, prevented significant reallocations and/or tax 
increases considered politically costly by the executive and political parties. Even 
the planned Fehmarn Belt Connection demonstrates that road projects divide the 
Danish political parties. 
 The final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was also strengthened by the Danish case after 1981. 
First, the Danish Ministry of Finance strengthened its position significantly during 
the Schlüter executives that instituted a more responsible financial policy that what 
had been common in Denmark until then. The Schlüter executive established hence 
a new equilibrium with regard to Danish financial policy. Second, the Schlüter 
executive’s introduction of turnpike financing of the Great Belt and Øresund 
Connections punctuated partly the equilibrium established 1910-27 through the 
Road Fund, with tax financed road investments, even if all other Danish roads 
remained tax financed. Third, the 1997 Road Act represented partly a return to the 
1867 Road Act’s logic, because the Danish State withdrew almost from road 
construction when the motorway H or the second national trunk road system was 
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almost completed, similarly as in 1867, and shifted the responsibility for many trunk 
roads to the counties and municipals, similarly as according to the 1867 Road Act. 
But the Danish State maintained its responsibility for the motorways and the most 
crowded trunk roads. Finally, the forthcoming Danish structural reform that replaces 
the 14 counties with 5 regions and reduces the number of municipals, introduces 
also a two-tier road system. The Directorate of Public Roads will manage only about 
5 percent of the most crowded public roads with national collective goods 
characteristics. The remaining 95 percent of the public roads with local collective or 
private good characteristics will be maintained by the 102 new municipals. This 
reform furthers the principles established by the 1793, 1957, 1963, 1971 and 1997 
Road Acts and is clearly an example of path dependence. 
Summary and conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Danish case? Table 4 provides an overview of the empirical findings 
from the Danish case concerning the study’s four working hypotheses. 
Table 4: Empirical findings from the Danish case concerning the four working 
hypotheses. 
Period/Hypothesis Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by 
politicians 
pursuing the 
common good 
Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by the 
constituencies’ 
resource struggles 
Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by the 
political parties’ 
rivalry 
Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by path 
dependence 
Prior to 1945 +/- + + + 
1945-1959 + - + + 
1960-1980 + -/+ + + 
1981-2005 + + + + 
 
 This study has corroborated the main hypothesis or benchmark about roads as 
national collective goods governed by legislators that pursue the common good 
independent of constituencies and political parties. The Danish executive built 
Denmark’s first national trunk road system 1761-1867. The Danish executive built 
similarly Denmark’s second national trunk road system; the so-called motorway H 
included the Great Belt and Øresund Connections 1957-2000, which had been 
outlined by private engineering and construction companies in 1936-37. Denmark’s 
high number of minority executives 1945-2005 did not prevent the executives or the 
majority of legislators from prioritizing development of national collective goods 
such as the motorway H. The entire motorway H, except the Great Belt and Øresund 
Connections, has been tax financed. 
 The second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective or 
private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles have some support, even if the 1867 Road Act 
made road policy and road construction to the counties and municipals’ task. First, 
the bicameral Rigsdagen’s seat allocation governed the Road Fund’s reimbursement 
key, because 5/6th of the reimbursements went to rural areas. The rural 
constituencies held a pivotal position in the bicameral Rigsdagen’s sanctioning 
chamber Landstinget. Second, Rigsdagen’s approval of construction of major 
bridges during the interwar years was usually based on pork barrel deals. Third, 
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introduction of the unicameral system 1953 included the new election system based 
on one person – one vote reduced the constituencies’ influence, but the 1970 
structural reform increased the constituencies’ influence, and paved the way for 
Denmark’s pork barrel deal of the century in 1987 about the Great Belt Connection. 
The constituencies’ struggles about the resource allocation had thus significant 
influence on the road policy and road construction despite the legislators’ only 
indirect involvement in the road policy and road construction from 1867 until 1972. 
 The third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective or 
private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was clearly strengthened, because the political parties rivalry has 
been decisive for Danish road policy and road construction, despite minister rule. 
First, the Social Democratic and Radical parties’ prewar executive used road policy 
and road construction strategically to counter the unemployment. Second, the 
postwar Social Democratic Party executives emphasized construction of modern 
trunk roads and motorways to facilitate the transformation from an agricultural to a 
modern, diversified industrial economy, to facilitate economic growth and thereby 
future opportunities for increased redistribution to the Social Democratic Party’s 
core voters. This motivation differed somewhat from the private engineering and 
construction companies’ 1936-37 national motorway and bridge plan championed 
by chartered engineers with rightwing nationalist sympathies that most likely 
advocated construction of motorways because of possible business and profit 
opportunities in addition to improved effectiveness and road safety. However, the 
Social Democratic Party embraced the leftwing populists and environmentalists 
throughout the 1970s, and reduced the emphasis on road policy and road 
construction. The road construction was also reduced because of the State economic 
problems entailing the first oil price shock. Finally, the non-socialist Schlüter 
executive piloted through the necessary decisions in Folketinget throughout the 
1980s and early 90s for completing the motorway H and the Great Belt and Øresund 
Connections as part of its neo-liberal reform program. 
 The final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened, because path dependence 
reproduced the Danish road polity’s power relations and resource allocation until 
sudden breakdown and development of new equilibriums. First, construction of 
modern roads to facilitate economic growth and development in Denmark was 
initiated already in 1761, and this policy has survived all kinds of external shocks, 
economic crises and regime changes, and is still upheld by Danish executives, 
legislators, counties and municipals, and is clearly an example of path dependence. 
Second, the Danish Ministry of Finance had a relatively weak position from 1894 
until the Schlüter executive that was strongly influenced by the neo-liberal shift and 
NPM ideas instituted a fundamentally new financial policy in the 1980s based on 
budget discipline and no more devaluation. Third, Denmark’s initial road policy 
regime established from 1761 and regulated through the 1793 Road Act was partly 
punctuated by the 1866 Constitution and the landowner’s regime. The 1866 
Constitution created path dependence, because Landstinget’s veto power gave the 
peripheral and rural constituencies a very powerful position on the urban 
constituencies’ and expense. Landstinget was partly weakened through the 1915 
Constitution, which increased the number voters and eligible. Introduction of 
common suffrage from 1918 and proportional elections from 1920 through the 
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Constitutional Amendment changed gradually the Danish political system’s 
character. Landstinget lost most of its political relevance from 1936 when the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties lost their majority, but was upheld until the 1953 
Constitution came into power. The 1953 Constitution established the unicameral 
Folketinget and an election system based on the principle one person – one vote. 
Fourth, the 1866 Constitution and landowner rule created also road political path 
dependence, because the 1867 Road Act made road construction and maintenance 
local matters, liquidated the State road administration and abolished the trunk roads 
which were reclassified to highways and managed by the counties. Fifth, 
establishment of the Road Fund from 1910 and dedication of the Road Fund to 
highways from 1927 kept the road financing away form the legislators as well as the 
Ministry of Finance, and safeguarded swift construction of a modern road system 
already prior to World War Two. Establishment of the Road Fund was most likely 
the result of a weak Ministry of Finance. Sixth, establishment of the Directorate of 
Public Roads in 1949 challenged seriously the localist principles established by the 
1867 Road Act, but this equilibrium was first punctuated by the 1953 Constitution 
that paved the way for the 1957 and 1963 Road Acts and the 1958 Road 
Reimbursement Act. The 1963 Road Acts made construction of motorways a State 
responsibility governed by the minister of public works. Seventh, the 1971 Road Act 
reintroduced the 1793 Road Act’s three-tier road system, where each administrative 
level financed its own roads. Folketinget governed construction of motorways, the 
minister of public works/minister of traffic construction of all other trunk roads. The 
counties and municipals governed construction of highways and local roads. Eight, 
the 1997 Road Act represented partly a return to the 1867 Road Act’s regime, when 
the motorway H was almost completed. The forthcoming structural reform that 
substitutes the counties with five regions and far fewer and larger municipals further 
many principles established through the 1997 Road Act, because the public road 
system will be reorganized to a two-tier road system. The Directorate of Public 
Roads will manage the 5 percent most crowded roads with national collective good 
characteristics. The rest, roads with local collective or private good characteristics, 
will be managed by the municipals. Finally, a recent example of path dependence is 
the Schlüter executive’s NPM financing model initially established to safeguard 
construction of the Great Belt Connection. The same model was later also used to 
finance construction of the Øresund Connection, a joint venture with the Swedish 
State. The Schlüter executive’s NPM financing model is also agreed used for the 
planned Fehmarn Belt Connection, a joint venture with the German Federal State. 
The Schlüter executive’s NPM financing model gave the motorists increasing 
returns because turnpikes were limited to road sections that earlier had been serviced 
through user financed ferries, and reduced also the motorists’ costs to an absolute 
minimum through State loan guarantees and financing through the international 
capital markets. The Schlüter executive’s financing model became also an example 
of institutional layering, because the turnpikes at Great Belt and Øresund coexisted 
with tax financing of all other roads, because the tax financing equilibrium was not 
punctuated after the neo-liberal shift such as in Norway. 
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Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
It has been a common belief – at least in Norway – that Swedish road policy and 
construction of Sweden’s modern world-class road system has been a 
straightforward and smooth ride. But this chapter reveals that has definitely not been 
the case, except when the experts or technocrats governed the road policy and road 
construction approximately 1954-70, when Sweden made its great road leap 
forwards and caught up with its road infrastructure lag. 
 This chapter is organized in five sections similarly as chapter two about 
Denmark. The first section introduces background and context about Sweden’s 
unique road polity and the road policy and road construction prior to 1945. The 
second section about 1945-59 is about the mass motoring’s breakthrough that 
became a major challenge for the Swedish executive, legislators and road 
administrators, because the prewar road system was dysfunctional concerning 
capacity, safety and environmental standards. The third section about 1960-80, when 
the Swedish model experienced its boom and bust, started with road policy catch-up 
and ended with significant road policy adjustments among others because of the 
Social Democratic Party’s road and traffic policy flip-flops. The fourth section is 
about 1981 until about 2005 when Sweden was hit by serious State economic 
problems and underwent the neo-liberal shift. The executive placed itself in the road 
policy driver’s seat, overruled in some instances the technocrats and used 
construction of motorways and modern trunk roads as means to jumpstart the ailing 
economy. Riksdagen increased similarly its power because of the numerous 
minority executives. The final section is summary and conclusions concerning the 
study’s four working hypotheses. 
Background and context 
The second industrial revolution 1890-1930 transformed Sweden from a backwards 
agrarian to a modern industrial society. Sweden underwent protracted struggles for 
democratization, but the balance of power shifted during the interwar years. The 
road policy prior to 1945 was characterized by struggles between those who 
defended status quo, decentralized municipal road administrations governed by 
laymen, and those who desired a centralized State road board staffed and governed 
by professionals. 
Delayed democratization and introduction of mass politics  
Sweden’s 1809 Constitution, which constituted the executive’s ground rules until 
1975, was a compromise based on the separation of power principle and upheld the 
State bureaucracy established by Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna through his 1634 
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Constitution that instituted centralized boards and regional State administrations. 
The 1719 and 1772 Constitutions furthered Oxenstierna’s bureaucracy.395 The State 
bureaucracy operated according to norms about State reason, meritocracy and 
promoting Sweden Inc. rather than special interest groups, and increased gradually 
its autonomy towards the King and Riksdagen. The State bureaucracy’s 
development path was clearly an example of path dependence, because the 
autonomy gave the bureaucrats increasing returns. However, the Chancery Review 
Court that in 1799 was renamed to the Administrative Court of Appeals 
(Kammarrätterna) kept the autonomous boards in check.396 Even the Swedish 
bureaucracy was thus based on the separation of power principle. 
 The 1809 Constitution authorized both the King and Riksdagen to pass 
common laws, but only the legislature Riksdagen was authorized to impose taxes. 
Riksdagen met initially only every fifth year, but the King could summon 
extraordinary sessions and call for extraordinary elections. Approval from three of 
the four estates was equal to Riksdagen’s approval, except for constitutional 
amendments or introduction or abolition of privileges that had to be approved by all 
four estates or chambers, namely the privileged estates nobility and clergy, and the 
non-privileged estates urban citizens and farmers.397 ‘King status quo’ governed 
Sweden until the 1860s, because the ancient corporative system with four estates 
and the four-cameral system blocked effectively most attempts of collective actions 
such as fundamental or radical reforms. The consequences were among others 
delayed modernization and industrialization of Sweden. 
 The 1865-66 constitutional reforms broke the ancient regime’s deadlock 
through abolition of the estates’ privileges and making Riksdagen bicameral. The 
four chambers approved the reform in December 1865, and the four-cameral 
Riksdagen held its final meeting June 21st 1866.398 Justice Prime Minister 
(justisiestatsminister) Louis De Geer, the bicameral system’s architect, aimed at 
creating an institutional framework that permitted new development paths but 
safeguarded the wealthy and educated groups’ control of Sweden’s future political, 
economical and social development.399 Louis De Geer and his minister of civilian 
matters (civilminister) Johan August Gripenstedt were both proponents for 
Sweden’s emerging urban middle class that had been excluded from political power 
and influence by the four-cameral system, even if they both belonged to the nobility. 
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Figure 10: Swedish counties 1996, an overview. 
 
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, from Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of 
Texas [Online January 24th 2006] – URL: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/sweden_div96.jpg.  
 Riksdagen’s two new chambers, the First Chamber (Första kammaren) and 
the Second Chamber (Andra kammaren) were created equal, similarly as in the 
former four-cameral assembly. Both chambers could initiate motions, but the 
matters were rejected if the two chambers disagreed. The King could dissolve one or 
both chambers and call for new elections.400 These principles established by the 
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1809 Constitution were furthered. The two chamber’s equal position gave the 
bicameral system a very strong consensual bias, similarly as the four-cameral 
Riksdagen, but the King’s entitlement to call for new elections in only one of the 
chambers safeguarded status quo, the interests usually represented by the First 
Chamber. But the bicameral system made still radical reforms far more likely than 
under the four-cameral system, and changed thereby Sweden’s political economy 
fundamentally. 
 The major cities’ municipal councils and the rural areas’ county councils 
appointed the First Chamber members successively for nine years terms. The 
members of the First Chamber were not required to live in their constituency. Many 
lived in Stockholm or other major cities. Almost every member of the First Chamber 
had academic or officer education.401 The First Chamber represented the counties 
and major cities’ interests, and institutionalized status quo due to its long terms and 
successive replacement. But the First Chamber instituted also the concern for 
progress, modernization and common good, hereunder development of national 
collective goods, because the First Chamber members belonged often to Sweden’s 
intellectual elites, and were often well informed about technical, economical, 
institutional and political innovations. The First Chamber had therefore a dual or 
triple nature, due to its particular mixture of reactionaries, progressives and the 
concerns for the common good, which was determined by the political balance. 
 The popularly elected Second Chamber had three years terms until the 1924 
election when the terms were extended to four years. Those eligible needed only to 
be aged 25 and own 1/80th of the property or to be taxed for 1/5 of the annual 
income for those eligible to the First Chamber. The Second Chamber’s members had 
to live in their constituencies.402 The Second Chamber’s members represented first 
and foremost their constituencies, and prioritized usually local collective or private 
goods to their own constituencies. Many members of the Second Chamber were 
skeptical to public spending and development of national collective goods due to 
their often local or parochial perspective. 
 The bicameral Riksdagen upheld the former four-cameral Riksdagen’s five 
standing committees. These were not subject matter committees, but organized 
functionally according to Riksdagen’s tasks, with standing committees for 
constitutional and legal matters, the State’s expenses, incomes and national bank 
matters.403 Riksdagen’s committees had maintained strong positions since the 18th 
century.404 The State Committee (Statsutskotten) was often considered most 
powerful, because it could refuse public spending, and became therefore particularly 
popular among farmers who opposed what they considered unnecessary public 
spending.405 The two chambers’ equal representation in the committees made the 
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First Chamber members relatively more powerful than their more numerous Second 
Chamber colleagues. The long tenure gave also the First Chamber’s ‘senators’ a 
psychological upper hand.406 The bicameral Riksdagen furthered the tradition with 
committees responsible for many sectors and policy areas, which made the members 
of Riksdagen to all-round legislators rather than narrow-minded sector specialists 
and sector enthusiasts. The functional committees’ persistence was also clearly an 
example of path dependence. 
 Many of the autonomous boards came clearly in question throughout the 19th 
century when the State engaged in more policy areas. The Supreme Administrative 
Court (Regeringsrätten) was therefore established in 1909 to take care of the judicial 
issues. The executive governed in those instances where the laws’ appropriateness 
came in question.407 The Swedish system differed thus fundamentally both from 
Denmark where the executive ruled and in Norway where the legislature ruled. 
 The struggle for common suffrage and parliamentary rule went on longer in 
Sweden than in Denmark and Norway. Sweden’s first formal Liberal and 
Conservative Parties were founded already in 1868, but splintered into struggling 
fractions. The Social Democratic Party was founded in 1889. The Social Democratic 
and Liberal Parties cooperated from the 1890s against the different Conservative and 
reactionary groups for introduction of common suffrage.408 The Social Democratic 
Party’s first stronghold was lumberjacks in northern Sweden, but the party shifted 
gradually its attention towards urban industrial workers and later also public sector 
employees.409 The King appointed the executive’s ministers even after the turn of 
the 19th and 20th century. Sweden did not have modern, national parties, except for 
the Social Democratic Party until after the turn of the 19th and 20th century. 
 Introduction of universal suffrage and mass-politics in Sweden took place 
through two reforms. The first reform came into power after the 1908 Second 
Chamber election and introduced common male suffrage to the Second Chamber 
together with direct proportional elections (PR) and seat allocation according to 
d’Hondt’s method. This reform changed also the voting rules for the local elections 
and made the wealthiest farmers eligible to the First Chamber.410 The second reform 
came into power from the 1921 Second Chamber election and introduced common 
suffrage to the Second Chamber elections for persons aged 23 or more. The suffrage 
was still limited for some categories, but the graded local votes were abolished. The 
voting age in the local elections that governed the appointment of members to the 
First Chamber was reduced to 27. The First Chamber’s terms were also reduced to 8 
years. This reform made also some wealthy workers eligible for the First 
Chamber.411 These two reforms punctuated the political equilibrium established 
throughout the 19th century and set in motion a chain reaction that gradually shifted 
the political balance and paved the way for further democratization.  
 The Social Democratic Party dominated the Second Chamber from the 1914 
election and maintained this position until the Second Chamber’s abolition in 
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1970.412 The Social Democratic Party became similarly the First Chamber’s 
dominant party from the 1922 local elections, won exactly half the seats in 1941 and 
held the majority from 1945 until the First Chamber’s abolition in 1970.413 
Introduction of common male suffrage encouraged also establishment of new 
political parties. Two Agrarian Parties were established in 1913 and 15. Both parties 
won seats in the 1917 Second Chamber election and merged into one Agrarian 
Party, Bondeförbundet, in 1921. The Communist Party was similarly established in 
1921. Sweden’s current Liberal Party was first established in 1934 after a merger of 
the two Liberal Parties. The current Conservative Party was similarly first 
established in 1935 when the First Chamber Conservatives and the Second 
Chamber’s two Conservative Parties merged.414 The 1907-09 and 1921 suffrage and 
election system reforms reshaped thus Sweden’s party system and political 
landscape, furthered the democratization and shifted gradually the political balance 
in the labor movement’s favor. 
 The struggles for parliamentary rule went on in parallel with the struggles for 
suffrage and voting system reforms. The Liberal Party headed by Karl Staaf desired 
British style parliamentary rule based on the directly elected Second Chamber, 
similarly as introduced in Denmark in 1901. Riksdagen’s Conservatives with among 
other law and political science professors like Rudolf Kjellén claimed the 1809 
Constitution was incompatible with parliamentary rule.415 But the Russian 
revolution scared obviously the nobility and the Conservatives, because the King 
accepted introduction of parliamentary rule based Riksdagen’s both chambers after 
the Conservatives lost the Second Chamber election. The Liberal and Social 
Democratic Parties established a coalition executive in October 1917.416 This was 
not the first instance of parliamentary rule in Sweden, because Riksdagen’s four 
estates established something that resembled political parties and parliamentary rule 
from the 1730s until King Gustav III’s coup d’état August 19th 1772 that partly 
reestablished the autocracy.417 Sweden’s history differed thus fundamentally from 
that in Denmark and Norway, due to Riksdagen’s strong position and the 
autonomous bureaucracy that usually protected the citizens against the King’s 
arbitrary rule.  
 The Swedish polity and parliamentary rule established from 1917 were 
unique. First, the 1809 Constitution gave the executive and Riksdagen almost 
equally strong positions. Second, the bicameral system gave up to 12 years lag 
between the voters’ preferences and the appointed members of the First Chamber’s 
preferences. Third, the parliamentary rule was based on both of Riksdagen’s 
chambers, not only the directly elected chamber such as in Denmark and Great 
Britain. Finally, Axel Oxenstierna’s 17th century State bureaucracy persisted, and 
operated still according to the norms about State reason and meritocracy, and upheld 
also its autonomy towards the executive and Riksdagen, but was kept in check by 
the administrative courts. The struggles between Riksdagen’s Conservatives and 
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Liberals may according to the political scientist Helena Wockelberg’s dissertation 
explain why the autonomous boards persisted even after introduction of 
parliamentary rule in 1917, because conservative members of Riksdagen such as 
Professor Rudolf Kjellén considered namely autonomous boards as guardians of 
“particular national values”, or simply conservative guarantees in case of abolition 
of the monarchy. Liberal members of Riksdagen such as Carl Lindhagen on the 
other hand considered autonomous boards legitimate if they represented the 
“national will”.418 Both the conservatives and liberals found thus Sweden’s 
autonomous boards useful, but with fundamentally different motivations. These 
common interests furthered most likely the autonomous boards against those who 
desired introduction of minister rule, which in turn furthered Sweden’s unique 
polity. 
 1920-32 was Riksdagen and particularly the committees’ golden years, due to 
lack of clear-cut majorities. Sweden had one civil servant, three Social Democratic, 
two Conservative and two Liberal Party executives during these years. Riksdagen’s 
pivotal parties were often able to dictate the executive’s policies.419 The Social 
Democratic Party settled for a reformist course during the 1920s and accepted the 
capitalist system, similarly as the Danish Social Democratic Party and the 
Norwegian Social Democratic Party that splintered from Norway’s then very 
radicalized Labor Party. Sweden’s political instability coincided with the post World 
War One deflation crisis. Sweden was the Nordic country hit most severely. 30 
percent of the unionized workers were unemployed 1921-22, and the GDP sank 20 
percent. The Swedish kroner’s (SEK) gold parity was restored in 1925 and the 
convertibility was reestablished, and the Swedish economy performed well during 
the second half of the 1920s.420 Sweden’s good economic performance during the 
second half of the 1920s was a fundamental difference compared to Denmark and 
Norway that struggled economically even during the second half of the 1920s. 
 The 1929 Wall Street crack sent the world economy into a depression. Sweden 
was hit in 1931 when Great Britain September 21st abolished the gold standard. 
Sweden gave up the gold standard soon after. Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank 
devaluated the SEK to a level favorable for the exports, reduced the interest rates 
and provided liberal credits to stimulate the economy, among others through 
investments in domestic industry and construction of housing to reduce the 
unemployment.421 Sweden became a part of the so-called Sterling area after Great 
Britain abolished the gold standard and pegged the SEK to the British Pound, and 
avoided thereby largely the consequences of the 1930s’ beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies.422 The Swedish unemployment peaked during the winter 1932-33. 
Riksdagen’s non-socialist parties argued for a traditional economic policy with 
reduced public spending to overcome the crisis. John Maynard Keynes’ ideas 
influenced the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s Ernst Wigforss already in 1930, 
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who introduced ideas about public relief works to market wages in the Social 
Democratic Party’s 1932 political platform, which proposed financing public works, 
such as construction of roads, bridges, airfields, hydroelectric power plants, harbors 
and railroads by State loans, which would be partly self-financing through the 
market wages’ multiplier effects. The Social Democratic Party won the 1932 Second 
Chamber election, and Sweden’s Social Democratic order started when Per Albin 
Hansson became Prime Minister. Ernst Wigforss served as minister of finance from 
1932 until 1949.423 The 1932 Second Chamber election shifted Sweden’s political 
balance, and paved the way for a development path that persisted until the 1976 
election.  
 The Agrarian and Social Democratic Parties’ horse trade or class compromise 
in May 1933 became another of Sweden’s political turning points. The farmers were 
compensated through protective measures and economic support. A short-lived 
Agrarian Party executive replaced the Social Democratic Party executive in June 
1936, but was succeeded by a Social Democratic and Agrarian Party coalition after 
the Social Democratic Party won the Second Chamber election. This bipartite 
executive was expanded to a national coalition in 1939 after the outbreak of World 
War Two.424 The 1933 class compromise did not only facilitate an active State and 
an active finance policy and the “Welfare Capitalism”, but established also 
Sweden’s modern corporative negotiation system founded on collective bargaining 
and peaceful resolution of labor conflicts. Even the farmers’ and the trade and 
industry’s business sector organizations were included in this corporative 
negotiation system that first and foremost promoted Sweden Inc.’s interests.425 The 
1930s’ class compromises paved also the way for increased productivity and growth, 
particularly within transport, manufacturing industry and public sectors.426 Sweden’s 
new corporative negotiation system can be understood as an extension of the 
established autonomous State bureaucracy that operated according to the norms 
about State reason and professionalism, but the new corporative negotiation system 
made the Social Democratic Party and partly its sister organization the Federation of 
Trade Unions (LO) the hub in Sweden’s political system. Sweden’s political 
economy changed therefore fundamentally, even if the polity formally remained the 
same. The new Swedish corporative system led also to establishment of a new social 
contract between the citizens, executive, legislators, political parties, civil servants 
and interest organizations founded on a highly rational engineer approach to politics. 
 Sweden experienced stronger economic growth then the other Nordic 
countries during the second industrial revolution from 1890 to 1930, measured in 
GDP per capita.427 Angus Maddison calculated Sweden’s GDP per capita measured 
in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars to 2.802 dollars in 1920, 3.937 dollars in 
1930 and 4.857 in 1940. The average for the 12 West European countries was 
according to Maddison 3.305 dollars in 1920, 4.289 in 1930 and 4.984 in 1940. 
Sweden lagged behind the West European average in 1920, 30 and 40, with West 
Europe’s seventh highest GDP per capita in 1920, eight highest in 1930 and fifth 
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highest in 1940.428 But Sweden caught up economically during the interwar years, 
despite the 1920s debt and deflation crisis and the 1930s depression. 
Roads remained a local responsibility, despite establishment of a professional 
State road administration 
Sweden’s military and bureaucratic nobility and senor civil servants were closely 
integrated with the landowners and wealthy farmers. Sweden’s cities remained 
relatively weak until the industrialization gained momentum from the second half of 
the 19th century.429 King Carl XIV Johan approved establishment of the Royal Board 
of Common Road and Water Constructions (Kungl. Styrelsen för Allmänna Wäg 
och Wattenbyggnader) August 6th 1841, after the four-cameral Riksdagen June 1st 
1841 had approved a four-year road investment program that safeguarded State 
contributions to road construction to catch up Sweden’s lag concerning transport and 
communication infrastructures, after Captain Axel Erik von Sydow’s study in 1840 
concluded the need for among others improved roads. Sweden was divided into five 
regional road and water construction districts, each headed by an engineer officer.430 
Riksdagen’s approval of the road plan and the executive’s establishment of the 
Royal Board of Common Road and Water Constructions was clearly 
acknowledgement that Sweden was left behind with regards to road infrastructures. 
The idea that improved transport and communication infrastructures was partly 
imported from abroad, similarly as in Denmark.  
 The Swedish Army’s Royal Road and Water Construction Corps (Kungliga 
Väg och Vattenbyggnadskåren) was established in 1851 for planning and managing 
construction of major new infrastructures. 1851 became the second turning point, 
because the Colonel who headed the Royal Road and Water Construction Corps 
headed also the Royal Board of Common Road and Water Constructions, which 
became a hybrid civilian and military organization. The Royal Road and Water 
Construction Corps’ five Majors headed similarly the Royal Board of Common 
Road and Water Constructions’ five regional road and water construction districts. 
These Majors became the board’s expertise in the field. The Royal Board of 
Common Road and Water Constructions became in 1883 the Royal Board of Roads 
and Waterways (Kungliga Väg och Vattenbyggnadsstyrelsen). The Royal Road and 
Water Construction Corps remained elite, because only the nobility and the upper 
classes could afford the required chartered engineer studies and reserve officer 
education. The Royal Road and Water Construction Corp’s members were entitled 
to the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ managerial positions until 1934, when 
the Social Democratic Party executive abolished these ties.431 The ties between the 
Royal Road and Water Construction Corps and the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways made the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways an autonomous elite, 
with close relations to the nobility and upper classes at least until World War Two. 
 The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ main task during most of the 19th 
century was not construction of roads but construction of canals and inland 
waterways. The board was also engaged in planning and construction of railroads, 
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similarly as its French role model, Le Corps des Ponts et Chaussées.432 Sweden’s 
railroad epoch was from 1850 to 1920, according to the economic historian Olle 
Krantz.433 434 The 1853-54 Riksdagen decided the Swedish State should build and 
operate a number of trunk railroads. The executive submitted in 1856 a trunk 
railroad plan, based on construction of five trunk railroads, a western from 
Stockholm to Gothenburg, a southern from Malmö to Falköping, a northern from 
Stockholm to Storvik, an eastern from Katrineholm to Nässjö and the northwestern 
from Laxå to the Norwegian border, and the connection between Stockholm C and 
Stockholm S that linked the southern and northern trunk railroads. These first trunk 
railroads, which were completed within 1875, connected southern and middle 
Sweden’s industrial areas and population clusters with the capital Stockholm. The 
railroad investments’ allocation was governed by the transport demand and where 
the trunk railroads gave most significant reductions of transport costs.435 
Construction of trunk railroads was first and foremost governed by a transport 
economic logic, even if these railroads also were supposed to fuel Sweden’s 
economic growth as such. The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways was 
responsible for construction of railroads from 1882 until the responsibility was 
handed over to the Royal Board of Railroads (Kungliga Järnvägsstyrelsen) in 
1888.436 The Swedish minister of finance Johan August Gripenstedt described in a 
speech in Riksdagen in 1857 the Swedish State’s role in trade and industry policy as 
the “helping hand”, and construction of railroads, was according to the technology 
historian Arne Kaijser, decisions with “extremely long-lasting impact”.437 
 A division of labor between Sweden’s different transport infrastructures 
emerged gradually during the late 19th and early 20th century. Sea transport and 
inland waterways took care of the long distance transports and heavy hauls. Most 
middle range transports went by railroads. The short distance and local transports 
went on roads.438  
 Riksdagen approved in 1891 Sweden’s first modern Road Act that superseded 
the 1734 Road Act that made road construction and maintenance the property 
owners’ sole responsibility, and the obligations were dependent of the agricultural 
property’s size. The First Chamber’s Conservatives had then postponed a new road 
act for years. The farmers had opposed the duty work in Riksdagen since 1786 
according to the economic historian Eva Liljegren. The 1891 Road Act, which came 
into power in 1895, replaced all kinds of turnpikes with local property road taxes 
even on industrial estates that earlier had been exempt from road taxes and duty 
work. The 1891 Road Act upheld the farmers’ duty work, but those liable to duty 
work were except from the property road tax. The 1891 Road Act divided the road 
system into 360.000 sections managed by 368 road maintenance districts or road 
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municipals that usually were organized according to the municipal borders. The 
1891 Road act introduced also 10 percent State contributions to the road municipals’ 
maintenance costs, which increased to 15 percent in 1905 and 30 percent in 1918.439  
 The 1891 Road Act instituted road policy and road construction governed by 
the municipals’ laymen. The road municipals’ transaction costs were significant due 
to the large number of road administrations and the even larger number of road 
sections, because construction of new roads led to requirements for partitions of the 
road system into new sections, which was costly and time consuming. It was also 
difficult to coordinate the road construction and maintenance across the road 
municipal borders. Trunk roads or other roads with collective good characteristics 
represented particular problems. The duty work burden was often larger for those 
farmers responsible for sections on crowded trunk roads than for those responsible 
for sections of sparsely trafficed parish roads.  
The shift towards semi-state governed road policy and road construction 
The car’s initial breakthrough in Sweden took place at Stockholm’s 1903 
international automobile exhibition, and led among others to establishment of a 
national motorist association, Sweden’s Automobile Club (Sveriges 
Automobilklubb) (SAC). Most of SAC’s members belonged to the nobility or other 
elites. SAC began almost immediately lobbying for making the members of 
Riksdagen more agreeable to motoring. SAC became Sweden’s Royal Automobile 
Club (Kungliga Automobil Klubben) (RAC) in 1908. Those days’ American Good 
Roads Movement inspired RAC, which in 1911 took the initiative to establishment 
of a Swedish Good Roads Movement. But there was one significant difference. The 
US Good Roads Movement had started as a grass roots initiative, even if the 
movement later was co-opted by the car, construction and oil industries. The similar 
Swedish initiative emanated from the ruling elites. Swedish Road Federation 
(Svenska vägföreningen) was formally established in January 1914, with Sörmland’s 
County Governor Lennart Reuterskiöld as chairman. RAC’s Captain Ingemar 
Petersson became treasurer and de facto leader. King Gustav V became Swedish 
Road Federation’s patron, a position he maintained until his death in 1950, when his 
successor Gustav VI Adolf took over.440 One of Swedish Road Federation’s goals 
was a new Road Act, because the duty work and small road parcels prevented 
rational road maintenance, according to the historian Ove Pettersson.441 Swedish 
Road Federation was thus as far from a grass root organization as possible, and was 
very well connected with or part of those days’ ruling elites. 
 The railroads’ diminishing profitability in the 1920s was largely a result of the 
trucks’ breakthrough after World War One.442 This shift from railroad and inland 
waterway transports to road transports of passengers and goods triggered in turn 
                                                 
439 Gustafsson (1987:92-94); Pettersson (1988:27-28, 31-32, 34-37, 123, 126-127); Montelius (1996); 
Gerentz (1991:18); Jönsson (1991:40); Modig (1991:223); Liljegren (1999:22-23); Blomkvist (2001:52-
58). 
440 Blomkvist (2001:62-70, 83-86). See also Pettersson (1988:127-129) and Andréasson et al. (1997:105-
109). 
441 Pettersson (1988:37-38). 
442 Andersson-Skog (1993:45-47, 86-88): Andersson-Skog and Ottosson (1994:8-9). 
Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
129 
demands for better roads and more professional road maintenance.443 RAC, Swedish 
Road Federation and later also other motorist organizations engaged in lobbying for 
improved roads, which in turn led to questioning of the 1891 Road Act and the road 
municipals’ road policy and road construction governed by laymen rather than 
engineers or other professionals. 
 Swedish Road Federation became gradually one of the interwar years’ major 
road political players through skillful utilization of its political network, and 
managed to do so without challenging the railroad interests. The trick according to 
the technology historian Pär Blomkvist was depoliticizing and defusing the road 
issues by dressing them as technical and economical matters.444 Swedish Road 
Federation desired industrialized road maintenance instead of the farmers’ duty 
work. This initiative achieved common support, but abolition of Sweden’s numerous 
road municipals was an entirely different matter, because that challenged the 
municipal autonomy, the layman rule, and those who defended status quo and feared 
increased public spending. 
 The 1920s became a transition period for the local layman governed road 
administrations due to increased State contributions to the road construction and 
maintenance. The almost an exponentially growing number of motor vehicles 
increased the need for road maintenance, because most roads were built for horse 
and cart. The number of motor vehicles increased from about 37.000 in 1920 to 
more than 200.000 in 1930 or from 21.000 cars in 1920 to more than 145.000 in 
1930.445 Riksdagen approved vehicle and rubber taxes in 1922, gasoline taxes in 
1924 and finally taxes on alcohol based fuels in 1929. The 1911 Road Commission 
proposed vehicle taxation based on the marginal cost principle according to the 
economic historian Eva Liljegren, but Pär Blomkvist claimed RAC and Swedish 
Road Federation’s lobby efforts were decisive for dedication of the vehicle tax 
revenues to road purposes. The main reason for the 1924 gasoline tax was the 
deteriorating trade balance due to the 1920s’ deflation crisis, according to Eva 
Liljegren. However, Eva Liljegren’s study based on analysis of Riksdagen’s 
deliberations concluded the motorist organizations did not affect Riksdagen’s 
decisions about introduction of vehicle and road taxation during the interwar 
years.446 Riksdagen’s approval of the marginal cost principle limited the taxation of 
the motorists, because Riksdagen’s majority considered cars a utility, not a luxury 
item. Dedication of vehicle and fuel tax revenues safeguarded similarly the road 
construction and maintenance’s financing, because the road appropriations increased 
proportionally with the number of cars and their use. 
 But how did Riksdagen’s introduction of vehicle, rubber and fuel taxes 
challenge the layman governed road municipals and the locally governed road 
policy and road construction? This process started early in the 1920s and included 
several institutional changes that gradually toppled the road policy equilibrium 
favoring traditionalists, localists and laymen and established instead a new 
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equilibrium favoring modernists, centralists and professionals. This shift came to a 
temporary halt in 1937, but the 1937 equilibrium was not viable.  
 The 1921 Road Act Amendment made it possible for the road municipals to 
substitute duty work with payments of property road tax, which did away with most 
of the duty work during the 1920s.447 The 1921 Road Act amendment led to 
employment of road inspectors in most road municipals and facilitated similarly 
many road municipals’ procurement of the first specialized machines, even if the 
average road municipal only managed 200 kilometers of roads. 
 Riksdagen’s approval of vehicle, rubber and fuel taxes strengthened gradually 
the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ professionals’ influence on the road 
municipals’ road policy and road construction, because the Royal Board of Roads 
and Waterways managed the road municipals’ State contributions. The road 
municipals had to apply for State contributions and build and maintain the roads 
according to the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ technical requirements, 
because the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ engineers approved the road 
municipals’ plans. The road municipals carried out the road maintenance during the 
1920s and 30s, but contracted usually out construction of roads and bridges to 
private construction companies. The plans for such projects were usually made by 
the construction companies or consulting engineers. The Ministry of 
Communications signaled in 1924 a desire for development of perennial road plans 
in each road municipal. This desire was formalized in 1929, because the road 
municipals was ordered to develop quadrennial local road plans for 1931-33, which 
were supposed succeeded by further quadrennial road plans.448 The Royal Board of 
Roads and Waterways’ management of the State contributions and supervision of 
the road municipals facilitated thus development of a more uniform road system. 
The same was the Ministry of Communications’ introduction of long term road 
planning and perennial budgets in each road municipal. 
 Riksdagen decided in 1929 to reorganize the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways. The five road and water construction districts were replaced by road 
administrations within each of the 24 State county administrations from July 1st 
1930 that supervised the road municipals.449 The 1930 reform furthered the Royal 
Board of Roads and Waterways influence on the road municipals, because their 
engineers were from then present in every county’s State administration, which 
increased the Royal Board of Road and Waterway’s administrative capacity. 
 Road construction was one of the executives and municipals’ most commonly 
used relief works during the 1920s and 30s economic crises, particularly in northern 
Sweden. The so-called Norrland-system divided the planned roads into 150-250 
meters sections, which were auctioned on site to groups of self-employed workers. 
The Norrland-system reduced the construction costs, but reduced also the road 
workers’ incomes, particularly if high unemployment. This road construction was 
generally based on manual labor. The only exceptions were in some parts of 
southern Sweden where specialized construction companies engaged in road 
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construction, because the labor force there often had more profitable alternatives 
than road construction.450 The interwar years’ Swedish road construction was thus 
usually not mechanized such as in Denmark, even if road construction also was 
commonly used as relief works in Denmark. 
 The Swedish State’s fuel and vehicle tax revenues exceeded the municipal 
property road tax revenues at the turn of the 1920s and 30s.451 The State’s financial 
contributions to construction of new roads in 1930 increased from 2/3 to ¾ of the 
construction costs, and the maintenance contributions were similarly increased from 
70 to 75 percent.452 The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways and the road 
municipals spent about 100 millions SEK annually in 1931 and 1932 on road 
investments and maintenance, approximately 191,6 and 197,72 millions 1990 PPP 
USD per year. The State’s financial contributions to road maintenance increased 
further from 75 to 80 percent in 1931; hereunder 65 percent financed by the 
dedicated vehicle, rubber and fuel taxes. The State’s maintenance contributions 
increased further to 90 percent in 1932.453 The State’s financial contributions to the 
road municipals’ road construction and maintenance were linked to the local road 
taxes, and increased with the local property road taxes.454 But the early 1930s’ 
increased road appropriations necessitated in turn increased vehicle and fuel taxes to 
maintain the State’s budget balance. Riksdagen increased therefore the vehicle and 
fuel taxes in 1927, 29, 31, 32 and 38, and abolished similarly the rubber taxes in 
1938.455 The significantly increased State contributions to the road municipals 
during the 1920s and early 30s indicated clearly that road construction and 
maintenance was used counter cyclic to fight unemployment, no matter the 
executives’ political affiliation. These contributions increased also the Royal Board 
of Roads and Waterways’ involvement in the road policy and road construction, 
which still was governed locally by the road municipals’ laymen. 
 The high unemployment and shift from railroad to road transports of 
passengers and goods placed also road policy and road construction firmly on the 
Swedish domestic political agenda.456 The executive appointed the 1929 Road 
Committee to update the 1891 Road Act, the 1931 Road and Bridge Committee to 
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update the road planning procedures and road design manuals, and finally the 
October 1931 Committee to elucidate the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ 
organizing and a possible State takeover of RAC’s Road Research Institute.457 458 
The entire Swedish road administration came hence under scrutiny at the turn of the 
1920s and 30s. 
 Sweden’s chartered engineers were well aware the German plans for 
construction of a national motorway system.459 They were similarly well aware of 
the US efforts for introduction of scientific planning and construction of modern 
roads, because Swedish scholars and engineers published regular reviews of 
international literature in journals like Teknisk tidskrift – Väg- och 
vattenbyggnadskonst.460 The question about construction of dedicated roads for cars 
vs. construction of roads that mixed cars, horses, bicycles and pedestrians was one 
of the interwar years’ big issues for road engineers.461 These questions were also 
discussed among Swedish engineers, which evidently were well aware of those 
days’ professional debates in mainland Europe and USA. Ideas about modern road 
planning and construction diffused among others to those who elucidated Sweden’s 
future road policy, road construction and organizing of the road administration. 
 The 1929 Road Committee’s majority did not recommend establishment of a 
centralized State road board such as in Italy or Germany, but consolidating the 376 
road municipals into larger units, each headed by a locally elected Road Board. The 
1929 Road Committee’s engineers proposed also State management of the most 
crowded roads.462 The 1929 Road Committee’s studies revealed that road 
municipals responsible for few kilometers of roads had far higher costs per 
kilometer than road municipals responsible for many kilometers of roads.463 The 
explanation was most likely that urban road municipals with crowded roads had far 
higher maintenance costs per kilometer than rural road municipals responsible for 
many kilometers of sparsely trafficed roads. Because the economy recovered after 
the depression, and increased economic activity led in turn to increased road traffic. 
 Riksdagen approved the 1934 Road Act after the Social Democratic and 
Agrarian Parties’ class compromise in May 1933. The 1934 Road Act that came into 
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power in 1937 abolished the duty work, reduced the road municipals’ number to 
170, increased the road municipals’ average road length to approximately 500 
kilometers and codified many of the 1920s and early 30s road policy reforms. The 
1934 Road Act formalized also the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ influence 
on the road policy and road construction through establishment of County Road 
Boards as the road municipals’ supreme authorities, almost as recommended by the 
1929 Road Committee. The State county administrations’ road engineers, who were 
the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ local representatives, were entitled to 
participate in the County Road Board’s negotiations.464 The combination of the 
Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ 1930 reform that established road 
administrations in each county’s State administrations and the 1934 Road Act paved 
hence the way for new local road administrations with seemingly many similarities 
with Norway’s so-called Combined Road Administration established from 1893, as a 
merger of the State’s Directorate of Public Roads that managed the trunk roads and 
the counties’ Public Roads Administrations that managed the parish roads. 
 An important forum for dissemination of knowledge about modern road policy 
and road construction among Nordic road administrators, engineers and construction 
companies was Nordic Road Association (Nordisk vegteknisk forbund) established 
in Stockholm June 19th 1935.465 Nordic Road Association with its many subgroups 
has since then facilitated cross-national networking among road administrators, 
consulting engineers and engineering and construction companies. 
 Sweden’s public road system increased significantly from the turn of the 19th 
and 20th century until World War Two. The roads managed by the road municipals 
measured 59.257 kilometers in 1906, 65.807 kilometers in 1921, 71.623 kilometers 
in 1926, 77.056 kilometers in 1931 and 88.595 kilometers in 1941.466 However, the 
trunk roads and highways’ length increased only from 19.086 kilometer in 1910, to 
19.990 kilometers in 1930 and 23.603 kilometers in 1936.467 Most roads built by the 
road municipals during the interwar years were thus local, except in the 1930s when 
construction of trunk roads and highways increased somewhat. 
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The municipal taxes became the lever that shifted the balance between laymen 
and professionals 
The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways initiated in 1937, when the 1934 Road 
Act came into force, development of master plans for the consolidated road 
municipals. But these plans were never completed, because the Ministry of 
Communications ordered further considerations about the road administration’s 
organizing already in November 1938, because the ongoing municipal taxes study 
required in October 1938 elucidation of possible State management of the public 
roads. Equalization of the municipals’ tax burdens was namely impossible unless 
abolition of the municipal property road taxes. The 1930s’ extensive road 
construction combined with increased road traffic had, despite significant State 
contributions to the road municipals, made the municipal property road taxes highly 
noticeable, particularly in the high tax municipals. The road construction and 
maintenance was in 1938 almost completely State financed and one of the few costs 
that easily could be shifted from the municipals to the State.468 The conclusion was 
thus almost given when the State Takeover Commission commenced. 
 Appointment of the State Takeover Commission was not the only important 
move that took place in 1938. An equally important institutional reform was creation 
of a particular account (automobilskattemedlens specialbudget) in the State’s 
accounting system that consolidated the vehicle and fuel tax revenues. The account’s 
contra entries were the State’s annual road appropriations. Creation of this particular 
account in the State’s general ledger for vehicle and fuel tax revenues dedicated 
these revenues to road purposes.469 Establishment of this particular account made it 
very difficult for the executive to spend the road and vehicle tax revenues on 
balancing the budget rather than on road investments and maintenance, and 
institutionalized thereby the practice established since Riksdagen’s approval of the 
first vehicle and fuel taxes in 1922.  
 The State Takeover Commission’s task listed several reasons for State 
management of the public roads. The most important reasons were the fast growing 
motoring that had made road management a national task, the road municipals’ 
varying road standard, the locally initiated road construction that led to different 
priorities, the road municipals’ high transaction costs and the absence of economies 
of scale. State managed roads would also improve the coordination of the road 
construction and maintenance with regard to the business cycles’ fluctuations. The 
State Takeover Commission’s 1941 recommendations added national security and 
the armed forces’ needs to this list, and Riksdagen approved the State takeover in 
1942.470 Motions for State takeover of the management of public roads had been 
forwarded to Riksdagen in 1889, 1905, 1908, 1910, 1911, 1915, 1919 and 1927, but 
been rejected every time, usually because the farmers and non-socialist parties 
feared increased costs and tax burdens.471 Riksdagen’s 1942 decision concluded 
hence almost 50 years struggles about the public roads’ management and financing, 
and was a major victory for the Social Democratic Party, the Royal Board of Roads 
and Waterways’ chartered engineers and other technocrats who desired a centralized 
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State road administration operating according to the professionals’ norms, similarly 
as for instance the Royal Board of Waterfalls (Kungliga vattenfallsstyrelsen). But 
Riksdagen’s 1942 decision was more a result of Ernst Wigforss, Sweden’s strong 
minister of finance’s desire for a municipal tax reform than the road engineers’ 
desire for rational and professional management of Sweden’s public roads, and can 
thus be understood as a side effect of the minister of finance’s moves. 
 The executive established in 1943 the ground rules or institutional framework 
governing the new State road administration. The 1943 Road Act (SFS 1943:431) 
that came into force January 1st 1944 made the State responsible for management 
and financing of the rural areas’ public roads, except those local roads still managed 
by the municipals. The major cities maintained the responsibility for management of 
their own public roads. The 1943 Road Statutes (SFS 1943:437) instituted road 
management according to perennial plans and budgets, and furthered thereby the 
practice established in 1931. The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ task was 
development of perennial plans for the rural areas’ trunk roads. The county councils 
became similarly responsible for development of perennial plans for all other rural 
roads. The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways made also perennial road plans for 
the cities based on the cities’ local plans. The King’s Decree for State Contributions 
to the Cities’ Road Management (SFS 1943:438) established the principle the cities 
received quadrennial State road contributions that had to be accounted for annually. 
The State financed generally 95 percent of the cities’ construction and maintenance 
costs for those roads eligible for State contributions. The King’s Decree of August 
30th 1943 for the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways and its subordinated county 
units (SFS nr 681) regulated the new State road administration’s activities and 
organizing.472 The 1943 Road Act, Road Statue and Road Decrees punctuated 
thereby the 1891 Road Act’s local or parochial road policy equilibrium, and 
established a new equilibrium based on State management of most public roads that 
placed the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ professionals in Sweden’s road 
policy driver’ seat. The 1943 Road Statutes established also a rational division of 
labor between the Road Board of Roads and Waterways that planned trunk roads 
and other roads with national collective good characteristics and the county councils 
that planned roads with local collective or private good characteristics. 
 Sweden’s new State road administration established January 1st 1944 was 
organized according to French model, because the responsibilities for several 
engineer-intensive infrastructures were gathered in the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways that either became directly responsible for planning, construction and 
maintenance, or for supervision of other boards or agencies responsible for planning, 
construction, maintenance and/or operations of the infrastructures. The Royal Board 
of Roads and Waterways in Stockholm and its 24 subordinated county road 
administrations managed the rural areas’ trunk roads, highways and county roads, 
and supervised also the cities’ management of the public roads. A Road Director 
headed each of the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ county units, and 
coordinated the road policy matters with the county councils, State county 
administrations and the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways in Stockholm. This 
model was upheld until the 1992 reform, which reintroduced regions transcending 
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the county border similarly as prior to 1930.473 The road municipals were history 
January 1st 1944, when the road policy and road construction governed by the road 
municipals’ laymen were replaced by road policy and road construction governed by 
the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ professionals. 
 Sweden’s new State road administration had seemingly many similarities with 
Norway’s Combined Road Administration. But there were fundamental differences. 
First, the Swedish executive outlined the road policy, forwarded the propositions to 
Riksdagen that made the strategic decisions and approved the annual road 
appropriations. Second, the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways received lump 
sum allocations and implemented Riksdagen and the executive’s road policy 
according to its own engineers’ scientific and professional standards, and furthered 
thereby the practice established since the 1920s when the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways managed allocation of the State road appropriations to the road 
municipals. Finally, the Swedish executive and legislators delegated the road policy 
and road construction to the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ professionals, 
because neither the executive nor Riksdagen engaged in micro management of the 
professionals such as their Norwegian opposite numbers did. This practice was 
clearly in accordance with the tradition for policy implementation through an 
autonomous State bureaucracy established since the 18th century, and was clearly an 
example of path dependence. 
 Riksdagen approved also in 1939 State takeover of private railroads based on 
voluntary agreements between the Royal Board of Railroads and the individual 
private railroad companies.474 This decision increased the Royal Board of Railroads’ 
number of kilometers of unprofitable railroads from approximately 1940. The 
difference between Riksdagen’s 1939 approval of State takeover of the private 
railroads and Riksdagen’s 1942 decision about State managed roads was striking, 
according to the economic historian Lena Andersson-Skog, because the State’s 
takeover of the railroads was a defensive move. Replacement of the road municipals 
with a national road board was an offensive move.475 Many railroads were 
yesterday’s transport infrastructures in the early 1940s. Roads were then tomorrow’s 
transport infrastructure, because of the road transports flexibility and cost 
effectiveness compared to most obsolete railroads. 
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Swedish case prior to 1945? This study’s main hypothesis or 
benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road policy and road 
construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good was weakened 
prior to the turning point in 1944, because roads were not considered national 
collective goods in Sweden until 1942. Road policy and road construction had 
namely been the farmers’ responsibility since the middle ages. The 1891 Road Act 
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upheld the idea about roads as local collective or private goods though establishment 
of the road municipals where layman governed the initially locally financed road 
policy and road construction. However, the road municipals were challenged 
throughout the 1920s and 30s by increased road traffic and increased State road 
financing, which increased the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ professionals 
influence on the road policy and road construction. An increasing number of 
legislators recognized roads as collective goods, and Riksdagen approved in 1942 
State management of the rural areas’ public roads. The 1943 Road Statutes 
established a rational division of labor, where the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways became responsible for planning of trunk roads and other roads with 
national collective good characteristics, while the counties became responsible for 
planning of roads with local collective or private good characteristics. The road 
municipals were history January 1st 1944 when the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways usually got the final say concerning road policy and road construction. 
State financed road construction and delegation of the road policy and road 
construction to the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways indicated clearly the 
legislators perceived many roads as national collective goods. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly weakened by the Swedish case prior 
to 1945, even if roads first and foremost were considered as local collective or 
private goods prior to Riksdagen’s 1942 decision. But Swedish the road policy and 
road construction prior to 1944 was not governed by the constituencies’ resource 
struggles, because the 1891 Road Act made road policy and road construction 
municipal matters. The State’s involvement in the road policy and road construction 
increased significantly during the interwar years because of increased State 
financing after introduction of fuel and vehicle taxes, among others to mitigate the 
1920s and 30s’ high unemployment when road construction was used as relief 
works.  But the State’s financial contributions to the road municipals were linked to 
local property road taxes and managed by the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways. Riksdagen was not directly involved such as Stortinget in Norway. 
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was weakened by the Swedish case prior to 1945, because the 
political parties’ rivalry was not decisive for the road policy and road construction 
prior to 1944, because the executives – no matter their political affiliation – used 
road construction and maintenance counter cyclic during the 1920s and 30s to 
mitigate the high unemployment. The political use of road policy and road 
construction prior to the State takeover was indirect, via the road municipals and the 
Royal Board of Roads and Waterways that allocated the State road appropriations.  
 The study’s final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Swedish case prior to 
1945. First, Sweden’s 1809 Constitution established a strong executive and a strong 
legislature, and upheld the State bureaucracy established by Axel Oxenstierna in the 
17th century. The ancient corporative system and the four-cameral Riksdagen 
delayed Sweden’s modernization during the first part of the 19th century, but 
Riksdagen’s decision in December 1865 punctuated this equilibrium and established 
the bicameral system and abolished the estates’ privileges. Second, the four-cameral 
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Riksdagen’s functional committee system was furthered even in the bicameral 
Riksdagen, and was also an example of path dependence. Third, the 1907-09 and 
1921 suffrage reforms punctuated the political equilibrium established through 
Riksdagen’s introduction of the bicameral system, and established a new 
equilibrium with entailing political economy that paved the way for the Social 
Democratic Party’s takeover in 1932. Fourth, introduction of parliamentary rule in 
1917 based on Riksdagen’s both chambers established similarly a unique political 
system with a strong executive and legislature and State boards with a high degree 
of autonomy both towards the executive and Riksdagen. These boards were first and 
foremost governed by the norms about State reason and the professionals’ scientific 
and professional standards, exactly as outlined by Axel Oxenstierna in the 17th 
century, even if they also were kept in check by the administrative courts. The 
boards’ autonomy developed since the 18th century was clearly an example of path 
dependence. Fifth, the Social Democratic and Agrarian Parties’ 1933 political horse 
trade or class compromise established Sweden’s modern corporative negotiation 
system, and changed once again the political economy, among others through 
increased expert and technocrat influence on the policy development compared to 
most other countries. The class compromise and new corporative negotiation system 
paved the way for a new social contract between the citizens and the authorities, 
which largely was based on a highly rational engineer approach to politics. Sixth, 
establishment of a particular account in the State’s accounting system in 1938 that 
consolidated the vehicle and fuel tax revenues, with the road appropriations as a 
contra entry, instituted dedicated vehicle and fuel tax revenues to road purposes, a 
practice established in the 1920s. Finally, Riksdagen’s 1942 decision and the 1943 
Road Act, Road Statue and Road Decrees punctuated the 1891 Road Act’s local or 
parochial road policy equilibrium governed by laymen, and placed instead the Royal 
Board of Roads and Waterways’ professionals in the road policy driver’s seat from 
January 1st 1944, when the executive and legislators delegated the road policy and 
road construction to the professionals, in accordance with the practice instituted 
since Axel Oxenstierna. 
1945-1959 – Establishment of Sweden’s expert governed road 
policy 
The period 1945-59 was characterized by political stability despite the opposition 
parties’ questioning of whether Sweden actually had parliamentary rule, because of 
the bicameral system’s lag that maintained the Social Democratic Party’s power. 
The postwar boom began in 1950 and lasted until 1975. Passenger cars became 
Sweden’s most important mean of transportation from about 1950, but the postwar 
road system was dysfunctional and not able to handle the fast growing road traffic. 
The remedy was the executive, legislators and new centralized State road 
administration’s import of ideas from USA about traffic engineering and 
development of a national road plan to catch up Sweden’s lag concerning modern 
road infrastructures. 
Sweden’s political and economic development 1945-59 
Sweden remained neutral during World War Two. The Swedish exports increased 
50 to 100 percent during World War One but were halved during World War Two, 
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according to the economic historian Lennart Schön. But the Swedish State and 
politicians’ role in the economy increased significantly.476 Germany was Swedish 
trade and industry’s most important export market during World War Two, 
according to the economic historian Lars Magnusson. Germany supplied Sweden 
with most raw materials at least until 1943.477 Many Swedish export industries 
reoriented themselves during the war, and served instead the domestic needs for 
supplies and armaments.478 The Swedish exports to Germany were reduced after 
1943 because of political pressure from the allied nations, particularly USA.479 
Many Swedish companies feared namely US blacklisting, and acted accordingly. 
 Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson died suddenly October 6th 1946. Tage 
Erlander, the Social Democratic Party’s minister of ecclesial matters, won the power 
struggle with Gustav Möller and governed until October 1969.480 Sweden had little 
need for reconstruction after the war, because of its neutrality. The Social 
Democratic Party’s chief ideologue and minister of trade Gunnar Myrdal prepared 
for a major postwar recession, similarly as after World War One, but the expected 
recession failed to materialize. The planned regulations were therefore never 
implemented fully, among others because of fierce opposition from the trade and 
industry and the non-socialist parties, particularly the Liberal Party’s Bertil Ohlin. 
The Swedish economy remained an open market economy.481 United Nations (UN) 
established in 1947 Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) headed by former 
minister of trade Gunnar Myrdal. ECE’s tasks were among others coordination of 
trade, economy, technology and environmental problems, and to improve Europe’s 
infrastructures to fuel the economic growth.482 Most ideas about a planned Swedish 
postwar economy went away with Gunnar Myrdal. The postwar problem became not 
deflation but inflation. 
 The Swedish Ministry of Finance increased its power within the executive 
during and after World War Two, and became gradually a ‘super ministry’. Per 
Edvin Sköld, minister of finance from October 1949 to September 1955, and Gunnar 
Sträng, minister of finance from September 1955 until October 1976, achieved 
particularly prominent positions within the executive, and constrained the other 
ministries’ room for maneuvering.483 The Swedish Ministry of Finance achieved 
thereby almost a similarly dominant position as the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
but there were, as we will see later, some fundamental differences. 
 The Social Democratic Party’s executive reintroduced rationing in 1947 
because of the European currency crisis, even if the rationing had been partly 
abolished in 1946. Reintroduction of rationing fueled the non-socialist parties’ 
critique of the executive prior to the election. Reintroduction of gasoline rationing in 
April 1948 furthered the non-socialist parties’ arguments against the executive’s 
economic policy. This critique paid off, because the Liberal Party more than doubled 
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its number of seats in the Second Chamber after the 1948 election.484 But the Social 
Democrats remained in position, despite their losses in the 1948, 1952 and 1956 
Second Chamber elections, due to their control of the indirectly elected First 
Chamber.485 The Social Democratic Party governed alone from July 1945 to 
October 1951 and from October 1957 to October 1976 and in coalition with the 
Agrarian Party from October 1951 to October 1957.486 The Agrarian Party got the 
ministry of agriculture, interior, ecclesial matters and a consultative minister.487 The 
bicameral system safeguarded thus continuity and partly status quo, exactly as 
planned by Justice Prime Minister Louis De Geer, except that the First Chamber’s 
lag and successive replacement maintained the Social Democratic Party’s power. 
 The postwar Second Chamber elections’ lack of political consequences 
increased the non-socialist parties’ critique of the bicameral system, which in turn 
led to replacement of the Second Chamber’s seat allocation according to d’Hondt’s 
method by a modified St. Lagüe’s method prior the 1952 election. This reform was 
initially for the 1952 Second Chamber election only, but was upheld until 
introduction of the unicameral system. Denmark’s 1953 constitutional reform, 
hereunder abolition of the bicameral Rigsdagen and introduction of the unicameral 
Folketinget with an election system based on one person – one vote, had similarly 
consequences. Because Sweden’s bipartite executive surprised many in August 1954 
when it appointed a commission to propose modernization of the constitution. Some 
of the non-socialist opposition parties had then questioned whether Sweden actually 
had parliamentary rule, because the Social Democratic and Agrarian coalition 
remained in position even after the 1956 Second Chamber election.488 However, a 
new constitution and election system was still decades ahead, similarly as 100 years 
earlier under the struggles about the four-cameral system and the estates. 
 Sweden’s 1950 trade and industry structure differed slightly from that in 
Denmark and Norway, because of 20 percent agriculture, 40 percent industry and 40 
percent services.489Sweden had a somewhat smaller agricultural sector than 
Denmark and Norway and a larger industrial sector, but was otherwise rather similar 
to the West European average. But Sweden was the only Scandinavian country 
where production of investment goods and durable consumer goods became the 
leading export sector after World War Two.490 The Swedish trade and industries 
differed therefore fundamentally from Denmark, where the agriculture and its 
industrial offspring still dominated the exports, and Norway where the smokestack 
industries’ export of raw materials and commodities achieved a prominent position 
after World War Two. The so-called “Swedish model” was characterized by a 
combination of the executive’s active labor market policy that encouraged 
streamlining of the trade and industry and the trade unions’ so-called solidary wage 
policy, outline by the Federation of Trade Union’s economists Gösta Rehn and 
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Rudolf Meidner in 1951, that weeded out enterprises not able to pay the agreed 
wages and moved the labor force to the employment opportunities, and not the 
opposite such as in Norway.491 Sweden’s postwar executives, the trade unions and 
the trade and industry safeguarded the welfare State through a joint policy that 
institutionalized effectiveness, competitiveness and trade and industries that 
provided high returns on the investments. 
 How did the Swedish economy perform during the first postwar period? The 
executive imposed import regulations and restrictions on construction works March 
15th 1947, to limit imports and save foreign currency, hereunder a complicated 
system with bilateral payment and trade agreements. The non-socialist opposition 
strongly criticized these measures.492 Sweden received Marshall Aid from 1948, and 
joined OEEC and the European Council, despite the Communist Party’s protests.493 
The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) headed by Paul Hoffman, a 
former US automotive industry executive, governed the Marshall Aid.494 The 
Swedish executive lifted the rationing of butter, meat, bacon and sugar in 1949. The 
SEK was also devaluated about 30 percent compared to the US dollar, to increase 
the exports, similarly as most other West-European currencies. The restrictions on 
construction works were first lifted in 1958.495 Sweden endorsed the Bretton Woods 
agreement in 1950.496 Swedish trade and industry profited from the Korea-boom that 
began in 1950, despite an economic setback in 1951.497 The Korea-boom was the 
beginning of the Swedish trade and industry's “golden age”, which lasted until about 
1975.498 
 The Swedish executive pursued a low interest policy after World War Two 
according to the Norwegian sociologist Lars Mjøset.499 The interest rates were 
reduced to about 3 percent during World War Two. The Riksbank reduced the 
discount rate further to 2,5 percent in February 1945, but overlooked the low interest 
rates and credit expansion’s effect on the demand for goods when the wartime 
regulations were lifted, according to the Swedish economist Johan Myhrman. The 
result was inflation. The low interest policy disabled one of the Riksbank’s means 
for managing the economy, and was therefore gradually abolished from 1950 
through a law of credentials that in 1952 authorized the Riksbank to govern issuing 
of new bonds, and through the 1955, 56 and 57 discount rate hikes. The low interest 
policy was hence not tenable.500 But the Swedish executive did never impose 
politically governed credit rationing such as the Norwegian postwar Labor Party 
executive did, but established instead flexible interest rates adapted to an open 
market economy together with market regulations that safeguarded construction of 
housing. Neither were the Swedish postwar executives obsessed with the currency 
balance, such as the Norwegian postwar executives. 
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 The Swedish economy underwent significant structural changes 1945-59. The 
agriculture and forestry’s share of the GDP went down. The labor from the 
agriculture and forestry sectors went to the high-yield industry and service sectors. 
The industry’s share of the GDP was fairly constant, but the service sector’s share 
increased. The exports increased, particularly to Europe, and changed gradually 
character from raw materials and commodities to more finished goods, such as cars. 
The modern industry structure developed since the beginning of the second 
industrial revolution in the 1890s made it possible for Sweden to harvest 
economically from the early 1950s.501 Sweden’s GDP per capita measured in 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars were 5.568 dollars in 1945, 6.739 in 50 and 
8.288 in 59. The average for the 12 West European countries was 4.154 dollars in 
1945, 5.018 in 50 and 7.184 in 59. Sweden had West Europe’s third highest GDP 
per capita in 1945, fourth highest in 50 and again third highest in 59.502 In other 
words, the Swedish postwar economic policy seemed to work well, and the trade 
and industry was able to utilize the postwar boom’s numerous windows of 
opportunities.  
Sweden’s postwar challenge – a dysfunctional road system  
Sweden’s number of motor vehicles grew almost exponentially after the November 
1949 abolition of the wartime rationing of gasoline, lubricant, rubber and restrictions 
on import of motor vehicles. The late 1940s and early 50s became the mass 
motoring’s definite breakthrough, because Sweden had about 50.000 passenger cars 
in 1945, 242.000 in 1950 and 1,2 millions in 1960! But the road traffic and number 
of accidents increased accordingly.503 The final restrictions on vehicle imports from 
West Germany were lifted in 1955.504 Sweden had about similar density of cars in 
1953 as France and Great Britain, and was well ahead of West Germany and Italy.505 
The mass motoring’s progress in Sweden after World War Two may have been a 
result of the Motoring’s Council (Bilismens centralråd), an informal network 
established in 1946 by RAC as a defensive measure against other means of 
transport.506 Roads became Sweden’s most important transport infrastructure for 
persons from approximately 1950 according to the economic historian Olle 
Krantz.507 The Swedish State’s takeover of private railroads from the 1930s until 
1945 facilitated a restructuring of the railroad system. About 25 percent or almost 
4.100 kilometers of the railroads were closed down between 1950 and 1972. 508  
 Neither the road appropriations nor the road investments kept up with the fast 
growing number of vehicles and the entailing road traffic. The Royal Board of 
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Roads and Waterways became soon one of Sweden’s most criticized public 
administrations. Because the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways prioritized first 
and foremost temporary measures for maintaining the road traffic during the second 
half of the 1940s.509 This was most likely a result of the Swedish executive’s 
constraining of all investments and construction projects between 1947 and 1951 
that not gave immediate export revenue increases, immediate improvements of the 
trade and industry’s productivity or other measures to save foreign currency, or 
avoid scarcity of manpower and to prevent overheating of the building and 
construction sector.510 The Swedish Ministry of Finance reasoned almost as its 
Norwegian opposite numbers between 1945 and the early 50s, but the Swedish 
executive, trade unions and trade and industry recognized soon, similarly as Axel 
Oxenstierna did in the 17th century, that functional transport and communication 
infrastructures were decisive for economic growth and development.511 
 The new State road administration; i.e. the Royal Board of Roads and 
Waterways in Stockholm, the 24 subordinated county road administrations and the 
Vehicle Inspection (Statens bilinspektion) was in 1947 renamed to the Road and 
Water Construction Administration (Väg- och vattenbyggnadsverket), but used the 
designation Royal Board of Roads and Waterways officially until 1967.512 Karl-
Gustaf Hjort succeeded in 1949 Nils Bolinder as the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s Director General.513 The historian Ove Pettersson claimed in his 
dissertation that Sweden’s municipal pre 1944 road administrations were deeply 
rooted locally in the municipal and county councils and in the local trade and 
industry, but were not deeply rooted upwards in the executive and Riksdagen. The 
1934 Road Act democratized the municipal road administrations because the 1921 
suffrage reforms introduced common and not graded votes in the local elections. But 
the post 1944 Road and Water Construction Administration with subordinated 
county units was only deeply rooted upwards, not locally such as the former 
municipal road administrations.514 Ove Pettersson considered the Road and Water 
Construction Administration’s lack of local deep rooting a problem. The 
forthcoming discussions question Pettersson’s claims. 
 Sweden’s 1947 road system consisted of 90.237 kilometers public roads, 
4.509 kilometers trunk roads and highways, 20.043 kilometers county roads and 
65.685 kilometers parish roads. Only 4.034 kilometers were in July 1947 paved; the 
rest was dirt or gravel road. The public road system included also 8.985 bridges and 
127 ferry routes.515 These bridges permitted only 2,5 tons payloads and were the 
postwar road system’s Achilles heels.516 Because these bridges’ low carrying 
capacity constrained the agriculture, forestry, trade and industry’s road transports. 
Many trucks, lorries and buses that came on the market from 1945 could not cross 
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these bridges even without payload.517 The road system inherited from the road 
municipals was neither able to handle the emerging mass motoring nor the trade and 
industry’s increasing demand for road transports, but how to remedy such a 
dysfunctional road system? The fix came through three parallel and partly 
intertwined threads or processes. 
 The first thread or process was introduction of traffic engineering in Sweden, 
which established the scientific and professional foundation for how to handle the 
fast growing road traffic’s problems. The Institute of Traffic Engineers, established 
in USA in 1931, introduced the designation traffic engineering, which became a 
recognized academic discipline in 1943, when Theodore Matson established a study 
in traffic engineering at Yale University. However, traffic engineering was not an 
exclusive American phenomenon, because Professor H.N. Pallin at Sweden’s Royal 
Institute of Technology (Kungliga tekniska högskolan) began in 1929 lecturing in 
subjects that later were subsumed under traffic engineering. Pallin’s lectures became 
a textbook in 1936.518 Swedish chartered engineers wrote numerous articles about 
traffic engineering, road safety and transport economy during the interwar years.519 
Many of these authors were most likely former students of Professor Pallin, who 
used the opportunity to disseminate their knowledge and also to advertise their 
expertise to the road municipals. The traffic engineering’s basic ideas were to design 
and treat the road system and traffic regulation mechanisms similarly as a 
production process. The aims were the desired mix of traffic flows, transportation 
and travel time, costs and road safety through application of scientific principles and 
methods. 
 The Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences’ (Kungl. 
Ingenjörsvetenskapsakademiens) Transport Research Commission headed by the 
Royal Railroad Board’s branch director A. Sjöberg was established at the Transport 
Day April 27th 1949. The automotive and motoring lobby’s most important 
subcommittee was the Road and Vehicle Committee, headed by the Royal Institute 
of Technology’s Professor Torsten Åström, who furthered Professor H.H. Pallin’s 
efforts in traffic engineering. The automotive and motoring lobby got ten of the 
Road and Vehicle Committee’s twenty members, in addition to Åström. The Royal 
Board of Railroads got three members; the remaining six were divided between the 
Road and Water Construction Administration and Sweden’s Armed Forces. The 
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Road and Vehicle Committee accomplished 1949-50 basic studies of Sweden’s 
settlement, industry structure and need for transportation, which were permeated by 
ideas from traffic engineering.520 521 The Royal Institute of Technology’s scholars 
and the automotive lobby that met in the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering 
Sciences paved thereby the way for import, translation and dissemination of 
knowledge about traffic engineering in Sweden. 
 The second thread or processes towards a permanent remedy of Sweden’s 
obsolete or dysfunctional postwar road system began in Swedish Road Federation 
with affiliated business sector organizations. Swedish Road Federation was 
reorganized and refinanced in 1947, because the 1944 abolition of the road 
municipals and establishment of the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways as a 
centralized and professional State road administration deprived its former raison 
d’être. This turnaround from dissemination of practical knowledge about modern 
road maintenance to high-level road policy issues and dissemination of traffic 
engineering were financed 43 percent by Swedish Automotive Industry Association 
(Sveriges Autmobilindustriförening) and the automotive dealers, 18 percent by the 
three motorist organizations, 20 percent by Swedish Petroleum Institute (Svenska 
Petroleumsinstitutet) and 8 percent by the Trade and Industry’s Traffic 
Delegation.522 The 1944 road polity and road policy reforms forced hence Swedish 
Road Federation to reconsider its mission completely, and expanded thereby its 
reach and horizon. This was most likely an unintended consequence of the 1944 
reform. 
 USA’s multinational automotive, oil and rubber industries established 
International Road Federation (IRF) in Washington D.C. May 5th 1948, because of 
concerns for their future business opportunities. The US Good Roads Movement 
established early in the 20th century inspired even IRF. IRF’s main goals were 
planning and construction of modern national road systems and construction of a 
modern transnational road system. IRF developed close ties to the US executive; 
disseminated knowledge about traffic engineering and logistics developed during 
World War Two and championed the idea about a linear and positive relationship 
between road construction and economic growth. IRF became one of the 1950s’ 
strongest proponents for traffic engineering and development of national road 
plans.523 IRF had far more financial and political muscles than any other similar 
organization prior to World War Two, and exercised considerable influence in many 
western industrialized countries, particularly those that received Marshall Aid. 
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 IRF established a European branch in London already in 1948. The American 
Douglas Clarke became in 1951 managing director of IRF’s new Paris office and 
IRF’s liaison to UN and other bodies established to safeguard Europe’s postwar 
reconstruction. IRF became soon UN’s consultative body in road matters.524 IRF 
worked as an intermediary between the automotive, oil and rubber industries, 
universities, research institutions, executives, legislatures and the numerous national 
and international bodies established to facilitate Europe’s economic reconstruction 
after World War Two, and became soon one of the late 1940s and early 50s road 
policy premise providers. 
 Swedish Road Federation joined IRF already in June 1948, and took part in 
IRF’s annual meeting in London in November 1949, which became an eye-opener. 
IRF’s managing director Robert Swain impressed Swedish Road Federation’s 
chairman, Gothenburg’s County Governor Malte Jacobsson, and managing director 
Bertil Liljequist during his lecture “Traffic Engineering in USA”. Swain’s main 
message was early planning to avoid future traffic problems, particularly in urban 
areas.525 Swedish Road Federation and IRF held a joint meeting in Karlstad, 
Värmland, June 13th and 14th 1950, where also four of the Nordic countries’ Director 
Generals or Road Directors took part together with Norwegian Road Federation 
(Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken), Swedish Road Federation’s sister organization 
that had been established by the Norwegian motorist organizations in November 
1948. The Karlstad meeting’s main topic was future road investments. Douglas 
Clarke, ECA’s transport adviser, lectured about “The roads’ economic significance 
in USA”.526 Swedish Road Federation did not only network with IRF, but connected 
also IRF with its recently established Norwegian sister organization that struggled 
against politically governed car rationing, minuscule road investments and a ruling 
party that considered cars and road investments unnecessary luxury. IRF managed to 
convey the idea about the need for a Swedish long-term national road plan at the 
1949 and 50 meetings. 
 Bureau of Public Roads, USA’s federal road administration, issued the first 
version of its Highway Capacity Manual in 1950 that summarized the state of art 
with regard to traffic-engineering research. Highway Capacity Manual became the 
scientific and professional starting point for USA’s forthcoming Interstate Highway 
System, and the ideal condition was an unconstrained flow of traffic.527 
 Swedish Road Federation’s chairman Malte Jacobsson discussed in August 
1952 development of a national road plan with the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s Director General Karl-Gustaf Hjort. The Road and Water 
Construction Administration wrote early in 1953 about the necessity of a national 
long-term road plan, and had thereby adopted many of Swedish Road Federation’s 
ideas. Swedish Road Federation emphasized also design and construction of roads 
according to traffic engineering’s principles could provide significant improvement 
in road safety.528 Swedish Road Federation conveyed thus IRF’s ideas about traffic 
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engineering and a national road plan to the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s top-level management. 
 Swedish and Norwegian Road Federation were both permitted to send one 
chartered engineer each to Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut during the 
term 1953-54, for further studies in traffic engineering. Stig Nordqvist went to Yale 
together with the Norwegian Directorate of Public Road’s chartered engineer Arne 
Grotterød.529 Grotterød became later crucial for development of Norway’s first 
modern national road plan. Stig Nordqvist established traffic engineering as an 
engineering discipline at Sweden’s technical institutes, because he received financial 
support from the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences’ Transport 
Research Commission and translated and adapted Highway Capacity Manual to 
Swedish after completing his studies at Yale.530 Stig Nordqvist did not participate 
directly in development of Sweden’s forthcoming road plan, but contributed 
indirectly through establishment of the road plan’s scientific, professional and 
ideological platform.531 Swedish Road Federation, IRF and Stig Nordqvist were thus 
crucial for import, translation and dissemination of traffic engineering in Sweden.  
 However, the final thread or process that became decisive for Sweden’s future 
road policy and road construction took place within the executive and Road and 
Water Construction Administration. But the ruling Social Democratic Party 
struggled internally with railroad, motoring, planned and market based transports. 
The minister of finance 1949-55, Per Edvin Sköld, considered cars an excellent tax 
object. Tage Erlander, Prime Minister 1946-69, considered cars and a functional 
road system means for increasing the population’s welfare and freedom of choice. 
Gunnar Lange, minister of trade 1955-70, was similarly positive to motoring, 
according to Rune Andréasson, Jonas Gawell and Sven Gerentz, who were central 
actors within the Swedish automotive and motoring lobby.532 The Swedish executive 
proposed a temporary doubling of the vehicle taxes in 1951 to balance the budgets 
due to the economic slump. Riksdagen approved this tax hike. Minister of finance 
Per-Edvin Sköld appointed also March 6th 1951 a committee to elucidate future 
vehicle taxes. This initiative triggered strong protests, but the executive sweetened 
the pill by linking tax hikes to increased road appropriations after discussions with 
the automotive and motoring lobby.533 The dedicated vehicle and fuel taxes 
introduced in the 1920s and instituted formally through the 1938 accounting system 
reform survived thereby the 1951 tax hikes. 
                                                 
529 Chartered engineer Gunnar Kullström was initially chosen for studies at Yale. Kullström was 
employed by Stockholm’s City Planning Office, and member of Swedish Road Federation, but was 
refused a leave from the City Planning Office. Stig Nordqvist went instead. Swedish Road Federation was 
awarded a new scholarship 1954-55. Gunnar Kullström became then the second Swedish road engineer at 
Yale. Director General Karl-Gustaf Hjort decided in 1955 to send one of the Road and Water 
Construction Administration’s own chartered engineers to Yale for further studies in Traffic Engineering, 
and Ture Grahn was chosen (Blomkvist 2001:174, 185-186). See also Arne Jacob Grotterød, Fra 
vegstikking til vegplanlegging, unpublished manuscript, Oslo 2001:3-5, VDA. 
530 Nordqvist (1958). 
531 Blomkvist (2001:186). 
532 Tage Erlander had not a driver’s license himself, but his wife had, and the family bought a car in 1950. 
Sven Erlander, one of Tage Erlander’s sons, engaged later in transport and road safety research 
(Adréasson et al. 1997:14, 123). 
533 Blomkvist (2001:194-196). 
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 The 1951 Vehicle Tax Committee did not conclude before November 4th 1953, 
but further studies of vehicle taxes were already in June 1953 handed over to the 
1953 Traffic Commission (1953 års trafikutredning) appointed by minister of 
communications Sven Andersson, after meetings between the Ministry of 
Communication’s Parliamentary Secretary (statssekreteraren) Per Åsbrink and the 
Trade and Industry’s Traffic Delegation (Näringslivets Trafikdelegation) headed by 
Sven Gerentz. Riksdagen approved relatively larger tax increases for heavy vehicles 
than for passenger cars in 1954, but the established link between vehicle taxes and 
road appropriations survived even this tax hike.534 535 536 The Swedish motoring 
lobby lost some battles but won partly the war, because the 1953 Traffic 
Commission was most likely a result of Sven Andersson’s compromise with the 
motoring lobby. This move illustrates how Sweden’s postwar corporative system 
worked.  
 Sven Andersson perceived obviously the motoring lobby’s campaigns as a 
political problem, because he wrote an article in the Social Democratic Party’s 
journal Tiden no. 7 1953 that clearly was an attempt of touching up the Social 
Democratic and Agrarian Parties’ executive’s anti-motoring image. Sven Gerentz 
assumed this article was written or inspired by Per Åsbrink, because Sven 
Andersson would not constrain the motoring despite the railroads’ difficult situation. 
The challenge, according to Sven Andersson, was how to maintain profitable 
railroads and utilize the road transports’ advantages.537 Sven Andersson – or most 
likely the executive – used this article as an opportunity to signal the motoring’s 
advantages to the 1953 Traffic Commission and to the common party and trade 
union members.538 Because road transports were often far more flexible and cost 
                                                 
534 SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:191; SOU 1961:23 
Svensk trafikpolitik I Riktlinjer och handlingsprogram:7 ff; Andréasson et al. (1997:28); Blomkvist 
(2001:157, 194-199); Gerentz (1995:9, 16); Montelius (1987b:80); Larsson (1993:227); Melin (2000:85-
88). 
535 Sweden’s Chambers of Commerce established in 1942 The Chambers of Commerce’ Association’s 
Traffic Delegation (Handelskamrarnas Nämnds Trafikdelegation) to monitor the counties’ enforcement of 
the 1940 Occupational Traffic Decree. The Chambers of Commerce’ Commission’s Traffic Delegation 
was in 1944 expanded to The Trade and Industry’s Traffic Delegation among others as a defensive move 
within the corporative system against the railroads. The founding members were The Chambers of 
Commerce’ Association (Handelskamrarnas Nämnd), Swedish Industry Association (Sveriges 
Industriförbund), Swedish Wholesale Dealers’ Association (Sveriges Grossistförbund), Swedish 
Retailers’ Association (Sveriges Köpmannaförbund), Swedish Agriculturalists’ Association (Sveriges 
Lantbruksförbund, later Lantbrukets Riksförbund), Swedish Artisans’ and Small and Medium Size 
Enterprises’ Association (Sveriges Hantverks- och Småindustriorganisation) and finally The Cooperative 
Federation (Kooperativa förbundet) (Blomkvist 2001:157; Andréasson et al. 1997:28). 
536 Sven Gerentz became the Trade and Industry’s Traffic Delegation’s secretary July 1st 1952, but the 
position was denoted managing director in 1956. Sven Gerentz had been employed at the National Board 
of Trade’s Naval Office since 1945 and had also been involved in miscellaneous studies for the Ministry 
of Trade. Sven Gerentz became Swedish Automotive Industry Association’s managing director February 
1st 1957, and held this position until June 30th 1960, when he became the Swedish Automotive Industry 
Association’s Chairman. Sven Gerentz established close ties with Stockholm’s Chamber of Commerce, 
the Motoring’s Council and was also member of RAC and Swedish Road Federation’s board of directors 
and the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences’ Transport Research Commission (Gerentz 
1995:16).Sven Gerentz was thus one of the Swedish automotive and motoring lobby’s most central actors 
during the 1950s; a position he maintained until the 1990s. 
537 Gerentz (1995:10-11). 
538 See for instance Andersson-Skog (1993:144-163) about the railroad political shift that took place 
between 1945 and Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision. 
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efficient than railroad transports. Neither the executive nor Riksdagen could 
overlook such economic fundamentals in the long run. Neither could the executive 
overlook the fact that road transport had become relatively more economically 
important than railroad transports from the middle of the 1950s.539 
 The automotive and motoring lobby’s postwar efforts paid off June 4th 1954, 
when Tage Erlander’s executive appointed The Commission for High Level Road 
Planning (Delegationen för översiktlig vägplanering).540 The Road and Water 
Construction Administration appointed September 9th 1954 a particular work group, 
and met for the first time September 15th and 16th 1954. The Commission for High 
Level Road Planning’s task was development of a high level plan for the future 
Swedish public road system, and had significant discretion and autonomy, because it 
was authorized to outline the road plan according to the members’ scientific and 
professional standards. The Swedish executive took the mass motoring’s emergence 
for granted, similarly as the Danish executive. The question was not whether there 
was need for a new road infrastructure, but where and when the necessary roads had 
to be completed, and according to which technical standards.  
 But the Social Democratic Party’s internal struggles were obviously not yet 
settled; because minister of communications Sven Andersson wrote in 1956 the 
booklet Can We Afford the Car? (Har vi råd med bilen?), where he warned against 
too fast increase in the number of cars, and argued for priority of the export 
industries and construction of housing rather than roads given the Ministry of 
Finance’s restrictions on constructions.541 But Sven Andersson wrote also that 
diffusion of cars from the upper to the other classes was part of Sweden’s 
“democratization”.542 Sven Andersson did obviously his best to keep in check the 
Social Democratic Party’s struggling motorist and anti-motorist fractions, but Sven 
Andersson was clearly in line with Prime Minister Tage Erlander who supported 
ownership and use of cars. Sven Andersson reasoned thus fundamentally different 
from the contemporary Norwegian Labor Party executive that upheld the car 
rationing, constrained the road investments and often relied on normative arguments 
against ownership and use of cars. 
 The first draft proposal for Sweden’s modern road system came in April 1956, 
and went to the county administrations and many other interest groups both for 
review and for anchoring the idea about a modern road system. The Commission for 
High Level Road Planning submitted its final draft of Swedish Road Plan (Vägplan 
för Sverige) November 8th 1957.543  
                                                 
539 See Andersson-Skog (1993:47 Diagram III.1) for an overview of the shift from railroad to road 
transports and the transport infrastructures’ relative economic importance. 
540 SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:11 ff. 
541 Andersson (1956) in Skårfors (1999:19).  
542 Andersson (1956:3) in Tengström (1990:14).  
543 Karl-Gustaf Hjort, the Road and Water Construction Administration’s Director General, headed the 
Commission for High Level Road Planning. Erik Nelander, the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s Chief Director, headed the work group. The Road and Water Construction 
Administration got only four of the Commission for High Level Road Planning’s twelve members. The 
other members were Ingvar Svennilsson, professor in economics, Gerd Enquist, professor in economic 
geography, Ivar Jonsson, head of office in the Construction Board (Byggnadsstyrelsen), landowner Nils 
Rosenlund, managing director Rutger Wijkander from the Industry Association and Scania-Vabis’ former 
managing director Carl-Bertel Nathorst from Swedish Road Federation. The work group carried out 
studies ordered by the Commission for High Level Road Planning, through appointment of dedicated 
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 The climate within the Commission for High Level Road Planning was 
strained, according to Sven Gerentz, because Director General Karl-Gustaf Hjort 
delayed the progress. But the 1956 study tour to USA, where among others Karl-
Gustaf Hjort took part, became a turning point.544 Why did Sven Gerentz claim that 
Karl-Gustaf Hjort dragged his feet? One explanation may be the not invented here 
syndrome. Another explanation may be party-tactical reasons. Karl-Gustaf Hjort 
may have been instructed by the minister of communications to slow down until the 
Social Democratic Party’s internal struggles were settled. Sven Andersson’s 1956 
booklet supports this interpretation. A third explanation may be the fact that Karl-
Gustaf Hjort was an old man that may have been stuck professionally in the 1920s 
and 30s’ road planning and road construction. It is thus not possible to rule out that 
Hjort initially overlooked the economical, political and road safety implications of 
the combination of fast growing road traffic and an obsolete and dysfunctional road 
system. 
 Gustav Vahlberg, the Labor Market Board’s (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsens) 
Director General, succeeded late in 1957 Karl-Gustaf Hjort as the Road and Water 
Construction Administration’s Director General. The motoring lobby greeted 
Vahlberg warmly, because he was far more sympathetic to the trade and industry’s 
needs than Hjort, according to Sven Gerentz. The Trade and Industry’s Traffic 
Delegation had, according to Gerentz, initiated appointment of Vahlberg.545 But 
there are reasons to question Sven Gerentz’ interpretation of the 1957 events, there 
are similarly reasons to question Pär Blomkvist’s interpretation of Sven Gerentz. 
 Karl-Gustaf Hjort’s retirement and the executive’s appointment of Gustav 
Vahlberg was a regime change, because Karl-Gustaf Hjort personified Sweden’s 
ancient bureaucracy, autonomous boards staffed by the nobility and upper classes 
and operating according to the norms about State reason and meritocracy. Hjort 
graduated as chartered engineer from the Royal Institute of Technology in 1917, 
became Lieutenant in the Royal Road and Water Construction Corps in 1921, was 
promoted to Captain in 1929, Major in 1947 and Colonel in 1957.546 Gustav 
Vahlberg lacked formal academic education, worked in a steel mill from 1924 until 
1932 when he became full time union boss and member of the Metal Workers’ 
Union’s board of directors. Vahlberg became the Metal Workers’ Union’s deputy 
leader in 1936 and Swedish Federation of Trade Unions’ deputy secretary in 1938. 
Vahlberg served as the Federation of Trade Unions’ deputy leader from 1946 until 
Tage Erlander’s executive in 1948 appointed him as the Labor Market Board’s 
Director General.547 It does not seem very likely that Gerentz and others’ lobbying 
was necessary to convince Prime Minister Tage Erlander and minister of 
communications Gösta Skoglund that Gustav Vahlberg was the right candidate as 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
expert panels (SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:12-15, 
28-31; Blomkvist 2001:206-209; Gerentz 1995:15). 
544 Gerentz (1995:15). 
545 Gerentz (1995:17); Blomkvist (2001:230, 231-232). 
546 Karl-Gustaf Hjort [Online September 1st 2005] – URL: http://www.vv.se. 
547 Gus Vahlberg [Online September 1st 2005] – URL: http://www.vv.se. 
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the Road and Water Construction Administration’s Director General. The Social 
Democratic Party bosses may have reasoned that Vahlberg would weed out the last 
remnants of nobility and upper class from the Road and Water Construction 
Administration and make the board less autonomous and more politically 
manageable. Appointment of Gustav Vahlberg placed also the Swedish Federation 
of Trade Unions and particularly the Metal Workers’ Union in the road policy 
driver’s seat. Few Swedes were more centrally located in the postwar corporative 
system than Gustav Vahlberg. He was well connected within the executive, Social 
Democratic Party, trade unions, employer organizations and the numerous business 
sector organizations. The executive’s appointment of Gustav Vahlberg as Director 
General was thus one of the fundamental differences between Sweden and Norway, 
because most Swedish trade unions encouraged construction of modern roads in the 
1950s, while some Norwegian trade unions in pivotal positions vigorously opposed 
liquidation of the car rationing and construction of modern roads. 
Swedish Road Plan – the road engineers’ rational response to a dysfunctional 
road system 
Sweden’s first motorway, between Malmö and Lund was completed in 1956.548 
Sweden’s public trunk road, highway and county road system in 1957 measured 
approximately 98.000 kilometers. The Road and Water Construction Administration 
managed approximately 92.000 kilometers; the remaining 6.000 kilometers were 
managed by the cities.549  
 Swedish Road Plan was first and foremost a plan for improving the Swedish 
agriculture, forestry, trade and industries competitiveness and thus Sweden’s wealth, 
through faster, safer and more flexible and cost efficient transports than the railroads 
and canals could provide.550 Swedish Road Plan outlined the future modern road 
system according to the so-called “pearl-chain principle” (pärlbandspincipen), with 
the most inhabited cities as pearls, instead of the more radical “beeline principle” 
(fågelvägsleder). The beeline-principle would have created trunk roads as straight 
lines between origins and destinations. The pearl-chain principle connected the 
cities. The main arguments for the pearl-chain principle were limited resources and 
the fact that most road transports were short-distance transports. The beeline 
principle was also more costly.551 The pearl-chain principle provided thus most 
‘bang for the bucks’ or the most favorable cost/benefit ratios. The Commission for 
High Level Road Planning took for granted the Swedish community’s pool of 
common resources had to be allocated as efficient as possible. Such reasoning was 
clearly in accordance with Road and Water Construction Administration’s 
governing norms about State reason and professionalism. 
 Swedish Road Plan pioneered also road safety, and paved the way for 
Sweden’s later position as world champion in road safety, due to implementation of 
                                                 
548 Castensson (1991:237). 
549 SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:28. 
550 SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:32-79, 187. 
551 SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:54-56, 128-129, 151, 
218. 
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many principles established by or derived from traffic engineering.552 A comparative 
study between the old road from Malmö to Lund 1950-53 and the new motorway 
1953-56, revealed the old road had three times as many accidents as the new 
motorway, despite far lower driving speeds and traffic intensity on the old road. A 
similar ex-post and ex-ante study from Stockholm in 1938-39 and 1946-47 revealed 
that substituting traditional crossings with traffic circles in crowded roads or city 
streets reduced the number of accidents 450-1.200 percent!553 Road safety came thus 
early on the road policy agenda in Sweden, similarly as in Denmark, because 
Swedish road engineers were early starters with regard to systematic measures 
efforts for mitigating the mass motoring’s inconveniences. Neither did the Swedish 
executive or legislators oppose the road safety measures’ road policy implications, 
such as the Norwegian executive and legislators. 
 The Commission for High Level Road Planning’s initial trunk road proposal 
forwarded for comments in 1956 limited the need for road construction by funneling 
as much road traffic as possible into the trunk roads, and was thus an attempt of 
house holding with the road appropriations. The Commission for High Level Road 
Planning prioritized construction of almost a motorway triangle between Sweden’s 
three major cities Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, and similarly construction of 
modern trunk roads between Gothenburg and Norway, between Stockholm and 
Bergslagen, between Stockholm and Norrland, and from southern Sweden to 
mainland Europe. These proposed trunk roads and motorways had many similarities 
with the trunk railroads built by the Swedish State during the second half of the 19th 
century.554 Swedish Road Plan’s cost/benefit calculations were based on 5 percent 
discount rates, equal to the Riksbank’s discount rate in 1956 and 57. The 
recommended trunk roads would provide a net gain of at least 10 billions SEK, 
approximately 9,16 billions 1990 PPP USD.555 The reviewers accepted the pearl-
chain principle.556 Swedish Road Plan’s use of the Riksbank’s discount rate is strong 
evidence the executive considered modern road infrastructure a national collective 
good with very long time-horizon, similarly as the trunk railroads built by the 
Swedish State in the 19th century. Because neither the Ministry of Finance nor the 
Commission for High Level Road Planning added any risk premium to these road 
investments, such as for instance the Norwegian Ministry of Finance did in 1967 and 
in 2004 to constrain the road investments. 
 Swedish Road Plan outlined construction of 13.900 kilometers trunk roads 
with 10/18 tons carrying capacity within 1975, hereunder bridges with 22 tons 
capacity. These recommendations was a significant improvement compared to the 
old road system’s bridges that only permitted 2,5 tons. The outlined trunk roads’ 
estimated construction costs were 8.000 millions 1956 SEK or approximately 7.329 
millions 1990 PPP USD, hereunder 2.000 millions SEK or 1.832,3 millions 1990 
                                                 
552 SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:Chapter 9; T. Grahn 
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PPP USD for the cities’ driveways. The trunk roads and motorways were expected 
to halve the number of fatalities in road accidents, compared to the 1956 number of 
fatalities.557  
Table 5: Swedish Road Plan’s recommended geographical allocation of trunk 
roads, hereunder motorways. 
Constituencies Recommended 
allocation of trunk 
roads (km / %) 
Recommended total 
trunk road investments 
(millions 1956 SEK / %) 
Hereunder 
recommended 
allocation of 
motorways (km / %) 
Hereunder 
recommended 
investments (millions 
1956 SEK / %) 
Central 2.265 / 16% 2.435 / 31% 540 / 41% 1.500 / 51% 
Middle 5.390 / 39% 3.225 / 40% 770 /59% 1430 / 49 
Peripheral  6.245 / 45% 2.340 /29%  0 / % 0 / 0% 
Grand total 13.900 / 100% 8.000 /100% 1.310 /100% 2.930 / 100% 
Source: SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige. Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:157 Tabell 11.2. 
 Table 5 shows the geographical allocation of Swedish Road Plan’s 13.900 
kilometers trunk roads, hereunder 1.310 kilometers of motorways. Most trunk roads 
were recommended built in the peripheral constituencies, because of large distances 
between the settlements, raw material and industrial areas, and least kilometers in 
the central constituencies. The situation was exactly opposite with regard to 
construction of motorways, because they were only recommended built in crowded 
central and middle constituencies. There were planned fewer kilometers motorways 
in the central than in the middle constituencies, but allocated more money to those 
motorways in the central constituencies because of high construction costs because 
of requirements for road capacity, numerous costly intersections, etc. The 
recommended allocation of trunk road investments gave a reasonable balanced trunk 
road system all across Sweden. The planned road standard reflected expected road 
traffic and the need for road capacity, road safety and environmental standards.  
 Swedish Road Plan outlined also construction of a secondary road system 
within 1975, consisting of 81.000 kilometers county roads, to an estimated cost of 
10.830 millions 1956 SEK or approximately 9.921,7 millions 1990 PPP USD, 
hereunder 2.300 millions SEK or 2.107,1 millions 1990 PPP USD in Stockholm, 
Gothenburg and Malmö.558 The existing roads largely gave this secondary road 
system. The Commission for High Level Road Planning estimated the completed 
trunk roads would carry out about 60 percent of the traffic work, even in the rural 
                                                 
557 The Commission for High Level Road Planning recommended construction of 1.310 kilometers trunk 
roads as four-lane motorways and 550 kilometers other four-lane roads; i.e. 1.860 kilometers or 13 
percent as four-lane roads. The Commission for High Level Road Planning recommended also 
construction of 5.360 kilometers or 39 percent trunk of the roads as expressways with wide shoulders; 
4.560 kilometers or 33 percent as expressways with narrow shoulders; and finally 2.120 kilometers or 15 
percent as narrow trunk roads. 12.500 kilometers of the trunk roads were suggested built by the Road and 
Water Construction Administration in rural areas. 1.400 kilometers were suggested built by the 
municipals in cities and urban areas (SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt 
kartbilagor:154, 156, 157 Tabell 11:2, 158 Tabell 11:3, 158-160, 215). 
558 The proposed county roads were distributed between 18.950 kilometers or 23 percent county roads of 
particular importance for the trade, industry, population and national defense and 22.600 kilometers or 28 
percent county roads that were important for other reasons. The remaining 39.450 kilometers or 49 
percent other county roads were of limited economic significance; i.e. mainly social welfare goods (SOU 
1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige . Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:180 Tabell 12.4, 181 Tabell 
12:5, 222). 
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areas, but even the secondary roads were recommended built with 10/18 tons 
carrying capacity on the paved roads, similarly as the trunk roads, and with 8 tons 
capacity on the unpaved roads.559 Significant parts of this secondary road system 
had public service functions and many similarities with the secondary and tertiary 
railroads built approximately 1870-1920.560 
Table 6: Swedish Road Plan’s recommended geographical allocation of secondary 
roads. 
Constituencies Recommended 
allocation of 
secondary roads 
(km / %) 
Recommended total 
secondary road 
investments (millions 
1956 SEK / %) 
Hereunder recommended 
allocation of those 
secondary roads decisive 
for trade and industry, 
settlement and national 
defense (km / %) 
Hereunder 
recommended 
investments 
(millions 1956 SEK 
/ %) 
Central 10.990 / 14% 1.690 /16% 2.090 / 11% 415 / 13% 
Middle 33.560 / 41% 4.030 / 37% 5.850 / 31% 895 /28% 
Peripheral  36.450 / 45% 5.110 / 47% 11.010 / 58% 1.835 / 58% 
Grand total 81.000 /100% 10.830 / 100% 18.950 / 100% 3.145 / 100% 
Source: SOU 1958:1 Vägplan för Sverige. Del 1. Riktlinjer och förslag samt kartbilagor:180 Tabell 12.4. 
 Table 6 provides an overview of Swedish Road Plan’s recommended 
allocation of the 81.000 kilometers secondary roads, hereunder those 3.145 
kilometers secondary roads considered decisive for trade, industry, settlement and 
national defense. Most of the secondary roads were planned in the peripheral and 
middle constituencies, and as feeder systems to the trunk roads. 
 Swedish Road Plan was first and foremost governed by the desire for efficient 
utilization of the public investments, fast payback, improved road safety and 
safeguarding the trade and industry’s competitiveness. 55 percent of the proposed 
trunk roads, hereunder motorways, all of the most important county roads, 25 
percent of the important county roads and 15 percent of the remaining county roads 
were recommended built between 1958 and 1967. The remaining road investments 
were recommended postponed until 1968-75.561 The Commission for High Level 
Road Planning’s recommendations was thus governed by the norm about State 
reason, such as instituted by Axel Oxenstierna in the 17th century; ideas that still 
permeated Sweden’s autonomous boards in the 1950s. Swedish Road Plan was also 
clearly an imitation of the 1956 US Interstate plan, and based on ideas from US 
Highway Capacity Manual translated and adapted to Swedish by Stig Nordqvist. 
 One of The Commission for High Level Road Planning’s most important 
recommendations in addition to the outlined road and investment profile was 
establishment of a dedicated corporative body to safeguard Swedish Road Plan’s 
implementation.562 The Trade and Industry’s Traffic Delegation championed this 
initiative. Director General Gustav Vahlberg appointed in May 1958 the Road 
Management Cooperation Delegation (Vägväsendets samarbetsdelegation). Its main 
tasks were monitoring of Riksdagen’s annual appropriations and the Road and 
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560 Cf. Andersson-Skog (1993:28, 37-38) about the development of Sweden’s secondary and tertiary 
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Water Construction Administration’s utilization of these appropriations.563 Gustav 
Vahlberg knew definitely how to tie up the executive and legislators’ hands, to 
safeguard Swedish Road Plan’s accomplishment. But Vahlberg, who most likely had 
been appointed by the executive to make the Road and Water Construction 
Administration more politically manageable and to weed out the remnants of the 
nobility and upper class acted soon according to Axel Oxenstierna’s norm about 
State reason and the Road and Water Construction Administration’s professional 
ethos. Because the Road and Water Construction Board’s professionals influenced 
clearly Gustav Vahlberg, similarly as Gustav Vahlberg influenced the Road and 
Water Construction Administration with his knowledge about Sweden’s new 
corporative system. 
 Swedish Road Plan was not included in the executive’s 1958 State Board 
Proposition (statsverksproposition), due to the State economic situation. But 
Riksdagen overruled the Ministry of Finance and increased the annual road 
appropriations significantly. The executive included Swedish Road Plan in its 1959 
State Board Proposition, and Riksdagen approved the plan almost without debate.564 
The Ministry of Finance headed by Gunnar Sträng overruled the Ministry of 
Communications and delayed hence Swedish Road Plan until the postwar 
restrictions on construction activities had been lifted in 1958. But Riksdagen’s 
majority in turn overruled Gunnar Sträng and the Ministry of Finance, and increased 
the road appropriations already from 1958. Riksdagen’s approval of Swedish Road 
Plan was obviously based on broad consensus even if the executive postponed the 
plan until 1959. The Swedish executive and legislators reasoned obviously in 
variable sum terms, and considered modern trunk roads and motorways as national 
collective goods. A comprehensive network of high standard secondary roads all 
across Sweden would similarly benefit almost the entire population. Sweden’s 
bicameral system, committees organized according to the functional principle and 
the Road and Water Construction Administration’s autonomy made it thus possible 
for the executive as well as the legislators to transcend the constituencies’ narrow 
self interests and safeguard Sweden Inc.’s long-term national interests. Riksdagen’s 
approval of Swedish Road Plan furthered thereby road policy as national matters, 
such as instituted by the 1944 State takeover of the management of most public 
roads. 
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses, 
concerning the Swedish case between 1945 and 1959? This study’s main hypothesis 
or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road policy and 
road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good was clearly 
                                                 
563 The Trade and Industry’s Traffic Delegation got three members. Rutger Wijkander represented the 
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Construction Administration’s supervision, got one member. Even the Construction Board and The Royal 
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1995:17; Blomkvist 2001:230). 
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overview of the annual Swedish road investments. 
Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
156 
strengthened 1945-59, because the public road system built by the road municipals 
became dysfunctional and not able to provide safe, flexible and cost efficient 
transports after World War Two due to strong growth in number of vehicles and 
road transports of passengers and goods. The postwar legislators and executive 
considered obviously modern trunk roads and motorways as national collective 
goods, because Swedish Road Plan approved by Riksdagen in 1959 was permeated 
by a technocratic and economic rationality, partly imported from USA via Swedish 
Road Federation and IRF. The trunk road investments were allocated according to 
cost/benefit calculations. But even domestic scholars from Sweden’s Royal Institute 
of Technology developed ideas about traffic engineering. The Road and Water 
Construction Administration’s lack of deep local rooting was clearly not a problem, 
such as claimed by Ove Pettersson, but rather a necessary condition for development 
of a rational road plan serving national rather than local and parochial interests. 
Because absence of deep local rooting maintained the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s professional autonomy, which in turn facilitated development of 
national collective goods such as modern, safe and efficient trunk roads and 
motorways. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly weakened by the Swedish case even 
between 1945 and 1959, because the executive had delegated allocation of the State 
road investments to the Road and Water Construction Administration’s 
professionals already in the interwar years. The constituencies’ resource struggle did 
hardly affect Swedish road policy and road construction at all 1945-59. Swedish 
Road Plan gave something even to those who considered roads as local collective or 
private goods, because it outlined a very comprehensive modern secondary road 
system targeting local needs in addition to trunk roads and motorways serving 
national needs.  
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was clearly weakened by the Swedish case between 1945 and 1959, 
because the political parties’ rivalry did hardly influence Swedish road policy and 
road construction during this period, even if the Social Democratic Party had 
internal struggles between railroad and motoring proponents until the middle of the 
1950s. A broad consensus among most political parties, trade unions, trade and 
industry about the need for a modern road system, emerged gradually similarly as in 
Denmark, most likely as a result of Sweden’s modern corporative system. The 
question was not whether Sweden needed a modern road system but how soon and 
where. Appointment of the Labor Market Board’s Director General and the 
Federation of Trade Unions’ former deputy leader Gustav Vahlberg as the Road and 
Water Construction Administration’s Director General in late 1957 placed de facto 
Sweden’s Federation of Trade Unions and particularly the Metal Workers’ Union in 
the road policy driver’s seat, because Gustav Vahlberg was one of the corporative 
system’s high-flyers. Sweden differed thus fundamentally from Norway where the 
governing Labor Party officially considered cars and construction of modern roads 
as unnecessary luxury. Some Norwegian trade unions vigorously opposed abolition 
of the car rationing and construction of modern roads with almost every means. 
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 This study’s final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Swedish case between 
1945 and 1959. First, the non-socialist opposition parties’ questioning of the 
bicameral system and whether Sweden actually had parliamentary rule had many 
similarities with the farmers and urban citizens’ questioning of the four cameral 
Riksdagen and the estate system in the 19th century, because the First Chamber 
safeguarded the Social Democratic Party’s power after World War Two. Second, the 
links between the motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes and the annual road 
appropriations established during the 1920s and formalized by 1938 accounting 
system reform survived even the 1950s vehicle and fuel tax hikes, because the 
automotive and motoring lobby vigorously defended these links. Third, the 
executive, legislators and Road and Water Construction Administration compared 
construction of modern trunk roads 1945-59 with the Swedish State’s construction 
of trunk railroads during the second half of the 19th century. The outlined secondary 
roads resembled similarly the secondary and tertiary railroads built by private 
railroad companies from the 1870s until about 1920. Fourth, the executive’s 
appointment of Gustav Vahlberg as the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s new Director General in 1957 when Karl-Gustaf Hjort retired, 
punctuated the established equilibrium since 1844 with a Road and Water 
Construction Administration dominated by officers and chartered engineers 
emanating from the nobility and upper classes. Vahlberg strengthened the Road and 
Water Construction Administration politically, due to his position in the new 
corporative system, and influenced definitely the Road and Water Construction 
Administration. But Vahlberg was also strongly influenced by the Road and Water 
Construction Administration’s professionals’ norms about State reason and 
professionalism instituted by Axel Oxenstierna in the 17th century and the norm 
about autonomy that had developed since Oxenstierna. The appointment of Gustav 
Vahlberg as Director General placed de facto the Swedish Metal Workers’ Union in 
the road policy driver’s seat. The final example of path dependence was Riksdagen’s 
approval of Swedish Road Plan in 1959 that upheld the division of labor established 
since the 1920s and instituted by Riksdagen in 1942, where Riksdagen made the 
high-level policy decisions and approved the annual road appropriations, while the 
policy implementation was left to the executive. The executive in turn delegated 
allocation of the road investments and choice between individual projects in the 
different constituencies to the Road and Water Construction Administration’s 
professionals who operated according to their scientific and professional norms.  
1960-1980 – Boom and bust and road and traffic policy flip-flops 
Sweden’s political system changed fundamentally from 1971 after introduction of 
the unicameral Riksdagen and an election system based on one person – one vote. 
This regime change coincided with severe State economic problems that strained the 
corporative system. Swedish road policy 1960-80 emphasized construction of the 
economically and industrially most important trunk roads and county roads prior to 
1970, when the road investments peaked, exactly as outlined in Swedish Road Plan 
and furthered through Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision that instituted a 
transport policy governed by economic effectiveness. The combination of the new 
unicameral system, State economic problems and change of ruling parties in 1976 
Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
158 
had profound road policy implications, because Riksdagen’s 1979 Traffic Policy 
Decision instituted a transport policy governed by concerns for regional policy and 
socio-economic effectiveness. 
Boom, bust and constitutional reforms  
The 1954 Constitutional Commission reached an initial compromise in February 
1961, but the Social Democratic and non-socialist parties disagreed about 
Riksdagen’s chamber structure and whether the election system should be national 
or linked to the county elections. This disagreement led to appointment of the 1966 
Constitutional Commission (Grundlagsberedningen), which in 1967 reached the so-
called “Åre-compromise” that agreed about converting the bicameral Riksdagen to a 
unicameral Riksdagen with 350 seats; 310 district seats and 40 national 
supplementary seats. The election system was supposed based on the principle one 
person – one vote, almost as in Denmark, with a 4 percent limit for the 
supplementary seats, to prevent party fragmentation. Riksdagen approved the Åre-
compromise during the spring 1968, and approved further constitutional 
amendments in 1969.565 The Åre compromise did not fundamentally alter 
Riksdagen’s geographical seat allocation, because even the bicameral Riksdagen’s 
seat allocation reflected the actual settlement.566 The Åre-compromise and 
Riksdagen’s 1968 and 1969 decisions abolished the bicameral system that had 
governed Swedish politics for better or worse since 1867.  
 Riksdagen’s committee system, that mainly had been organized functionally 
since the 18th century became also subject to the 1966 Constitutional Commission’s 
attention. The most important committees in 1969 concerning road policy and road 
construction were the State Committee responsible for the State’s expenses and the 
Third Legislation Committee responsible for the road and traffic legislation. The 
State Committee had 30 members in 1969 and was divided into five subcommittees 
with six members each. The fourth subcommittee was responsible for the Ministry 
of Communications and it’s subordinated boards’ matters, hereunder road 
appropriations and distribution between investments and maintenance.567 568 The 
1966 Constitutional Commission recommended to replace the functional committees 
with 16 new standing subject matter committees, each with 15 members, and 
proposed establishment of a Standing Transport and Communication Committee 
(Samfärdselutskottet) responsible for railroads, mail services, telegraph and 
telephone matters, roads, road traffic, sea traffic, air traffic and the weather 
services.569 The 1966 Constitutional Commission did in other words recommend 
introduction of a committee system with many similarities to that in Norway’s 
legislature Stortinget. 
                                                 
565 Molin (1991b:241-244). 
566 See the Data Appendix’ Table 3.1-3.10 for an overview of Sweden’s settlement and geographical 
political representation 1950-2000 under the bicameral and unicameral system. 
567 SOU 1969:62 Ny utskottsorganisation:3-32, 122. 
568 Herbert Tingsten’s 1934 study revealed that Riksdagen’s most important committees concerning road 
issues since 1867 had been the State Committee, Legislation Committee, Agricultural Committee and 
Appropriation Committee (Tingsten 1934:254, 255, 257, 258, 275). 
569 SOU 1969:62 Ny utskottsorganisation:129-131. 
Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
159 
 But why did the governing Social Democratic Party abandon the bicameral 
system that had safeguarded its power since 1932, except for the short Agrarian 
Party interregnum in 1936? The poor 1966 local elections was most likely an eye 
opener for the party bosses, because the Social Democratic Party lost 5,1 percent of 
the votes compared to the 1964 Second Chamber election.570 The local elections 
elected those who appointed the members of the First Chamber, and reduced support 
in the local elections could thus swing the political balance for decades, similarly to 
what happened in the 1930s. The Social Democratic Party could in worst-case risk 
more than 30 years in opposition if the balance shifted, similarly as the Liberal and 
Conservative Parties had experienced. The Swedish electorate’s moods shifted 
significantly during the second half of the 1960s. The Social Democratic Party’s 
bosses accepted most likely a unicameral system and an election system based on 
one person – one vote, because that reduced their operational and political risk 
significantly compared to the established bicameral system with its lag and 
indirectly elected First Chamber. 
 The Communist Party changed name to the Leftwing Communist Party 
(Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna) in 1967, to distance itself from Moscow, and to 
increase the party’s appeal among new voters.571 The Social Democratic Party 
recovered from the 1966 shock and reached its all time high in the 1968 Second 
Chamber election with a record high turnout after the Russian invasion of 
Czechoslovakia. The Agrarian Party became the leading non-socialist opposition 
party.572 The voters supported most likely the ruling party in 1968 due to the 
perceived threat against Sweden’s national security. Tage Erlander, who had been 
Prime Minister since October 1946, retired in October 1969. Olof Palme, who had 
been Erlander’s closest aide since 1953 succeeded him, even if some party comrades 
rather saw Gunnar Sträng, minister of finance since 1955, as Erlander’s successor.573 
Olof Palme was in many instances Tage Erlander’s fundamental opposite. Olof 
Palme was colorful, highly visible, and charismatic and created strong feelings 
among followers and opponents. 
 Introduction of the unicameral system removed most of the ‘sluggishness’, 
stability and predictability that had characterized Swedish politics since 1867, and 
particularly since 1932. The September 1970 election gave the voters a choice 
between two blocks and two alternative executives. It was close race, but Olof 
Palme and the Social Democratic Party governed further through a minority 
executive.574 The Åre compromise reintroduced three-year terms in Riksdagen that 
had been abandoned after the 1924 Second Chamber election. The 1973 election 
gave the so-called “equilibrium Riksdagen”, with 175 seats to the socialist parties 
and 175 seats to the non-socialist parties.575 But Olof Palme did not call for a new 
election, despite the two blocks’ equal number of seats, because three so-called 
Haga-compromises in 1973, 1975 and 1976 between the Social Democratic and 
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middle parties settled many important issues.576 But the equilibrium Riksdagen led 
also to significant political risk, unpredictability and inconsistent policy, because 
many important matters were settled through lotteries. Riksdagen’s chairman’s 
(talmannens) lottery machine was used 18 times during the spring 1974, 45 times 
during the spring 1975 and 79 times during the 1975-76 session!577 Riksdagen’s 
equal number of seats was obviously a design flaw, because the ‘impossible’ 
happened when the two blocks won an equal number of seats in the 1973 election. 
 The Åre-compromise and the 1969 constitutional amendment were only 
partial constitutional reforms. The political parties agreed about most remaining 
issues in 1973. Riksdagen approved the new constitution in 1974, which came into 
force January 1st 1975 and replaced the 1809 Constitution. Parliamentary rule was 
written into the 1974 Constitution (Regeringsformen), and Riksdagen’s chairman 
replaced the King during change of executive, reduced the King to a symbolic 
figure. The 1974 Constitution instituted also Riksdagen’s approval of a new Prime 
Minister through a vote of confidence or investiture.578 Riksdagen’s calendar was 
similarly changed during the fall 1975 from spring and fall sessions to fall and 
spring sessions, similarly as in the Norwegian legislature Stortinget. Riksdagen’s 
number of seats was also reduced to 349 prior to the 1976 election, to prevent 
further equilibrium terms.579 Sweden’s constitutional reforms at the turn of the 
1960s and 70s was obviously a learning process. 
 The 1974 Constitution furthered and strengthened Sweden’s autonomous 
bureaucracy developed since Axel Oxenstierna established the first boards and 
county administrations in the 17th century, and banned so-called minister rule even if 
parliamentary rule was written into the constitution.580 The Swedish ministers were 
not authorized to instruct any subordinated boards about how to handle their 
individual matters. They were only authorized to outline the policy goals; minister 
rule was considered almost as a kind of corruption. The 1974 Constitution 
safeguarded also the bureaucracy’s meritocracy, through explicit requirements for 
qualified and professional civil servants.581 This requirement for qualified civil 
servants was also an example of path dependence, because similar requirements 
were written into the 1634, 1719, 1772 and 1809 Constitutions.582 The Swedish 
executive and parliamentary system worked in other words fundamentally different 
from that in Denmark where each minister had been almost sovereign within her or 
his policy domains since 1849, and instructed the civil servants about how to handle 
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each individual matter, because Denmark did not abandon minister rule after 
introduction of parliamentary rule in 1901.583 The 1974 Constitution’s seemingly 
innocent details maintained thereby the Swedish parliamentary rule’s unique dual 
character, where the executive was accountable to Riksdagen and ultimately to the 
voters, but where the boards largely maintained their autonomy toward the executive 
and Riksdagen and operated according to norms about State reason and 
professionalism, even if they were partly kept in check by the administrative courts. 
Sweden’s 1974 Constitution furthered thus the parliamentary system established 
from 1917 with autonomous boards, except for the conversion to the unicameral 
system, and was clearly an example of path dependence. 
 The 1976 election became a new turning point, because the Social Democratic 
Party lost power after having been in office since 1932, except for a few months in 
1936. Olof Palme explained the lost 1976 election as a result of among others the 
Wage Earner Funds (löntagarfonderna) championed by the trade union bosses, 
Ingmar Bergman’s tax problems, Astrid Lindgren’s fairytale about Pomperipossa 
due to Sweden’s then more than 100 percent marginal tax for self-employed, and 
finally the nuclear power utilized skillfully by the Agrarian Party’s Thorbjörn 
Fälldin.584 The tax legislation’s enforcement was largely the autonomous boards’ 
responsibility, and may indicate that Olof Palme questioned at least some boards’ 
autonomy, because he was accountable to the voters, the tax bureaucrats were not. 
 The Swedish non-socialist parties cooperated for the first time in a three party 
majority executive headed by the Agrarian Party’s Thorbjörn Fälldin after the 1976 
election, but this executive dissolved from within due to the nuclear power issue and 
the increasing State economic problems. A minority executive headed by the Liberal 
Party’s Ola Ullsten came to power in October 1978. The non-socialist parties won 
even the 1979 election with 175-174 seats to each block and governed until the 1982 
election.585 The unicameral system worked hence as planned by its designers, 
because the Swedish political system’s sluggishness and predictability was history. 
 The new Traffic Committee (Trafikutskottet), with 15 members and 15 to 18 
deputy members during the 1970s, took care of the unicameral Riksdagen’s road 
policy matters.586 The Traffic Committee had many similarities with the Norwegian 
Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
(Samferdselskomiteen). First, some committee members served up to three terms in 
the committee and became partly sector specialists. Second, the central 
constituencies had only two members 1971-73 and 1973-76. The peripheral and 
middle constituencies dominated the committee 1971-82, but the middle 
constituencies were pivotal. Third, the leftwing parties dominated the committee 
1971-73. The middle and rightwing parties dominated the committee 1973-76, 1976-
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79 and 1979-82.587 But there was one fundamental difference compared to Norway’s 
legislature, because Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee maintained road policy as a 
national matter, and furthered thereby the traditions established under the bicameral 
system; i.e. the responsibility for road policy and road construction was delegated to 
the autonomous Road and Water Construction Administration. This institutional 
configuration kept usually the legislators on arm’s length distance from individual 
road projects and reduced the likelihood of pork barrel politics even in the 
unicameral Riksdagen. 
 Sweden joined EFTA in 1960 together with among others Denmark, Norway 
and Great Britain, but Prime Minister Tage Erlander declared in 1961, when Great 
Britain, Denmark and Norway considered joining EEC, that Swedish membership in 
EEC was incompatible with the neutrality.588 The Swedish economic policy 
throughout the 1960s was first and foremost characterized by the expanding public 
sector and increasing inflation problems. The ruling Social Democratic Party did its 
best to shift the attention from costly to less costly policy reforms, such as 
environmental protection.589 A new Swedish distributional coalition, not organized 
according to the left-right cleavage but according to economic growth vs. 
environmental protection, or so-called “Old Politics” vs. “New Politics”, was 
established throughout the 1960s and 70s.590 This environmental distributional 
coalition started as an intellectual and elite protest, but became later also a popular 
protest movement against urbanization, centralization, pollution and nuclear power. 
The first political parties to capitalize politically were the Agrarian Party that 
utilized the nuclear power issue throughout the 1970s, and partly even the Leftwing 
Communist Party.591 
 The economic historian Lars Jonung denoted 1970-73 as Sweden’s “lost 
years” because of the Palme executive’s contractive policy 1971-72 as a response to 
the 1969-70 boom that gave tendencies to overheating of the Swedish economy.592 
The Bretton Wood system’s breakdown in 1971 led to increasing economical 
turbulence. Sweden joined EEC’s Currency Snake but left it in August 1977. 
Sweden profited from the 1970-74 raw material boom prior to the first oil price 
shock, OPEC 1 in 1973-74, but the raw material boom led partly to overheating of 
the economy.593 The first oil price shock reduced the domestic and export markets’ 
demand and brought many underlying problems to the surface, hereunder Sweden’s 
need for energy.594 The Swedish trade and industry’s high costs and diminishing 
productivity had been masked by sustained economic growth since the 1950s. The 
1970s stagflation was according to the economic historian Lennart Schön a 
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structural and technological shift from old smokestack and manufacturing industries 
to new knowledge based industries and services.595  
 A broad majority in Riksdagen 1974-76 supported the executive’s counter 
cyclic response to the recession entailing the first oil price shock, but the Swedish 
wage level increased more than the competitors’ during the 1970s. The Swedish 
trade and industry lost competitiveness, which in turn lead to State economic 
problems due to reduced exports. But Sweden’s dependence of the export markets 
constrained the special interest groups’ influence, according to Lennart Schön, and 
safeguarded a rational and consensus oriented policy even during the crisis.596 Some 
claimed that Sweden’s large public sector in the 1970s crowded out private 
enterprises, but that was not the case according to the Norwegian sociologist Lars 
Mjøset.597 The corporative system established since the 1930s was strained, but 
safeguarded seemingly rational handling of the 1970s’ crisis. 
 The Fälldin executive’s responses to the State economic problems were 
devaluation of the SEK to improve the exports, increased VAT to increase the 
State’s incomes, reduced public investments, and borrowing on the international 
capital markets from 1977. The State economic problems led to the Fälldin 
executive’s resignation in 1978 prior to the second oil price shock, OPEC 2 from the 
fall 1979 that came as a result of the Iranian revolution.598 OPEC 2 aggravated 
Sweden’s State economic problems further due to increased inflation and growing 
balance of payment problems. The Swedish corporative model came in question.599 
The Carter administration’s deflationary policy from 1978 that squeezed the 
inflation out of the US economy harmed the Swedish exports.600 The two decades 
1960-80 that started with a boom ended with an emerging system crisis. 
 Sweden’s GDP per capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollars, were 8.688 dollars in 1960, 12.716 in 70, 13.494 in 73 and 14.937 in 80. The 
average for the 12 West European countries was 7.607 dollars in 1960, 10.959 in 70, 
12.156 in 73 and 14.057 in 80.601 Sweden was above the average and number three 
in 1960, number two in 1970 and number three in 1973. But Sweden’s golden years 
culminated in 1975. Sweden was reduced to number five in 1980 measured as GDP 
per capita and barely above the West European average, because of the stagflation 
entailing OPEC 1 and the Swedish system’s crisis during the late 1970s. 
The technocrats’ heydays – implementation of Swedish Road Plan and 
development of its successor – Road Plan 1970  
The 1953 Traffic Commission concluded in May 1961 and June 1962 and 
recommended introduction of free choice of means of transport, removal of cross 
subsidies between the means of transport and deregulating truck and tractor 
transports.602 Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision established economic 
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effectiveness and competitiveness as the transport and communication policies’ 
lodestar, and approved also a three-phase deregulation of the transport sector within 
1967.603 However, Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision established some fairly 
strange bedfellows according to the political scientist Jörgen Wedin’s dissertation. 
Because the Federation of Trade Unions, the Railroad Workers’ Union, the 
Transport Workers’ Union, the motorist organizations and the Communist Party 
championed a plan based traffic policy, while the Trade and Industry’s Traffic 
Delegation, the Railroad Board, the Social Democratic, Agrarian, Liberal and 
Conservative Parties argued for a market based traffic policy such as approved by 
Riksdagen.604 The Swedish executive and legislators in the early 1960s were thus far 
more concerned with the trade and industry’s competitiveness than preserving 
particular transport and communication infrastructures, or keeping the trade unions 
happy. Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision had significant road policy 
implications, because it furthered the shift from railroad to road transports. 
 One of the 1960s and 70s most influential Swedish ideas was SCAFT 
(Stadsbyggnad, Chalmers, Arbetsgruppen för Trafiksäkerhet), a collection of norms, 
principles and technical standards for urban and traffic planning developed from 
1961 by architects, road engineers and urban planners at Chalmers Technical 
Institute (Chalmers tekniska högskola) in Gothenburg. SCAFT’s ideas and norms 
permeated soon Swedish road policy and road construction, and diffused even to 
other countries. SCAFT’s starting points were Swedish Road Plan, traffic 
engineering and adaptation of Sweden to mass motoring. The Road and Water 
Construction Administration and the Planning Board (Planverket) assigned the task. 
SCAFT was supposed to safeguard road safety, and systematized and 
institutionalized the traffic engineering’s means, tools and methods. SCAFT’s most 
important means were traffic separation, physical separation of hard and soft road 
users through construction of separate road systems for motor vehicles, pedestrians 
and cyclists, traffic differentiation, physical separation of fast and slow moving 
vehicles and remote and local traffic through a differentiated road system with trunk 
roads and motorways, highways, county roads, local roads, city streets and dedicated 
bicycle and pedestrian paths. SCAFT introduced also residential areas without motor 
vehicle traffic, in addition to generally well arranged, tidy, logical and predictable 
traffic environments.605 The road system outlined in Swedish Road Plan and most of 
Sweden’s new residential areas and suburbs were all built according to SCAFT’s 
guidelines. Even the Danish Directorate of Public Roads, the Danish counties and 
municipals built most of Denmark’s modern road system according to SCAFT’s 
guidelines. There were also attempts of introducing the SCAFT paradigm in Norway 
during the 1960s, but these attempts failed completely except in some of Oslo’s new 
satellite towns built during the 1960s and 70s. The concerns for road safety, which 
can be understood as a collective good, were thus instituted in Swedish and partly 
also in Danish road planning and road construction, but hardly so in Norway. 
 Gösta Skoglund, Sweden’s minister of communications since April 1957, 
appointed April 29th the 1964 Commission for High Level Road Planning, because 
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the centralization, urbanization, vehicle and traffic growth by far exceeded Swedish 
Road Plan’s forecasts. Skoglund desired a plan for further road construction until 
1985. He was particularly concerned about the road safety, and desired also 
improved coordination between the urban and rural areas’ road construction, and 
between construction of roads and housing.606 Tage Erlander’s executive planned 
namely construction of a million housing units between 1965 and 1975, the so-
called million program.607 Erik Grafström headed the 1964 Commission for High 
Level Road Planning initially, but Gösta Skoglund replaced him in December 1965, 
when Olof Palme became minister of communications.608 
 The 1964 Commission for High Level Road Planning submitted its Road Plan 
1970 (Vägplan 1970) in December 1969, an updated and revised version of Swedish 
Road Plan for 1970-85.609 The cost/benefit calculations were based on 8 percent 
discount rate, 3 percent more than in the original Swedish Road Plan, but this was in 
accordance with the Ministry of Finance’s guidelines. The 1964 Commission for 
High Level Road Planning assumed the road investments had 30 years life span, and 
outlined two alternatives for Riksdagen’s road appropriations 1970-85. The ‘low 
growth’ alternative with 4 percent annual growth was based on allocation of 36.640 
millions 1969 SEK or approximately 20.568,4 millions 1990 PPP USD 1970-85, 
hereunder investment of 19.960 millions 1969 SEK or approximately 11.253,9 
millions 1990 PPP USD. The high growth alternative with 7,5 percent annual 
growth was based on allocation of 47.800 millions 1969 SEK or approximately 
26.950,6 millions 1990 PPP USD 1970-85, hereunder investment of 31.120 millions 
1969 SEK or approximately 17.546,1 millions 1990 PPP USD. The low-growth 
alternative was based on the existing vehicle and fuel taxes; the high-growth 
alternative necessitated increased vehicle and fuel taxes to maintain the balance 
between vehicle and fuel tax revenues and road appropriations.610 The 1964 
Commission for High Level Road Planning’s estimation model included investment 
costs, maintenance costs, costs for parking areas, vehicle and time costs and accident 
costs, and concluded the society should be willing to increase the road investments 
equal to the social costs for a totally disabled person, to avoid future traffic accident 
fatalities.611 612 Road Plan 1970 became therefore a seminal or path-breaking work 
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with regard to road safety, because it established the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s use of allocation models that included accident costs, and differed 
thus fundamentally from the contemporary Norwegian Road Plan that omitted 
accident costs and road safety considerations both from the formal investment 
allocation models and most politically adjusted allocations of the road investments. 
 Road Plan 1970’s new road standards were based on SCAFT’s guidelines, and 
included three main parameters, namely “road safety” (trafiksäkerheten) measured 
in number of vehicle kilometers per accident, “traveling speed” (reshastigheten) 
measured in kilometers per hour and “carrying capacity” (bärigheten) measured as 
permitted axle, bogie and total vehicle weights in tons. The 1964 Commission for 
High Level Road Planning recommended construction of motorways where the 
average traffic exceeded 6.000 vehicles per day during each road’s first year of 
operations.613 These three parameters were all of great importance for the Swedish 
trade and industry’s future competitiveness, for Sweden’s future road safety and for 
the Swedish healthcare and social system’s future costs. But the increased discount 
rate combined with road safety as one of the model’s parameters reduced Road Plan 
1970’s recommended investments in the peripheral areas’ county roads, a 
fundamental difference compared to the contemporary Norwegian Road Plan. 
Riksdagen approved Road Plan 1970 in 1972.614 However, it was soon evident that 
Road Plan 1970’s growth estimates came close to State economic hubris. 
 Sweden’s public road system’s length increased from 92.070 kilometers in 
1957 to 97.960 kilometers in 1969. Sweden had 19 kilometers motorways in 1957 
and 328,5 kilometers motorways and 139,7 kilometers expressways January 1st 
1969.615 The permitted axle load in 1957 was 6 tons on most public roads. The 
permitted axle load in 1968 was 8 tons on 96 percent of the public roads, but 80 
percent of the new trunk roads and about one third of the most important county 
roads permitted in 1968 10/16 tons axle/bogie loads.616 The Road and Water 
Construction Administration prioritized thus construction and modernizing of the 
industrially most important trunk roads and county roads during the 1960s. Most of 
the road construction and modernizing was governed by an economic logic, exactly 
as outlined in Swedish Road Plan. 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
5.114 millions 1969 SEK or approximately 2.883,4 millions 1990 PPP USD in county roads, and 
investing 604 millions 1969 SEK or approximately 340,55 millions 1990 PPP USD in improvements of 
2.775 kilometers roads. The 1964 Commission for High Level Road Planning’s total recommended 
investments were hence 16.892 millions 1969 SEK or approximately 9.524,1 millions 1990 PPP USD 
distributed across 11.695 kilometers of roads. These investments were divided between 13.035 millions 
1969 SEK or approximately 7.349,4 millions 1990 PPP USD to 7.244 kilometer trunk roads and 3.857 
millions 1969 SEK or approximately 2.174,7 millions 1990 PPP USD to 4.451 kilometer primary county 
roads. 4.422 millions 1969 SEK or approximately 2.493,2 millions 1990 PPP USD of the proposed 
investments were recommended allocated to 538 kilometer urban roads and city streets (SOU 1969:56 
Vägplan 1970:146 Tabell 9:1, 147 Tabell 9:2). 
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From expert ruled to more politically governed road policy and road 
construction 
The Road and Water Construction Administration’s lack of deep local rooting 
became a problem for the Road and Water Construction Administration in the 1960s 
and 70s according to the historian Ove Pettersson, because the engineers built 
excellent roads but overlooked often other considerations of great importance for 
those affected by the road construction or lack of such.617 The county borders and 
county organizations were also perceived as problems for the Road and Water 
Construction Administration throughout the 1950s and early 60s. The Ministry of 
Communications appointed a commission to elucidate the Road and Water 
Construction Administration’s organization in 1963 that concluded in 1965, and 
transformed July 1st 1967 the Road and Water Construction Administration to 
Swedish National Road Administration (Statens vägverk). The road construction and 
maintenance activities were gathered into seven regions transcending the county 
borders, similarly as the Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ five road and water 
construction districts prior to the 1930 reform. This new regionalized model was 
upheld until 1982. The Water and Sewage Branch (Vatten och Avlöpsbyrån) was 
spun off to the new Environmental Protection Board (Naturvårdsvärket). The Road 
Traffic Branch (Vägtrafikbyrån) was similarly in 1968 spun off to a new Road 
Safety Board (Trafiksäkerhetsverket).618 Sweden changed from left-hand to right-
hand driving during the night September 3rd 1967. Sweden had no general speed 
limits until 1960, but the Road Safety Board introduced 90 km/h as maximum speed 
limit on highways and 110 km/h on motorways in 1970, after trials with various 
speed limits after introduction of right-hand driving.619  
 Was the real reason for the 1967 reforms the county borders or had the Road 
and Water Construction Administration become too powerful, too autonomous and 
unmanageable? Was Director General Gustav Vahlberg deaf to the executive’s 
political signals? The Swedish centralization went on for full blast during the 1960s, 
well ahead of the 1950s’ wildest expectations. The Road and Water Construction 
Administration and the major cities’ construction of trunk roads, driveways and 
motorways fueled this centralization. Few domestic political issues interested Olof 
Palme, the new minister of communications from November 1965, more than 
regional policy and distribution of goods between rural and urban areas, particularly 
the distribution of employment.620 It was also commonly accepted knowledge within 
the Road and Water Construction Administration that Gustav Vahlberg was a strong 
                                                 
617 Pettersson (1988:135 ff.). 
618 Montelius (1987b:80-81); Liten Vägverkshistoria [Online October 9th 2004] – URL: http://www.vv.se; 
Vägverkets namn genem tiderna [Online October 9th 2004] – URL: http://www.vv.se. 
619 Vägverket 1944 till idag; Högertrafikens historia; Hastighetsbegränsningarnas historia [Online 
September 15th 2005] – URL: http://www.vv.se. 
620 Peterson (2002:159). See also Palme (1970:112-120, 123-124). Thage G. Peterson was a leading 
member of the Social Democratic Party’s Youth Movement (SSU) 1961-67, and worked in the 
Community Center Movement (Folketshusrörelsen) 1967-70. Peterson was member of Riksdagen from 
1971 and Parliamentary Secretary at the Prime Minister’s office 1971-75, where he developed the modern 
Prime Minister’s Office. Peterson was minister of coordination from 1975 until the Social Democratic 
Party’s executive’s resignation after the 1976 election. Peterson served first as minister of industry in 
Palme’s second executive from 1982 and thereafter as minister of industry in Ingvar Carlsson’s executive 
until 1988. Peterson served also as minister of justice during three months, after Anna-Greta Leijon’s 
resignation (Peterson 2002:15; Hadenius et al. 1991:371, 374). 
Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
168 
Director General who struggled for increased road appropriations and questioned the 
executive’s use of road construction as a business cycle regulator, even if his own 
party governed.621 Gustav Vahlberg may have been perceived as a problem for the 
ministers of communication, but Olof Palme had sufficient political strength and 
backing to lop off Director Generals who ignored the executive’s political signals. 
 The Social Democratic Party lost as mentioned earlier the 1966 local elections. 
The middle parties lost voters to the Conservative Party, while the Social 
Democratic Party lost voters to the middle parties.622 Olof Palme’s skepticism to the 
Agrarian Party was growing, because the Agrarian Party had been targeting urban 
voters since 1957 when the coalition executive dissolved and the Agrarian Party 
changed its name from Bondeförbundet to Centerpartiet. The 1930s’ class 
compromises and the 1950s’ coalition between the Social Democratic and Agrarian 
Parties were first and foremost possible because the Agrarian Party represented the 
rural areas’ wealthy farmers and forest owners. The Social Democratic Party 
represented similarly the urban areas, industrial workers and civil servants.623 Olof 
Palme feared most likely a trend where reduced voter support could shift the 
political balance in the non-socialist parties’ favor similarly as the political balance 
had shifted in the Social Democratic Party’s favor in the 1930s. 
 The Agrarian Party questioned in 1966 Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy 
Decision because it led to winding up of unprofitable peripheral and rural secondary 
and tertiary railroads. These discussions continued in Riksdagen in 1967. The issue 
at stake was the final phase of 1963 Traffic Policy Decision’s deregulations. Even 
Riksdagen’s 1967 debates created some strange political bedfellows, according to 
Jörgen Wedin’s study, because the Leftwing Communist Party, the Federation of 
Trade Unions and the Railroad Workers’ Union argued for a plan based traffic 
policy. The Transport Workers’ Union shifted slightly more towards the market 
position. The Truck Owners’ Association, Agrarian and Liberal Parties were 
similarly almost at the market end of the continuum. The Social Democratic and 
Conservative Parties and the Trade and Industry’s Traffic Delegation remained 
firmly at the market end of the continuum similarly as in 1963.624 The Social 
Democratic and Conservative Parties maintained thereby their belief in market based 
transport and communication policies to safeguard the trade and industry’s 
competitiveness. The middle parties on the other hand had shifted more towards a 
planned transport policy since 1963, most likely because they recognized the voters’ 
response. 
 Minister of communications Olof Palme replaced in 1967 the former Road and 
Water Construction Administration’s Road Management Cooperation Delegation 
with a board of directors between the new Swedish National Road Administration’s 
Director General and the Ministry of Communications.625 This board had two 
directors from Riksdagen, one representing the Social Democratic and one the 
Agrarian Party. The third director represented the Federation of Trade Unions. 
Swedish Automotive Industry Association’s Chairman Sven Gerentz represented the 
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automotive and motoring lobby. Swedish National Road Administration’s Director 
General Gustav Vahlberg headed the new board of directors.626 The corporative 
model that had facilitated swift implementation of Swedish Road Plan was hence 
furthered and formalized through Olof Palme’s 1967 reform that seemingly not 
reduced Director General Gustav Vahlberg’s power and influence significantly, 
because Vahlberg headed the new board of directors. But the new board of directors 
made the Agrarian Party a road policy accomplice, and may have been one of Olof 
Palme’s moves to contain the Agrarian Party. Swedish National Road 
Administration’s board of directors sanded most decisions, according to Sven 
Gerentz. The Director Generals took usually the other directors’ views into 
consideration.627 Olof Palme’s new board of directors between Swedish National 
Road Administration’s Director General and the Ministry of Communications 
furthered thus the corporative consensus tradition established as soon former 
Director General Carl-Gustaf Hjort retired, but glued the opposition parties to the 
executive’s road policy. 
 Minister of communications Svante Lundkvist postponed in 1968 until further 
Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision’s final phase deregulations.628 New road 
and traffic policy shifts were obviously in the pipeline, most like as a result of the 
Social Democratic Party’s strategic moves to contain the Agrarian Party. 
Stockholm pioneered the road policy shifts 
Stockholm’s number of inhabitants increased from about 100.000 in 1856 to about 
390.000 in 1913. Greater Stockholm area’s number of inhabitants increased 
similarly from about 500.000 in 1910 to about 1,1 millions in 1950.629 This fast 
population growth and the fact that many inhabitants moved from the city hub to the 
surrounding suburbs after World War Two necessitated radical improvements of 
greater Stockholm’s transport infrastructures, both rail bound public transports and 
trunk roads. 
 The 1956 draft version of Swedish Road Plan proposed construction of several 
motorways in the Stockholm area, but Stockholm’s aldermen required even more 
motorways in their commentary, first and foremost a motorway ring encircling 
Stockholm’s city hub to drain the through traffic and radial entrance roads from the 
suburbs to the city hub. Swedish Road Plan allocated 2.000 millions SEK or 
approximately 1.832,3 millions 1990 PPP USD to unspecified trunk road projects in 
the major cities. Stockholm’s 1960 Trunk Road Plan (Trafikledsplan för Stockholm 
1960) developed further Stockholm’s 1958 Region Plan, and outlined construction 
of a six-lane motorway ring encircling Stockholm’s city hub, with radial entrance 
motorways. Stockholm’s 1960 Trunk Road Plan assumed investment of 2.330 
millions SEK or approximately 1.850,4 millions 1990 PPP USD in roads and 284 
millions SEK or approximately 225,4 millions 1990 PPP USD in land purchase the 
forthcoming 20 years.630  
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 The Essingen Trunk Road (Essingeleden), the southwestern corner of the 
planned motorway ring, was initially approved by Stockholm’s city council October 
15th 1959 and agreed built in two phases. Phase one 1960-69, was construction of a 
motorway with reduced width in some sections. Phase two 1975-79, was expansion 
to full width. Stockholm’s city council’s decision triggered many protests, but the 
project was revised and furthered. Both Stockholm’s Essingeleden (E 3, E 4) and 
Gothenburg’s Tingstad Trunk Road (Tingstadleden) (E 6), which also came as a 
result of Swedish Road Plan, were vital links and potential bottlenecks in Sweden’s 
future national trunk road system. Stockholm and Gothenburg received significant 
co-financing from the Road and Water Construction Administration during the 
1960s. Tingstadleden and most of Gothenburg’s other planned trunk roads and 
motorways were completed. The Essingen Trunk Road and Stockholm’s motorway 
ring’s remaining parts were largely abandoned from 1970, due to popular resistance 
and lack of funding.631 The Essingen Trunk Road’s Bromma section was one of 
Sweden’s most profitable road investment, with a 7,3 cost/benefit ratio, according to 
the economist and doctoral engineer Ingemar Ahlstrand, but was not completed.632 
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Figure 11: Greater Stockholm’s future trunk road system outlined in Road Plan 
1970. 
 
Source: SOU 1969:56 Vägplan 1970. 
 Rikard Skårfors’ economic historical study of Stockholm’s urban planning 
1945-75 uncovered the local opposition against the planned and approved 
motorways and trunk roads increased significantly throughout the 1960s. One strong 
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indication was the political parties and community groups’ formal comments to the 
proposed plans. The number of comments peaked in 1970. The local resistance 
against further construction of motorways and trunk roads was evident in Stockholm 
County’s 1973 Regional Plan (Regionplan 1973 för Stockholm’s län).633 Sweden 
experienced similarly as Denmark and Norway a significant red-green 
environmentalist tide in the second half of the 1960s and early 70s. Many of these 
organizations were popular or grass root movements not formally related to the 
established political parties.634 1970 became in other words a road policy turning 
point in Stockholm and in most other major Swedish cities, because of increasing 
radical and environmental critique of mass motoring and the cities’ road 
construction.635  
 How to explain this road policy shift approximately from 1970? Rikard 
Skårfors found two broad categories of explanations. The economical explanation 
was first the so-called 1964 Hörjel-agreement, orchestrated by the Ministry of 
Communication’s Parliamentary Secretary Nils Hörjel that permitted Stockholm city 
council to finance 95 percent of the construction costs for Stockholm’s subway with 
State road appropriations. Only the remaining road appropriations were left to road 
construction. The major cities’ State road appropriations were reduced. Adaptation 
of Stockholm’s city hub to mass motoring and construction of Essingeleden became 
also more costly than planned. A temporary slump in Stockholm’s population 
growth in the second half of the 1960s gave less traffic growth than estimated, and 
reduced thereby temporarily the need for trunk road construction. The change of 
mood among Stockholm’s inhabitants and local politicians started as an elite 
phenomenon in the early 1960s, but diffused soon to miscellaneous popular 
movements. The new generation of local politicians that came in position at the turn 
of the 1960s and 70s perceived these signals and adjusted the road policy and road 
construction accordingly in Stockholm County’s 1973 Regional Plan and in the 
entailing road and infrastructure plans.636 However, there was one fundamental 
difference between Sweden and Norway, which also had fairly strong popular and 
political mobilization against road construction at the turn of the 1960s and 70s. The 
economically most important Swedish road sections were completed before this 
change of mood took place. Swedish National Road Administration or the former 
Road and Water Construction Administration allocated the road investments 
according to transport economic considerations, cost/benefit calculations and desires 
about improved road safety, and prioritized therefore high-gain projects. Norwegian 
legislators postponed construction of profitable trunk roads at least until 1978. 
 The 1964 Hörjel-agreement challenged seriously the road policy equilibrium 
established since the 1920s and instituted by the 1938 accounting reform that 
dedicated vehicle and fuel tax revenues to road appropriations.637 The 1951 Vehicle 
Tax Committee refused financing construction of urban subways with vehicle and 
fuel tax revenues, because that violated the established “cost responsibility 
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principle”. Even the 1955 Urban Road Management Committee that submitted its 
recommendations in 1959 advised against financing construction of urban subways 
with vehicle and fuel tax revenues, even if substitution of urban tramlines with 
subways would increase the cars’ available road capacity. Stockholm’s city council 
asked in February 1957 for the Ministry of Communication’s permission to finance 
construction of the planned subways with road appropriations.638 The Ministry of 
Communication’s Parliamentary Secretary Nils Hörjel orchestrated the agreement 
that authorized financing 95 percent of the construction costs for Stockholm’s 
subway with road appropriations, despite the automotive and motoring lobby’s 
protests. But Nils Hörjel’s move safeguarded construction of a comprehensive and 
very functional subway system that improved Stockholm’s environment and traffic 
conditions fundamentally. 
The 1970s’ road and traffic policy flip-flops 
Railroads carried most of Sweden’s domestic goods transports until 1970 measured 
in ton kilometers.639 But this shift from railroad to road transports was not reflected 
in the road investments, because they peaked about 1970 and was almost halved 
within 1980.640 Road Plan 1970’s strong growth projections were literally Spanish 
castles prior to Riksdagen’s approval in 1972, because the Palme executive’s 
contractive economic policy 1971-72. The urban areas’ road investments were 
similarly strongly reduced during the 1970s, due to the first oil price shock 1973-74, 
the entailing stagflation and international recession, the Swedish corporative 
system’s crisis, tighter budgets for public investments and popular and political 
resistance against urban road construction. 
 Ove Pettersson claimed Swedish National Road Administration maintained its 
strong position until the early 1970s, when it was undermined by large municipals 
that gradually acquired their own road, urban and environmental planning expertise. 
The Swedish road policy and road construction that almost had been dictated by the 
former Road and Water Construction Administration changed therefore gradually 
character to a negotiation process between Swedish National Road Administration 
and the involved counties and municipals. This development was also a result of the 
1970s’ ambitions about a more decentralized Sweden.641 Was Pettersson right about 
Swedish National Road Administration’s weakened position? 
 The new Traffic Committee became responsible for road policy issues in 1971 
after introduction of Riksdagen’s unicameral system. Gustav Vahlberg retired 
similarly August 1st 1971. Sven-Göran Olhede succeeded him as Swedish National 
Road Administration’s Director General. Olhede had served as Parliamentary 
Secretary in the Ministry of Defense 1966-69 and in the Ministry of Industry 1969-
70 and became member of Riksdagen for the Social Democratic Party in 1970 until 
he became Director General.642 It became also known in 1973 that Sven-Göran 
Olhede had been involved in the Social Democratic Party’s secret surveillance of 
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communists together with Swedish Industry and the military intelligence services.643 
Sven-Göran Olhede was also one of the social democrats that polished the party’s 
ideological profile.644 Riksdagen’s establishment of standing subject matter 
committees and Vahlberg’s retirement created a new situation that increased 
Riksdagen’s influence even in road policy matters.  
 The Agrarian Party that became the Social Democrats’ primary opponent after 
the 1968 election revised its manifesto in 1969, and promised introduction of social 
and socio-economic concerns as guidelines for Sweden’s future transport and 
communication policy, hereunder integration of regional, transport and 
communication policies to achieve a decentralized society.645 Olof Palme was well 
aware the three major cities’ growth during the 1960s and early 70s had increased 
the Agrarian Party’s support. Olof Palme was also well aware that Stockholm’s 
strong man, Hjalmar Mehr, had done his best to increase Stockholm’s number of 
inhabitants through liberal application of glass and concrete constructions. Olof 
Palme became almost “obsessed” with the Agrarian Party’s secretary, Gustaf 
Jonnergård, and the Agrarian Party’s new leader from 1971, Thorbjörn Fälldin, and 
pursued a dual strategy to stem the Agrarian Party’s progress in urban areas, 
according to Olof Palme’s Parliamentary Secretary Thage G. Peterson. Olof Palme 
accused first the Agrarian Party for describing the major cities’ inhabitants as 
second-class citizens forced to live in the major cities, and depicted the major cities’ 
living conditions as “Dantes inferno”, in his speech at Stockholm’s Labor 
Municipal’s (arbetarkommun) annual meeting in April 1972.646 Hjalmar Mehr was 
in September 1971 offered an honorary and face saving retreat from his position as 
Stockholm’s city manager (finansborgarråd), when he was appointed to Stockholm’s 
County Governor.647 Olof Palme knew when and how to remove those within the 
movement who were out of tune with the popular sentiments and furnished the 
opposition parties with arguments, but he attacked also the Agrarian Party head on, 
and used the opportunity to boost the Social Democratic Party’s followers’ morale. 
 Olof Palme’s second move against the Agrarian Party came through the 
executive’s 1972 State Board Proposition, which included Road Plan 1970. But 
Road Plan 1970 was – as we soon will see – almost dead on arrival. The cities had 
not responded as expected to the executive’s carrots. Olof Palme used therefore the 
stick to limit the three major cities’ growth, because some of Stockholm’s Social 
Democratic Party bosses had not been able or willing to see the political connections 
between increased centralization and the Agrarian Party’s progress, even if 
Stockholm’s road investments already had been significantly reduced due to popular 
resistance.648 Olof Palme instructed obviously his ministers of communications 
                                                 
643 “Principskiss over det svenska spionaget, Samband mellan IB och Statsföretag AB”, Folket i 
Bild/Kulturfront, No. 17, 1973 [Online September 21st 2005] – URL: http://www.fib.se/IB/princips.html; 
http://www.fib.se/IB/samband.html; Konstitutionsutskottets betänkande 1998/99:KU25 Granskning av 
statsrådens tjänsteutövning och regeringsärendenas handläggning: Chapter 1.2. 
644 Sven-Göran Olhede [Online September 1st 2005] – URL: http://www.vv.se; “100 års tradition i 
partiprogrammet: Krav på planerad ekonomi”, Socialisten [Online September 21st 2005] – URL: 
http://www.socialisten.nu/abr/sap/partiprogram_historia_53.shtml  
645 Wedin (1982:213). 
646 Peterson (2002:159, 367-371). See also Palme (1970:113-121, 123-131, 133-142) about the major 
cities environmental problems and how these could be solved among others through public planning. 
647 Skårfors (1999:90-91). 
648 Peterson (2002:159, 369). 
Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
175 
Bengt Norling, because Norling promised closer integration of the road and regional 
policies in the 1972 State Board Proposition similarly as promised by the Agrarian 
Party prior to the 1970 election. Both Riksdagen’s new Traffic Committee and the 
plenary approved Norling’s ideas, but the road investments were still supposed 
allocated according to cost/benefit ratios. Bengt Norling appointed May 5th 1972 the 
1972 Committee for Long Term Road Planning (Komitén för den långsiktiga 
vägplaneringen) to develop a model that integrated road and regional policy and 
other kinds of public planning.649 Olof Palme tried obviously to outflank the 
Agrarian Party and those within the Social Democratic Party that opposed further 
centralization, but upheld Swedish National Road Administration’s allocation of the 
road investments based on rational criteria. Director General Sven-Göran Olhede did 
not oppose this road policy shift. 
 Minister of Communications Bengt Norling questioned also the traffic policy 
as such on the Social Democratic Party’s 1972 convention when he signaled 
willingness to shift from road to railroad transports of goods though imposition of 
transport policy measures.650 Jörgen Wedin’s study revealed the Social Democratic 
Party in 1972 located itself almost in the same traffic policy position as the Leftwing 
Communist Party. The Conservative Party remained in the market end of the 
continuum. The Agrarian and Liberal Parties were both near the market end of the 
continuum, but somewhat more towards plan, similarly as in 1967. Bengt Norling’s 
move represented clearly a traffic policy flip-flop, compared to the Social 
Democratic Party’s positions in Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision and 
Riksdagen’s 1967 traffic policy debate. Jörgen Wedin explains this flip-flop as a 
result both of party internal considerations and strategic considerations given the 
situation in Riksdagen, because the railroad workers’ dissatisfaction had to be 
contained internally. It was also of utmost importance to divide the non-socialist 
parties prior to the forthcoming 1973 election.651 The parliamentary situation and a 
minority executive dictated a shift in the Social Democratic Party’s traffic policy to 
strangulate the Leftwing Communist Party, contain the Agrarian Party and divide 
the non-socialist block. Similar motives explain most likely Bengt Norling’s road 
policy moves in May when he appointed the 1972 Committee for Long Term Road 
Planning. 
 The 1972 Committee for Long Term Road Planning submitted its 
recommendations in October 1975. Road Plan 1970’s 8 percent discount rate was 
upheld, according to the Budget Commission’s (Budgetutredningen) 1973 
recommendations.652 The 1972 Committee for Long Term Road Planning 
established a new road plan regime based on planning in three levels or phases. First 
strategic long-term planning with 15 years time horizon derived from the 
executive’s policy goals and the desired development of the Swedish society, 
thereafter physical detail planning of the desired roads based on the long-term plans. 
Finally priority of the individual road projects every third year coordinated with 
Riksdagen’s elections, based on Swedish National Road Administration’s ten-years 
long term road plans and quinquennial revolving road plans with feedback loops to 
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the physical planning and political decision processes. Swedish National Road 
Administration’s new investment allocation model increased the accident costs’ 
significance compared to Road Plan 1970’s investment allocation model, and 
introduced also regional policy considerations and uncertainty through stochastic 
elements.653 But the Ministry of Finance’s high discount rates undermined both Olof 
Palme’s executive and Riksdagen’s increased regional and structural policy 
ambitions, because high discount rates reduce the number of profitable projects and 
tend to concentrate the investments in the most profitable projects, all other things 
equal. But this effect was partly mitigated through introduction of uncertainty and 
regional policy parameters in the allocation model. 
 But the Ministry of Finance’s high discount rate was only a ripple compared to 
the tide, the macro economic shock caused by the 1973-74 oil price shock and the 
entailing stagflation that triggered Sweden’s fast growing State economic problems. 
One indication of these problems was the 1972 Committee for Long Term Road 
Planning’s recommended reductions in road widths compared to the road standards 
established through Road Plan 1970, even if road width is a decisive road safety 
parameter. Motorways and other four-lane roads were from 1975 recommended 
built only if the average traffic exceeded 12.000 vehicles per day, a doubling 
compared to Road Plan 1970. Expressways and two-lane trunk roads with wide 
shoulders were similarly recommended built where the average traffic was 9.000-
12.000 vehicles per day. Two-lane trunk roads with wide shoulders were similarly 
recommended built where the average traffic was 6.000-9.000 vehicles per day.654 
Narrower roads reduced the construction costs, but the 1975 ‘narrow gauge’ road 
standard had profound long-term road safety implications. 
 The most significant consequence of the fast growing State economic 
problems was substantially reduced road investments. The revised Road Plan 1970’s 
total investments 1976-85 were scaled down to 16.279 millions 1975 SEK or 
approximately 6.262,5 millions 1990 PPP USD, with 8.267 millions SEK or 
approximately 3.180,3 millions 1990 PPP USD to Swedish National Road 
Administration and 8.012 millions SEK or about 3.082,2 millions 1990 PPP USD to 
the major cities.655 Swedish National Road Administration was thus hit severely by 
the oil price shock and the entailing stagflation and State economic problems already 
in 1975, through recommendations about significantly reduced road investments. 
 Torbjörn Fälldin used environmental issues and regional policy as means for 
convincing the voters about the need for a system change prior to the 1976 election, 
and won. The Agrarian Party and Torbjörn Fälldin dominated three of the four 
executives 1976-82, except the Liberal executive headed by Ola Ullsten from 
October 1978 until October 1979.656 Sweden’s first non-socialist executive since the 
1930s ‘purged’ the ministries and boards, and began also dismantling many 
corporative institutions. The Conservative Party’s Bo Turesson served as minister of 
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communication from October 1976 until October 1978 and adjusted Bengt Norling’s 
traffic policy somewhat, because the 1977 budget proposition emphasized 
effectiveness both through competition between means of transport and 
enterprises.657 Bo Turesson reestablished thereby almost the governing market based 
traffic policy prior to the Social Democratic Party’s 1972 flip-flop. 
 Helena Wockelberg’s study of Riksdagen’s debates about the Swedish public 
administration unveiled the Conservative and Liberal Parties desired a small State. 
The Agrarian Party desired similarly a small but decentralized State that delegated 
tasks to the counties and municipals. The Agrarian Party argued in the 1970s for a 
spoils system or cronyism, almost as in USA, with their own followers as head of 
the boards with terms of years coordinated with the elections, because that would 
align the boards’ policy implementation with the national will, according to the 
Agrarian Party.658 The Fälldin executive appointed Carl-Olof Ternryd, who had a 
doctoral degree in engineering from the Royal Institute of Technology as Swedish 
National Road Administration’s new Director General May 1st 1978, after the Social 
Democratic Party’s Sven-Göran Olhede died March 23rd.659 660 Carl-Olof Ternryd 
was not an active politician but first and foremost a skilled professional and civil 
servant, even if he most likely sympathized with the new executives and the 
automotive and motoring lobby. 
 Olof Palme’s executive started relocating State boards from Stockholm to 
more peripheral areas in the late 1960s, to constrain the centralization, reduce the 
peripheral counties’ depopulation and to contain, outflank and disarm the Agrarian 
Party. Riksdagen decided in 1973 to relocate Swedish National Road Administration 
to Borlänge in Dalarna, northeast of Stockholm. The physical relocation took place 
under the Liberal Ullsten executive 1978-79 and was completed in 1980.661 The 
relocation to Borlänge weakened Swedish National Road Administration’s 
opportunities for quiet lobbying, but the increased distance to the Ministry of 
Communications and Riksdagen on the other hand protected Swedish National Road 
Administration’s autonomy, even if the Agrarian Party desired more politically 
manageable boards, for instance through appointment of Director Generals 
sympathetic to their programs.  
 Neither the Social Democratic Party’s Bengt Norling nor the Conservative 
Party’s Bo Turesson was in position when Riksdagen finally concluded the 1970s’ 
traffic policy debates. It was Ola Ullsten’s Liberal minority executive’s minister of 
communications, Anitha Bondestam, a former deputy undersecretary 
(expeditionschef) in the Ministry of Communications that forwarded the proposition, 
which was approved by Riksdagen June 1st 1979. 662 Riksdagen’s 1979 Traffic 
Policy Decision instituted requirements for “socio-economic” assessments of future 
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infrastructure investments.663 The 1972 Committee for Long Term Road Planning 
had already introduced such assessments in Swedish National Road 
Administration’s investment allocation models.  
 Riksdagen’s 1979 Traffic Policy Decision reestablished almost the equilibrium 
prior to the Social Democratic Party’s 1972 traffic policy flip-flop, according to 
Jörgen Wedin’s study, and reflected clearly the Liberal Party’s preferences. The 
Leftwing Communist Party, the Federation of Trade Unions and the new 
Government Employees’ Union, which then organized the railroad workers, 
championed as usual planned rather than market based transports. The Transport 
Workers’ Union, the Agrarian, Liberal and Social Democratic Parties clustered 
almost at the market end of the continuum. Swedish Road Federation, the Truck 
Owners’ Association, the Trade and Industry’s Traffic Delegation and the 
Conservative Party championed market-based transports.664 The major political 
parties upheld thereby Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision’s principles about 
competition between different means of transport, even if Riksdagen’s 1979 Traffic 
Policy Decision facilitated more regulations to safeguard regional policy concerns. 
But the established road and traffic policies prevailed. The Social Democratic 
Party’s joining of the middle parties’ position a few months prior to the 1979 
election was a second road and traffic policy flip-flop, and most likely an attempt to 
divide the non-socialist block. 
 Torbjörn Fälldin’s second three-party executive liquidated in 1980 the account 
introduced in 1938 that consolidated the annual vehicle and fuel tax revenues with 
the State’s annual road appropriations as a contra entry.665 This move against one of 
the non-socialist parties’ most important interest groups’ sacred cows punctuated the 
equilibrium established since the 1920s with dedicated vehicle and fuel taxes to road 
purposes, and abolished de facto the Swedish Road Fund, but was most likely a 
State economic necessity, because of Sweden’s augmenting State economic 
problems. 
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Swedish case between 1960 and 1980? This study’s main hypothesis 
or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road policy and 
road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good was clearly 
strengthened, because modern trunk roads and motorways were obviously 
considered as national collective goods by the Swedish legislators and executives 
even between 1960 and 1980, despite growing popular and political resistance 
against trunk roads and motorways in Stockholm and other major cities. The 
SCAFT-paradigm and Road Plan 1970 established also road safety as a national 
collective good. The road investments were reduced significantly from 1970 when 
significant parts of Swedish Road Plan were completed. Road Plan 1970 furthered 
the road policy established through Swedish Road Plan, even if the ambitions were 
further reduced in 1975 and 1979 due to State economic problems. But trunk roads 
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and motorways remained national collective goods and Swedish National Road 
Administration upheld its rational allocation of the road investments through formal 
models that also included road safety and later also regional policy parameters. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was weakened by the Swedish case between 1960 
and 1980, because the constituencies’ struggles for resources to local collective or 
private goods did not displace road policy and road construction as national matters 
despite introduction of the unicameral system in 1971, establishment of a standing 
Traffic Committee instead of the former bicameral Riksdagen’s functional State 
Committee or the 1976 regime change when the non-socialist parties came to power 
for the first time since 1936. But introduction of the unicameral Riksdagen 
facilitated linking or road policy and regional policy throughout the 1970s. But 
Swedish National Road Administration’s autonomy prevailed, even if the 
municipals and counties increased their influence on road policy and road 
construction through acquiring their own road and environmental planning expertise.  
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was clearly strengthened by the Swedish case between 1960 and 
1980, because the political parties’ rivalry permeated Swedish road policy and road 
construction from the middle of the 1960s. The Swedish political parties used traffic 
and road policy to distinguish themselves after Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy 
Decision when only the Communist Party deviated from the market consensus. The 
Social Democratic executive’s reorganizing of the Road and Water Construction 
Administration and reduced road construction in the major cities can be interpreted 
as attempts of containing the Agrarian Party. The Social Democratic Party’s 1972 
road and traffic policy flip-flops were moves to contain the Agrarian Party as well as 
the railroad workers that often sympathized with the Leftwing Communist Party. 
The Social Democratic Party’s 1979 traffic policy flip-flop, when it joined the 
middle parties’ position and reintroduced the market mechanisms together with 
regional policy concerns, was most likely similarly an attempt of dividing the non-
socialist parties prior to the 1979 election.  
 The final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Swedish case between 
1960 and 1980. First, introduction of the unicameral system after the 1970 election 
punctuated the bicameral system’s equilibrium and removed the Swedish political 
system’s sluggishness, but upheld largely the former Second Chamber’s election 
system based on one person – one vote. Second, introduction of the unicameral 
system led also to replacement of the bicameral system’s functional committees with 
standing subject matter committees, but road policy and road construction remained 
national matters. The road policy details had namely been instituted as Swedish 
National Road Administration’s turf since 1944, after having been established 
practice since the 1920s. Third, the 1974 Constitution maintained Sweden’s unique 
parliamentary rule established from 1917, with autonomous boards, and banned 
minister rule and upheld the requirements for qualified civil servants. The unique 
Swedish parliamentary rule with autonomous boards responsible for the policy 
implementation was clearly another example of path dependence. Fourth, the 1976 
election punctuated the Social Democratic Party’s hegemony since 1936. 
Chapter 3 – Sweden – the catch-up case 
180 
Introduction of the unicameral system after the 1970 election and removal of the 
First Chamber’s lag gave executives more in accordance with the voters’ 
preferences. Fifth, the Social Democratic Party’s road and traffic policy flip-flops in 
1972 and 1979 did not fundamentally alter the market based road and traffic policies 
established through Riksdagen’s approval of Swedish Road Plan in 1959 and the 
1963 Traffic Policy Decision, even if Riksdagen’s 1979 Traffic Policy Decision also 
introduced regional policy concerns and requirements for socio-economic 
effectiveness. Sixth, the 1964 Hörjel-agreement that authorized financing 95 percent 
of the construction costs for Stockholm’s subway by State road appropriations 
challenged the road policy equilibrium established since the 1920s and instituted 
through the 1938 accounting system reform that consolidated the vehicle and fuel 
tax revenues with road appropriations as contra entries. But the non-socialist Fälldin 
executive punctuated this equilibrium in 1980, when it abolished dedication of the 
vehicle and fuel tax revenues to road appropriations, most likely because of the 
augmenting State economic problems. Finally, Swedish National Road 
Administration’s persistent allocation of the road investments according to the 
professionals’ scientific and professional norms, among others through use of 
rational investment allocation models, even under the 1970s’ State economic 
problems and when Swedish National Road Administration became subject to the 
political parties’ road and traffic policy flip-flops, was clearly an example of path 
dependence. 
1981 – Jumpstarting and restructuring Sweden’s ailing economy 
through further investments in national collective goods  
The neo-liberal shift and dismantling of Sweden’s corporative system characterized 
the period from 1981 until about 2005. The leading politicians and industrialists’ 
takeover of the road policy characterized similarly the 1980s, when major 
infrastructure projects such as ScanLink were supposed to strengthen the ailing 
Swedish trade and industry’s competitiveness. But these moves led to increased 
political polarization between Sweden’s environmentalist and growth lobbies. 
Riksdagen’s 1988 Traffic Policy Decision linked the transport and environmental 
policies. The early 1990s was characterized by State economic crisis with entailing 
State economic restructuring. The road policy became a part of the State financial 
restructuring, and emphasized investments in national collective goods such as 
motorways and trunk roads, in some instances through use of institutional and 
financial innovations to safeguard swift construction. Riksdagen’s 1998 Traffic 
Policy Decision established the principle that taxes and fees were supposed to 
internalize the transports’ social costs. The road policy since the 1998 election was 
clearly affected by the Green Party’s pivotal position and the executive’s desire for a 
healthy economy and sustainable development. 
From a corporative to a neo-liberal system 
Thorbjörn Fälldin’s Agrarian, Conservative and Liberal majority executive 
dissolved in May 1981. Thorbjörn Fälldin established thereafter an Agrarian and 
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Liberal Party minority executive.666 The Social Democratic Party won the 1982 
election and Olof Palme established a new minority executive, the first in 50 years 
without ties to former Social Democratic Party executives. Olof Palme served as 
Prime Minister until he was murdered February 28th 1986, when Deputy Prime 
Minister Ingvar Carlsson took over.667  
 The 1988 election reshaped Sweden’s political landscape because the Green 
Party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna) founded in 1980 passed the 4 percent limit and won 
20 seats in Riksdagen.668 The Leftwing Communist Party redressed and became the 
Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) in 1990 after the Berlin wall and the Soviet empire’s 
collapse, and rose again as a leftwing populist party.669 The Social Democratic Party 
started similarly in 1990 to aim for Swedish membership in EU, because the cold 
war was brought to an end with entailing reshaping of Europe’s geopolitical 
landscape.670 The 1991 election further reshaped Sweden’s political landscape. The 
Green Party lost their seats in Riksdagen, instead came the Christian Party (Kristen 
Demokratisk Samling) and the rightwing populist New Democracy (Ny Demokrati). 
The Conservative Party’s Carl Bildt established a minority executive together with 
the Liberal, Agrarian and Christian Parties, with the rightwing populist New 
Democracy as Riksdagen’s pivotal party.671 The Bildt executive pursued a relatively 
high-profile neo-liberal profile in some policy areas. 
 Riksdagen introduced four-year instead of three-year terms in 1994. The fiscal 
year became similarly equal to the calendar year, and Riksdagen was supposed to 
approve the State’ annual budget during the fall session.672 These reforms made 
Riksdagen more similar to Denmark’s Folketinget and Norway’s Stortinget.  
 The leftwing parties won the 1994 election. The rightwing populist New 
Democracy disintegrated and the Green Party returned to Riksdagen. The Social 
Democratic Party headed by Ingvar Carlsson established a new minority executive 
based on an agreement with the Left Party. The growth coalition prevailed when 
52,3 percent of the Swedes voted yes in the 1994 EU referendum. Sweden joined 
EU in 1995 together with Finland and Austria. Ingvar Carlsson governed until 
March 22nd 1996, when the Social Democratic Party needed a new leader not tainted 
by the EU-struggles. Göran Persson became the Social Democratic Party’s new 
strong man, and was still in power during the fall 2005. Persson’s minority 
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executives after the 1998 and 2002 elections were based on agreements with the Left 
and Green Parties.673  
 Sweden’s neo-liberal shift started in 1982 with Olof Palme’s second 
executive, because the corporative Agrarian Party had dominated most of the non-
socialist executives between 1976 and 1982 that basically did their best to keep the 
corporative system afloat, often by using more of the Social Democratic Party’s 
medicine. Olof Palme’s response to the 1976 defeat was a dual strategy. First tough 
opposition in Riksdagen, to chase the non-socialist parties furthers into the 
quagmire, secondly a complete reorientation of the Social Democratic Party. The 
Social Democratic Party lost even the 1979 election, but Olof Palme seemed to be 
happy, because the marginal victory furthered the non-socialist parties’ problems 
and gave him more time for honing the alternatives. The second oil price shock in 
1979, OPEC 2, and the entailing international recession did not make life easier for 
the non-socialist executives. A work group headed by Ingvar Carlsson wrote the 
Social Democratic Party’s crisis manifest Future for Sweden (Framtid för Sverige) 
prior to the 1982 election. Olof Palme was very careful not to promise any reforms 
not fully financed or possible to deliver almost immediately because the Social 
Democratic Party’s credibility was at stake. Palme buried also the idea about Wage 
Earner Funds, despite the trade union bosses’ protests.674 1982 became also the 
turning point for Sweden’s public sector employment, which had been growing 
steadily throughout the entire postwar period.675 Even the balance of power within 
Sweden’s Federation of Trade Unions shifted in 1982, because the Municipal 
Employees’ Union (Kommunalarbetarförbundet) displaced the Metal Workers’ 
Union’s dominant position.676 The Federation of Trade Union’s center of gravity 
and balance of power shifted therefore gradually from the private to the public 
sector employees throughout the 1980s.  
 The Palme executive’s aggressive devaluation in 1982, to jumpstart Sweden’s 
ailing economy through increased exports, and for pursuing the so-called “third 
way”, punctuated the corporative system. The devaluation led also to increased 
interest costs due to Sweden’s mounting foreign debt accumulated as a result of the 
crisis policy since 1975. The devaluation increased also Swedish trade and 
industry’s liquidity, but the new credit market did not work properly through State 
controlled interest rates, which led to deregulation of the credit markets. The 
combination of the executive’s devaluation and deregulation of the credit markets 
led soon to a more expansive economic policy during the remaining 1980s.677 The 
Swedish economy grew fast 1983-84 both compared to the other OECD countries as 
such and the other Nordic countries, but this growth was almost exclusively export 
driven, due to the devaluation. The domestic demand lagged because of the 
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executive’s very stern policy until deregulating the capital markets.678 The Social 
Democratic Party’s victory in the 1982 election and Olof Palme’s second executive 
initiated hence Sweden’s neo-liberal shift. NPM inspired reforms gradually 
displaced the corporative system. The Social Democratic Party did not emphasize 
easy populist solutions after its opposition period, because these reforms were partly 
necessitated by the economic realities, but were also results of the Social 
Democratic Party’s fundamental reorientation during its opposition 1976-82. 
 The Supreme Administrative Court was in 1988 empowered to make legal 
reviews of the executive and bureaucracy’s decisions in some issues; i.e. whether 
they were compatible with the legal provisions.679 The empowerment of the 
Supreme Administrative Court weakened further the boards’ professionals’ 
autonomy that already had been significantly weakened throughout the 1970s. 
 Sweden went into the 1990s with an overheated economy, but Riksdagen 
rejected in February 1990 tightening the economic policy, among others because of 
the trade unions’ strong protests. The executive resigned. Ingvar Carlsson 
established a new executive, but without Kjell-Olof Feldt as minister of finance. 
Ingvar Carlsson second executive’s tighter economic policy combined with a new 
tax system with lower marginal tax rates for the middle class and a sudden drop in 
inflation punctuated the loan financed real estate bubble developed during the 1980s. 
The result was a banking crisis from the fall 1990 until about 1993, which ultimately 
led to State control of some major banks. The Riksbank, Sweden’s national bank, 
which then was controlled by the executive, pegged the SEK unilaterally to EU’s 
most important currencies, the ECU, May 17th 1991, to signal Sweden’s intentions 
to join EU. This pegging reinforced the economic crisis further, through 
overvaluation of the SEK, loss of exports and speculations against the SEK that 
culminated in 1992 when the Riksbank was forced to increase the interest rates to 
500 percent, to defend the SEK. Carl Bildt’s non-socialist executive that came to 
power after the 1991 election gave finally in and floated the SEK, which led to about 
25 percent devaluation of the SEK, Sweden’s greatest devaluation ever. The Bildt 
executive introduced also inflation targets for the Riksbank in 1993. The Bildt 
executive’s neo-liberal rhetoric about a system change, and introduction of further 
NPM inspired reforms increased the Swede’s uncertainty. Sale of new cars is 
usually a very reliable economic indicator. The number of new cars went down 20 
percent from 1990 to 1991. The number of new cars went further down 30 percent 
from 1991 to 1992. The car sale in 1993 was below that in the 1950s. Many Swedes 
in the early 1990s preferred saving their money, and reinforced hence the economic 
crisis.680 The Swedish economy was hence in a very deep recession in the early 
1990s. The Bildt executive abolished the Wage Earners’ Funds in 1991. The 
accumulated capital was located in autonomous foundations. The profits were 
dedicated to research activities.681 
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 The early 1990s’ State economic and banking crises with entailing rise in 
unemployment cleaned up the Swedish economy, similarly as the Potato Cure did in 
Denmark, and squeezed the inflation out of the Swedish economy, increased the 
economic growth, the workers’ productivity and washed away most remnants of the 
corporative system. The Social Democratic Party minority executives that have 
governed since the 1994 election furthered largely the Bildt executive’s neo-liberal 
economic policy, even if the rhetorical wrapping has been very different. Karl Marx, 
John Maynard Keynes, Rudolf Meidner and Gösta Rehn were all shelved, according 
to the social democratic journalist Olle Svenning. Sweden, and particularly the 
Stockholm area, became a center for knowledge based future businesses such as 
telecommunications, pharmacy and biotechnology during the 1990s.682 Sweden’s 
GDP per capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, was 14.917 
dollars in 1981, 17.695 in 1990 and 20.321 in 2000. The average for the 12 West 
European countries was 14.045 dollars in 1981, 16.872 in 1990 and 19.806 in 
2000.683 Sweden’s GDP per capita was well above the West European average 
during the 1980s, but lagged behind between 1992 and 1998. The Swedish economy 
recovered from 1999, and performed thereafter better than the West European 
average, measured as GDP per capita. 
The Swedish ministers and leading industrialists’ partnership safeguarded 
construction of new motorways but strengthened also Sweden’s 
environmentalist and anti-growth lobby 
The Swedish road investments were further reduced during the early 1980s because 
of the State economic problems, and reduced to approximately the 1955 level in 
1985. The road investments increased thereafter somewhat. The 1970s and early 
80s’ reduced road appropriations gave a 20 billion 1969 SEK or approximately 11,3 
billions 1990 PPP USD investment deficit, compared to the 1970-84 investment 
program approved through Road Plan 1970. But the road maintenance was 
increased somewhat, particularly after 1980, to compensate for lack of 
investments.684 The 1970s and early 80s’ lack of road investments was not 
immediately a detrimental blow to Swedish trade and industry’s competitiveness, 
because those road investments that gave the largest aggregated reductions in 
transport costs had already been accomplished within 1969 after Riksdagen’s 
approval of Swedish Road Plan. 
 Thorbjörn Fälldin’s executive reorganized Swedish National Road 
Administration’s board of directors in 1981. Sven Gerentz replaced Swedish 
National Road Administration’s Director General as chairman in 1982, and held this 
position until 1992. Carl-Olof Ternryd resigned as Director General in June 1982 
when he was appointed to Försvarets Materielverk’s (FMV) Director General. Olof 
Palme’s second executive renamed Swedish National Road Administration to 
Swedish Road Administration (Vägverket) in April 1983 and appointed Per Anders 
Örtendahl, a former Agrarian Party politician in Gothenburg’s municipal council 
and Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Industry who held a doctoral degree 
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in economics, as new Director General.685 686 The Fälldin executive’s reorganizing 
of the board of directors may have been an attempt of making Swedish National 
Road Administration more politically manageable and sensitive to the trade and 
industry’s need for better roads, because Sven Gerentz had been one of the Swedish 
trade and industry’s leading road lobbyists since the 1950s. 
 Volvo’s CEO, Pehr G. Gyllenhammar, was one of Sweden and the Nordic 
countries’ most influential road lobbyists in the 1980s. Gyllenhammar initiated the 
lobby organization European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) in Paris, April 6-7th 
1983. ERT addressed among others Europe’s structural problems, and argued for 
comprehensive modernization of Europe’s trade, industry and infrastructures, to 
remain competitive against USA and Japan.687 The Work Group for Increased 
Nordic Economic Cooperation (Arbetsgruppen för utvidgat ekonomisk samarbete i 
Norden) headed by Pehr G. Gyllenhammar was established early in 1984, with the 
five Nordic Prime Minister’s blessing. The Work Group’s board of directors 
included among others Volvo, Asea, Nokia and Norsk Hydro’s CEOs.688 ERT’s 
number one priority was improved infrastructures. Gyllenhammar and ERT 
published the report Missing Links December 13th 1984 that argued for construction 
of a sub sea railroad tunnel, Euro-Route, from France to England, and ScanLink, a 
ferry-free motorway and railroad connection between Norway, Sweden and 
Denmark to Northern Germany, along Sweden’s West Coats, and across Øresund 
and Fehmarn Belt. Missing Links lead in turn to a joint report from ERT and the 
European Commission about championing and financing major infrastructure 
projects.689 Hence, Missing Links paved the way for what later became known as 
EU’s TEN (Trans-European Network) projects for improvements of Europe’s major 
road and railroad infrastructures. Gunnar Falkemark claimed Olof Palme’s executive 
supported ERT’s and Pehr G. Gyllenhammar’s vision about ScanLink.690 Pehr G. 
Gyllenhammar was one of Olof Palme’s confidants, according to former ministry of 
industry, Thage G. Peterson.691 It seems thus likely that Pehr G. Gyllenhammar’s 
European and Nordic infrastructure initiatives had both the Nordic countries’ 
executives’ and the leading Nordic industrialists’ blessings. 
 The E6 motorway from Stenungsund north of Gothenburg to Uddevalla, 
between Gothenburg and the Norwegian border, was a section of ScanLink and 
became one of Sweden’s most controversial road projects in the 1980s and early 
90s. This motorway was largely a result of Uddevalla Shipyard’s (Uddevallavarvet) 
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bankruptcy December 11th 1984, when 2.300 persons lost their jobs. The Nordic 
ministers of finance submitted a joint plan in January 1985, Nordic Growth (Norden 
i vekst), which was approved by Nordic Council (Nordisk råd) in March 1985. 
Nordic Growth proposed several infrastructure projects, hereunder construction of 
the motorway from Stenungsund to Uddevalla.692 
 The Palme executive approved in December 1984 construction of another 
section of ScanLink, the motorway from Varberg to Falkenberg south of 
Gothenburg. The executive’s decision about building this section of E6 as a 
motorway was clearly a road policy turnaround that challenged Swedish Road 
Administration’s autonomy, because Swedish Road Administration had namely, 
based on the planning and investment allocation models developed during the 1970s, 
recommended construction of an expressway rather than a motorway. Swedish Road 
Administration overruled thereby the formerly approved Swedish Road Plan based 
on construction of the entire E6 between Malmö and Uddevalla with motorway 
standard within 1975. Olof Palme’s executive approved in June 1983 Swedish Road 
Administration’s revised recommendations about the new section of E6 Varberg-
Falkenberg as an expressway; most likely because of the State economic situation 
and the road section’s estimated cost/benefit ratio. But the executive’s approval of 
an expressway triggered strong complaints from Halland County, because E6 was 
Western Sweden’s transport artery with poor accident records. It was also popular 
demand for a motorway. Volvo with approximately 55.000 employees was then 
responsible for about 10 percent of Sweden’s exports.693 It is not unlikely that Volvo 
and Pehr G. Gyllenhammar were involved even in the Palme executive’s road policy 
turnaround in December 1984, because Varberg-Falkenberg was a section on 
ScanLink and of utmost importance for Volvo’s logistics. 
 Volvo started negotiations with minister of finance Kjell-Olof Feldt and 
minister of industry Thage G. Peterson when the Uddevalla shipyard failed. Minister 
of communications Curt Boström did not participate personally in these 
negotiations, even if the motorway from Stenungsund to Uddevalla was Swedish 
Road Administration’s single largest project until then. Pehr G. Gyllenhammar and 
Kjell-Olof Feldt agreed in January 1985 that Volvo should establish a new 
automotive factory in Uddevalla. The executive’s quid pro quo was access for Volvo 
to significant State investment funds and construction of the motorway from 
Stenungsund to Uddevalla to improve Volvo’s logistics.694  
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Figure 12: Sweden’s trunk road system late 2005 with average traffic per day. 
 
Source: Swedish Road Administration. 
 Ingvar Carlsson’s executive honored the agreement with Volvo and proposed 
construction of the motorway from Stenungsund to Uddevalla in its 1986 Budget 
Proposition, partly financed through loans from the Nordic Development Bank. 
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Only the Agrarian and Leftwing Communist Parties opposed this proposal in 
Riksdagen. The Carlsson executive came back to Riksdagen in its 1987 Budget 
Proposition, due to ScanLink north of Gothenburg’s increased construction costs, 
which were supposed financed through a new loan from The Swedish National Debt 
Office (Riksgäldskontoret). Riksdagen approved even the 1987 proposal against the 
Agrarian and Leftwing Communist Parties’ protests.695 Construction of ScanLink 
north of Gothenburg towards Norway did not only trigger the Agrarian and Leftwing 
Communist Parties’ opposition in Riksdagen. There were also opposition from local 
environmental administrators in Gothenburg and Bohus County, protests from the 
neighboring city Trollhättan where the automaker SAAB had a factory, because the 
motorway to Uddevalla was too favorable for Volvo and Uddevalla, and on-site 
protests from the so-called “tree-huggers”.696 The Leftwing Communist Party’s 
Viola Claesson complained to Riksdagen’s Constitutional Committee 
(Konstitutionsutskottet) in February 1988 about the Carlsson executive’s alleged 
violation of the Nature Resource Act (Naturressurslagen) that came into power July 
1st 1987. The Green Party complained similarly to Riksdagen’s Constitutional 
Committee in November 1988 about the Carlsson executive’s alleged violation of 
the 1974 Constitution’s § 7.2; i.e. for not having gathered sufficient information 
from the relevant boards and authorities. However, the Carlsson executive was only 
mildly criticized by the Constitutional Committee because of a somewhat superficial 
environmental impact assessment.697 Hence, the Palme executive’s agreement with 
Volvo in January 1985 did not only result in construction of a new motorway, but 
also State loan financing of motorways similarly as Sweden’s 19th century’s trunk 
railroads. This loan financing was not based on turnpikes such as in Norway, but 
amortizing through the motorists’ ordinary payments of vehicle and fuel taxes. State 
loans to motorway investments represented thus a financial innovation compared to 
Sweden’s traditional tax financing that had been directly linked to the vehicle and 
fuel tax revenues until 1980, but then decoupled because of the State economic 
problems. Loan financing safeguarded forced construction and swift harvesting of 
the new motorway’s benefits, compared to traditional tax financing where the 
appropriations usually constrained and delayed the progress.  
 The ScanLink controversies were clearly reflected in Riksdagen’s 1988 Traffic 
Policy Decision that instituted both environmental concerns and how to catch up the 
investment lag on the road and transport policy agenda. Environmental concerns had 
not been part of Riksdagen’s 1963 and 1979 Traffic Policy Decisions. The 1988 
Traffic Policy Decision differed fundamentally from the 1963 and 1979 Traffic 
Policy Decisions, because the Ministry of Communications’ civil servants carried 
out the elucidation within 18 months. The 1963 decision’s elucidations took about 
10,5 years. The 1979 decision’s elucidations took about 6¾ years. All parties, except 
the Leftwing Communist Party supported Riksdagen’s 1988 Traffic Policy 
Decision.698 The environmental and growth lobbies’ increasing conflicts 
characterized thereby the 1980s’ Swedish road policy, largely because of ScanLink. 
These conflicts went through the political blocks, triggered conflicts within some of 
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the parties and paved the way for new road policy alliances in the 1990s. The 
ministers’ and industrialists’ partnership in the mid 1980s may explain why the 
Green Party passed the 4 percent limit in the 1988 election. 
 Sweden’s minister of communications, Curt Boström, and Denmark’s minister 
of public works, Arne Melchior, appointed the Öresund Commission in February 
1984, and revived thereby the Öresund Bridge, another crucial section in ScanLink. 
Establishment of the Öresund commission was both a result of the Schlüter-
executive’s eased finance policy and Arne Melchior’s personal efforts. But even the 
Palme executive had started looking ahead in 1984. Pehr G. Gyllenhammar and 
other industrialists’ lobbying, among others through ERT, to remedy Europe’s 
diminishing competitiveness, may have been decisive for the Palme executive’s 
increased interest in improved infrastructures with national collective goods 
characteristics. The Öresund Commission’s report Permanent Öresund Links 
submitted in the summer of 1987 recommended construction of a combined road 
and railroad bridge. But the Öresund Commission’s report and the motorway from 
Stenungsund to Uddevalla triggered the Social Democratic Party’s environmentalist 
and railroad phalanx at the September 1987 convention, and came close to 
jeopardizing the bridge, but the convention made no formal decisions concerning 
ScanLink. The Carlsson executive championed a combined motorway and railroad 
bridge. The Danish Social Democratic Party, which then was in opposition, 
championed a railroad tunnel only. Curt Nicolin, Scandinavian Link Svenska AB’s 
chairman and one of Sweden’s leading industrialists, said after the Social 
Democratic convention that a stepwise construction of ScanLink was acceptable. 
The Carlsson executive struggled the autumn 1989 both internally with the Social 
Democratic Party’s environmentalists and the Danish Social Democratic Party’s 
reluctance. The Danish Social Democratic Party’s support for a bridge across 
Öresund was in January 1990 dependent of the Swedish Social Democratic Party, 
according to Sweden’s ambassador in Copenhagen, Anders Ferm. The Swedish 
Social Democratic Party’s board approved the Öresund Bridge in April 1990. The 
Carlsson and Schlüter executives entered into negotiations in June 1990, and agreed 
about the Malmö-Copenhagen alternative March 23rd 1991. Riksdagen approved 
construction of the Öresund Bridge June 12th 1992, as a joint venture between the 
Swedish and Danish State, financed through loans.699  
 The economist and doctoral engineer Ingemar Ahlstrand was one of many that 
questioned the Öresund Bridge’s socio-economic profitability. Ahlstrand’s critique 
was seemingly more based on ideology than facts, because Ahlstrand claimed 
alternative connections, such as expressway and railroads bridges and tunnels at 
Helsingborg and Malmö had “not been studied properly”.700 Ahlstrand ignored 
either deliberately or were ignorant about the 1930s, 50s and 60s elucidations of the 
Öresund Bridge discussed in this dissertation’s chapter 2. Ahlstrand claimed also the 
Öresund Bridge should have been built as a combined expressway and railroad 
rather than a motorway and railroad connection.701 Ahlstrand overlooked also the 
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Öresund Bridge’s expected life span, the need for redundancy in case of accidents or 
maintenance and the fact that later expansion to motorway standard would be 
prohibitively costly. The Norwegian bridge across Drammen on E18 built as an 
expressway rather than a motorway in the 1970s is one example of road construction 
according to Ingemar Ahlstrand’s ideals. The Drammen Bridge became soon one of 
the Norwegian trunk road system’s worst bottlenecks, and was expanded to a 
motorway about 2004. The costs were prohibitive compared to the added costs for 
motorway standard in the 1970s. 
 The previous discussions show clearly the governance of Swedish road policy 
and road construction changed fundamentally when Olof Palme’s second executive 
came to power in 1982, even if no formal institutional reforms took place. The 
Palme and the entailing Carlsson executive’s road policies were namely often results 
of direct negotiations between the Prime Minister, minister of finance and minister 
of industry and Sweden’s leading industrialists. The minister of communications and 
the Ministry of Communications that had increased their power and influence 
significantly in the 1970s became less influential concerning road policy. 
Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee’s influence on the road policy was similarly reduced 
after 1982; the same was largely the case for intermediaries such as Swedish Road 
Federation that had been one of the trade and industry’s most prominent road 
lobbyists during the 1950s and 60s. The middle and rightwing parties dominated 
Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee 1979-82. The middle constituencies had the largest 
number of members. The leftwing parties dominated the Traffic Committee 1982-85 
and the central constituencies had the largest number of members. The leftwing 
parties also dominated the Traffic Committee 1985-88 and 1988-91, but the middle 
constituencies had most members 1985-88 and a strong majority 1988-91.702 The 
political scientist Gunnar Falkemark and lawyer Peter Westdahl claimed that 
Swedish Road Administration in some instances had been ordered by the Ministry of 
Communications to orchestrate the needed formal arguments after the ministers and 
industrialists had agreed about the road policy priorities.703 If Falkemark and 
Westdahl were right, then it was possible to perceive the Ministry’s moves as 
something approaching minister rule. 
 The Swedish road policy’s development after the 1982 election resembled 
partly the procedures in Denmark, even if no formal reforms had taken place. 
Swedish Road Administration’s autonomy was partly punctuated by Olof Palme’s 
executive after the 1982 election and later also by Ingvar Carlsson’s executive. 
These moves challenged clearly Axel Oxenstierna’s system. Sweden’s 1974 
Constitution did not authorize minister rule, but the Prime Minister, minister of 
finance and minister of industry’s direct negotiations with Sweden’s leading 
industrialists and the entailing instructions of Swedish Road Administration came 
pretty close. These findings are clearly in line with Ove Pettersson’s findings that 
Swedish Road Administration in 1985 had returned to its regionalized and 
negotiating 19th century starting point, after its centralized and technocratic heydays 
1944-70.704 Significant but informal road policy reforms took hence place in the 
1980s. 
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 The Palme and Carlsson executives and Riksdagen’s majority prioritized mega 
infrastructure projects during the second half of the 1980s such as ScanLink with 
motorways between Varberg and Falkenberg, Stenungsund and Uddevalla, and later 
also the Öresund Bridge, despite State economic problems. These were all projects 
with strong national collective good characteristics. But the executive, industrialists, 
Conservative and Liberal Parties, Social Democratic Party and trade unions’ growth 
lobby’s championing of ScanLink triggered resistance from among others the Social 
Democratic Party’s railroad and environmentalist lobby and the Agrarian, Leftwing 
Communist and Green Parties that questioned the alleged relations between modern 
road infrastructures and Sweden’s future as a welfare State. The environmentalist 
and anti-growth lobby may have desired reduced economic growth, taken Sweden’s 
wealth for granted or simply engaged in deliberate opportunistic free riding on other 
parties’ willingness to carry out necessary but not always popular decisions. 
The infrastructures’ decade – but which infrastructures and how to finance 
these investments? 
Swedish road policy and road construction during the 1990s and after the turn of the 
20th and 21st century was clearly affected by the early 1990s State financial and bank 
crises with entailing State financial restructuring. The road policy and road 
construction was used deliberately to fuel the economic growth, reduce the road 
accidents’ number and consequences to safeguard the State economic restructuring, 
but was also used to safeguard sustainable development through mitigation of 
environmental problems and facilitating more energy efficient transports. 
Construction of modern railroads supplemented trunk roads and motorways. 
Riksdagen achieved a far more prominent position in the road policy and road 
construction from the 1990s than during the 1970s and 80s due to the minority 
executives, usually through high-level agreements between the minority executives 
and their supporting parties. 
 Many assumed the 1990s would become the “infrastructures’ decade”, 
because investments in modern infrastructures were supposed to create economic 
growth, promote European integration and mitigate Sweden’s environmental 
problems.705 These assumptions were based on the Carlsson executive’s 
Productivity Commission (den statliga produktivitietsdelegationen) that in 1991 
concluded modern infrastructures were important to safeguard Sweden’s future 
economic growth. The Bildt executive that came to power after the 1991 election 
furthered many of these ideas. 706 The Productivity Commission concluded hence 
almost similarly as those in the 1950s’ who made Swedish Road Plan. 
 The Bildt executive reorganized in 1992 Swedish Road Administration 
according to those days’ ruling NPM ideas, in a double matrix with 7 road 
management regions as purchasers, and 5 production regions as providers. The Road 
Safety Board spun off in 1968 was also merged with Swedish Road 
Administration.707 The Bildt executive’s NPM-inspired reforms established thus a 
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purchaser-provider split and regions transcending the county borders, and 
reintroduced also the road safety activities. 
 It was not only the Swedish executive that emphasized road policy matters in 
1992. Swedish Road Federation made a scoop when Kjell-Olof Feldt, minister of 
finance until February 1990 succeeded Swedish Road Administration’s Director 
General 1978-82, Carl Olof Ternryd, as chairman of the board.708 Kjell-Olof Feldt’s 
acceptance of the position as Swedish Road Federation’s chairman is clearly 
evidence about the Social Democratic Party’s internal conflicts that had festered 
since the 1970s between the growths and environmental lobbies. The Social 
Democratic Party and the trade unions’ growth lobby, where Kjell-Olof Feldt 
belonged, considered modern infrastructures crucial for the Swedish trade and 
industry’s competitiveness, for creation of new employment opportunities and for 
safeguarding Sweden’s future as a welfare State. 
 Sweden was as mentioned earlier severely hit by the State economic and 
banking crises 1991-92 that sent the Swedish economy into a deep recession with 
entailing unemployment. The economist and doctoral engineer Ingemar Ahlstrand 
claimed the Swedish executive and legislators “lost their head” 1993-94 when the 
unemployment soared, and approved Swedish Road Administration’s “unprofitable 
giant investments”.709 The Bildt executive’s 1993 Infrastructure proposition 
recommended to invest 98 billions SEK or approximately 9,5 billions 1990 PPP 
USD in new transport infrastructures, about half of these in roads. The Christian 
Party’s minister of communications Mats Odell proposed also building Sweden’s 
most important trunk roads as transport corridors or arteries, with equal road 
standard from origin to destination, no matter the traffic level. Mats Odell proposed 
also loan financed infrastructure investments, to safeguard swift completion and 
early harvesting of the benefits, but Riksdagen’s majority refused further loan 
financing.710 The State economic and banking crises had obviously taught the 
legislators some lessons. Many of Denmark’s most important trunk roads were then 
under construction as transport corridors, but those Swedes who opposed 
infrastructure investments claimed transport corridors or arteries would be 
unnecessarily costly and lead to excess road capacity. However, Riksdagen’s 
majority approved the idea about transport corridors or arteries. Riksdagen’s 
willingness to invest in modern transport infrastructures was remarkable, given 
Sweden’s State economic and bank crises, because neither the executive nor 
Riksdagen could easily remedy Sweden’s State economic problems through 
increased production of oil, such as the Norwegian neighbors. 
 The major cities’ congestion and environmental problems were some of 
Sweden’s most controversial road policy issues throughout the 1990s. The major 
cities’ traffic infarcts led to waste of time, increased transport costs and increased air 
pollution, because cars in congested streets or roads used about four times more fuel 
than cars driving on roads with sufficient capacity.711 The congestions quadrupled 
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the CO2 emissions and led also to significantly increased NOX emissions, all other 
things equal. However, Stockholm’s traffic situation differed somewhat from the 
major Norwegian cities’, because 70 percent of the traffic within Stockholm’s city 
hub during peak hours went by public transports that otherwise carried out about 42 
percent of Stockholm’s daily transports.712 The public transports’ dominant position 
in Stockholm was largely a result of the 1964 Hörjel agreement that permitted 
financing 95 percent of Stockholm’s subway’s construction costs with State road 
appropriations. 
 The congestions were gradually perceived as a problem for the entire 
Stockholm-region’s future growth and development opportunities. Four major 
Swedish enterprises established the Eastern Trunk Road Consortium 
(Österledskonsortiet), and offered in 1985 completing Stockholm’s motorway ring 
that had been abandoned in the 1970s as a turnpike project. Stockholm’s Chamber of 
Commerce carried similarly out a study in 1986 to revive the motorway ring.713 
These and other lobby efforts succeeded, because the Carlsson executive appointed 
in April 1990 Bengt Dennis, the Riksbank’s governor, to negotiate a long-term 
agreement within January 15th 1991, with Stockholm’s city and county councils, to 
solve the entire Stockholm area’s congestion and environmental problems.714  
 Bengt Dennis outlined a combination of improved public transports and user 
financed trunk roads through turnpikes because of the State economic problems. 
Swedish Road Administration’s Director General Per Anders Örtendahl engaged 
early in the negotiations, according to Stockholm’s regional planning director and 
head of the Dennis negotiation’s secretariat Bo Malmsten. Örtendahl championed 
Swedish Road Administration’s construction of Stockholm’s internal Motorway 
Ring (Ringen) and the so-called Outer Traverse Trunk Road (Yttre Tvärleden), a 
western bypass for the north south through traffic, as turnpikes. Swedish Road 
Administration established the joint stock company Stockholmsleder AB, to plan, 
finance, build, own and operate the turnpike projects.715 Swedish Road 
Administration utilized obviously this window of opportunity, because the 
Motorway Ring and the Outer Traverse Trunk Road were mega projects with an 
estimated cost of approximately 20 billions 1992 SEK or approximately 2,03 
billions 1990 PPP USD.  
 Stockholm’s Social Democratic, Liberal and Conservative Parties agreed 
finally in September 1992 about what became known as the Dennis-package. The 
planned investments 1992-2006 were 35,7 billions 1992 SEK or about 3,62 billions 
1990 PPP USD, with approximately 56/44 division between trunk roads and public 
transports. However, the Dennis-package triggered intense debates about 
environmental, spatial and financial issues, which was thoroughly studied by among 
others Karolina Isaksson. The local opposition against the Dennis package in 
Stockholm’s county council emanated first and foremost from the Agrarian, Left and 
Green Parties, the Stockholm’s Party (Stockholmspartiet) and partly also the 
Motorist Party (Bilistpartiet) and The Party Against the Eastern Trunk Road (Partiet 
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mot Österleden).716 The local opposition against the Dennis-package was hence first 
and foremost those who opposed road construction as such, those who opposed road 
construction in their neighborhood; i.e. NIMBY protests, and finally motorists who 
opposed turnpikes. 
 But the executive and its supporting parties in Riksdagen largely determined 
the second half of the 1990s’ road policy development. The final Swedish decision 
about the Öresund Bridge, which had been postponed several times, came close to 
splintering Carl Bildt’s four-party executive in 1994, a few months prior to the 
election. The Agrarian Party’s leader Olof Johansson resigned as minister of 
environment and left the executive. The other Agrarian ministers protested but 
stayed.717 The voters were obviously not happy with the Bildt executive’s neo-
liberal experiments during the crisis, because the Social Democratic Party won the 
1994 election. Ingvar Carlsson established his third minority executive.718 The 
Social Democratic Party went as mentioned earlier to bed with the Left Party after 
the election, but Ingvar Carlsson, Mona Sahlin, Göran Persson and other leading 
members of the Social Democratic Party agreed with the Agrarian Party during the 
spring 1995 about the needed State financial restructuring. This flip-flop was most 
likely both a result of party tactical considerations, because the Left Party targeted 
the same voters as the Social Democratic Party, and a result of strategic 
considerations, because lenders, Swedish and foreign investors, IMF and even some 
trade unions feared the alliance with the Left Party.719 The State economic problems 
had thus direct political implications, because the cooperation with the Left Party 
safeguarded only financial hardship, not necessarily the desired State economic 
restructuring, while the Social Democratic Party was held accountable. Another 
important trust building measure, according to the journalist Olle Svenning who was 
well connected within the Social Democratic Party, was minister of finance Göran 
Persson’s appointment of former minister of finance Kjell-Olof Feldt as the 
Riksbank’s chairman.720 It was also worth noticing that Göran Persson had been on 
far more friendly terms with the Agrarian Party’s former leader Thorbjörn Fälldin, 
than for instance Olof Palme. Persson was similarly on good terms with Olof 
Johansson, the Agrarian Party’s leader until 1998.721 Former minister of finance 
Allan Larsson introduced Göran Persson for Volvo’s CEO Pehr G. Gyllenhammar 
1991-94, when the social democratic opposition had frequent talks with 
Gyllenhammar.722 Göran Persson’s political role model was former minister of 
finance Gunnar Sträng. Both believed in the “ideological trinity: healthy finances, a 
strong public sector and complete employment”.723 As we soon will see, the political 
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landscape after the 1994 election and the Social Democratic Party’s flip-flop had 
road and infrastructure policy implications. 
Figure 13: Stockholm’s current and planned trunk road system approximately 2005. 
 
Source: Swedish Road Administration. 
 How did the 1994 election affect Stockholm’s congestion and environmental 
problems? The Social Democratic Party supported the Dennis-package, but the Left 
and Green Parties opposed it.724 Ingvar Carlsson resigned as Prime Minister March 
16th 1996. His mission was completed when Sweden joined EU. Minister of finance 
Göran Persson won the power struggles with among others Mona Sahlin, Ingela 
Thalén, Anna-Greta Lejon and Margareta Winberg when it became known that 
Ingvar Carlsson would resign, even if many from Stockholm’s leading social 
democratic families considered Göran Persson an outsider. The Social Democratic 
and Left Parties approved Göran Persson as Prime Minister in Riksdagen’s vote of 
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confidence March 21st 1996.725 The Left Party gave thus the Social Democratic 
Party a second chance, even if they had been abandoned in 1995. 
 Many agreed improvements of Stockholm’s public transports were carried out 
1994-97, but the Motorway Ring that mainly was planned as tunnels, was delayed 
because of the Dennis-package’s lack of popular support and the increasing 
opposition against turnpikes. But it was seemingly legal actions that punctuated the 
Dennis-package. Stockholm’s city managers made several administrative decisions 
1993-95 concerning the development plan for the Northern Link (Norra Länken), 
one of the Motorway Ring’s sections. Some affected by the plans filed late 1996 a 
complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court about violation of the Nature 
Resource Act. The Supreme Administrative Court ruled January 31st 1997 that parts 
of the Northern Link’s approved route violated the Nature Resource Act. The 
Ministry of Communications liquidated thereafter February 7th 1997 the Dennis-
package, and imposed instead a reduced and ostensibly more environmental friendly 
deal named the Ines-package after the Carlsson and first Persson executives’ 
minister of communications Ines Uusmann. The Ines-package was based on a deal 
in Riksdagen between the Social Democratic and Agrarian Parties that abandoned 
the Motorway Ring’s Eastern Trunk Road (Österleden) and the Outer Traverse 
Trunk Road’s Western Trunk Road (Västerleden), which in turn made it possible for 
the executive to liquidate the turnpikes, because they were not necessary to finance 
the Ines-package’s remaining motorways.726  
 It has been a commonly held belief the Supreme Administrative Court’s ruling 
January 31st 1997 punctuated the Dennis-package, but Karolina Isaksson claimed, 
based on interviews with among others employees in Swedish Road Administration 
and local environmentalists, that the mood within the Government Offices of Sweden 
(Regeringskanslitet) had started to change already during the fall 1996, because of 
Prime Minister Göran Persson’s “lack of interest for turnpikes”, the voters’ 
increasing skepticism to turnpikes and the perceived risk for turnpikes as a costly 
barrier between northern and southern Stockholm.727 It was hence not possible to 
rule out the Supreme Administrative Court saved the Persson executive’s face, and 
created a window of opportunity that made it possible for Göran Persson to disarm 
the turnpike issue well in advance of the 1998 elections. 
 Swedish Road Administration’s holding company AB Väginvest established 
under the Bildt executive, owned the joint stock company Stockholmsleder AB that 
managed the Dennis-package’s loan-financed subsidiaries and partnerships. 
SVEDAB AB managed similarly the Swedish share of the Öresund Bridge. 
Banverket, the new board responsible for Sweden’s railroad infrastructures, and 
Swedish Road Administration guaranteed each for 50 percent of SVEDAB AB’s 
loans from The Swedish National Debt Office. Stockholmsleder AB’s loans were 
transferred to AB Väginvest to save administration and capital costs when the 
Persson executive in February 1997 liquidated the Dennis-package, abolished the 
turnpikes and approved construction of the Motorway Ring’s Southern Link (Södra 
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Länken) that started the same year.728 The Persson executive furthered and refined 
thereby the financing model established by the Bildt executive, which furthered the 
idea about loan financing of infrastructure investments from the Carlsson 
executive’s ScanLink initiatives, even if the turnpikes most likely was a result of the 
Bildt executive’s neo-liberal and NPM ideologies and the early 1990s’ State 
economic crisis.  
 The Persson executive’s model for loan financed road investments was far 
more cost efficient for the motorists than the equivalent Danish and Norwegian 
turnpike models. First, because the State owned joint stock companies could borrow 
money from The Swedish National Debt Office at the lowest possible costs. Even 
the Danish State’s turnpike company borrowed with State loan guarantees. The 
Norwegian municipal and county owned turnpike companies had to borrow through 
Norwegian finance institutions at market rates, because they were refused State loan 
guarantees and not permitted to borrow directly from the international capital 
markets similarly as the State owned Danish turnpike company. Second, the 
Swedish motorists avoided turnpikes after the Persson executive’s liquidation of the 
Dennis-package, and avoided thereby also the turnpike companies’ operational costs 
and overheads, such as the motorists had to pay in Denmark and particularly in 
Norway. The Carlsson and later also the Bildt and Persson executive’s loan 
financing of infrastructure investments through The Swedish National Debt Office 
was also de facto reintroduction of long-term infrastructure investment budgets, 
because the loans were irreversible or hardly reversible commitments that 
effectively tied the future members Riksdagen’s hands. Loan financed infrastructure 
investments was thus an important institutional innovation, compared to Sweden’s 
traditional tax financing where the road construction had been constrained by the 
annual appropriations and the motorists’ annual payments of vehicle and fuel taxes. 
 The Ministry of Communications’ agreement with Stockholm December 22nd 
1997 established also a new equilibrium that reduced the State financing of urban 
infrastructure investments from 95 to 75 percent.729 This agreement instituted the 
practice established through Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö’s very complex 
urban packages with entailing political struggles for increased local influence on 
such investments decisive for future development paths. The reduced State financing 
of the urban infrastructure investments reflected also clearly the 1990s State 
economic problems, but increased local influence was also contingent increased 
local co-financing, to maintain the cost responsibility principle.  
 Minister of communications Ines Uusmann appointed formally February 1st 
1995 the Communication Committee (Kommunikationskommitén).730 Swedish Road 
Federation decided not to participate in ComCom’s expert groups, but established 
instead late in 1994 its lobby campaign Sweden in Movement (Sverige i Rörelse) that 
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went on until the end of 2003.731 The orchestrators of Sweden in Movement were 
first and foremost chairman Kjell-Olof Feldt and managing director Lars Gunnar 
Tannerfors. The campaign’s aim, according to Tannerfors, was to prevent 
“realization” of ComCom’s ideas.732 Sweden’s automotive and motoring lobby 
mobilized thus heavily against ComCom’s linking of environmental and traffic 
policy issues. 
 Minister of communications Ines Uusmann appointed also Jan Brandborn as 
Swedish Road administration’s new Director General, because Per Anders 
Örtendahl lost the minister’s trust April 10th 1995 after the press had dug into 
Örtendahl’s housing affairs in Borlänge and Stockholm, but the court acquitted 
Anders Örtendahl in April 1998.733 Swedish Road Administration had thereby its 
share of affairs in the 1990s, but the responsible for this alleged affair was not a 
social democrat but an agrarian. 
 The Persson executive’s December 1996 Infrastructure Proposition changed 
ComCom’s recommended balance between railroad and road investments from 
60/40 to 50/50. Riksdagen’s 1997 Infrastructure Decision, approved after the State 
economic restructuring was well in advance, prioritized construction of E6 or 
ScanLink on the West Coast, after agreement between minister of communications 
Ines Uusmann, Gothenburg’s Social Democratic Party city manager Göran 
Johansson and the Ministry of Communication’s Lars Nilsson. The 1997 
Infrastructure Decision included also construction of the Botnia railroad in Northern 
Sweden, after a deal between Prime Minister Göran Persson and the Agrarian 
Party’s leader Olof Johansson.734 Riksdagen’s 1997 Infrastructure Decision gave 
thus something both to the environmental and peripheral lobby and to the growth 
lobby. The Botnia Railroad was clearly a concession to the pivotal Agrarian Party, 
as well to the Left Party and the Social Democratic Party’s own railroad and 
environmental lobbies. ScanLink was similarly a concession to the Social 
Democratic Party and the trade unions’ growth lobbies, as well to the Liberal, 
Christian and Conservative Parties and to Swedish Road Federation. 
 Riksdagen gave Swedish Road Administration the sector responsibility for 
road safety in 1996, and approved the so-called Zero Vision (Nollvisionen) in 1997 
that made the vision about zero killed and injured in road accidents official 
policy.735 Road safety issues achieved hence once again a prominent position on the 
Swedish political agenda, most likely because road accidents generated significant 
costs for the publicly financed health care system in addition to personal costs for 
those inflicted. The accident costs were also a significant obstacle for the ongoing 
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State economic restructuring. Road safety can also be understood as a national 
collective good. 
 ComCom’s 1997 final report recommended internalization of the transports’ 
social costs, among others through increased diesel taxes.736 ComCom’s former 
broad majority was then reduced to the Social Democratic and Agrarian Parties. The 
Green and Left Parties required further increased fuel taxes, the Liberal, Christian 
and Conservative Parties held opposite views.737 ComCom’s final report illustrates 
clearly how Prime Minister Göran Persson maneuvered politically, through 
containing the Left and Green Parties that jeopardized the economic restructuring, 
and dividing the non-socialist parties through his understandings with the Agrarian 
Party’s Olof Johansson. Göran Persson maintained thereby the Social Democratic 
Party’s hegemonic position through cunning divide and conquers. 
 ComCom’s final report triggered strong opposition from the automotive and 
motoring lobby, but it were those, according to Carl Melin’s study, who claimed 
Swedish Road Federation’s lobby campaign backfired, because the newsletter 
Sverige i Rörelse scorned minister of communications Ines Uusmann.738 ComCom’s 
recommended fuel tax increases triggered also the Social Democratic Party’s 
members of Riksdagen representing peripheral and rural constituencies’ resistance, 
in addition to resistance from the Metal Worker’s and Transport Worker’s Unions. 
The Service and Communication Workers’ Union SEKO, that also organized the 
railroad workers, was divided internally.739  
 The Persson executive’s March 5th 1998 Traffic Policy Proposition omitted 
ComCom’s recommended diesel tax increases but upheld the principle about 
internalization of the social costs, and emphasized also the need for an available 
transport system, road safety, environment standards and regional development. 
Riksdagen approved most of the proposition, hereunder taxes and fees from the 
transport infrastructure users’ equal to the social marginal costs.740 The Left and 
Green Parties argued for the railroad and environmental interests, the Liberal, 
Christian and Conservative Parties for the road interests, while the Social 
Democratic and Agrarian Parties settled for a middle position, according to Carl 
Melin’s study.741 Riksdagen’s 1998 Traffic Policy Decision was a significant 
setback for minister of communications Ines Uusmann. Other losers, according to 
Carl Melin, were the environmental movements and the railroad workers’ trade 
union SEKO. Swedish Road Federation and the Metal Workers’ Union were among 
the winners.742 Prime Minister Göran Persson learned most likely that challenging 
the automotive and motoring lobby in an election year could entail significant 
political costs. Because Prime Minister Göran Persson pursued both economic 
growth and State financial restructuring combined with sustainable development. 
Participation at UN’s Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 convinced Göran Persson about sustainable development’s 
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necessity. Even the Agrarian Party’s leader Olof Johansson, who then served as 
minister of environment in Carl Bildt’s executive, took part at the Rio conference.743 
But Prime Minister Göran Persson was first and foremost a political realist. He was 
not willing to permit ComCom to obstruct the ongoing State economic restructuring. 
The Agrarian Party’s leader Olof Johansson shared most likely Persson’s realist 
views. 
 Olof Johansson’s resignation as leader of the Agrarian Party in 1998 
terminated effectively the cooperation with Göran Persson’s Social Democratic 
executive, because the Agrarian Party’s new leader Lennart Daléus was more 
idealist and environmentalist than a practical politician, and engaged later in 
Greenpeace after he in March 2001 resigned as party leader and was succeeded by 
Maud Olofsson. Daléus cooperated with the other non-socialist parties prior to the 
1998-election.744 The Social Democratic Party lost 30 seats in the 1998 election, but 
Göran Persson’s minority executive survived the Conservative Party’s vote of no 
confidence because of an agreement that safeguarded the Left and Green Parties’ 
support. The other non-socialist parties abstained from voting.745 The Agrarian 
Party’s change of leader prior to the 1998 election shifted partly the political 
balance, and made the Green Party Riksdagen’s pivotal party. 
 Göran Persson reorganized the executive almost immediately after the election 
to safeguard the growth issues’ prominent position. The three former ministries for 
industry, labor market and communications were in 1990 merged into a so-called 
super ministry, The Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications 
(Näringsdepartementet), headed by the former trade union boss and Norrbotten’s 
county governor Björn Rosengren.746 Björn Rosengren was a friend of Göran 
Persson and an important link to the heterogeneous group of middle class white-
collar workers organized by the trade union TCO.747 Ines Uusmann had to leave the 
executive and became not head of the trade union SIKA.748 The Persson executive 
established also the new holding company Statens Väg- och Baninvest AB, fully 
owned by The Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications, which in 
turn owned Stockholmsleder AB, Göteborgs Trafikleder AB and Botniabanan AB 
that managed and organized the loan financed infrastructure investments.749  
 Swedish Road Federation introduced so-called PPP-projects where private 
consortiums finance, build, own and operate infrastructures on the State’s behalf for 
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an agreed number of years before the title to the infrastructure is transferred to the 
State, for minister of communications Georg Andersson prior to the 1991 election. 
The Bildt executive’s minister of communications Mats Odell piloted Sweden’s first 
PPP-project, the Arlanda airport express railroad through Riksdagen.750 The Persson 
executive’s liquidation of the Dennis-package in 1997, the 1997 Gothenburg-
agreement and EU’s budget requirements made Swedish Road Federation launch a 
new campaign for PPP-projects, particularly construction of the Outer Traverse 
Trunk Road’s Western Trunk Road.751 Göran Persson and the Social Democratic 
Party did most likely not oppose organizing construction of new motorways as PPP-
projects, because the party’s internal workgroup that prepared the 2001 
Infrastructure Proposition was positive to PPP-projects.752 Swedish Road 
Administration’s current Director General, Ingemar Skogö, replaced Jan Brandborn 
in July 2001.753 
 But the Persson executive’s dependence of the Green and Left Parties’ ruled 
out PPP projects from Riksdagen’s 2001 Infrastructure Decision, even if the 
Stockholm area’s congestion problems became one of the most prioritized tasks.754 
The executive outlined several trunk road and motorway projects in its 2001 
Infrastructure Proposition, but each new trunk road or motorway came at a price of 
increased railroad appropriations, due to the Green Party’s pivotal position.755 
Riksdagen approved December 14th 2001 the executive’s proposed spending of 364 
billions SEK or approximately 32,08 billions 1990 PPP USD in investments and 
operations of the transport and communication infrastructures 2004-2015, hereunder 
investing 39 billions SEK or about 3,44 billions 1990 PPP USD in trunk roads and 
motorways, 30 billions SEK or about 2,64 billions 1990 PPP USD in regional roads 
and 100 billions SEK or about 8,8 billions 1990 PPP USD in trunk railroads. 45 
billions SEK or approximately 3,97 billions 1990 PPP USD of these investments 
were supposed borrowed through The Swedish National Debt Office, the rest was 
supposed financed through ordinary appropriations.756 Swedish Road Association 
heavily criticized Riksdagen’s 2001 Infrastructure Decision. First, because the 
railroad investments were almost twice as large as the road investments, second, 
because the trunk road investments were only sufficient for the most precarious 
projects within and near the major cities. The economically most significant trunk 
roads between the regions and to the most important export markets such as E4, E6, 
E18, E20, and E22 and highway 40 and 45 had numerous ‘missing links’.757 But 
there is no wonder why the executive and Riksdagen prioritized the major cities, 
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because Stockholm County with approximately 20 percent of the population 
provided 40 percent of the tax revenues. The Stockholm area produced similarly 
almost half of Sweden’s GDP growth during the second half of the 1990s. The 
Stockholm-area’s economic growth had also been almost twice the national average 
since the 1980s.758 The Persson executive’s dependence of the Green and Left 
Parties after the 1998 election led thus to significantly increased railroad 
investments and linking of trunk road and railroad investments. But the road 
investments’ allocation reflected clearly the need for increased economic growth to 
safeguard the State economic restructuring. The Stockholm area was one of the 
Swedish economy’s motors, and priority of the major cities was clearly a move to 
safeguard the economic growth and wealth creation. 
Figure 14: Stockholm’s internal Motorway Ring (Ringen).  
 
Source: Swedish Road Administration. 
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 The Green Party became Riksdagen’s pivotal party even after the 2002 
election. Göran Persson preferred cooperating with the Green Party because that was 
complementary to the Social Democratic Party. The Green Party competed directly 
with the Agrarian Party but the Agrarian Party oriented itself to the right, the Green 
Party oriented itself to the left. The Left Party targeted largely the same voters as the 
Social Democratic Party.759 The Social Democratic and Green Parties made an 
agreement October 1st 2002, which was expanded to a 121 items agreement that 
even included the Left Party October 4th 2002, the day before the Conservative 
Party’s required vote of no confidence, which then was supported by all non-
socialist parties except the Green Party. But the October agreements safeguarded the 
Left and Green Parties’ votes in favor of Persson’s executive.760 Göran Persson 
reorganized the executive even after the 2002 election, and upheld the Ministry of 
Industry, Employment and Communications. Ulrica Messing became new minister 
of communications and later minister of infrastructures. The Green Party’s price for 
supporting the Persson executive was introduction of a congestion fee in 
Stockholm’s city hub, and 100 billions SEK or approximately 8,62 billions 1990 
PPP USD to railroads the forthcoming twelve years. The Social Democratic Party in 
Stockholm City and Stockholm County had committed themselves publicly against 
any congestion fees prior to the 2002 local elections, but the October 4th agreement 
prevailed. The three parties in Stockholm’s town hall agreed soon about a 
congestion fee in Stockholm. Construction of the Motorway Ring’s Northern Link 
was similarly approved in 2002.761 However, the Northern Link was the fall 2005 
once again headed for the Supreme Administrative Court similarly as in 1996.762 763 
The Green Party’s pivotal position in Riksdagen dictated thus partly the national 
infrastructure policy, as well as Stockholm’s local traffic policy. 
 Riksdagen’s approval of the Zero Vision led to establishing of a new public 
administration, the Road Traffic Inspection (Vägtrafikinspektionen) January 1st 
2003.764 Riksdagen’s majority was obviously not satisfied with Swedish Road 
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763 Stockholm’s city council’s majority decided June 2nd 2003 to carry out trials with a congestion fee 
(trängselskatt). Riksdagen sanctioned this decision June 16th 2004. The trials started August 22nd 2005 
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Administration’s handling of the road safety issues. Swedish Road Administration’s 
responsibility for planning and management of the road system could also conflict 
with the road safety efforts, for instance because of tight budget constraints. 
Riksdagen established therefore an independent agency to supervise Swedish Road 
Administration’s road safety efforts. 
 Swedish Road Administration estimated in 2003 a need for about 126 billions 
SEK or approximately 10,66 billions 1990 PPP USD in additional investments to the 
formerly approved 69 billions SEK or about 5,84 billions 1990 PPP USD, both to 
mend the public road system’s shortcomings and to fulfill the Zero Vision’s aims. 
The 126 billions SEK included among others 35 billions SEK, approximately 2,96 
billions 1990 PPP USD for construction of physical separation between the 
directions of traffic on the most crowded expressways not planned upgraded to 
motorways.765 Swedish Road Federation headed by Kjell-Olof Feldt launched a new 
lobby campaign for PPP-projects in 2003, then inspired by Great Britain, Finland 
and Norway’s utilization of PPP projects. The party leaders’ attitude to PPP projects 
was divided according to Riksdagen’s political blocks, because the Social 
Democratic, Left and Green Parties opposed PPP-projects, the Liberal, Agrarian, 
Christian and Conservative Parties championed PPP-projects.766 Chairman Kjell-
Olof Feldt and managing director Lars Gunnar Tannerfors wound up Swedish Road 
Federation’s lobby campaign Sweden in Movement at the end of 2003. Swedish 
Road Federation was similarly liquidated in January 2004 after having been 
Sweden’s leading road lobbyist for 90 years. The road lobby task was handed over 
to Confederation of Swedish Enterprises (Svensk Näringsliv), the trade and 
industry’s new umbrella organization.767 Swedish Road Federation’s mission was 
largely completed, because the Persson executive was then ready to launch 
Sweden’s largest infrastructure investments ever in modern times.  
 The executive’s revised April 1st 2004 Road and Railroad Proposition 2004-
2015 increased the railroad investments to 107,7 billions SEK or approximately 9,1 
billions 1990 PPP USD. The trunk road and motorway investments were similarly 
increased to 42,1 billions SEK or approximately 3,55 billions 1990 PPP USD. Most 
of these were allocated to E4, E6, E12, E18, E20, E22, E65 and highway 40 and 
45.768 769 However, the principle established in 2001 by the pivotal Green and Left 
Parties when Persson’s executive had to ‘buy’ increased road investment through 
further railroad investments prevailed. Most trunk road investments were allocated 
as recommended by Swedish Road Federation and others, to those trunk roads most 
critical for the trade and industry’s future competitiveness. Stockholm’s Southern 
Link, 6 kilometer of the Motorway Ring, hereunder 4,5 kilometer in tunnels, was 
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similarly completed as planned October 24th 2004, and was supposed to drain about 
60.000 vehicles per day from the city streets. The Southern Link was that far 
Sweden’s most costly individual road project. The costs were initially estimated to 
5,6 billions 1992 SEK approximately 567,2 millions 1990 PPP USD, but increased 
to about 8 billions 2002 SEK or approximately 689,9 millions 1990 PPP USD.770  
 The leftwing parties dominated Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee 1991-94, 
1994-98, 1998-2002 and 2002-06. The middle constituencies held similarly the 
Traffic Committee’s pivotal position 1991-94 and 2002-06. The peripheral 
constituencies held the pivotal position 1994-98, and 1998-02 together with the 
middle constituencies.771 The Traffic Committee’s geographic center of gravity may 
explain Riksdagen’s approval of the Öresund Bridge and further investments in 
ScanLink. Helena Wockelberg’s interviews with 10 members of Riksdagen’s Traffic 
Committee the fall 2003 uncovered that most of them considered transport and 
communication policy, hereunder road policy national and not local matters, despite 
plenty of so-called “hometown motions”.772 The hometown motions were obviously 
first and foremost ‘greetings’ to the voters. Helena Wockelberg found also that 
special interest group representatives and members of Riksdagen as directors 
threatened the boards’ autonomy.773  
 Swedish road and infrastructure policy during the 1990s indicate clearly that 
Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee’s members’ constituencies were less important than 
their party affiliation, because most road investments went to roads with national 
collective good characteristics. But the executive and party leaders’ high-level 
agreements governed most of the road investments’ allocation. Sweden’s motorway 
system’s length more than doubled from 1986 to 2005, from about 800 to more than 
1600 kilometers. Swedish road policy and road construction 1981-2005 differed 
fundamentally from contemporary Norwegian road policy and road construction, 
because the Swedish executive and legislators were willing to fortify the economic 
growth in those areas that went well, for instance through the Dennis, Gothenburg 
and Malmö packages. The Swedish executives and legislators were also willing to 
invest in motorways and trunk roads to support struggling trade and industries such 
as the west coast’s automotive industry through construction of ScanLink. It seems 
hence reasonable to conclude that most legislators and most members of the Traffic 
Committee considered road policy national and not local matters. 
 The findings 1981-2005 indicates also the executive’s influence on the road 
policy increased significantly, particularly compared to 1944-1970 when the 
executive and legislators hardly questioned Swedish Road Administration’s 
autonomy. Riksdagen’s influence on the road and infrastructure policy increased 
also, particularly after the 1994 election. These findings were clearly in line with 
Helena Wockelberg’s study that in 2003 concluded the 1974 Constitution did not 
protect the formally autonomous Swedish boards against “political governance”.774 
Helena Wockelberg questioned in her concluding remarks whether it was “time to 
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introduce minister” rule even in Sweden, even if minister of coordination Pär Nuder 
in 2003 defended the Swedish system based on Axel Oxenstierna’s autonomous 
bureaucracy.775 But Pär Nuder indicated June 28th 2004 willingness to reshape and 
redesign Axel Oxenstierna’s bureaucracy and governance system fundamentally. 
The so-called Responsibility Committee (Ansvarskomitén) is supposed to submit its 
recommendations within February 2007.776 The discussions about Swedish road 
policy since 1981 indicate clearly the Swedish system with autonomous boards 
changed fundamentally, even if the 1974 Constitution ruled out minister rule and 
guaranteed the boards’ autonomy. It was evident the system had changed informally, 
particularly when compared to the bicameral system prior to 1971. 
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Swedish case from 1985 until about 2005? This study’s main 
hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road 
policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good 
was clearly strengthened from 1981 until about 2005, because the motorway 
system’s length was more than doubled 1986-2005, from about 800 to more than 
1600 kilometers, despite the State economic crisis and entailing State economic 
restructuring. The 1997 Zero Vision furthered road safety as a national collective 
good, and the idea about sustainable development that also can be understood as a 
national collective good was linked to road policy throughout the 1990s. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly weakened by the Swedish case, 
because the constituencies’ struggles for resources to local collective or private 
goods did hardly affect road policy and road construction at all 1981-2005. The 
members of Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee considered road policy national and not 
local matters, despite numerous hometown motions made for the voters. The 
counties and municipals’ influence on the road policy increased throughout the 
1990s, but the counties and municipals did not exercise their influence through the 
constituencies but rather through the political parties and the established institutions 
for local democracy. 
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was significantly strengthened, because the political parties’ rivalry 
permeated Swedish road policy and road construction from 1981 until about 2005. 
The executive and leading industrialists’ direct negotiations 1982-91 largely 
overruled Swedish Road Administration. Swedish Road Administration was 
similarly largely overruled by the minority executive’s agreements and national pork 
barrel deals with the supporting parties after the 1994 election. The need for State 
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financial restructuring after the 1991-92 State economic and bank crises and 
achievement of sustainable development overruled most other concerns after the 
1994 election. 
 The final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Swedish case from 
1981 until about 2005. First, the Palme and Carlsson executives’ direct negotiations 
with leading industrialists about road construction during the 1980s weakened 
Riksdagen and Swedish Road Administration’s influence on the road policy and 
road construction. The same was largely the case with the minority executive’s high-
level agreements and pork barrel deals with the supporting parties after the 1994 
election. Second, the Carlsson executive introduced loan financing to safeguard 
swift construction of ScanLink in the second half of the 1980s, and the Bildt 
executive furthered the loan financing of the Öresund Bridge and later also 
Stockholm’s Dennis-package. The Bildt executive imposed also turnpikes, among 
others in the Dennis-package, but the Persson executive abolished Stockholm’s 
turnpikes in 1997 together with the Dennis Package. However, the financing of road 
investments through loans from The Swedish National Debt Office was furthered, 
and safeguarded swift road construction to the lowest possible costs for the road 
users. These loans were amortized through the ordinary road appropriations not 
through turnpikes or other kinds of direct user payments such as for instance in 
Norway. Maintenance of loan financed road and infrastructure investments 
amortized through the road appropriations can be understood as an example of path 
dependence. Third, empowerment of the Supreme Administrative Court in 1988 to 
carry out legal reviews of the executive and bureaucracy’s decisions paved similarly 
the way for the Persson executive’s abolition of the Dennis-package and 
Stockholm’s turnpikes, and weakened partly the executive’s power towards the 
citizens and the local administrations. Fourth, Riksdagen’s 1988 Traffic Policy 
Decision linked road policy and environmental policy. Riksdagen’s 1998 Traffic 
Policy Decision introduced similarly fuel taxes supposed to internalize the 
transports’ social costs. The Green Party’s pivotal position after the 1998 and 2002 
elections led to linking of railroad and trunk road investments in Riksdagen’s 2001 
Infrastructure Decision. Increased railroad investments were similarly part of the 
agreements between the Green, Social Democratic and Left Parties after the 2002 
election. The railroad investments increased more than the road investments in 2004 
when the infrastructure investments were further increased to safeguard the State 
economic reconstruction, Swedish trade and industry’s future competitiveness and 
sustainable development. Introduction of a congestion fee in Stockholm was also 
part of the Green Party’s 2002 agreement with the Social Democratic and Left 
Parties. Fifth, Swedish Road Federation liquidated itself in January 2004 after 
having been Sweden’s leading road lobbyist for 90 years. Finally, Axel 
Oxenstierna’s bureaucracy lost partly its autonomy after 1981, even if no formal 
reforms took place, but fundamental structural reforms of Sweden’s bureaucracy and 
governance system seem to be in the pipeline. 
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Summary and conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Swedish case? Table 7 provides an overview of the empirical 
findings from the Swedish case concerning the study’s four working hypotheses. 
Table 7: Empirical findings from the Swedish case concerning the four working 
hypotheses. 
Period/Hypothesis Road policy and road 
construction 
governed by 
politicians pursuing 
the common good 
Road policy and road 
construction governed 
by the constituencies’ 
resource struggles 
Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by the 
political parties’ 
rivalry 
Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by path 
dependence 
Prior to 1945 - - - + 
1945-1959 + - - + 
1960-1980 + - + + 
1981-2005 + - + + 
 
 This study’s main hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national 
collective goods with road policy and road construction governed by politicians 
pursuing the common good was clearly corroborated. Riksdagen’s decision that 
substituted the municipal road administrations with a centralized State road 
administration accompanied by State financing of most public roads from January 1st 
1944 was a turning point and safeguarded construction of roads with national 
collective good characteristics beneficial for the common good. The executive 
delegated from then the responsibility for management of most public roads to the 
Royal Board of Roads and Waterways. The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways’ 
autonomy and lack of local anchoring was most likely a necessary condition for 
development of Swedish Road Plan that safeguarded national rather than parochial 
interests. Swedish Road Plan instituted allocation of the road investments according 
to cost/benefit calculations and road safety considerations, because house holding 
with the community’s common pool of resources was clearly in line with the 
autonomous bureaucracy’s norms about State reason and professionalism. The 
SCAFT paradigm and Road Plan 1970 made similarly road safety to national 
collective goods. The economically most important road investments were 
accomplished within 1970. The Swedish motorway system’s length more than 
doubled 1986-2005, despite State economic problems since the second half of the 
1970s and bank crises 1991-93. The executive invested deliberately in motorways 
and other trunk roads with national collective good characteristics to jumpstart the 
ailing economy, to safeguard the urgently needed State economic restructuring and 
sustainable development, which also can be understood as a national collective 
good. The 1997 Zero Vision furthered road safety as a national collective good even 
after the turn of the 20th and 21st century.  
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly weakened by the Swedish case. The 
constituencies’ struggles for resources to local collective or private goods have 
hardly affected Swedish road policy and road construction at all, neither prior to 
1944 when the road policy and road construction was governed locally by the road 
municipals, under the bicameral system 1944-70 after introduction of State 
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management of most public roads, or after introduction of the unicameral system. 
The Royal Board of Roads and Waterways allocated the State road appropriations to 
the road municipals autonomous of Riksdagen prior to 1944. The entailing Road and 
Water Construction Administration and from 1967 Swedish National Road 
Administration allocated similarly most road investments according to the 
professionals’ norms and standards autonomously of the executive and Riksdagen 
until the 1970s. Riksdagen’s approval of Swedish Road Plan safeguarded also 
construction of a very comprehensive secondary road system. Introduction of the 
unicameral system and the Traffic Committee in 1971 did not reduce road policy 
and road construction to local matters, even if the municipals and counties increased 
their influence on road policy and road construction through acquiring their own 
road and environmental planning expertise from the 1970s. Riksdagen’s Traffic 
Committee did not engage in micromanagement of the road policy and road 
construction such as the Norwegian legislators had done since 1851. 
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was both weakened and strengthened by the Swedish case. The 
political parties’ rivalry was not decisive for road policy and road construction prior 
to 1944 because the executives, no matter their political affiliation used road 
construction and maintenance counter cyclic to mitigate the 1920s and 30s 
unemployment. A broad consensus among the major political parties governed 
similarly the road policy and road construction after World War Two. Appointment 
of the Labor Market Board’s Director General Gustav Vahlberg as the Road and 
Water Construction Administration’s Director General in late 1957 placed de facto 
Sweden’s Federation of Trade Unions and particularly the Metal Workers’ Union in 
the road policy driver’s seat, because Gustav Vahlberg was one of the corporative 
system’s high-flyers. But the road policy consensus ruptured partly in the second 
half of the 1960s, because of the Social Democratic and Agrarian Parties’ shadow 
boxing. The Social Democratic executive used road policy and road construction as 
one of its means to contain the Agrarian Party hereunder reduced road investments 
within and near the major cities. The Social Democratic Party’s road and traffic 
policy flip-flops in 1972 and 1979 were similarly motivated by party tactical 
considerations. The executive and the leading industrialists’ direct negotiations 
governed the road policy and road construction during most of the 1980s, and 
weakened both Swedish Road Administration’s professional autonomy and 
Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee’s influence. Road policy and road construction was 
similarly governed by party tactical considerations throughout the 1990s and after 
the turn of the 20th and 21st century, through high-level agreements or pork barrel 
deals between the minority Social Democratic Party executive and the Agrarian 
Party 1995-98 and between the minority Social Democratic Party executive and the 
pivotal Green and Left Parties after the 1998 and 2002 elections. The political 
parties’ rivalry became hence decisive for Swedish road policy and road 
construction after introduction of the unicameral system. 
 The final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Swedish case. First, 
the 1809 Constitution established the rules of the game until 1975 when it was 
furthered by the 1974 Constitution that maintained most of the 1809 Constitution’s 
principles. Second, Riksdagen’s four-cameral system was replaced by a bicameral 
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system 1866-67, which in turn was replaced by a unicameral system 1970-71. These 
chamber structure reforms changed Sweden’s political economy fundamentally. 
Introduction of the bicameral system made fundamental reforms far more likely, but 
established also a very stable, status quo and consensus oriented regime because of 
the First Chamber’s lag and the members’ long tenure, successive replacement and 
restricted votes in the local elections of those who appointed the First Chamber’s 
members. However, the 1907-09 and 1921 suffrage reforms shifted the political 
balance from the nobility and upper classes, via the wealthy farmers to the middle 
and working classes’ favor. Introduction of the unicameral system gave a far more 
volatile system, and removed the Swedish political system’s sluggishness and 
predictability. Third, replacement of the bicameral Riksdagen’s functional 
committees with the unicameral Riksdagen’s standing subject matter committees, 
such as the Traffic Committee, did not reduce road policy and road construction to 
local matters, because allocation of the road appropriations based on rational 
methods and models had been Swedish National Road Administration’s 
responsibility since the 1920s. Road policy as a national matter persisted, and was 
clearly an example of path dependence because of increasing returns to the road 
users. Fourth, Sweden’s parliamentary rule introduced 1917 with a strong executive, 
strong legislature and with an autonomous bureaucracy established by Axel 
Oxenstierna in the 17th century that worked according to norms about State reason 
and professionalism, but kept in check by the administrative courts, was unique. 
Fifth, the 1930s’ class compromise established a corporative system based on 
negotiations between the executive and the interest organizations that persisted until 
it was punctuated by the 1970s and 80s State economic problems and the neo-liberal 
shift and NPM reforms. Sixth, the vehicle and fuel taxes introduced in the 1920s 
were informally linked to road construction and maintenance, but were formally 
linked to the road appropriations through the 1938 State accounting reform that 
made road investments and road maintenance the vehicle and fuel tax revenues’ 
contra entries. This equilibrium persisted until 1980 when it was punctuated by the 
Fälldin executive because of State economic problems, despite the motoring lobby’s 
protests, even if the 1964 Hörjel-agreement that permitted financing construction of 
Stockholm’s subway with road appropriations almost punctuated it. Seventh, 
Swedish Road Plan furthered and instituted the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s professionals’ allocation of the road investments based on rational 
methods and formal models. This principle survived even the 1970s, 80s and 90s 
State economic crises, and entailing State economic reconstruction, even if the 
models were refined and modified to reflect the executive and Riksdagen’s changing 
priorities, and was clearly an example of path dependence. Such resource allocation 
was also in accordance with the norms about State reason and professionalism. 
Eight, Riksdagen’s 1963 Traffic Policy Decision made economic effectiveness the 
road and traffic policies’ lodestar. Riksdagen’s 1979 Traffic Policy Decision linked 
traffic, road and regional policies and instituted also requirements for socio-
economic effectiveness. Riksdagen’s 1988 Traffic Policy Decision linked road and 
environmental policies. Riksdagen’s 1998 Traffic Policy Decision instituted taxes 
and fees supposed to internalize the transports’ social costs. Ninth, the 1988 
empowerment of the Supreme Administrative Court to carry out legal reviews of the 
executive and bureaucracy’s decisions paved the way for punctuation of 
Stockholm’s so-called Dennis-package in 1997. Tenth, the traditionally tax financed 
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road appropriations were partly replaced by loan financed road investments in the 
second half of the 1980s, to safeguard swift construction of motorways. This model 
was furthered in the 1990s and after the turn of the 20th and 21st century. The 
Persson executive abolished in 1997 the turnpikes imposed by the Bildt executive, 
when it liquidated the Dennis-package, but upheld loan financing through The 
Swedish National Debt Office that safeguard swift road construction to the lowest 
possible costs, that gave the motorists, trade and industry and taxpayers increasing 
returns. Eleventh, the Social Democratic Party executive’s agreement with the Green 
and Left Parties in Riksdagen’s 2001 Infrastructure Decision linked trunk road and 
railroad investments, but Riksdagen’s 2004 Infrastructure Decision increased the 
railroad investments more than the trunk road and motorway investments. This 
linking was part of the executive’s price for the Green Party’s support, together with 
introduction of congestion fees in Stockholm. Twelfth, Swedish Road Federation 
liquidated itself in January 2004 after having been Sweden’s leading road lobbyist 
for 90 years. Its mission was completed when Riksdagen made its 2004 
Infrastructure Decision and approved Sweden’s largest infrastructure investments 
ever in modern times. Finally, Axel Oxenstierna’s autonomous bureaucracy seems 
to have been punctuated by the executive’s moves throughout the 1980s and 90s to 
handle the State economic problems and by the State economic restructuring since 
1994. 
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Chapter 4 – Norway – the deviant case  
Norway is here denoted the deviant case, because postwar Norwegian executives 
and legislators carried out an almost contrary road policy compared to many other 
Western industrialized countries until about 1995. Norway lagged in 2005 
approximately 30 to 60 years after many other West European industrialized 
countries with regard to modern trunk roads and motorways between the regions and 
to the export markets. 
 This chapter is organized in five sections similarly as the preceding chapters 
about Denmark and Sweden. The first section presents background and context 
about Norway’s polity and road policy prior to 1945 when the mass motoring had its 
initial breakthrough. The second section is about 1945-59, when the majority Labor 
Party executives upheld the car rationing after completing the initial reconstruction, 
while Stortinget’s majority and the counties derailed the road policy established 
during the interwar years. The third section is about 1960-80, when the car rationing 
was liquidated and the mass motoring had its second breakthrough in Norway, and 
the Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation was rolled back by a 
counterreformation. The fourth section is about 1981 until about 2005 when Norway 
underwent the neo-liberal shift and a fundamental road policy reorientation after the 
early 1980s’ road policy debacle. But the executives and legislators were not in a 
hurry to catch up Norway’s lag concerning trunk roads and motorways, most likely 
because the oil revenues placed the Norwegian State in very comfortable financial 
situation compared to most other West European countries. The final section is 
summary and conclusions concerning the study’s four working hypotheses. 
Background and context 
Norway was a Danish province 1536-1814, but the Danish King that sided with the 
Napoleon wars’ loosing party was forced to pass over Norway to Sweden as 
compensation for Sweden’s loss of Finland to Russia in 1809. Norway remained in 
personal union with Sweden until 1905, but the Norwegian elites managed to 
establish a constitution, a legislature, Stortinget, and an executive in between the 
handover from Denmark to Sweden. Norway’s road polity was largely established 
from the early 19th century until World War Two, and institutionalized patterns or 
trajectories of development that governed Norwegian road policy and road 
construction during most of the 20th century. 
An exceptionally strong legislature dominated by the peripheral and rural 
constituencies 
Norway’s legislature Stortinget is formally bicameral, but with equal representation 
in both chambers, because the election systems have never distinguished between 
the two chambers, Lagtinget and Odelstinget. Stortinget became hence a hybrid 
between a unicameral and a bicameral legislature.777 The 1814 election system, 
written into the Constitution, gave the peripheral and rural areas 2/3 and the cities 
1/3 of Stortinget’s seats. The cities had then about 1/10 of the inhabitants, but that  
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would soon change. Stortinget’s 1814 seat allocation was frozen in 1859 through the 
so-called Farmer’s Paragraph, a constitutional amendment that shielded the 
peripheral and rural areas against political consequences from the increasing 
urbanization and industrialization.778 
 The 1814 election system, the Farmer’s Paragraph and the political power 
struggles between the legislators which were farmers, urban citizens and civil 
servants, and the executive dominated by civil servants instituted what here is 
denoted Stortinget’s peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition.779 The 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition is Norway’s oldest, strongest and 
most aggressive all-party distributional coalition or meta-party, and cemented the 
center-periphery and urban-rural cleavages as basic conflict dimensions in 
Norwegian politics prior to establishment of formal political parties. 
 Stortinget was established with standing subject matter committees in 1814, 
and established in 1854 a new Standing Road Committee.780 Stortinget’s Rules of 
Procedures (Stortingets forretningsorden) was revised in 1871. The members of 
Stortinget spent from then the whole term in one and only one standing subject 
matter committee, which increased the specialization and division of labor.781 This 
procedural change strengthened the committees, facilitated legislator rule and 
instituted the tradition where the legislators spent their entire career within one or 
only a few committees.  
 The historian Jens Arup Seip claimed the so-called Norwegian System 
governed Stortinget’s provision and allocation of collective goods and infrastructure 
investments such as roads and railroads during the middle of the 19th century.782 The 
starting point, according to Seip, was the prevailing laissez-faire ideology’s ideal, a 
passive State. Local initiatives, either private and/or municipal replaced centralized 
planning. At least 20 percent local co-financing could lead to partial State financing 
of roads or other infrastructure investments, but the different counties’ projects were 
pitted against each other until Stortinget’s final decision.  
 The economic historian Fritz Hodne questioned Jens Arup Seip’s 
understanding of the Norwegian System, because Stortinget’s farmer legislators 
managed to abolish the land tax in 1837. Export and import duties became from then 
two of the State’s most important revenue sources. The State’s revenues and budget 
balance reflected clearly the international business cycles’ fluctuations.783 Jens Arup 
Seip claimed Fritz Hodne perceived the Norwegian System as a tactical measure for 
making the farmers pay, because they refused to pay State taxes.784 The Norwegian 
System’s reason for existence, according to Fritz Hodne, was prevention of costly 
national precedents, because requirement for local co-financing constrained the 
demand and prevented free riding. The Norwegian System linked also the counties 
and cities’ contributions to the community to State financing of collective goods and 
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infrastructures.785 Fritz Hodne explained the Norwegian System as a result of scarce 
resources and a liberal ideology. Locally or privately initiated collective goods and 
infrastructure investments made differentiated supply tolerable. Stortinget approved 
only uniform supply and State financing of low cost collective goods and 
infrastructures such as telegraph services and lighthouses.786 Jens Arup Seip’s 
answer to Fritz Hodne’s critique was that competing projects safeguarded efficient 
resource allocation, but prevented also equal treatment of the counties.787  
 One of the Norwegian System’s most important side effects was 
institutionalization of the new Norwegian State as the counties and municipals’ 
servant, instead of opposite such as in Denmark and Sweden where the executives 
emphasized development of national collective goods and left development of local 
collective goods to the counties and municipals. The Norwegian System instituted a 
localistic, communalistic pattern, where provision of national collective goods and 
infrastructures depended on local willingness to pay, but constrained on the other 
hand the constituencies’ tendencies to rent seeking. Because the constituencies 
received few public financed goods unless they were willing to contribute 
financially. 
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Figure 15: Norwegian counties 2005, an overview. 
 
Source: Statens kartverk and Statistisk sentralbyrå. 
 Introduction of parliamentary rule from 1884 after the impeachment court’s 
verdict punctuated the so-called Civil Servant State established from 1814.788 The 
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Civil Servant State had been a closed and self-supplying system, because the 
Norwegian ministers were ordinary civil servants appointed by the Swedish union 
King. The ministers were often considered “Stortinget’s enemies” prior to 1884, but 
became instead “Stortinget’s prisoners of war” after introduction of parliamentary 
rule, according to the historian Rolf Danielsen.789 Introduction of parliamentary rule 
led also to establishment of formal political parties. The Liberal (Venstre) and 
Conservative (Høyre) Parties were both established in 1884. The Liberal Party’s 
initial followers were farmers and urban citizens who utilized the second half of the 
19th century’s liberalization of trade, crafts and industry. The Conservative Party’s 
initial followers were mostly civil servants and others with stakes in the ancient 
regime.790 The Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet) was founded in 1887, but did not 
achieve a prominent position until the 1920s and 30s.791 Because the Liberal and 
Conservative Parties that otherwise usually fought each other, cooperated against the 
emerging labor movement, unlike in Denmark and Sweden where liberals and social 
democrats partly cooperated against the conservatives. 
 The Civil Servant’s State was replaced by the so-called Liberal Party State 
from 1884, and was governed by the Liberal and Conservative Parties with offspring 
until 1935. The Liberal Party State’s most central actors were farmers, fishermen, 
small town ship owners, entrepreneurs and industrialists, merchants and lumber 
barons. Most of the economic elites did not live in the capital, Kristiania, but in 
peripheral towns scattered along the coast and in the inland where the raw material 
harvesting and/or processing took place. Kristiania, which was renamed Oslo in 
1925, was first and foremost an administrative city, even if the Kristiania or 
Oslofjord area experienced strong economic growth during the second half of the 
19th and early in the 20th century. The Liberal Party State persisted until the German 
occupation 1940-45.  
 The Norwegian System was gradually replaced by what is here denoted as the 
Liberal Party’s System, which emerged from about 1870, because of increasingly 
politicized allocation of railroad investments. The Liberal Party’s System became 
permanent from the 1890s after reintroduction of State taxes in 1892, and instituted 
Stortinget’s allocation of collective goods and infrastructure investments according 
to a political rather than an economic logic such as under the former Norwegian 
System.792 Fritz Hodne’s studies revealed how Stortinget gradually 1840-1914 
developed into a “marketplace” for infrastructure investments. But Hodne’s study 
revealed also how Stortinget’s market mechanisms gradually deteriorated from the 
1890s because of decoupling the counties and cities’ contributions to the community 
and Stortinget’s allocation of collective goods and infrastructure investments.793 
Stortinget’s majority’s political preferences replaced from then head on competition 
between projects and the counties’ willingness to local co-financing such as under 
the Norwegian System. The Liberal Party’s System gave therefore the constituencies 
strong incentives to rent seeking. 
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 Introduction of parliamentary rule did not alter the pattern with a very strong 
legislature. Neither did Stortinget amend the Constitution to reflect introduction of 
parliamentary rule. Norway became the only parliamentary democracy with fixed 
terms.794 The head of State or Prime Minister was not authorized to call for new 
elections. This peculiarity made the Norwegian governance systems more like a 
separation of power system such as for instance in USA. The executive and 
legislative were almost stuck with each other, if the opposition was not willing to get 
into position.795 Fixed terms made it more likely with negotiations and pork barrel 
deals in Stortinget than in most other parliamentary legislatures, all other things 
equal. The peripheral and rural areas’ overrepresentation due to the election system 
and the Farmer’s Paragraph entrenched the political system’s peripheral and rural 
bias and maintained the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition even after 
introduction of parliamentary rule and establishment of formal political parties. 
 Norway’s 1905 direct single seat district plurality election system introduced 
after the independence from Sweden, and the 1921 direct multimember district 
proportional election system (PR) with seat allocation according to d’Hondt’s 
method, upheld both the Farmer’s Paragraph’s seat allocation in Stortinget and gave 
the rural areas and small towns’ inhabitants far stronger political representation than 
the major cities’ inhabitants.796 Even these election systems ignored the urbanization 
and industrialization that had taken place since the second half of the 19th century, 
and reflected clearly the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s 
dominant position, and maintained hence Stortinget’s peripheral and rural bias 
despite significant shifts concerning settlement structure. 
 Norway’s modern six-party system was completed in 1933, with a Communist 
Party (Norges Kommunistiske Parti) and a social democratic Labor Party to the left, 
after the Labor Party splintered into a revolutionary Labor Party and a reformist 
Social Democratic Party, which reunited to the current Labor Party. There were 
three middle parties, the Liberal Party with its offspring, the Agrarian Party 
(Bondepartiet) and the Christian Peoples’ Party (Kristelig Folkeparti). It was finally 
the Conservative Party to the right.797 The Norwegian population could similarly be 
divided into three broad sociological categories, namely modernists, traditionalists 
and anti-modernists. The modernists embraced new technologies and did not fear 
possible structural changes. The traditionalists were not against new technologies 
per se, according to the technology historian Olav Wicken, but opposed possible 
structural changes entailing new technologies. The anti-modernists opposed 
vigorously new technologies as well as possible structural changes in the traditional 
sectors.798 The modernists were first and foremost found among the Labor and 
Conservative Parties’ followers in central and urban areas, but even the Liberal 
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Party had modernist followers in some urban areas. The traditionalists were usually 
found among the Labor and the middle parties’ followers in peripheral and rural 
areas. The anti-modernists were first and foremost found among the middle parties’ 
followers in peripheral and rural areas. 
 Norway was highly polarized politically until 1935 because the farmers and 
citizenry did their best to marginalize the workers politically, among others through 
the 1905 election system and the non-socialist parties’ flirts with several nationalist 
and fascist groups during the interwar years’ crises. Major Vidkun Quisling served 
for instance as minister of defense in Peder Kolstad and Jens Hundseid’s Agrarian 
Party executives 1931-32 and 1932-33.799 The Labor Party had similarly fierce 
internal struggles between revolutionaries and reformists until the party settled for a 
reformist course, even if it maintained its radical rhetoric to contain the Communist 
Party.800 These struggles between revolutionaries and reformists distinguish clearly 
the Norwegian Labor Party from the Danish and Swedish Social Democratic Parties 
that early settled for a reformist course, cooperated with liberal middle parties and 
achieved political power and influence far earlier than the Norwegian Labor Party. 
 The 1920s’ became Norway’s lost decade. Many other countries prospered 
until the Wall Street crack in October 1929. But the sudden drop in export prices 
from September 1920, the entailing 1921-24 bank crisis because of failing export 
industries and Bank of Norway’s slow response as lender of last resort, and finally 
Bank of Norway’s deflationary par policy 1925-27 to reestablish gold parity were all 
devastating blows for Norwegian trade and industry.801  
 The 1920s and early 30s economic crises and entailing political polarization 
strained the political system and undermined partly the trust in democracy both on 
the left and right side of the political specter. These problems culminated in 1931, 
when the employers demanded up to 40 percent wage reductions and reduced real 
salaries, when the unemployment accelerated because of the depression. The 
employers declared several lockouts in April and May 1931 that refused up to 
81.000 industrial workers employment. The industrial production fell to a fraction of 
the normal output. Some enterprises, such as Norsk Hydro, circumvent their own 
lockout through use of scabs. Vidkun Quisling, the Agrarian Party executive’s 
minister of defense, used military troops and State Police at Menstad in Telemark to 
protect the scabs against the regular workers. This lockout went on for about six 
months and led to loss of approximately 7,5 million man-days, which gave 
numerous repercussions such as reduced exports, tax revenues, etc.802  
 Great Britain abandoned the gold exchange standard September 21st 1931 
through devaluation of the British pound (GBP). Norway’s national bank, Norges 
Bank, abandoned the gold exchange standard September 27th; the same did 
Sweden’s Riksbank. Norway’s two largest banks ceased payments December 15th 
and received immediately a three months moratorium from the Agrarian Party 
executive. The Norwegian kroner (NOK) was devaluated almost 20 percent to the 
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GBP in 1932. Norges Bank established also a voluntary currency rationing together 
with the banks and business sector organizations. Abandoning the gold exchange 
standard became a turning point; because Norges Bank’s monetary policy became 
less doctrinaire. This in turn stimulated the home market industries and construction 
of housing, and led gradually also to increased investments and exports.803 Norway 
struggled economically even during the depression, but the depression was less 
noticed in Norway than in many other countries because Norway was already 
kneeling due to the 1920s deflation and bank crises. 
 The Labor Party settled for a reformist course and got its breakthrough in the 
1933 elections when they promised employment for everyone.804 The political 
climate changed noticeably from 1935. First because the National Federation of 
Labor and the Employers’ Association agreed about a Principal Agreement 
(Hovedavtalen), which constituted the labor market’s ground rules. Second, because 
Johan Nygaardsvold, one of the Labor Party peripheral and rural chieftains, 
established a minority executive after a horse trade and crisis compromise with the 
Agrarian Party that safeguarded economic support to farmers and municipals, 
because many farmers were then on the rim of precipice. The agreement led also to 
increased road construction to overcome the economic crisis. The economic 
historian Fritz Hodne claimed the Nygaardsvold executive financed increased relief 
expenditures through introduction of a one-percent sales tax, taxes on bank deposits 
and dividends, and through increasing the tax system’s graduation.805 The Principal 
Agreement and the agreement with the Agrarian Party paved the way for Norway’s 
broad class compromise and strengthened also the corporative system developed 
since World War One.806 Even the Liberal Party became soon one of the 
Nygaardsvold executive’s supporters. These moves isolated the Conservative Party 
politically prior to World War Two.807 The Liberal Party State’s days were thus 
numbered. A regime change was imminent, but the German invasion April 9th 1940 
that changed the regime was highly unexpected. 
 The Nygaardsvold executive shifted Stortinget’s median somewhat to the left, 
but maintained Stortinget’s peripheral and rural bias. The Nygaardsvold executive 
did not carry out a Keynesian policy, despite popular belief, but furthered the former 
Liberal and Agrarian executives’ economic policy, even if the public sector 
spending stabilized the demand.808 The common belief is the business cycle’s shift 
from 1934 was more responsible for Norway’s economic recovery prior to World 
War Two than the executive’s activist policy. But the economic historians Tore 
Jørgen Hanisch and Jan Vea claimed the 1930s’ recovery was not a result of 
increased international demand, but rather increased domestic production, because 
ending the 1931 labor market conflicts lead to increased production of consumer 
goods in the new home market industries, not within the export enclaves. The 
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emerging Norwegian home market industries emphasizing consumer goods had 
namely their breakthrough during the 1920s and 30s.809 Hanisch and Vea’s claims 
are partly corroborated by Fritz Hodne’s studies that indicated increased domestic 
demand for many consumer goods during the 1930s.810 
 How was Norway’s economic performance prior to World War Two? Norway 
underwent the so-called second industrial revolution 1890-1930. Norway’s GDP per 
capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars was 2.780 dollars in 
1920, 3.712 in 1930 and 4.088 in 1940. The 12 West European countries’ average 
was 3.305 dollars in 1920, 4.289 in 30 and 4.984 in 40. Norway lagged thereby 
behind the West European average in 1920, 30 and 40, with West Europe’s eight 
highest GDP per capita in 1920, ninth highest in 30 and eight highest in 40.811 The 
1920s crises reduced Norway’s economic performance, but the relative performance 
improved after 1934, among others because of increased production in the new 
home market industries. 
Repugnant transition from railroad to road transports  
Norway’s 1824 Road Act abolished the former Danish centralized State road 
administration and made road construction and maintenance local matters, governed 
by the County Governors (amtmennene). The 1824 Road Act divided the road 
system into main roads and parish roads. Trunk roads were not singled out as a 
particular class, even if the costs for main roads defined as trunk roads, which were 
national collective goods, were distributed among all counties according to their 
properties’ tax obligations, until the State tax was abolished in 1837. All other roads 
were financed locally. Road construction was accomplished through the farmers’ 
duty work, but construction of expensive bridges was based on competitive 
bidding.812 The 1837 Local Government Act made the county councils’ executive 
committees (formannskapene) powerful road political players, because the county 
and municipal councils were authorized to approve road investments. The 1837 
Local Government Act gave the farmers valuable political training for later use in 
Stortinget. 
 The 1851 Road Act upheld the 1824 Road Act’s semi-local county road 
administrations and introduced a road tax that until 1894 was dedicated to a Road 
Fund. The civil servant executive proposed in 1879 changing the Road Fund’s 
allocation from 4/5 to 2/3 to the rural areas and 1/5 to 1/3 to the cities, similarly as 
Stortinget’s seat allocation, which was rejected by Stortinget’s majority.813 
Stortinget’s peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition upheld thereby the 
Road Fund’s biased but for them highly favorable allocation. But the 1851 Road 
Act’s most important institutional change was establishment of the principle that 
Stortinget approved individually each road project that received partial State 
financing.  
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 The executive decided in 1861 the Army’s Engineering Brigade should 
manage the most important public roads with national collective good 
characteristics. This decision was most likely inspired by the Swedish State road 
administration established in 1844, but Stortinget’s majority overruled this decision 
in 1864 and established instead the Directorate of Public Roads (Vegdirektoratet), to 
manage planning and construction of main roads and bridges eligible for partial 
State financing according to the Norwegian System.814 The Directorate of Public 
Roads was subordinated the Ministry of Interior (Indredepartementet), established in 
1846 to modernize Norway. The Directorate of Public Roads became soon one of 
the Norwegian System’s cogwheels, and was transferred to the new Ministry of 
Public Works (Arbeidsdepartementet) in 1885. The Ministry of Public Works 
became soon Norway’s largest ministry because it managed and supervised various 
collective goods and infrastructures such as roads, canals, lighthouses, postal 
services, scheduled ship services, railroads, telegraph, telephone, and later also 
hydroelectric power plants and the power grid, until it was downsized by the 1920s’ 
so-called axe-committees.815  
 Stortinget emphasized construction of passable main roads or trunk roads in 
the second half of the 19th century, but most trunk roads were then feeder systems to 
the railroads and scheduled steamship services.816 This policy made perfectly sense 
because railroads and steamships substituted horse and cart for long distance 
transports and heavy hauls. The geographical allocation of road investment 1820-
1908 with approximately 20 percent to the central constituencies and 40 percent 
each to the middle and peripheral constituencies reflected clearly the Norwegian 
System’s impact, because most road investments went to crowded southern central 
and middle rural constituencies willing and able to provide the required local co-
financing.817 The 19th century Norwegian road policy and road construction was first 
and foremost a bottom-up process, initiated by the municipal and county councils, 
and not top down from the executive such as in Denmark prior to the 1867 Road Act 
came into power and made road policy and road construction local matters even in 
Denmark. 
 The 1893 Road Act Amendment was Stortinget’s next important move that 
abolished the Road Fund, introduced State road financing through the annual 
budgets and established the so-called Combined Road Administration. The 
Combined Road Administration was a merger of the State and the counties’ road 
administrations. All counties’ Public Roads Administrations (vegkontorene) except 
in the two largest cities Kristiania and Bergen were subordinated the Directorate of 
Public Roads. The County Engineer (amtsingeniøren), the County Governor’s 
former road inspector, headed each county’s Public Roads Administration except in 
Kristiania and Bergen. The Road Director (vegdirektøren), head of the Directorate 
of Public Roads, headed also the entire Combined Road Administration, and was in 
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turn subordinated the Ministry of Public Works.818 Kristiania and Bergen’s roads 
were managed by municipal road administrations subordinated these cities’ 
combined city and county councils. The 1893 Road Act Amendment instituted also 
the Liberal Party’s System as Stortinget’s governing principle for allocation of State 
road appropriations. 
 Norway’s 1912 Road Act reflected clearly introduction of parliamentary rule, 
the Liberal Party’s System for resource allocation and the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition’s dominant position, because only the rural areas became 
eligible for State road appropriations. The 1912 Road Act strengthened also the 
Combined Road Administration through establishment of the County Road Boards 
(amtsvegstyrene) with one member appointed by the County Governor and two 
members appointed by the county councils. The county councils were until 1976 
collegiate bodies of the municipals’ mayors, headed by the County Governor, and 
responsible for each rural county’s road construction and maintenance. The County 
Road Boards in turn delegated their responsibility to the County Engineer, which 
often became the County Road Board’s de facto fourth member.819 
 The 1893 Road Act Amendment, the Combined Road Administration and the 
1912 Road Act reflected all the fact that peripheral and small town interests 
dominated most Liberal or Conservative Party executives that governed Norway 
1884-1935. The Combined Road Administration and the 1912 Road Act forced 
similarly the County Engineers to serve two masters, the remote Directorate of 
Public Roads concerning trunk roads, which were national collective goods, and the 
always present county politicians concerning parish roads, which were local 
collective or even private goods. The 1912 Road Act, the Combined Road 
Administration and the County Road Boards undermined effectively the Directorate 
of Public Roads’ role as coordinating body for the State’s road policy, and 
established a pattern where members of the County Road Boards and the county 
councils often cooperated directly with each county’s members of Stortinget. Each 
county’s party bosses were thus often able to bypass the Directorate of Public Roads 
and/or the Ministry of Public Works, because Stortinget had the final say whether a 
road project received partial State financing or not. The 1912 Road Act 
institutionalized therefore local and decentralized control of the road policy 
combined with State financing. 
 The first car came to Norway in 1895, but common use of cars on public roads 
was first permitted in 1913, when the 1912 Motor Vehicle Act came into power. 
Each ride on the main roads prior to 1913 except in a few central and urban counties 
and cities had to be approved in advance by the County Governor. Each ride on the 
parish roads had similarly to be approved in advance by the concerned municipal 
councils.820 The 1912 Motor Vehicle Act introduced also motor vehicle taxes based 
on the marginal cost principle, to compensate for the vehicles’ wear and tear on the 
roads. These tax revenues were allocated to the counties, where the County Road 
Boards further distributed them to the rural municipals.821 Cars were initially an 
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urban phenomenon, because the early institutional arrangements made it very 
cumbersome to own and use cars in rural and peripheral areas. Norway’s public road 
system in 1900 exclusive city streets, measured 28.591 kilometers. 10.671 
kilometers were defined as trunk roads, the rest were parish roads. The public road 
system measured 33.190 kilometers in 1915. 13.069 kilometers were then defined as 
trunk roads. The rest were parish roads.822 
 The central and most crowded areas’ road investments were significantly 
reduced 1908-1926 compared to 1820-1908.823 This shift reflected clearly the 
Liberal Party’s System’s emergence. 15,3 percent of the State road investments 
1908-26 were allocated to central rural constituencies. 39 and 45,7 percent were 
allocated to middle and peripheral rural constituencies.824 Many peripheral and rural 
areas lacked then road connections, because resistance against local co-financing 
had prevented allocation of road investments to these areas under the former 
Norwegian System. The 1926 Road Plan, approved by Stortinget in 1929, fixed the 
rural counties’ share of the annual State road appropriations until 1964.825 The 1926 
Road Plan approved in 1929 with adjustments allocated 12,6 percent to the central 
rural constituencies and 39,1 and 48,3 percent to the middle and peripheral rural 
constituencies.826 The coastal rural constituencies from Hordaland in southwest to 
Finnmark in north, the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s 
heartland, were the road policy winners from 1908. The 1912 Road Act gave 
similarly City of Oslo and City of Bergen 0 percent of the State road investments.827 
The counties’ fixed share of the road appropriations 1929-64 was clearly an example 
of path dependence, because of increasing returns to those constituencies that took 
part in the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition in Stortinget. These 
institutional arrangements reflected clearly those days’ election systems’ peripheral 
and rural bias. 
 Norway was a railroad society prior to World War Two, but most narrow 
gauge railroads built during the late 19th century’s railroad mania were obsolete 
already in the 1920s.828 The railroad heydays’ were 1890-1920. 1920-40 was only a 
transition towards the forthcoming mass motoring according to the historian Trond 
Bergh.829 The Directorate of Public Road’s engineers made transport economic 
calculations in the 1920s for Road Director Andreas Baalsrud that laid open that 
horse transports in some instances were far more cost efficient than those days’ 
obsolete railroads.830 But railroads had become one of the legislators’ sacred cows; 
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most likely because they had been Norway’s largest 19th century publicly financed 
investments. The significance of establishing Norwegian State Railroads (Norges 
Statsbaner) in 1926 as a public administration with approximately 16.000 employees 
should not be underestimated.831 The railroads symbolized modernity and progress 
for many legislators. Several narrow gauge railroads were therefore decided 
expanded to normal gauge.832 Many legislators were not able or willing to recognize 
that cars often provided far more cost efficient and flexible transports. 
 Many legislators considered cars a dangerous competitor that had to be 
constrained. Several of the interwar years’ studies about whether to invest in new 
railroads or update the 19th century road system were permeated by ideology, 
according to the economist and transport historian Dag Bjørnland.833 Many 
legislators’ strong belief in railroads throughout the interwar years is one decisive 
difference compared to Denmark and Sweden, where most legislators had a more 
fact based and realistic understanding of the transport infrastructures functions in the 
transport system. Stortinget’s majority imposed legal constraints on occupational 
road traffic in June1930 to protect the railroads.834 The Liberal Mowinkel executive 
imposed also so-called temporary protective restrictions; hereunder import quotas 
for cars in 1934.835  
 The Norwegian railroad champions did their best to prevent or delay the shift 
from railroad to road transports, but were not able to stem the tide. The number of 
cars increased almost exponentially, from 320 in 1910; 9.100 in 1920; 46.478 in 
1930 and 87.767 in 1940.836 837 Storting imposed July 18th 1917 a temporary luxury 
tax on motor vehicles, proposed by the Ministry of Finance, to balance the State’s 
budget.838 But few things are more permanent than temporary laws. The temporary 
luxury tax became a major revenue source when the number of vehicles increased 
throughout the 1920s and 30s. The 1912 Motor Vehicle Act was superseded by the 
1926 Motor Vehicle Act that substituted the initial horsepower tax with weight based 
annual fees and rubber taxes, and warranted fuel taxes. Stortinget imposed a fuel tax 
in 1931 to balance the budget. The fuel tax increased annually until 1940. The 1926 
Motor Vehicle Act allocated 5 percent of the tax revenues to the cities’ road 
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maintenance. The cities’ share increased to 8 percent in 1934.839 The interwar years’ 
vehicle and fuel tax revenues were hence dedicated to the public road system’s 
maintenance. The annual vehicle and fuel tax-revenues balanced almost the State’s 
annual expenses for road maintenance 1930-40, according to Dag Bjørnland.840 The 
1926 Motor Vehicle Act upheld the marginal cost principle instituted by the 1912 
Motor Vehicle Act. 
 However, at least somebody within Johan Ludwig Mowinkel’s Liberal Party 
executive understood the shift from railroad to road transports was imminent, 
despite the railroad lobby’s resistance, because the Directorate of Public Roads was 
made responsible for maintenance of 8.700 kilometers trunk roads from January 1st 
1928. The counties contributed initially financially to this maintenance, which was 
completely State financed from 1939.841 Stortinget established a new Road Fund in 
1928 funded through an initial appropriation and the vehicle tax revenues. The 
Directorate of Public Roads could borrow from this Road Fund for paving trunk 
roads, modernizing of bridges and similar projects. But Stortinget decided already in 
1931 to finance the maintenance of trunk roads through the road tax revenues. The 
road tax revenues were from 1932 allocated according to the counties’ maintenance 
costs and share of public roads, and from 1935 according to road technical and even 
economic criteria.842 But Road Director Andreas Baalsrud’s optimism during the 
interwar years must have been controlled, because he championed so-called 
“progressive road construction”. It was better with “poor roads than no roads” at all, 
which could be improved later on, if necessary.843  
 Dag Bjørnland’s calculations revealed Norwegian road investments and road 
maintenance for trunk roads and parish roads measured in fixed prices almost 
doubled from 1919 to 1938, from 72,7 millions 1961 NOK, or about 53,04 millions 
1990 PPP USD to 136,4 millions 1961 NOK or approximately 99,52 millions 1990 
PPP USD.844 The interwar years’ emphasis on road construction and maintenance 
reflected clearly the fast growing number of cars, but road construction and 
maintenance was also used as relief works during the 1920s and 30s crisis, similarly 
as in Denmark and Sweden, particularly in the peripheral and rural areas. But the 
Norwegian executives and legislators were not equally willing as their Danish 
opposite numbers to invest in modern roads. But the 1926 Motor Vehicle Act’s 
significance should not be underestimated, because of its dedication of the vehicle, 
rubber and fuel tax revenues to road maintenance. 
 Norway’s most urgent road problems during the interwar years, in addition to 
the peripheral and rural areas’ lack of roads, were found in Greater Oslo, where most 
cars were located. Oslo’s entrance roads and city streets were built for horse and 
cart, not for trams, buses and mass motoring. One of the first attempts to solve these 
problems were Aker municipal’s head of area development, August Nielsen, and his 
chief architect Ljungberg, who in 1925 proposed construction of a tunnel below 
Rådhusgaten to drain the east west thorough traffic from Oslo’s city hub. Harald 
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Hals’ 1929 General Plan furthered many of Nilsen and Ljungberg’s ideas.845 Road 
Director Andreas Baalsrud championed commuting to Oslo by buses instead of 
construction of new tramlines and suburban railroads, and recommended therefore 
in 1933 construction of modern entrance and remote roads dedicated to cars. But 
Baalsrud’s motoring friendly views did not prevail.846 Andreas Baalsrud was thus 
well informed about one of interwar years’ most dominant discussions among the 
road engineers all across Europe and in USA, namely construction of roads 
dedicated for roads construction of roads that mixed cars, horses, bicycles and 
pedestrians.847 Greater Oslo, Aker and Bærum’s General Area Development Plan of 
1934 were instead based on construction of three so-called combined entrance and 
remote roads radiating from Oslo’s outskirts that mixed hard and soft road users and 
local and remote traffic, namely southeastwards along the current E6; westwards 
along the current E18; and finally northeastwards along the current E6. In addition 
came several new tramlines and suburban railroads to existing and planned suburbs 
in Oslo’s surrounding municipals Oppegård, Aker and Bærum.848 The Oslo area’s 
local politicians recognized only reluctantly the mass motoring’s emergence, but 
were also most likely struggling with tight budget constraints because of 
unemployment and economic crisis. Nor should one forget those days’ leftwing 
parties that preferred public to individual transports. 
 One of Road Director Andreas Baalsrud’s few bright moments during the 
interwar years came in 1936 when Stortinget approved the so-called 1937 Trunk 
Road Plan that outlined construction of about 7.000 kilometers trunk roads between 
the regions to facilitate utilization of modern buses and trucks. Andreas Baalsrud 
had then championed a national trunk road plan since the 1920s.849 The 
Nygaardsvold executive’s increased emphasis on road construction was part of the 
1935 settlement and class compromise between the Labor and Agrarian Parties. 
Norwegian Automobile Owners’ Association (Norges Automobilforbund) proposed 
already in 1936 expanding the 1937 Trunk Road Plan from 24 millions NOK, or 
52,1 millions 1990 PPP USD to 35 millions NOK or 75,95 millions 1990 PPP USD 
through State loan financing. Road Director Andreas Baalsrud and Stortinget’s 
Standing Road and Railroad Committee supported these proposed extra road 
investments during four years, which would be self-financing through increased 
road traffic and thereby increased vehicle and fuel tax revenues, but the Ministry of 
Finance refused. Road Director Andreas Baalsrud proposed similarly in 1938 forced 
construction of the most important trunk roads through State loans. Stortinget’s 
Standing Road and Railroad Committee supported Baalsrud’s proposal. Norwegian 
Automobile Owners’ Association proposed similarly once again in 1938 a revised 
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35 millions NOK, or 68,9 millions 1990 PPP USD, trunk road plan that emphasized 
construction and modernization of the most important trunk roads up to Trøndelag, 
which included Norway’s most crowded counties. The Nygaardsvold executive 
acknowledged this plan, but shelved it because it had already proposed 8,3 millions 
NOK or 16,34 millions 1990 PPP USD in extra road investments.850 The Ministry of 
Finance was hence clearly skeptical to loan financed forced construction of modern 
trunk roads during the second half of the 1930s, even if the highly increased activity 
level after the depression accelerated the shift from railroad to road transports of 
passengers and goods. But the 1937 Trunk Road Plan became a turning point. The 
new trunk roads facilitated the different regions’ economic integration, and linked 
thereby road, trade and industry policies. 
 The Norwegian public road system measured 37.443 kilometers in 1930. 
9.303 kilometers were classified as trunk roads, 6.116 kilometers as county roads 
and 22.024 kilometers as parish roads. Only 99 kilometers outside the cities were 
paved, the rest was gravel road. The Norwegian public road system in 1940 
measured 42.598 kilometers. 14.695 kilometers were classified as trunk roads, 5.135 
kilometers as county roads and 22.768 kilometers as parish roads. 1.572 kilometers 
outside the cities were paved in 1940.851 The 1937 Trunk Road Plan gave thereby 
results concerning paving, but the trunk road system’s length increased most 1930-
35, because road construction was then used as relief works during the depression. 
Parts of the public road system were also reclassified in the 1930s. 
The German occupation established a temporary expert governed road policy 
The German occupation from April 9th 1940 until May 8th 1945 led to introduction 
of temporary civil servant and expert rule in many sectors.852 The German 
occupation led also to temporary suspension of the Liberal Party’s System for 
resource allocation, because the parliamentary democracy was replaced by 
totalitarian rule. This temporary return to a regime with some similarities with the 
1814-1884 Civil Servant’s rule took place through the senior civil servants’ 
Administration Council (Administrasjonsrådet) that governed from April 15th until 
September 25th 1940, when Adolf Hitler’s vice regent in Norway Josef Terboven 
appointed the so-called commisarian ministers. The commisarian ministers did not 
constitute a collegium, because each minister was accountable to Reichskommisar 
Joseph Terboven. The commisarian ministers governed until February 1st 1942, 
when the Germans installed Vidkun Quisling’s so-called national executive through 
an official ceremony (statsakten) at Akershus Castle.853 Quisling’s second regime 
remained in power until the liberation May 8th 1945. 
 The National Resistance Movement’s self appointed top management in Oslo 
consisting of among others the Labor Party’s Einar Gerhardsen, Oslo’s deputy 
mayor 1938-40 and mayor a short period in 1940, and some industrialists and senior 
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civil servants affiliated with the non-socialist parties, planned already in 1941 
postwar Norway in secret meetings. Three of their aims according to the historian 
Finn Olstad were establishing of a strong executive and expert rule similarly as in 
Denmark and Sweden, development of a new party system with preferably 2 or 
maximum 3 parties and last but not least the Nygaardsvold executive’s immediate 
resignation after the liberation.854 However, these plans were soon shelved because 
Einar Gerhardsen and thousands of others opposing the German occupation were 
arrested and sent to Norwegian and later also German concentration camps. 
 How did the German occupation and temporary civil servant rule affect the 
road policy? The Administration Council decided July 1st 1940 that trunk roads 
outlined in the 1937 Trunk Road Plan, which were not yet completed, would be 
fully financed by the State; i.e. without 20 percent county co-financing.855 The 
Administration Council’s decision recognized clearly trunk roads as national 
collective goods, similarly as the 1937 Trunk Road Plan did. But the Administration 
Council’s technocrats perceived obviously trunk roads somewhat different than the 
legally elected legislators and executives did prior to the German occupation, and 
were obviously inspired by the interwar years’ road policy development in for 
instance Denmark, Germany and USA, such as discussed in chapter 2. 
 How did the German occupation affect the Combined Road Administration 
and the road planning and road construction? Norway got a new polity during the 
occupation, a dual government structure, similarly as in more recently occupied 
countries. The German Reichscommisariat’s headquarter in Oslo supervised and 
overruled in some instances the Norwegian ministries and public administrations. 
The Reichscommisariat had also regional chapters, so-called Aussenstellen in 
Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. The Reichscommisariat’s 
most important section concerning road policy and road construction was 
Hauptabteilung Volkswirtschaft, headed by Carlo Otte that supervised the Ministry 
of Public Works. Hauptabteilung Volkswirtschaft had one Abteilung Verkehr 
headed by Ober-Reichsbahnrat Windscheid who supervised the Norwegian State 
Railroads, one Abteilung Technic that in 1942 became Hauptabteilung Technic, 
headed by Ministerialrat Henne. Oberbaurat and later Hauptbauleiter Hesse headed 
similarly Hauptabteilung Technic’s Organisation Todt Arbeidsgebiet Straßen- und 
Bruckenbauten that supervised the Combined Road Administration’s road 
construction.856 Organisation Todt was among others responsible for construction of 
the German Autobahns after the regime change in 1933, and engaged similarly in 
road planning and construction in Norway. Organisation Todt supplemented 
Norwegian construction workers with Russian prisoners of war after the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union.857 April 9th 1940 changed the Norwegian polity 
fundamentally, because the democratically elected legislators and executives were 
replaced by a totalitarian regime combined with partly civil servant and expert rule, 
which in turn was supervised and in some instances overruled by the German 
occupants’ local representatives. 
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 Reichskommisar Josef Terboven appointed September 25th 1940 the architect 
Tormod Hustad, who had been minister of agriculture in Vidkun Quisling’s April 9th 
executive, as commisarian minister of public works.858 Norwegian road construction 
reached its all time high 1940/41 measured in man-hours, but was significantly 
reduced when the German warfare lost momentum.859 About 69.200 Norwegian 
workers were employed in the construction sector in 1939 prior to the German 
invasion. The construction sector’s employment increased to approximately 120.000 
workers in 1940 and reached its all time high in July 1941 with 147.000 workers. 
The construction sector’s number of employees went thereafter down to 137.600 in 
1942, 120.500 in 1943, 107.400 in 1944 and finally about 78.700 in January 1945.860  
 The German occupation did not lead to significant improvements of the 
Norwegian road system, despite popular belief, because the construction activities 
1940-45 served first and foremost the occupants’ military needs, not the Norwegian 
population or trade and industry’s needs.861 However, the very expansive economic 
policy during the occupation removed Norway’s almost permanent prewar 
unemployment and the 1920s and 30s debt crisis.862 The railroads’ share of the 
passenger transports increased from 22 percent in 1939 to 35 percent in 1945. But 
the roads’ share of passenger transports went down from 59 percent in 1939 to 32 
percent in 1945. The railroads’ share of the goods transport increased from 9 percent 
in 1939 to 28 percent in 1945. But the roads’ relative share of the goods transports 
increased from 6 percent in 1939 to 8 percent in 1945.863 The roads’ increased share 
of goods transport even during the occupation indicated clearly that cars received a 
more prominent position in the transport system, despite lack of fuel, spare parts and 
restricted use of cars. 
 The German occupants and their Norwegian helpers used also the opportunity 
plan the ’new order’ within the German Großwirtschaftraum. Commisarian minister 
of interior Viljam Albert Hagelin appointed December 4th 1941 Greater Oslo’s 
Planning and Beautification Commission (Stor-Oslos Regulerings- og 
Skjønnhetsnevnd (S.O.R.S.)), headed by Hagelin’s deputy, permanent 
undersecretary (Innenriksråd) Thorleif Dahl. Engineer Skjalm Bang, head of Aker’s 
municipal road administration and the Public Roads Administration’s engineer 
Anders Tomter were Greater Oslo’ Planning and Beautification Commission’s road 
expertise. Anders Tomter was also the commission’s secretary, but Skjalm Bang 
substituted when Tomter volunteered in the German invasion of Soviet until May 1st 
1942 through his participation in the Norwegian Legion (Norske Legion), a chapter 
of Waffen SS.864 Greater Oslo’ Planning and Beautification Commission’s tasks 
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were first to revise Greater Oslo’s 1934 General Plan and second to approve the 
revised plan.865 Greater Oslo’ Planning and Beautification Commission’s dual role 
as planners and approvers illustrates another aspect of the regime change after April 
9th1940. 
 But how did the Directorate of Public Roads and Akershus’ Public Roads 
Administration handle the German occupation and establishing of Greater Oslo’s 
Planning and Beautification Commission? One member of Aker’s Area Planning 
Council (Akers Reguleringsråd), most likely Akershus’ County Engineer Arne Olai 
Korsbrekke, sent a private letter to Road Director Andreas Baalsrud in February 
1942, enclosed a copy of Greater Oslo’s Planning and Beautification Commission’s 
letter to Aker’s Area Planning Council of January 31st 1942 that informed about the 
so-called ‘new order’ for planning and area development.866 Greater Oslo’s Planning 
and Beautification Commission supplemented and replaced namely from then partly 
the 1924 Building Act, which regulated the urban areas’ area planning and road 
construction. The so-called ”new order” was based on the established local 
autonomy, supplemented with expert coordination to improve the ”common utility”. 
The new Ministry of Interior’s permanent undersecretary Thorleif Dahl headed 
Greater Oslo’ Planning and Beautification Commission, but he was also Greater 
Oslo’ Planning and Beautification Commission’s expert and supreme authority, 
because all decisions were from then made in accordance with the so-called ”fuehrer 
principle”.867 These letters – particularly the copy of Greater Oslo’s Planning and 
Beautification Commission’s letter to Aker’s Area Planning Council – may have 
been a warning from County Engineer Arne Olai Korsbrekke to Road Director 
Andreas Baalsrud, and illustrates other aspects of the regime change began April 9th 
1940. 
 What made Greater Oslo’s Road and Railroad Plan of September 1942 
(Forslag til nytt grunnlag for Stor-Oslo byplan - Veg- og jernbaneplan) more than a 
historical parenthesis and curiosity? Skjalm Bang and Anders Tomter introduced 
here many ideas from the Danish engineering and construction companies’ 1936-37 
motorway and bridge plans, such as discussed in chapter 2. These ideas had been 
established as facts on the ground through German motorways and US entrance 
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roads prior to World War Two.868 The Reichscommisariat and Organisation Todt 
planned similarly construction of a Norwegian Autostrada from Halden in south at 
the Swedish border, via Oslo to the third largest city Trondheim in Sør-Trøndelag 
County. Greater Oslo’s Road and Railroad Plan of September 1942 was based on 
transport economic calculations. Skjalm Bang and Anders Tomter launched here 
ideas that first reemerged in Norway in the late 1950s and early 60s, but never 
gained similar foothold such as in Denmark and Sweden until the 1980s and late 
90s, and hardly even then.  
Figure 16: Greater Oslo’s Planning and Beautification Commission’s proposed 
trunk road and railroad plan of September 1942 
 
Source: Forslag til nytt grunnlag for Stor-Oslo byplan. Veg og Jernbaneplan, N.S. Rikstrykkeri, Moss 
September 1942:Bilag A10, VDA cassette 363a Reguleringsplan for Stor-Oslo 1942, Aker 1927-1946. 
 Greater Oslo’s Planning and Beautification Commission planned construction 
of Oslo’s three radial entrance roads approved through Greater Oslo’s 1934 General 
Plan as 18 meters wide four-lane urban motorways, with physical separation 
between the directions of traffic, no direct entrances from the adjacent properties 
and level-free crossings, and with an Autostrada from Halden to Trondheim 
bypassing Oslo’s central areas in the east through Aker municipal. Greater Oslo’s 
Road and Railroad Plan of September 1942 represented thus a radical departure 
both from the prevailing Norwegian road regime, based on construction of narrow 
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and bendy 19th century style gravel roads, and Greater Oslo’s 1934 General Plan 
based on construction of combined entrance roads that mixed soft and hard road 
users and remote and local traffic. Bang and Tomter suggested also merging the 
three entrance roads southeast of Oslo’s Eastern Railroad Station (Østbanestasjonen) 
that was planned closed down and reestablished as a new Central Station 
(Sentralbanegård) at Tøyen northeast of the city hub. Bang and Tomter’s main 
arguments for building the entrance roads as urban motorways were road capacity, 
efficiency and road safety.869 Greater Oslo’s Road and Railroad Plan of September 
1942 was thereby a state of the art high-level road plan, similarly as the Danish 
engineering and construction companies’ 1936-36 motorway and bridge plans, but 
from the wrong persons under the wrong circumstances, and was clearly an attempt 
of introducing a German road policy in Norway.  
 Knut Waarum was in 1942 employed as senior engineer in the Directorate of 
Public Roads, after having served as Finnmark’s County Engineer 1938-41 and 
Nordland’s County Engineer 1941-42, and became soon Road Director Andreas 
Baalsrud’s deputy.870 Road Director Andreas Baalsrud, who had been struggling 
with the railroad lobby since he became Road Director in 1919, endorsed partly 
Greater Oslo’s Road and Railroad Plan of September 1942 in a letter April 21st 
1943, where he concluded Greater-Oslo was congested, despite many warnings, 
among others through his 1932 PM to the Ministry of Public Works. Baalsrud 
concluded “extraordinary and innovative measures” were necessary to overcome 
these problems, even if there were some indications of ambiguity and reservations to 
the plans.871 It seems that Road Director Andreas Baalsrud here tread water, because 
Andreas Baalsrud was never a nazi according to his granddaughter Kristin (Kikkik) 
Baalsrud, but a “democratic conservative”. Andreas Baalsrud had ostensibly been 
instructed by the National Resistance Movement to remain Road Director, despite 
his age, among others to monitor the Quisling regime’s public works through 
mobilization of labor through the Labor Services (Arbeidstjenesten).872 But the 
National Resistance Movement was a fragmented conglomerate prior to its 
reorganizing in 1944 according to Jens Chr. Hauge, who headed MILORG, the 
military wing of the National Resistance Movement from 1942 until the 
liberation.873 Kristin Baalsrud’s father and Andreas Baalsrud’s son, Terje Baalsrud, 
was a prominent member of the rightwing nationalist movement Fedrelandslaget 
prior to World War Two.874 Many Norwegians on the political rightwing 
sympathized with Germany during the interwar years, but many changed sympathies 
April 9th 1940. 
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 Knut Waarum was in 1943 chosen by the Norwegian exile executive in 
London, and evacuated to Great Britain via an invitation through the Directorate of 
Public Road’s engineer Johannes Holt, who had been employed at the Bridge 
Department since 1939. Johannes Holt was one of the Directorate of Public Roads’ 
liaisons to the Reichscommisariat and Organisation Todt, because of his mastering 
of the German language, but he was also secret agent for the exile executive’s 
intelligence network XU.875 Knut Waarum went to Britain, and served 1943-45 as 
member of the Technical Advisory Committee Inland Transports, where he planned 
postwar Norway’s road administration.876 Road Director Andreas Baalsrud was thus 
partly on his own after his deputy went to London. Many clandestine activities took 
place at the Directorate of Public Roads’ premises during the occupation, because 
the directorate’s offices and archives were poorly guarded, according to Johannes 
Holt.877 The poor guarding of the Directorate of Public Roads’ offices and archives, 
which were highly attractive targets for allied intelligence services, may indicate the 
Germans or their Norwegian helpers hardly questioned the Directorate of Public 
Roads or Road Director Andreas Baalsrud’s loyalty during the occupation. 
 The Quisling regime renamed in February 1944 the Directorate of Public 
Roads to Directorate General of Public Roads Administration (Generaldirektoratet 
for vegvesen), after the Ministry of Public Works January 28th had been renamed 
Ministry of Traffic. Road Director Andreas Baalsrud became Director General of 
Public Roads Administration and was authorized to govern the Directorate General 
of Public Roads Administration according to the fuehrer principle.878 Andreas 
Baalsrud had earlier proposed altering the County Engineers’ title to Chief County 
Road Officer (veisjefer) in his 1939 budget proposal, but Stortinget postponed the 
idea. Baalsrud forwarded it once again, and the Ministry of Public Works approved 
Baalsrud’s proposal. The County Engineers became Chief County Road Officers 
(vegsjefer) January 1st 1944.879 The Quisling regime reorganized hence the Ministry 
of Public Works and the Combined Road Administration according to the German 
role model, with a Ministry of Traffic and an autonomous Directorate General of 
Public Roads Administration. 
 The Ministry of Traffic processed Greater Oslo’s Road and Railroad Plan of 
September 1942 with comments during 1944.880 Minister President Vidkun Quisling 
approved the plan October 21st 1944. The Ministry of Traffic ordered 
implementation in February 1945.881 Newspapers permitted by the Quisling regime 
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promoted also construction of modern roads during the fall 1944 and winter 1945.882 
But Greater Oslo’s Road and Railroad Plan of September 1942 was shelved 
immediately after the liberation May 8th 1945. The road sector differed thus 
fundamentally from the energy sector, where the Germans and the Quisling regime’s 
new hydroelectric policy gave the Norwegian State a prominent position in 
development of large-scale heavy industries after the liberation.883  
 Norway had 43.980 kilometers public roads in 1945. 15.866 kilometers were 
defined as trunk roads, 5.243 kilometers as county roads and 22.871 kilometers as 
parish roads. 1.555 kilometers outside the cities were paved.884 The Germans and the 
Quisling regime built thereby about 1.300 kilometers new roads. Most of these were 
trunk roads, but very few kilometers were paved, because of the oil product 
shortage. Concrete were hardly used for road paving during the occupation, because 
most concrete went to construction of German fortifications and hydroelectric power 
plants. 
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Norwegian case prior to 1945? First, this study’s main hypothesis or 
benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road policy and road 
construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good was clearly 
weakened from the 1890s until 1928, but thereafter strengthened until 1945. The 
Combined Road Administration, 1912 Road Act and County Road Boards 
undermined clearly the Directorate of Public Roads and Ministry of Public Works’ 
roles as coordinating bodies for road policy and road construction, and established a 
system with decentralized and local control of the road policy combined with State 
financing, which in turn created common pool problems because of poor 
correspondence between the constituencies’ contributions to the community and 
allocation of publicly financed goods such as trunk roads. The Liberal Party 
executive’s transferring of responsibility for maintenance of trunk roads from the 
counties’ Public Roads Administration to the Directorate of Public Roads from 1928 
strengthened clearly the Directorate of Public Road’s role as road policy 
coordinating body. This reform at the mass motoring’s initial breakthrough in 
Norway recognized clearly trunk roads as national collective goods. The same did 
Stortinget’s approval of the 1937 Trunk Road Plan that linked road, trade and 
industry policies. The German occupation established temporary expert ruled road 
policy and road construction and increased the Directorate of Public Roads’ 
professional autonomy. The Quisling regime and Organisation Todt planned 
similarly construction of motorways in Oslo and an Autostrada from Halden to 
Trondheim via Oslo. These plans introduced ideas about modern trunk roads and 
motorways such as outlined in Denmark prior to World War Two. 
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 Second, the working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective or 
private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly strengthened by the Norwegian case 
prior to 1945. The farmers’ struggles with the civil servants in Stortinget established 
the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition prior to establishment of 
formal political parties, and made road policy and road construction an area for 
resource struggles between the constituencies. Establishment of the Combined Road 
Administration in 1893 and the 1912 Road Act gave similarly the constituencies’ 
strong incentives for construction of roads with local collective or even private good 
characteristics rather than roads with national collective good characteristics, 
because the State paid most of the costs. 
 Third, the working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective or 
private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was also strengthened by the Norwegian case prior to 1945. 
Introduction of parliamentary rule from 1884 and establishment of formal political 
parties instituted politicized resource allocation to collective goods and public 
utilities. The political parties’ rivalry was also clearly evident in the 1920s and 30s 
struggles between road and railroad champions. The Labor and Liberal Parties had 
many railroad champions, but the Labor Party revised its road policy somewhat after 
the 1935 agreement with the Agrarian Party that facilitated Stortinget’s approval of 
the 1937 Trunk Road Plan. The German occupation 1940-45 established a 
temporary totalitarian regime that banned all political parties except the Norwegian 
Nazi Party, and established a system where the Germans and the Combined Road 
Administration governed road policy and road construction according to the 
professionals’ norms and standards. 
 Finally, the working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was also strengthened by the Norwegian case prior to 
1945. First, the 1824 Road Act instituted a localist and communalist pattern, where 
road policy and road construction was governed bottom-up and not top-down such 
as in Denmark prior the 1867 Road Act came into power. Second, the 1851 Road 
Act instituted Stortinget’s individual approval of every single road that received 
partial State financing, an arrangement that gave the legislators increasing returns, 
even if road policy in the middle of the 19th century was governed according to the 
so-called Norwegian System where Stortinget’s allocation of infrastructure 
investments was contingent local co-financing through local taxes. Third, 
introduction of parliamentary rule and political parties from 1884, State taxes from 
1892 and establishment of the Combined Road Administration through the 1893 
Road Act Amendment paved the way for the Liberal Party’s System that instituted 
politicized resource allocation and redistribution to infrastructures, and governed 
Stortinget’s resource allocation to roads most of the 20th century. The 1912 Road 
Act blocked allocation of State road appropriations to the cities and gave also the 
peripheral and rural constituencies increasing returns. Stortinget’s 1929 key froze 
the counties’ annual share of the State road appropriation until 1964, no matter the 
actual need for road investments. The Liberal Party’s System was clearly an 
example of path dependence. Fourth, the equilibrium established through the 
Combined Road Administration was almost punctuated by the executive’s 
transferring of responsibility for maintenance of trunk roads from the counties’ 
Public Roads Administration to the Directorate of Public Roads from 1928 and 
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Stortinget’s approval of the 1937 Trunk Road Plan. Finally, the German occupation 
1940-45 established a new but highly unstable equilibrium where the Combined 
Road Administration’s professionals temporarily governed road policy and road 
construction. 
1945-59 – Struggles within the governing Labor Party after 
derailing the interwar years’ development path that linked road, 
trade and industry policies 
The interwar years’ development path that linked road, trade and industry policies 
was derailed during the initial reconstruction. New studies of primary sources 
revealed the majority postwar Labor Party executives fought several wars at once 
with regard to road policy and road construction; both internally against the Labor 
Party traditionalists, railroad lobby and anti-motorists, and externally against the 
non-socialist opposition parties that opposed the car rationing imposed in 1947 and 
demanded increased road investments. These findings difference former studies that 
partly overlooked the Labor Party’s intraparty conflicts concerning road and 
motoring policies. 
The new Labor Party State – or return to the former 1814-1884 Civil Servant 
State? 
A regime change took place after the liberation May 8th 1945. The National 
Resistance Movement’s (Hjemmefrontens) caretaker executive governed until May 
31st, when the legally elected Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold returned from his 
exile in London.885 The political parties’ Common Manifesto (Fellesprogrammet) 
presented by King Haakon at his return from exile June 7th liquidated the so-called 
Oslo group’s dream about a new political system discussed in secret meetings 
immediately after the occupation.886 A national coalition executive headed by the 
Labor Party’s new strong man, Oslo’s mayor Einar Gerhardsen, replaced 
Nygaardsvold’s Labor Party executive June 25th.887 888 Many considered then Johan 
Nygaardsvold a political debit, because his executive’s disarmament policy was held 
partly responsible for the German invasion. The legal postwar executives invalidated 
or reversed the Quisling executive’s illegal decisions, but reintroduced later some of 
the Quisling executive’s organizational and administrative means. 
 The Germans financed the occupation by printing money.889 The transition 
from wartime to peacetime economy posed several challenges. First, it was risk for 
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strong inflation because of excess liquidity. Second, Finnmark and Nord-Troms had 
to be rebuilt, because the Germans burned down almost every building when they 
withdrew from the Russians. Third, there was acute shortage of housing, particularly 
in Oslo and other major cities. Fourth, the labor force, which had been employed in 
the wartime production and partly also in the Norwegian merchant marine, had to be 
employed. Fifth, machines, tools and transport and communication infrastructures 
had to be maintained and rebuilt, due to lack of renewal and maintenance during the 
occupation. Finally, there was risk for shortages on consumer goods during a 
transition period.890 
 The Labor Party won 76 of Stortinget’s 150 seats in the 1945 election, and 
maintained its majority even after the 1949, 1953 and 1957 elections.891 Einar 
Gerhardsen established the Labor Party’s first majority executive November 5th 
1945. Majority Labor Party executives governed Norway until after the 1961 
election. The Labor Party’s internal power relations therefore determined many 
political issues. The executive’s governing apparatus during the initial 
reconstruction was based on a trinity, the ”corporative pyramid”, direct price and 
quantity regulations and National budgets.892 The corporative pyramid consisted of 
the executive’s Economic Coordination Council (Det økonomiske samordningsråd) 
established in May 1945, Business Sector Councils (Bransjeråd), approved by 
Stortinget in June 1947 against the non-socialist parties’ votes, and Production 
Committees (Produksjonsutvalg) in each firm, agreed between the trade unions and 
the employers organization in December 1945. The corporative pyramid came in 
addition to the elected political institutions, but ceased in practice to exist in the 
early 1950s, because the 1953 Price Act removed the Economic Coordination 
Council and partly also the Business Sector Councils’ legal basis.893  
 Erik Brofoss, minister of finance in Einar Gerhardsen’s first Labor Party 
executive who designed the particular Norwegian postwar economic policy was a 
lawyer with supplementary exam in State Economy from University of Oslo in 1938 
that had served in the exile executive’s Ministry of Supply in London 1942-45.894 
Erik Brofoss’ economic policy was an amalgam of ideas from John Maynard 
Keynes and Professor Ragnar Frisch from University of Oslo, who headed the so-
called Oslo School of economics. Keynes argued for State interventions to stabilize 
the macro economy. Frisch argued for micro economic State activism, and 
considered the real economy opposed to the so-called financial fiction economy.895 
Erik Brofoss and his advisers saw themselves as Norway Inc.’s management 
team.896 Brofoss’ aim was policy based on ”rational considerations”; i.e. expert 
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rule.897 Brofoss made the Ministry of Finance a super ministry or executive within 
the executive, and gave Ragnar Frisch’ followers – the economists 
(sosialøkonomene) graduated from University of Oslo – prominent positions, and 
instituted positivism and ’social-economism’ as the governing beliefs. The 
economists and their social-economism diffused gradually to other ministries and 
agencies as the economists partly displaced lawyers as leading civil servants.898 The 
Labor Party executive’s economic policy furthered partly the temporary civil 
servants’ expert rule 1940-45. The result was soon close ties between leading civil 
servants and the Labor Party. But there were some fundamental differences: The 
Swedish-Norwegian King appointed the 1814-1884 civil servants. The temporary 
1940-45 civil servant rule was totalitarian and installed by the German occupants. 
The postwar Labor Party executives were all popularly elected through democratic 
elections. 
 Einar Gerhardsen’s first Labor Party executive’s reconstruction policy was 
based on “raising the national income above the 1939 level”, “spending relatively 
less of the national income on consumption and more on investment” and by 
“surplus imports from abroad financed out of reserves of foreign exchange and by 
foreign credits”. This policy was achieved through “deliberate austerity maintaining 
a very strict rationing system for all main consumer goods”.899 Erik Brofoss’ 
economic policy worked until 1947 when the dollar reserves earned by Norway’s 
merchant marine during World War Two were spent. Norway experienced then a 
currency crisis similarly as most other West European countries, among others 
because the anomalous drought reduced the agricultural crops and stocks of cattle. 
Norway received Marshall Aid from April 1948 until June 30th 1953, but with 
strings attached. Norway joined OEEC in 1948 and the European Payment Union 
(EPU) in 1950. The NOK was devaluated about 30 percent to the USD in 1949. But 
the executive’s stabilization and subsidy policy had to be abandoned in 1950, when 
almost 1/3 of the State’s budget went to subsidies, despite the National Federation of 
Labor’s opposition against reduced subsidies.900 Norway joined NATO in 1949 after 
internal struggles between the Labor Party modernists and Atlantists and 
traditionalists and neutralists.901  
 The 1947 currency crisis and entailing State economic problems led to Erik 
Brofoss’ takeover of the import and export regulations from minister of supplies 
Oscar Torp, and to establishment of the new Ministry of Trade 
(Handelsdepartementet) December 6th 1947, headed by Erik Brofoss. Olav 
Meisdalshagen, one of the Labor Party’s leaders of the peripheral and rural areas’ 
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distributional coalition and a staunch neutralist, became minister of finance. The 
Ministry of Finance was reduced to a tax and budget ministry during 
Meisdalshagen’s tenure, because the currency accounting went to the new Ministry 
of Trade and Norges Bank.902 The OEEC membership led to gradual dismantling of 
the command economy in most sectors from November 1949, because of the free 
listing system. About 50 percent of the private imports in 1949/50 were except from 
direct price and quantity regulations that gradually were substituted by indirect 
regulations.903 Erik Brofoss served as minister of trade until 1954, when he became 
governor (sentralbanksjef) of Norges Bank, a position he held until 1970. Erik 
Brofoss moved then ”from the stage to the string attic”. 904 But few knew better than 
Erik Brofoss the rules of the game had changed fundamentally 1950-54.  
 The economic historian Sverre Knutsen denoted the Labor Party’s postwar 
economic policy as ”Strategic Capitalism” or neo-mercantilism, because of 
politically governed channeling of the investments to hydroelectric power plants and 
heavy metallurgical and electrochemical industries.905 906 The Ministry of Finance 
upheld the politically governed interest rates imposed during the German 
occupation, and the “doctrine about low cost loans” created loan queues that 
facilitated politically governed credit rationing.907 The low interest policy was not 
considered tenable in Sweden, such as previously discussed in chapter 3, but the 
Labor Party executive established a new corporative body in 1951, the Cooperation 
Council (Samarbeidsnemda) that allocated credits to politically desirable projects 
through voluntary agreements between the executive and the finance institutions’ 
business sector organizations. The executive’s aim, according to Erik Brofoss, was 
to “check borrowing from private banks”, to reduce the “inflationary pressure”. Erik 
Brofoss headed the Cooperation Council 1954-65 and the Currency Council 
(Valutarådet) 1954-70.908 The Labor Party executive’s aim was export led growth, 
through utilization of Norway’s comparative advantages based on cheap electrical 
power and relatively cheap labor, and social leveling and maintenance of the 
peripheral areas’ settlement. This policy based on comparative advantages was 
clearly in accordance with E.C.A., the Marshall Aid administration’s preferences.909 
However, the non-socialist parties became gradually more critical to the Labor 
Party’s economic and monetary policy, particularly after the initial reconstruction 
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had been accomplished about 1948/49.910 The non-socialist opposition parties 
advocated a far more liberal and localistic economic policy, hereunder development 
of a diversified and dispersed trade and industry, based on traditional Norwegian 
businesses, such as fisheries, agriculture, lumber, wood processing, manufacturing, 
crafts, services and tourism. 
 The Strategic Capitalism derailed effectively the development path established 
during the interwar years and under the German occupation based on home market 
industries for production of consumer goods, and strengthened what is here denoted 
the power industrial complex and enhanced an alternative development path based 
on the export enclaves’ energy intensive industries. The export enclaves were often 
located in peripheral and rural areas.911 The power industrial complex consisted 
largely of industrialists, trade union bosses, legislators and members of county and 
municipal councils dependent of the export enclaves. Traditional Norwegian trade 
and industries and the emerging home market industries were in practice crowded 
out by the heavy industries. 
 Einar Gerhardsen resigned as Prime Minister November 19th 1951, officially 
because he was tired, but most likely because of intraparty struggles about security 
political matters according to the historian Trond Bergh and the political scientist 
Nils Ørvik who also was member of the Labor Party, and an economic policy no 
longer tenable according to the economic historian Sverre Knutsen and the historian 
Finn Olstad, because Norway’s membership in OEEC was not compatible with 
direct price and quantity regulations and Einar Gerhardsen’s preferred corporative 
system. Einar Gerhardsen appointed Oscar Torp as his successor. Trygve Bratteli, 
the Labor Party’s deputy leader since 1945 succeeded Olav Meisdalshagen as 
minister of finance.912 The Ministry of Finance strengthened its position 
significantly from 1952, through establishment of the Economy Department 
(Økonomiavdelingen), staffed by the Ministry of Trade’s economists and planners. 
Lawyers staffed the Ministry of Finance’s other sections when Trygve Bratteli 
Succeeded Olav Meisdalshagen as minister of finance.913 The new Economy 
Department’s economists were crucial for the transition from direct price and 
quantity to indirect regulations.914 But Einar Gerhardsen and the Labor Party 
executive’s postwar economic policy was not socialism, according to the Ministry of 
Finance’s economist Bjørn Larsen, despite Einar Gerhardsen’s often radical rhetoric, 
but rather the Liberal Party’s prewar alternative to socialism, “a planned economy”, 
such as outlined by Wilhelm Thagaard, the very influential head of Norway’s Price 
and Trust Control 1921-60.915 Bjørn Larsen, who had first hand experiences both 
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with Ragnar Frisch and Wilhelm Thagaard, recognized their ideas immediately in 
1952 when he became a part of the Ministry of Finance’s middleware of politically 
interested civil servants. 
 Einar Gerhardsen regained his position as Prime Minister January 22nd 1955 
through a “Palace revolution” and imposed the so-called February measures to 
prevent overheating of the economy.916 Oscar Torp’s executive had then changed 
the economic policy from direct to largely indirect regulations. Einar Gerhardsen’s 
third executive was a result of increasing tensions between Oscar Torp’s executive 
and the Labor Party’s faction in Stortinget headed by Einar Gerhardsen, according to 
the National Federation of Labor’s leader Konrad Nordahl who also was one of the 
Labor Party’s rulers. The historian Finn Olstad claimed Prime Minister Oscar Torp 
and his minister of finance Trygve Bratteli advocated more market and less 
regulation than preferred by Einar Gerhardsen and his followers. Bergen and 
Hordaland’s County Governor Mons Lid became new minister of finance, but 
resigned in December 1956 and was succeeded by Trygve Bratteli.917 Growing 
inflation was one of the third Gerhardsen executive’s “headaches”, according to the 
historian Trond Bergh.918 But the third Gerhardsen executive upheld the low interest 
policy that most likely aggravated the inflation problems. Abandoning the low 
interest policy was not an issue, because that would have undermined both the 
Strategic Capitalism and the regional policy, two of the jewels in the Labor Party’s 
crown. 
 The historian Jens Arup Seip denoted the period 1945-61 as the “Monoparty 
State”, but this period can also be understood as return to the Civil Servant State, 
after its suspension 1884-1940.919 920 Stortinget had been suspended between June 
1940 and June 1945. Some claimed Stortinget partly became the executive’s rubber 
stamp 1945-61.921 However, the forthcoming discussions about road policy and road 
construction nuance and modify these claims, because the traditionalists and the 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition strengthened their positions 
during the German occupation, due to often more pronounced resistance in rural and 
peripheral than in central and urban areas. Both the Liberal Party’s System for 
resource allocation and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition were 
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hardy perennials that rose again after their 1940-45 suspension, and accommodated 
soon to the new Labor Party State. 
 The Norwegian election system underwent fundamental changes prior to the 
1953 election. The 1859 Farmer’s Paragraph was formally abolished in 1952 after a 
delicate and implicit compromise between the Labor and Conservative Parties, 
despite the Agrarian Party’s protests. Even d’Hondt’s method for seat allocation was 
replaced with a modified St. Laguë’s method favoring smaller parties.922 The 1953 
election system made the counties common constituencies for urban and rural areas. 
This institutional shift gave the rural areas control of many political parties’ 
nominations to the parliamentary elections, because most counties had far more rural 
than urban municipals.  
 The 1953 election system did not establish the principle one person – one vote, 
such as Denmark’s 1953 election system did, but upheld the peripheral and rural 
areas’ malapportionment and furthered the established principle that distinguished 
between A and B voters similarly as in many Scandinavian joint stock companies. 
The revised geographical seat allocation gave the coastal counties from Rogaland in 
southwest to Finnmark in north 73 of Stortinget’s 150 seats until the 1973 
election.923 These counties have always been the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition’s heartland, and needed only 3 additional votes to establish 
an MWC and thus control of the annual State budgets and their geographical 
allocations. The peripheral counties held similarly almost 2/3 of Stortinget’s seats. 
The coastal counties from Rogaland to Finnmark held similarly more than 1/3 of 
Stortinget’s seats that gave them negative control in case of constitutional 
amendments. The same was largely the case for the traditionalists. The institutional 
configuration 1945-59 established hence a political economy favoring the 
traditionalists and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition. The 
National Federation of Labor’s leader Konrad Nordahl claimed the Farmer’s 
Paragraph that “protected narrow parish interests, fell like a ripe fruit”.924 But 
Nordahl was wrong. The Farmer’s Paragraph was upheld substantially, despite 
formal abolition prior to the 1953 election. 
 Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
(Samferdselskomiteen) was established after the 1949 election as a merger of 
Stortinget’s Standing Road and Railroad Committee and the Standing Mail, 
Telegraph and Coastal Navigation Committee.925 The peripheral constituencies and 
the socialist and middle parties’ representatives dominated Stortinget’s Standing 
Road and Railroad Committee 1946-49, and similarly the new Standing Committee 
on Transport and Communications 1950-53, 1954-57 and 1958-61 both numerically 
and with regard to formal positions.926 The committee’s members’ constituencies 
and background made road policy and road construction 1945-59 to the peripheral 
and rural areas’ distributional coalition and the traditionalists’ turf.  
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 How did Norway perform economically 1945-59? There is a stubborn myth 
that Norway was poor and backwards during the 1950s. The initial reconstruction 
was completed 1948/49, as discussed previously in chapter 1.927 Norway’s GDP per 
capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, was 4.029 dollars in 
1945, 5.463 in 1950 and 6.871 in 1959. The average for the 12 West European 
countries was 4.154 dollars in 1945, 5.018 in 1950 and 7.184 in 1959. Norway had 
thus caught up economically in 1950, because of strong economic growth 1945-50, 
particularly within the domestic consumer good industries, but lagged somewhat 
behind in 1959, because of weaker economic growth 1950-59 than the West-
European average, despite exceptionally high investments. Norway had West 
Europe’s eighth highest GDP per capita in 1945, sixth highest in 1950 and eight 
highest in 1959.928 Norway’s relatively poor economic performance 1950-59 may 
therefore be a direct result of the Labor Party executives’ Strategic Capitalism and 
regional policy that allocated significant resources to projects with low economic 
return on the investments. 
Derailing the interwar years’ road and motoring policies  
The Quisling executive’s Ministry of Traffic was largely upheld after the liberation, 
but renamed Ministry of Public Works. The Directorate General of Transports was 
renamed Directorate of Transports (Transportdirektoratet) and transferred to the 
Ministry of Supplies and Reconstruction (Forsynings- og 
gjenreisningsdepartementet). The Directorate of Transports was merged with the 
Ministry of Public Works February 22nd 1946. This reform established the current 
Ministry of Transport and Communications (Samferdselsdepartementet).929 The 
Ministry of Traffic was hence one of the Quisling executive’s organizational 
arrangements that persisted after the liberation but under a different name. 
 The Directorate General of Public Roads Administration was renamed 
Directorate of Public Roads after the liberation. The Director General of Public 
Roads Administration became once again Road Director. The counties’ Chief 
County Road Officers became similarly County Engineers. The 73 years old Road 
Director Andreas Baalsrud, who graduated as chartered engineer from Zurich in 
1894, retired in 1945, and was succeeded by the 68 years old Arne Olai Korsbrekke, 
who graduated as chartered engineer from Dresden in 1906. Arne Olai Korsbrekke 
who had been Nord-Trøndelag’s County Engineer 1920-34 and Akershus’ County 
Engineer since 1934, was only a transitional figure, but did his best to establish 
Oslo’s then crowded entrance roads on the political agenda before he retired. 
Korsbrekke was succeeded by the 56 years old Thomas Offenberg Backer in 1948, 
who in 1914 graduated in the first hatch of chartered engineers from Norwegian 
Institute of Technology (Norges Tekniske Høgskole) in Trondheim. Backer had been 
employed in the Directorate of Public Roads 1935-40 and served as Oppland’s 
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County Engineer 1940-48.930 The County Engineers became once again Chief 
County Road Officers (vegsjefer) in 1949.931 Road Director Andreas Baalsrud was 
not investigated after the liberation, according to his granddaughter Kristin (Kikkik) 
Baalsrud, and had the use of an office in the Directorate of Public Roads for years 
after he retired.932 The Combined Road Administration, hereunder the Directorate of 
Public Roads and the Ministry of Public Works/Ministry of Traffic’s role under the 
German occupation is an interesting and so far understudied part of Norwegian road 
policy and public administration. 
 The liberation led hence to a partial regime change even in the Combined 
Road Administration, because the Directorate of Public Roads lost already in 1945 
its new autonomy introduced in February 1944. The County Road Boards and Public 
Roads Administrations used clearly this window of opportunity and punctuated 
partly the 1928 equilibrium that made trunk roads the Directorate of Public Roads’ 
turf, and undermined partly the Directorate of Public Roads’ position during the 
initial reconstruction. 
 Erik Brofoss’ economic policy during the initial reconstruction aimed first and 
foremost at increased production, and prioritized investments that gave immediate 
export revenues or saved foreign currency, similarly as the contemporary Swedish 
economic policy discussed in chapter 3. All other investments, hereunder roads and 
import of cars were postponed, because it was “not possible to export roads”, 
according to Brofoss. Nils Langhelle from Bergen, minister of transport and 
communications until January 5th 1952, was not a sector enthusiast but a political 
generalist, and became soon one of Erik Brofoss’ closest friends and allies.933 934 
The Ministry of Public Works/Transport and Communications governed the road 
and motoring policy formally 1945-59, but was overruled by the Ministry of 
Finance’s governing of the budget constraints. 
 Stortinget approved the very restrictive 1947 Transport and Communication 
Act (Samferdselsloven) that imposed direct price and quantity regulations in the 
transport sector, hereunder politically governed allocation of permits for transports, 
and later also mandatory allocation of goods and passenger transports through 
transport centrals.935 The 1947 Transport and Communication Act protected the 
railroads against competition, and upheld a highly fragmented transport industry, 
because the truck owners were usually only permitted tom own one vehicle. 
 The 1947 currency crisis triggered the executive’s imposition of car rationing 
from July 1st 1947, and similarly fuel rationing from July 1st 1947 until June 20th 
1949. The Combined Road Administration’s motor vehicle inspectors managed both 
the car and fuel rationing.936 An extraordinary and temporary fiscal fuel tax was 
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imposed in 1949 after abolition of the fuel rationing, officially for balancing the 
budgets.937 But the 1949 extraordinary fuel tax furthered also the rationing with 
other means, and punctuated the 1912 and 1926 Motor Vehicle Acts’ equilibrium by 
decoupling the fuel tax revenues from the road maintenance appropriations. The 
1949 extraordinary fuel tax could hence be interpreted as an omen about the 
Ministry of Finance’s forthcoming decoupling of all vehicle and fuel tax revenues 
from the annual road appropriations. 
 Norwegian Automobile Owners’ Association proposed already May 29th 1945 
forced improvements of the 2.500 kilometers most important trunk roads to far 
better standard than agreed in the 1937 Trunk Road Plan. The estimated extra costs 
were 156 millions 1945 NOK or 194,15 millions 1990 PPP USD. Both the Ministry 
of Public Works and Stortinget’s Standing Road and Railroad Committee supported 
this initiative.938 But this initiative was temporarily shelved, because of lack of 
manpower due to the initial reconstruction. 
 Road Director Arne Olai Korsbrekke championed the 1947 Trunk Road Plan 
(Stamvegplanen av 1947), a slightly a reworked version of Norwegian Automobile 
Owners’ Association’s May 1945 initiative, and Korsbrekke proposed financing 
through State loans, similarly as proposed by the Directorate of Public Roads in 
1883, 1886, 1920, 1937, 1938 and 1939. The new trunk roads would be self-
financing according to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, through 
reduced transaction costs and increased tourism and fuel and vehicle tax revenues. 
Stortinget approved the 1947 Trunk Road Plan July 8th 1949 against 8 votes, but 
financed through ordinary appropriations instead of State loans. The 1947 Trunk 
Road Plan’s aim was investment of 200 millions 1949 NOK, or 241,8 millions 1990 
PPP USD, the forthcoming 10 years to facilitate use of modern buses and trucks. 
New trunk roads were completely State financed, but updates of old roads required 
local co-financing. The 1937 Trunk Road Plan was first accomplished in 1951. The 
1947 Trunk Road Plan provided at least 9,6 percent return on the investments 
according to the road and motoring lobby, given paving of 6.480 kilometers trunk 
roads.939 The Ministry of Transport and Communications’ economist Eiler 
Holtermann claimed in September 1955 that paving the roads gave 8 to 20 percent 
return on the investments given 200-500 vehicles per kilometer per day.940 The 
Ministry of Transport and Communication’s championing of the 1947 Trunk Road 
Plan and State loan financing indicated clearly that both minister of transport and 
communications Nils Langhelle and the Ministry of Transport and Communication’s 
civil servants reasoned almost as the Nygaardsvold executive did prior to the 
German occupation and similarly as the Administration Council did during the 
occupation’s initial phase. Stortinget’s approval of the 1947 Trunk Road Plan was 
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similarly evidence of the executive and legislators’ willingness to prioritize 
investments in national collective goods – at least in principle. 
 The non-socialist opposition parties required every year more road 
appropriations than proposed by the executive during Nils Langhelle’s tenure as 
minister of transport and communications. Many Labor Party legislators 
representing the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition supported the 
opposition parties’ demands. The result was often increased road investments, 
despite Erik Brofoss’ protests.941 The Norwegian postwar road investments reached 
their all time low 1951/52, with 33 millions NOK, or approximately 32,5 millions 
1990 PPP USD. The 1939/40 road investments had been 30,3 millions NOK or 
approximately 57 millions 1990 PPP USD.942 The reduced investments increased the 
roads’ average construction period from 5 years in 1939/40 to 17,5 years in 
1951/52.943 Rearmament was the executive’s “top priority” at the turn of the 1940s 
and 50s, according to Erik Brofoss.944 The Labor Party executive thus deliberately 
postponed Road investments. 
 Stortinget’s majority ignored soon the 1947 Trunk Road Plan, because the 
1929 allocation key, the County Road Boards and Public Roads Administrations 
dispersed the road investments to hundreds of small construction sites, particularly 
in the peripheral and rural constituencies. The aim was often employment rather 
than completed roads, even if the Ministry of Transport and Communications and 
the Directorate of Public Roads required consolidation of the road investments in 
fewer and larger construction sites to facilitate mechanized road construction. But 
most road construction in Norway after World War Two was based on manual 
labor.945 Road Director Thomas Offenberg Backer claimed in October 1955 the 
county authorities had “responded somewhat different” to the executive and 
Directorate of Public Roads’ request for reduced number of construction sites to 
improve the sparse road appropriations’ utilization.946 The 1912 Road Act, County 
Road Boards and Combined Road Administration together counteracted effectively 
most attempts of implementing a road policy governed by transport economic and 
cost/benefit considerations even after World War Two, because the legislators were 
often more concerned with their voters than party discipline in low politics issues 
such as road policy and road construction. The counties prioritized similarly often 
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construction of roads with local collective or private good characteristics rather than 
roads with national collective good characteristics. 
 But why was mechanized road construction and maintenance significantly 
delayed in Norway compared to Denmark and Sweden? Stortinget’s decision March 
15th 1894 banned the executive’s accomplishment of public works through 
competitive bidding and use of private construction companies, except in “particular 
circumstances”.947 This ban was approved soon after the 1893 Road Act 
Amendment that established the Combined Road Administration. Competitive 
bidding and private construction companies were commonly used for road 
construction and maintenance in Denmark and Sweden. Delayed mechanization 
gave increasing returns to the Norwegian legislators, because provision of 
employment through numerous minuscule construction sites increased the 
legislators’ likelihood of reelection. The peripheral and rural areas’ distributional 
coalition that largely consisted of Labor and middle parties legislators had thereby 
few incentives to abolish the ban against competitive bidding and use of private 
construction companies prior to World War Two, because cars were then largely an 
urban phenomenon. Most car owners were well off financially. The car rationing 
imposed in 1947 delayed and constrained further diffusion of cars. The counties’ 
number of cars in 1939 determined the postwar car quotas.948 The postwar car 
rationing upheld thereby cars as an urban phenomenon. Stortinget did not abolish 
the ban against competitive bidding and use of private construction companies until 
1954, after Road Director Thomas Offenberg Backer had requested Stortinget’s 
permission, to safeguard swift road construction.949 Stortinget’s 50 years ban against 
competitive bidding and use of private construction companies can thus be 
understood as an example of path dependence, and explains also why construction 
of 19th century style gravel roads persisted in Norway during the interwar years and 
even after World War Two. 
 Stortinget and the counties’ partly overruling of the executive and Directorate 
of Public Roads’ initiatives for construction of modern trunk roads weakened clearly 
the historian Jens Arup Seip’s claim in his famous 1963 speech that Oslo took 
charge of the Labor Party in 1945 when Einar Gerhardsen ousted Johan 
Nygaardsvold.950 The 1947 Trunk Road Plan became almost a textbook example of 
common pool problems, because the Liberal Party’s System and the peripheral and 
rural areas’ distributional coalition rose again after the 1940-45 occupation and the 
1945 regime change. The Liberal Party’s System and the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition emphasized local collective or private goods rather than 
national collective goods, and instituted also an almost inverse relation between the 
constituencies’ financial contributions to the community and allocation of publicly 
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financed investments through the central and urban constituencies’ cross 
subsidization of the peripheral and rural constituencies. 
 Lack of financing clearly constrained Norwegian road construction in the 
1950s. The counties financed often trunk roads in advance, even if trunk roads were 
an explicit State responsibility according to the 1912 Road Act. The counties’ 
accumulated advance payments were 49,4 millions NOK or 44,5 millions 1990 PPP 
USD in 1953, and more than 100 millions NOK or 80,6 millions 1990 PPP USD in 
1957. The State’s net road investments 1956/57 were 113,9 millions NOK or 91,81 
millions 1990 PPP USD to trunk roads and 11,1 millions NOK or 8,95 millions 1990 
PPP USD to parish roads.951 The balance between investments in trunk roads and 
local roads shifted thus fundamentally during the 1950s from emphasis on local 
roads at the turn of the 1940s and 50s to 91 percent trunk road investments 1956/57, 
among others because of the Directorate og Public Roads and the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications’ initiatives for fewer and larger construction sites, 
but the total investments were only a fraction of the actual demand. 
 The forthcoming discussions about road and motoring policies from 
approximately 1950 to 1959 are organized along two paths. The first is about the 
non-socialist opposition parties and the road and motoring lobby’s challenges after 
completing the initial reconstruction 1948/49. The second is about the governing 
Labor Party’s policy responses, and investigates why profitable road investments 
were postponed or never accomplished and why liquidation of the unpopular car 
rationing was postponed through use of seemingly misleading or phony arguments 
until 1960, twelve years after completing the initial reconstruction. 
The non-socialist opposition parties and the road and motoring lobby’s 
challenges 
The motorist organizations, automobile importers and dealers, trade, industry and 
others established the umbrella organization Norwegian Road Federation 
(Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken), November 11th 1948 to facilitate more efficient 
lobbying for liquidation of the car rationing and increased road construction, and 
hired former motor vehicle inspector Chr. Christiansen as managing director from 
January 1st 1949.952 Chr. Christiansen engaged immediately in networking at home 
and abroad, as mentioned previously in chapter 3, to promote motoring and road 
construction, and furnished those who argued for liquidation of the car rationing or 
increased road construction with comprehensive and reliable data. Norwegian Road 
Federation was not able to join I.R.F. formally such as Swedish Road Federation 
did, due to the currency restrictions, but was still treated almost as a member.953  
 The non-socialist opposition parties desired development of a national road 
system, similarly as the Labor Party executive, because improved roads and 
communications were two pillars in their alternative economic and regional policies. 
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These demands’ strength increased from the 1949 election, when most of the initial 
reconstruction had been accomplished. The three middle parties championed 
increased road appropriations 1950-53; the Labor and Conservative Parties omitted 
this issue. Only the Conservative Party championed competitive bidding and use of 
private construction companies. The Agrarian Party did not mention mechanized 
road construction in its manifesto, but argued for construction of local rather than 
trunk roads, and was the only party that championed amendments of the 1947 
Transport and Communication Act. Neither the Liberal Party mentioned 
construction of trunk roads. Only the Labor Party argued explicit for paving of the 
roads in its 1950-54 manifesto.954 
 Norwegian Road Federation established direct contacts with the US Marshall 
Aid administration, Economic Cooperation Administration (E.C.A.), and UN’s 
Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.) at Swedish Road Federation’s annual 
meeting in June 1950, such as previously mentioned in chapter 3. Douglas Mac 
Clarke, E.C.A.’s transport adviser and USA’s representative in E.C.E., Norwegian 
Road Federation’s chairman Jon Skotte, managing director Chr. Christiansen and 
Swedish Road Federation’s managing director Bertil Liljequist went all to Norway 
after this meeting where Vestfold’s Chief County Road Officer Thor Larsen gave a 
guided tour on Norwegian roads.955 Thor Larsen quoted frequently the US Road 
Director’s adage, “you pay the same for roads whether you build them or not”, and 
claimed that good roads paid for themselves.956 Thor Larsen was one of the few 
Chief County Road Officers in the 1950s that publicly disseminated I.R.F.’s ideas, 
that modern roads facilitated economic growth. 
 Douglas Mac Clarke visited Oslo even in August 1951, when he invited 
Norwegian Road Federation to join I.R.F. at very favorable terms, namely donations 
to I.R.F.’s fund for further education of road engineers instead of the ordinary fee. 
UN used I.R.F.’s Paris office for mapping E.C.E.’s planned future Pan-European 
trunk road system, which was one of the agenda items in Douglas Mac Clarke and 
Chr. Christiansen’s meeting with the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
and Directorate of Public Roads. Norwegian Road Federation joined I.R.F. in 
October 1951.957 But ECA’s interest for improved Norwegian roads vanished as 
soon the Marshall Aid was completed in 1953. Norwegian Road Federation lost then 
its probably most powerful ally.  
 Norwegian Road Federation was closely affiliated with the non-socialist 
opposition parties, business sector and motorist organizations, and took part in 
several postwar corporative bodies.958 But Norwegian Road Federation managed 
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never to establish equally close relations with the trade unions and social democrats 
such as Swedish Road Federation did. The conflict level in Norway was far higher, 
most likely because of the car rationing. Three of the Swedish road and motoring 
lobby’s leading actors, Rune Andréasson, Jonas Gawell and Sven Gerentz, 
explained Norwegian Road Federation’s lack of success as a result of the member 
organizations’ very divergent interests. Both Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen and 
Prime Minister Oscar Torp personally considered cars a luxury, while Sweden’s 
Prime Minister Tage Erlander considered cars a utility. Erlander did not oppose the 
Social Democratic Party’s voters’ desire for cars, rather the opposite.959 
 The Conservative Party tried to establish a Trunk Road Committee 
(Stamveikomiteen) in October1952, prior to the 1953 election, but had difficulties 
finding volunteers. Most party members were then busy earning money. The 
Conservative Party managed finally to establish a committee headed by attorney 
Odd Nerdrum from Tønsberg, with Royal Norwegian Automobile Club’s lieutenant 
colonel Arne Rørholt, one of Norwegian Road Federation’s initiators, as secretary. 
The committee met in October and December 1952, and agreed to meet in January, 
but the archive had no further traces of this committee that most likely led to 
nothing.960 The Conservative Party’s difficulties mobilizing their own members for 
collective action is probably one explanation of why the car rationing was upheld 
twelve years after completing the initial reconstruction.  
 All the major political parties agreed about increased road appropriations 
1954-57 in their 1953 manifestos, but the Labor Party would not increase the road 
appropriation until the rearmament was completed. The non-socialist opposition 
parties required dedicated vehicle and fuel tax revenues to road appropriations; i.e. 
establishment of a Road Fund, similarly as in Denmark, Sweden and several other 
countries. All parties advocated mechanized road construction, but none advocated 
explicit use of competitive bidding and private construction companies such as the 
Conservative Party did in its 1949 manifesto. Only the Labor, Agrarian and 
Conservative Parties championed paving the roads. The Labor Party advocated 
furthering the 1947 Transport and Communication Act that suspended the market 
mechanisms, while the Agrarian and Conservative Parties required amendments. 
The Labor and Conservative Parties emphasized construction of trunk roads with 
national collective good characteristics in addition to construction of local roads.961 
The three middle parties championed clearly a more localist road policy than the 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
1957:13, 14; Styrets beretning for 1957, Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1958:57, 58; Styrets 
beretning for 1958, Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1959:7; Styrets beretning for 1959, 
Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1960:11, all from OVA. 
959 Andréasson et al. (1997:122-123). 
960 Cf. letters to and from potential candidates and minutes from the 1952 Trunk Road Committee’s 
meetings, RA-HH cassette 97. 
961 “Arbeiderpartiet Arbeidsprogram 1953-1957”:Samferdselen; “Valgprogram for Venstre 1953”:13 
Samferdsel og reiseliv; “Kristeleg Folkeparti Program ved stortingsvalet 12. oktober 1953”:VI 
Kommunikasjonar og kraftutbygging; “Bondepartiets program Stortingsvalget 1953”:4 Samferdsel og 
kraftutbygging; “Programmet åt Høgre til stortingsvalet 1953”:Samferdsel, all in Vi vil..! Norske 
partiprogrammer 1884-2001. 
Chapter 4 – Norway – the deviant case 
251 
Labor and Conservative Parties, and were obviously still the peripheral and rural 
areas’ distributional coalition’s core parties 1953-57. 
 The Directorate of Public Road’s chartered engineer Arne J. Grotterød was, as 
mentioned in chapter 3, the first Norwegian that received I.R.F.’s scholarship. 
Grotterød studied traffic engineering at Yale University’s Bureau of Highways 
1953/54 together with the Swedish chartered engineer Stig Nordqvist.962 The studies 
at Yale was ”a trip into a future that first came through in Norway 30-40 years 
later”, according to Grotterød, who learned how to design effectiveness and road 
safety into the road system. Road Director Thomas Offenberg Backer and Arne J. 
Grotterød agreed in August 1954 that Grotterød should not write a report, but 
disseminate his new knowledge through articles, lectures and speeches about traffic 
engineering. Grotterød claimed in some of these speeches ”Norway needed 
motorways”. Such claims brought him in direct conflict with somebody in the 
Directorate of Public Road’s top management that opposed motorways. Grotterød 
did unfortunately not write whom. He was thereafter left partly idle until the fall 
1956, when he was employed as substitute leader of Akershus County’s Public 
Roads Administration’s Bridge office, where he supervised construction of several 
bridges.963  
 Norwegian authorities and legislators did not adopt traffic engineering 
similarly as their Danish and Swedish opposite numbers, such as discussed in 
chapter 2 and 3. Why did they respond differently? Most Labor Party ministers were 
modernists and rationalists, and the non-socialist opposition parties desired 
increased road investments. Was Road Director Thomas Offenberg Backer not able 
or willing to orchestrate the necessary lobby campaigns? Did he not utilize Arne J. 
Grotterød’s new knowledge properly, or was Grotterød a better professional than 
salesman or lobbyist? Stortinget’s majority and the County Road Boards may have 
understood that common introduction of traffic engineering would establish a 
fundamentally different road policy. None of these explanations are mutually 
excluding. The Norwegian authorities and legislators’ ignoring of traffic engineering 
was most likely a result of several interacting factors, but distinguished clearly 
Norway from Denmark and Sweden. The governing Norwegian Labor Party bosses 
reasoned similarly fundamentally different compared to their Danish and Swedish 
fellow believers. 
 The economist Axel Dammann, who was employed by the Directorate of 
Public Roads 1952-55, published in December 1955 a comprehensive study of 
Norwegian postwar transport and communication policy.964 Dammann found the 
executive and legislators had overlooked the transport and communication’s 
significance for economic growth and for the production system as such, and even 
these investments’ profitability. The transport and communication sector’s 
allocation of authority and investments was often governed by history or path 
dependence. Lack of competition between different means of transport preserved 
status quo. Unprofitable railroads were often upheld where road transports could do 
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the job more cost efficient or even profitably.965 Axel Damman claimed allocating 
the transport and communication investments according to their cost/benefit ratios 
would improve the currency balance, one of the Labor Party executives and the 
Ministry of Finance’s major concerns in the 1940s and 50s.966 Axel Dammann’s 
findings indicated clearly Stortinget’s majority reasoned fundamentally different 
compared to their opposite numbers in Denmark and Sweden such as discussed in 
chapter 2 and 3. Most Danish and Swedish road investments were then allocated 
according to cost/benefit calculations, other rational models and/or the trade and 
industry’s needs. 
 Arne J. Grotterød assisted professor Ole Didrik Lærum’s preparations of 
Norwegian Institute of Technology in Trondheim’s first course in traffic 
engineering, January 3-6th 1956, where approximately 100 engineers, urban 
planners, consultants and policemen took part.967 968 Professor Lærum introduced 
also transport and communication technology as the Institute of Road and Railroad 
Construction’s (Institutt for veg- og jernbanebygging) fourth major in 1956/57, 
hereunder courses in traffic engineering and transport economy. Traffic engineering 
became a common course for the institute’s students from 1958.969 But the first 
chartered engineers with in-depth knowledge of traffic engineering and transport 
economy did not graduate from Norwegian Institute of Technology until the early 
1960s. One of these was Olav Søfteland, who became Road Director in 1992. 
 Bjarne Braathen in Buskerud’s Conservative Party suggested in November 
1955 to the Conservative Party’s leadership selling the State’s stocks, and allocating 
the revenues in a Road Fund, which also could serve as a tax shelter for firms, 
through deposit of surplus profits against tax credits.970 Bjarne Braathen proposed 
similarly in February 1956 using a ”Road Fund on approximately 500 millions 
NOK” or approximately 419 millions 1990 PPP USD as one of the hooks in the 
forthcoming 1957 election campaign.971 The Conservative Party’s central board 
decided March 2nd 1956 to establish a committee to study further development of 
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Norwegian transports and communications, hereunder establishment of a Transport 
and Communication Fund that also could serve as a tax shelter.972 The Conservative 
Party’s Transport and Communication Committee (Høires Samferdselskomité) was 
established formally November 16th 1956, headed by Nordland’s member of 
Stortinget and the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications since 
1954 Håkon Kyllingmark. The economist Axel Dammann served as secretary, 
together with Paul Thyness.973 974 But the industry was not interested in the 
Conservative Party’s tax shelter and Road Fund, ”except in particular instances”.975 
The Labor Party executive’s Strategic Capitalism created seemingly paradise 
conditions for the heavy industries and others within the power industrial complex, 
which dominated those days’ Norwegian corporative negotiation system. But trade 
and industries dependent of road transports and their employees were poorly 
represented in the corporative negotiation system, and thereby almost powerless. 
The Conservative Party’s initiative for a combined tax shelter and road fund was 
hence almost stillborn or dead on arrival. 
 The industrialist and entrepreneur Fritz Rieber from Bergen held a public 
lecture in Polytechnic Association (Polyteknisk Forening) in Oslo February 26th 
1957 where ministers, legislators, civil servants, engineers and industrialists met. 
Rieber proposed here reorganizing the Directorate of Public Roads to a State owned 
Joint Stock Company, Norwegian Roads Inc. (A/S Norsk Veiselskap) responsible 
for management of a Road Fund funded through dedicated fuel and vehicle tax 
revenues. Rieber suggested also organizing and financing particularly costly projects 
as turnpikes and/or PPP projects, public private partnerships where such 
undertakings were profitable for the road users. Fritz Rieber estimated Norway’s 
future needs for road investments to at least 15 billions 1957 NOK, or approximately 
12,1 billions 1990 PPP USD.976  
 Neither Stortinget as such, the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, the Directorate of Public Roads, the County Road Boards or the 
Public Roads Administrations applauded Rieber’s initiative publicly. Many 
perceived it as a cutthroat attack on the established road political order. But several 
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of Fritz Rieber’s ideas rose again after the neo-liberal shift, particularly after the turn 
of the 20th and 21st century. However, Fritz Rieber’s initiative was strong evidence 
about the road policy issues’ contentedness prior to the 1957 election, and indicated 
also growing dissatisfaction and frustration from the construction companies and 
road users with the Directorate of Public Roads and particularly Road Director 
Thomas Offenberg Backer’s perceived lack of vigor. 
 Håkon Kyllingmark ignored the trade and industry’s lukewarm reception of 
the Conservative Party’s proposed combined Road Fund and tax shelter, and 
championed instead the Conservative Party’s Transport and Communications 
Committee’s 10 Years Plan for Transports and Communications (En 10års plan for 
samferdselen) published in September 1957 just in time for the election. The 10 
Years Plan for Transports and Communications outlined how to reduce the 
Norwegian State Railroads’ increasing deficits, how to increase the road investments 
and how to remove the telephone queues. The suggested remedies were among 
others deregulating the transport and communication sector, removal of cross 
subsidies and charging the users for the actual costs, except in the peripheral areas, 
where profitable operations or road investments were not possible. The 10 Years 
Plan for Transports and Communications promised investments of approximately 
3.5-4.0 billions 1957 NOK, or between 2,82 and 3,22 billions 1990 PPP USD, in 
new roads the forthcoming 10 years, hereunder 214 millions NOK in 1957/58, 
approximately 172,5 millions 1990 PPP USD, with 50 millions NOK or about 40,3 
millions 1990 PPP USD financed through loans, as a kick-off.977 The Norwegian 
State’s net road investments 1956/57 were 125 millions NOK, approximately 100,75 
millions 1990 PPP USD. Even the Conservative Party championed establishment of 
a new road administration based on Danish and US role models that outsourced road 
construction to private construction companies through competitive bidding.978 The 
Conservative Party’s 10 Years Plan for Transports and Communications was a 
tenable and credible alternative to the Labor Party’s transport and communication 
policy, based on Axel Dammann’s transport economic studies. Modern transport and 
communication infrastructures would, according to the Conservative Party improve 
the trade and industries’ cost effectiveness and competitiveness, and thereby 
improve the currency balance.  
 All the major political parties championed increased road appropriations 1958-
61 prior to the 1957 election, similarly as during the term 1953-57. All parties – 
except the Labor Party – championed dedicated vehicle and fuel taxes for the term 
1958-61 similarly as 1953-57; and advocated hence establishment of a Road Fund. 
The novelty 1958-61 was that all non-socialist parties championed alternative 
financing in addition to State road appropriations, for instance through private 
investments, loans and turnpikes, to safeguard catch-up of Norway’s lag with regard 
to road construction. But only the Labor and Conservative Parties championed 
allocation of road investments according to transport economic methods. The middle 
parties defended the Liberal Party’s System. All parties championed competitive 
bidding; private construction companies, mechanized road construction and paving 
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of the roads, but the Liberal and Agrarian Parties were as usual more concerned with 
construction of local than trunk roads.979 The influence from Norwegian Road 
Federation, I.R.F., Axel Dammann’s 1955 study and Fritz Rieber’s February 26th 
speech were clearly evident in many of the parties’ manifestos. The Labor Party won 
even the 1957 election, but the Labor Party bosses had been mentally prepared for 
loosing this election, according to Norwegian Federation of Labor’s leader Konrad 
Nordahl.980 The 10 Years Plan for Transports and Communications was therefore 
partly shelved, even if the ideas were furthered in the Conservative Party’s 
forthcoming manifestos. Many ideas and proposals reemerged also twelve years 
later in Norwegian Road Plan when Håkon Kyllingmark served as minister of 
transport and communications. The political struggles 1945-59 discussed in this 
section of the chapter was clearly overlooked by the economist and transport 
historian Dag Bjørnland and by the historian Per Østby that wrote about the 1950s in 
their studies about Norwegian postwar road and motoring policies.981 
 The car rationing created growing dissatisfaction, particularly throughout the 
second half of the 1950s when the voters’ purchase power increased and car 
ownership became a realistic option for an increasing number of Norwegians. The 
car rationing system was namely not perceived equally fair as the Telephone 
Board’s rationing system, according to the historian Harald Espeli. The car rationing 
system could be evaded, and established a so-called ”quota nobility”.982 The Public 
Roads Administrations’ motor vehicle inspectors handed out purchase permits twice 
a year.983 Purchase permits for cars were valuable, because of almost black market 
conditions for used cars. There were also examples of purchase permit fraud, abuse 
of the rationing system and black market sale of cars, according to the economist 
and transport historian Dag Bjørnland and the historian Per Østby.984 Both the non-
socialist opposition parties and Norwegian Road Federation used the car rationing 
politically against the governing Labor Party. Even the financing constrained the 
sale of cars, because the buyers had to pay 50 percent cash and the rest during 12 
months for passenger cars and 18 months for vans and delivery trucks.985 The 
politically governed credit rationing made it also difficult for common wage earners 
to obtain bank loans for purchase of cars. 
 Those responsible for the postwar rationing system considered obviously 
somebody more equal than others, because Per Kleppe received immediately private 
telephone and a purchase permit for a passenger car in 1957 when he was appointed 
Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. Per Kleppe passed his drivers 
license test in 1958, and purchased a Vauxhall Cresta 1957 model for 18.000 
borrowed NOK or approximately 14.105 1990 PPP USD.986 Information about 
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allocation of the purchase permits, car ownership and the vehicle population’s age 
and geographical distribution was hidden behind a veil of secrecy. The Road 
Director’s circular letters 49/48M and 22/49M prohibited namely dissemination of 
such information. No other western industrialized country had similar restrictions. 
This secrecy was upheld until October 7th 1958.987 Most Norwegian voters in the 
late 1950s were well aware that cars were common property among ordinary wage 
earners in the Social Democratic Party governed Sweden. 
The governing Labor Party’s internal struggles and policy response 
How did the majority Labor Party executives respond to the challenges from the 
non-socialist opposition parties and Norway’s road and motoring lobby? 
 The Gerhardsen executive permitted in June 1951 free imports of trucks and 
lorries from OEEC countries participating in EPU, because of the free listing 
system, but upheld the van and passenger car rationing. Minister of trade Erik 
Brofoss expressed December 12th 1951 concerns for the currency reserves in case of 
unconstrained imports of cars, but imports of vans and passenger cars from OEEC 
countries were free from 1952. Rationing of trucks and lorries was similarly 
abolished in May 1952, well in advance of the forthcoming 1953 election. 
Norwegian Road Federation had then lobbied vigorously for improved productivity 
through increased road transport. But the rationing of vans and passenger cars were 
upheld, ostensibly because of the currency balance.988 Liquidation of the truck and 
lorry rationing removed soon the remaining horse transports all across Norway.989 
All restrictions on import and sale of cars made in the Soviet Union or other east 
block countries were abolished in 1954, because such imports were based on 
bilateral barter that saved foreign currency.990 But the historian Per Østby found the 
lack of foreign currency argument not tenable after 1955, and considered the “long 
lasting restriction policy anyway peculiar”. However, Per Østby was far more 
concerned with the car rationing’s cultural than political implications.991 The US 
economic historian Dudley Dillard concluded similarly that Europe’s dollar 
problems were solved approximately 1950, among others through EPU, where 
Norway took part.992 The currency balance argument for maintained car rationing 
was hence questionable, and most likely a political smokescreen to mask intra Labor 
Party conflicts. 
 The corporative Transport and Communication Council (Samferdselsrådet) 
summarized March 25th 1953 the local requirements for new roads to approximately 
50.000 kilometers, almost equal to the length of the existing public road system. The 
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Transport and Communication Council recognized also local requirements for 
approximately 4.500 kilometers new railroads, even that almost equal to the length 
of the existing railroad system. But railroads were very costly. The Transport and 
Communication Council recommended therefore only construction of new railroads 
where the traffic was sufficient to justify such investments, and recommended 
otherwise construction of roads.993 The population’s demand for new roads and 
railroads was obviously enormous in the early 1950s. The Transport and 
Communication Council’s recommendations were clearly governed by economic 
considerations and those days’ very tight budget constraints for transport and 
communication investments. 
 The executive’s 1954-57 Long-Term Program submitted to Stortinget April 
29th 1953 by Prime Minister Oscar Torp proposed “significant change in the 
composition of investments” after completing the rearmament, housing and large 
industrial projects, and signaled “a large increase” in investments in “internal 
communications, particularly roads”.994 The Torp executive claimed that 
construction of roads was the most efficient solution of the growing need for 
transports, similarly as the Transport and Communication Council concluded a few 
months earlier.995 The postwar Labor Party executives improved seemingly sector 
by sector, and transport and communications was obviously prioritized 1954-57. But 
the Torp executive’s promises about increased road investments were also most 
likely a policy response to the non-socialist opposition parties and the road and 
motoring lobby’s challenges because of the forthcoming 1953 election. 
 The Gerhardsen executive’s approval of E.C.E.’s Pan-European Trunk Road 
Treaty in 1950, and Norway’s ratification of the treaty in 1953, indicated clearly the 
executive’s willingness to invest in national collective goods. The Motorists’ 
Temperance Association (Motorførernes Avholdsforbund) proposed in December 
1954 forced construction of 2.380 kilometers trunk roads that connected eastern, 
southern, western and middle Norway’s most crowded areas and the most important 
export markets, financed through extraordinary appropriations and State loans. 
These investments were supposed self-financing through reduced time consumption, 
fewer accidents and increased tourism.996  
 The Motorists’ Temperance Association’s initiative was noticeable, because 
this small motorist organization was well connected politically with the Christian 
Peoples’ and Liberal Parties, the Labor Party teetotalers and Stortinget’s peripheral 
and rural areas’ distributional coalition. One of the Motorists’ Temperance 
Association’s most prominent members was minister of transport and 
communications Jakob M. Pettersen from Hordaland.997 The Motorists’ Temperance 
Association’s December 1954 initiative advocated views usually associated with 
Norwegian Automobile Owners’ Association, Norwegian Road Federation and 
                                                 
993 “Samferdselsrådet har bredt anlagt møte i Oslo: Problemet bil-bane trer fram i diskusjonen igjen”, 
Arbeiderbladet, March 26th 1953. 
994 Erik Brofoss, Norway’s economic and financial problems, Two lectures by the Governor of Bank of 
Norway, at the University of Oslo Summer School for American students, July 1956:42, 50, AAB-EB, 
cassette Da 3. 
995 St. meld. nr. 62 (1953) Om et langtidsprogram for 1954-1957:183-184 Tabell 106. 
996 Forslag om hurtig utbygging av Europavegene i Norge, Motorførernes Avholdsforbund, Oslo, 
December 1954, VDA cassette 363 Div. reguleringsplaner i Oslo 1928-1971. 
997 Cf. Jacob M. Pettersen’s biography in Nordby (1985b:581). 
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I.R.F. Jakob M. Pettersen told later his friend Rune Andréasson, managing director 
in the Motorists’ Temperance Organization’s Swedish sister organization 1953-67, 
half jokingly, that he went to USA to study road policy and road construction, but 
was forced to resign as minister when he returned.998  
 The priest Kolbjørn Varmann from Nordland succeeded namely Jakob M. 
Pettersen as minister of transports and communications January 22nd 1955, when 
Einar Gerhardsen established his third executive and imposed the contractive 
February measures.999 Kolbjørn Varmann was in April 1955 informed by the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications’ economist Arne Hoff that Norway 
lagged significantly behind many Western industrialized countries with regard to 
transport and communication infrastructures. The road system needed urgent 
updates, because Norway’s public roads had the lowest permitted axle loads and the 
narrowest permitted vehicle width of 13 countries. Norwegian roads permitted 
generally only 2,0 tons axel load and 2,2 meters wide vehicles. Other countries 
permitted 13 tons and 2,5 meters. Axle load and vehicle width were two of the most 
decisive transport economic parameters together with transport time. The Swedish 
road appropriations measured in nominal SEK increased 441 percent 1946/47 -
1955/56. The total Norwegian investments in roads, railroads and airports increased 
only 70 percent 1946/47-1955/56. Kolbjørn Varmann was also made aware that 
Finland, Belgium, France, West Germany and USA had developed or already 
approved national road plans. Arne Hoff expected 30 percent increased private 
consumption the forthcoming 10 years, and assumed most of the new purchase 
power would be spent on cars. Sweden’s number of cars had increased 
approximately 100.000 per year during the first half of the 1950s. Arne Hoff urged 
therefore increased road construction to prevent “chaotic conditions”.1000 Arne 
Hoff’s note and its location in the Labor Party’s archive is clearly evidence the 
Labor Party bosses were well aware the road and motoring issues’ political 
implications. 
                                                 
998 Andréasson et al. (1997:124, 132). 
999 Nordby (1985a:304; 1985b:770-771). 
1000 Note “Er statens (og distriktenes) bevilgninger i kommunikasjonssektoren etter hele vår økonmomi og 
vårt produksjonsliv, av riktig størrelsesorden?”, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Arne Hoff, 
April 3rd 1955, AAB-DNA cassette Da 127. 
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Table 8: Norway’s relative geographical distribution of roads and cars in 1954. 
Counties (Informal 
regions) 
Area (%) Inhabitants 
1950 (%) 
Roads (%) Cars (%) Seats in 
Stortinget 
1949-1953 
(%) 
Seats in the 
Standing 
Committee on 
Transport and 
Communicati
ons 1949-
1953 (%) 
Østfold, Akershus, Oslo, 
Hedmark, Oppland, 
Buskerud and Vestfold 
(Østlandet) 
24,6 44,1 31,5 61 37,3 30,8 
Telemark, Aust-Agder, 
Vest-Agder, Rogaland 
(Sørlandet) 
12,6 15,9 20,2 15 20,0 23,1 
Hordaland, Bergen, 
Sogn and Fjordane, 
Møre and Romsdal 
(Vestlandet) 
15,2 18,3 20,6 10 18,7 23,1 
Sør-Trøndelag, Nord-
Trøndelag (Trøndelag) 
12,7 9,4 21,1 8 10,7 7,7 
Nordland, Troms, 
Finnmark (Nord-Norge) 
34,9 12,3 15,7 6 13,3 15,4 
Grand total 323.917,2 km2 3.278.546 47.446 km 197.434 150 13 
Sources: 1001 
 Most roads and cars in 1954 were located on Østlandet. Sørlandet had second 
most cars but fourth most roads. Vestlandet had third most cars and roads. 
Trøndelag had fourth most cars and second most roads. Nord-Norge had least cars 
and roads. Table 8 indicates clearly that Østlandet was strongly underrepresented in 
Stortinget and in the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 1949-
53. Sørlandet, Vestlandet and Nord-Norge were over represented both in Stortinget 
and the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications. Trøndelag was 
slightly over represented in Stortinget but underrepresented in the Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communications. Many roads on Østlandet were built 
in the 19th century under the Norwegian System, prior to establishment of the 
Combined Road Administration and the Liberal Party’s System. The Ministry of 
Transport and Communications’ 1955 challenges were among others lack of road 
capacity and poor road safety in the greater Oslo area, lack of roads on Sørlandet, 
Vestlandet, Trøndelag and Nord-Norge, and lack of modern trunk roads between the 
regions all across Norway and to the most important export markets. 
 Many Labor Party members perceived obviously Norway’s poor transport and 
communication infrastructures a potential political problem, because the 1955 
convention urged the Labor Party’s national board to initiate an analysis of the 
transport and communication policy. The national board approved this request May 
31st 1955 and passed the request to the central board that August 16th 1955 appointed 
The Party Commission for Transport and Communication Problems (Partiutvalg for 
samferdselsproblemer), headed by lawyer Jens Haugland, member of Stortinget for 
                                                 
1001 Statistisk årbok for Norge 1960, 79th issue, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo 1960:6 Tabell 5 (area and 
settlement); Note “Er statens (og distriktenes) bevilgninger i kommunikasjonssektoren etter hele vår 
økonmomi og vårt produksjonsliv, av riktig størrelsesorden?”, Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, Arne Hoff, April 3rd 1955, AAB-DNA cassette Da 127 (relative allocation of roads and 
cars); Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Bil og veistatistikk 1996:Spreadsheet 1-10 (electronic version) 
(total number of cars), OVA; Nordby (1985a:147-160, 162-171) (political representation 1949-53). 
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Vest-Agder and minister of justice November 1st 1955 until August 28th 1963.1002 
1003 The central board’s appointment of The Party Commission for Transport and 
Communication Problems recognized clearly that poor transport and 
communications could backfire politically in the forthcoming 1957 election. 
Appointment of Secretary Haakon Lie and other modernists as member of the 
commission was also very a strong signal, because Haakon Lie was the Labor 
Party’s chief strategist and de facto managing director. 
 The Party Commission for Transport and Communication Problems discussed 
several questions that had been non-issues or kept off the official agenda, and 
concluded in May 1956.1004 The recommendations included among others 
significantly increased road investments, considerations about introduction of 
progressive vehicle taxation, allocation of the vehicle taxes to a Road Fund with 
long term balance between vehicle taxes and road appropriations such as in 
Denmark and Sweden, consolidation of the road investments to fewer and larger 
construction sites to facilitate swift and mechanized road construction, use of 
competitive bidding and private construction companies and paving of the roads.1005 
Oslo and Akershus’ County Governor Trygve Lie proposed also establishment of a 
more autonomous Directorate of Public Roads governed by a corporative board with 
                                                 
1002 Letter to minister of transport and communications Kolbjørn Varmann, from Det Norske 
Arbeiderparti, Frank Andersen, June 9th 1955, AAB-DNA cassette Da 127; Minutes from the Labor 
Party’s central board’s meeting August 16th 1955:361-362, AAB-DNA cassette Ac 5. The biographical 
data about Jens Haugland are from Nordby (1985b:280-281). 
1003 The Party Commission for Transport and Communication Problems’ other members appointed by the 
central board August 16th 1955 were the Norwegian State Railroad’s Director General 1951-66 Halvdan 
Eyvind Stokke who had been minister of transport and communications Nils Langhelle’s Parliamentary 
Secretary 1947-48, Aker’s mayor 1946-48 and Oslo’s mayor 1948-50 after Oslo and Aker merged; head 
of the Ministry of Transport and Communications’ Coordination Office assistant secretary (byråsjef) John 
Paxal; director in Norwegian Bus Owner Association Gottfred Hoem; the Labor Party’s Secretary 
Haakon Lie; minister of transport and communications Kolbjørn Varmann and minister of finance Mons 
Lid. The last member appointed somewhat later was Oslo and Akershus’ County Governor 1955-63 
Trygve Lie, former minister of foreign affairs in the Nygaardsvold executive and Gerhardsen’s first two 
executives, UN’s Secretary General 1946-53 and head of The Oslo-Area’s Regional Planning Committee 
(Regionplankomiteen for Oslo-området) (Letter to Jens Haugland “Partiutvalg for 
samferdselsproblemer”, from Det Norske Arbeiderparti, Frank Andersen, August 28th 1955, AAB-DNA 
cassette Da 127. For Trygve Lie’s biography see for instance Nordby (1985b:444-445). For Halvdan 
Eyvind Stokke’s biography see for instance Gulowsen and Ryggvik (2004:83)). 
1004 Note “Aktuelle samferdselsproblemer – momentliste”, Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
Eiler Holtermann, September 19th 1955; Note, “Litt nærmere om enkelte aktuelle samferdselsproblemer”, 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, Eiler Holtermann, September 25th 1955; Note “Bør 
bilavgiftsinntekter i prinsippet gå til vegformål, subsidiært til samferdselsformål i sin alminnelighet? Hva 
med toll og omsetningsavgift?”, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Eiler Holtermann, 
September 28th 1955; Note “Er statens (og distriktenes) bevilgninger til i [sic] kommunikasjonssektoren, 
etter hele vår økonomi og vårt produksjonsliv, av riktig størrelsesorden?”, Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, Eiler Holtermann, October 1st 1955; Letter to minister of transport and communications 
Kolbjørn Varmann ”Konsentrasjon av vegarbeidsdriften m.v.”, Directorate of Public Roads, 
Vegdirektøren 5721/55 SB/LH October 28th 1955; Note “Samferdselsinvesteringene i Norge har i de 
senere år ikke holdt takt med investeringene for øvrig, ikke holdt takt med produksjonsutviklingen og når 
det gjelder utbyggingen av vegene heller ikke holdt takt med økningen i antall motorkjøretøyer, trafikken 
og lastebilene og bussenes størrelse”, Ministry of Transport and Communications, no author [but most 
likely Eiler Holtermann], not dated [but most likely the spring 1956], all from AAB-DNA cassette Da 
127. 
1005 Note (draft) “Konklusjon”, April 26th 1956 [with Jens Haugland or Kolbjørn Varmann’s handwritten 
comments]; Letter “Til kommunikasjonskomiteens medlemmer” from Det Norske Arbeiderparti, Jens 
Haugland, attatched draft “Konklusjon”, both from ABB-DNA cassette Da 127. 
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representatives from the road users’ organizations and trade unions in case of 
establishment of a Road Fund. Trygve Lie claimed the road users’ organizations’ 
involvement was necessary in case of financing roads in crowded areas through 
turnpikes or loans and contributions from insurance companies and trade and 
industry dependent of road transports, because those days’ tax revenues were not 
sufficient to provide the desired roads.1006 The Party Commission for Transport and 
Communication Problems’ recommendations were most likely pragmatic responses 
to the non-socialist opposition parties and the road and motoring lobby’s challenges, 
but modify completely the prevailing views concerning the Labor Party’s road 
policy in the 1950s, because these recommendations had many similarities with the 
non-socialist opposition parties’ views, and were in some instances far more 
progressive if the aim was development of a functional road and transport system. 
 Information about the Labor Party’s central board’s appointment of The Party 
Commission for Transport and Communication Problems August 16th 1955 changed 
the initial understanding of Buskerud Conservative Party’s initiative for a combined 
tax shelter and Road Fund in November 1955, Axel Dammann’s study about 
Norwegian postwar transport and communication policy published in December 
1955, the Conservative Party’s Transport and Communication Committee 
established in November 1956 and Fritz Rieber’s lecture in February 1957, because 
the Labor Party bosses’ initiative came prior to the non-socialist opposition’s 
initiatives. The Conservative Party’s 10 Years Plan for Transports and 
Communications can thus be understood as a response to the Labor Party’s internal 
activities, and not only an isolated move in the Conservative Party’s opposition such 
as assumed earlier.1007 Only a small number of those days’ economists and chartered 
engineers were involved in development of transport, communication and road 
policies. It seems thus reasonable to assume they knew each other and talked 
together, no matter their party affiliation. The Labor Party’s central board’s 
appointment of The Party Commission for Transport and Communication Problems 
was thereby most likely well known for the Conservative Party’s leadership. 
 The Party Commission for Transport and Communication Problems’ 
recommendations coincided with the Ministry of Finance’s preparations of the 
executive’s forthcoming 1958-61 Long-Term Program. The Ministry of Finance’s 
economist Eskild Jensen argued for increased transport and communication 
investments 1958-61, particularly road investments, but concluded the question 
about car rationing had to be discussed later.1008 Eskild Jensen’s colleague in the 
Ministry of Finance, the economist Bjørn Larsen, concluded June 15th 1956 that 
abolition of car rationing would neither increase the private consumption nor 
undermine the currency balance, because car imports would substitute other 
currency demanding imports, given constrained consumer credits. Bjørn Larsen 
concluded also that increased road investments in case of increased car imports 
would not result in State financial problems, because the vehicle and fuel tax 
                                                 
1006 Letter “Til kommunikasjonskomiteens medlemmer” from Det Norske Arbeiderparti, Jens Haugland, 
attatched draft “Konklusjon” and Trygve Lie’s “Tillegg til konnunikasjonsprogrammets post 3 – etter 
siste avsnitt”, ABB-DNA cassette Da 127. 
1007 See for instance Knutsen and Boge (2005:66-69). 
1008 Ministry of Finance’s note “Den økonomiske politikken 1958-61”, not dated EJ/BB [but most likely 
written during the first half of 1956], AAB-TB cassette Db 10. 
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revenues increased almost proportionally with the number of cars.1009 The Ministry 
of Finance punctuated hence in June 1956 the myth that car rationing was necessary 
because of the currency balance. But Labor Party ministers and legislators used the 
currency balance as argument for maintained car rationing even after June 1956. 
 The Norwegian State Railroads with 26.622 employees in 1955/56 that 
operated with 119,7 millions NOK or approximately 100,3 millions 1990 PPP USD 
in deficits, more than the annual State investments in trunk roads, was one of the 
most significant obstacles against increased road investments and liquidation of the 
car rationing. The State Railroads annual deficits increased strongly throughout the 
1950s after significant surpluses during the German occupation.1010 Road transports 
of goods passed railroad transports measured in ton kilometers already in 1954.1011 
But the Railroad Workers’ Union held prominent positions both within the National 
Federation of Labor and the Labor Party after World War Two, according to Jon 
Gulowsen and Helge Ryggvik, who wrote the Norwegian State Railroads’ history 
1940-2004.1012 The Labor Party bosses could not afford to overlook the railroad 
lobby that aggressively opposed any attempts of lifting the car rationing or 
increasing the road construction.1013 The Norwegian railroad lobby’s strong position, 
both within the ruling Labor Party and in the opposition middle parties, was a 
fundamental difference compared to Denmark and Sweden.  
 But minister of transport and communications Kolbjørn Varmann decided 
June 21st 1956 to consolidate the Norwegian State Railroads through completing 
ongoing construction projects and streamlining the operations.1014 Varmann 
punctuated thereby the railroad lobby’s dream about construction of new 
railroads.1015 The Liberal and Agrarian Parties’ members of Stortinget’s Standing 
Committee on Transports and Communications, Bent Røiseland and Trond Wirstad, 
demanded therefore in November 1956 binding plans either for construction of new 
railroads or roads as substitutes for the formerly planned railroads. Stortinget 
required also a comprehensive plan for how to solve Norway’s transport and 
communication problems.1016 The balance of power between the railroad and road 
and motoring lobbies shifted thus gradually during the second half of 1956, when 
                                                 
1009 Ministry of Finace’s note “Konsekvenser for forbruk og import av en økt import av personbiler”, June 
15th 1956 BL/BB (Avskrift 28/-56 TT), AAB-TB cassette Db 10. Bjørn Larsen ([Interview] 2005]), who 
wrote this note, confirmed this information and the Ministry of Finance’s internal discussions about the 
car rationing in the 1950s. 
1010 The Norwegian State Railroads’ number of employees increased from 17.528 in 1939/40 to 26.251 in 
1944/45. The Norwegian State Railroads delivered their all time high surplus 1942/43, with 108,4 
millions NOK or approximatly 141,14 millions 1990 PPP USD, after having operated barely in balance or 
with deficits until then. (Historisk statistikk 1968, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo 1969: 410-411 Tabell 200, 
413-414 Tabell 202. See also Historisk Statistikk 1994, Statistisk sentrabyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger 
1995:495 Tabell 20.26, 497 Tabell 20.28 about employment and economic performance 1955/56). 
1011 Cf. DB-DBA-GTW 1926-2002. 
1012 Gulowsen and Ryggvik (2004:51 ff., 147-150, 163-177). See also Bjørnland (1989:148-151, 222-224) 
and Knutsen and Boge (2005:69-70). 
1013 Many Labor Party legislators were railroad champions. See the Data Appendix’ Table 4.8, 4.10-4.13 
concerning Stortinget’s and the Standing Road and Railroad Committee 1945-49 and the Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communications’ political representation 1949-61. 
1014 St. meld. nr. 58 (1956) Om Jernbanekommisjonens innstilling og om investeringer i jernbanesektoren 
i de nærmeste år:23-25; Gulowsen and Ryggvik (2004:73 ff., 82-95). 
1015 For further discussions about the postwar struggles about the Norwegian State railroads see for 
instance Østby (1995:148, 150-151); Gulowsen and Ryggvik (2004:69-71);  
1016 Stortingstidende (1956):3398-3400, 3414-3416, 3449. See also Innst. S. nr. 256 (1956):641. 
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the Labor Party executive and Stortinget’s majority recognized the interwar years’ 
railroad policy was not tenable. 
 The Ministry of Trade’s deputy undersecretary Knut Getz Wold claimed in a 
debate on national radio in February 1957 with Norwegian Road Federation’s 
managing director Chr. Christiansen that annual import of for instance 35.000 cars 
in case of abolition of the car rationing would consume the annual currency 
revenues from the aluminum smelting work Årdal & Sunndal Verk. Christensen 
replied that import of coffee until then consumed more foreign currency than import 
of cars.1017 The Ministry of Trade used still the currency balance argument, even if 
the Ministry of Finance already in June 1956 had concluded that liquidation of the 
car rationing was not detrimental for the currency balance. But the Labor Party’s 
political costs for maintaining the telephone and particularly the car rationing were 
obviously growing, because Konrad Nordahl characterized the “bourgeois press’” 
complaints about lack of passenger cars and telephones as “distinguished want” in 
his inaugural address at the National Federation of Labor’s 1957 convention.1018 It 
was obviously those trade union members and Labor Party voters who desired cars 
and telephones.1019 But the Labor Party and trade union bosses had cornered 
themselves with regard to liquidation of the car rationing, among others through use 
of strong normative arguments against use and ownership of cars. 
 It was clearly evident the Labor Party bosses considered the Combined Road 
Administration and the 1912 Road Act serious obstacles against development of a 
functional road system, because already the second Gerhardsen’s executive 
appointed the Road Act Committee (Veglovkomiteen) March 30th 1951 to revise the 
1912 Road Act. Jakob M. Pettersen headed this committee until he became minister 
of transport and communications. But the Road Act Committee, then headed by 
Aust-Agder’s County Governor Nils Hjelmtveit, did not conclude until March 6th 
1957, approximately a week after Fritz Rieber’s formerly mentioned lecture in 
Polytechnic Association.1020 The Road Act Committee proposed establishment of an 
almost Swedish, German or British road policy regime, where the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications managed and financed the rural areas’ main roads or 
trunk roads and 75 percent of the urban areas’ costs for trunk roads. The Road Act 
Committee did not mention the Directorate of Public Roads or the Road Director at 
all, but parish roads were supposed managed by the County Road Boards.1021 The 
Road Act Committee’s proposal stirred up plenty of commotion, and was therefore 
                                                 
1017 Fasting and Hagerup (1999:93-94). 
1018 Nordahl (1973:38). 
1019 See for instance Østby (1995:122-129, 132-134) about some of the Labor Party legislators’ moral 
indignation about the voters’ desires for cars. 
1020 The Road Act Committee consisted initially of the Labor Party and Hordaland County’s member of 
Stortinget Jakob M. Pettersen, Aust-Agder’s County Governor Nils Hjelmtveit, the Labor Party and 
Troms County’s member of Stortinget Peder Nikolai Leier Jacobsen, Hordaland’s Chief County Road 
Officer Sven Waage, stipendiary magistrate C. W. Bang and the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications and the Directorate of Public Roads’ assistant secretary Eugen Wister, who was the 
Road Act Committee’s secretary. Nils Hjelmtveit headed the Road Act Committee after Jacob M. 
Pettersen became minister of transport and communications January 5th 1952. Jacob M. Pettersen was 
replaced by the Construction Workers’ Unions’ (Norsk Arbeidsmandsforbund) secretary Albert Karlsen. 
Sør-Trøndelag’s Chief County Road Officer Johannes Eggen replaced Sven Waage June 12th 1953, 
because of Waage’s illness (Innstilling fra veglovkomiteen av 1951. Utkast til veglov med motiver:V-VI). 
1021 Innstilling fra veglovkomiteen av 1951. Utkast til veglov med motiver:13, 15, 42-43, 164-168, 226-
227, 235-236. 
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shelved until further.1022 The Road Act Committee’s list of recommendations was 
obviously not well timed politically, because it was submitted early in an election 
year prior to the Labor Party’s convention, and was similarly as Fritz Rieber’s 
lecture a motion of no confidence against the established road policy regime. The 
Road Act Committee’s bottom line was liquidation of the Liberal Party’s System 
that had governed Stortinget’s allocation of road appropriations since the 1890s and 
the Combined Road Administration. Such recommendations were completely 
unacceptable for the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, and the 
Labor Party traditionalists and anti-motorists. 
 Stortinget’s request in November 1956 for a comprehensive plan about how to 
solve Norway’s transport and communication problems was partly answered May 
23rd 1957 when Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen submitted the executives’ 1958-61 
Long-term Program that outlined construction of roads instead of new and 
unprofitable railroads, and promised increased investments in trunk roads and 
entrance roads to Oslo, Bergen and Trondheim, Norway’s three major cities in 
decreasing order.1023 The State’s average gross road investments 1954-57 had been 
210 millions NOK, approximately 169,3 millions 1990 PPP USD, per year which 
was somewhat less than planned because of the inflation, but the number of 
minuscule construction sites had been reduced.1024 The 1958-61 Long-term Program 
indicated clearly a forthcoming shift with regard to road policy and road 
construction. 
 The Labor Party’s central board appointed the members of The Party 
Commission for Transport and Communication Problems as members of the new 
party internal Transport and Communication Commission (Samferdselskomiteen) to 
prepare the forthcoming 1958-61 manifesto.1025 The Labor Party’s national board 
agreed similarly May 29th 1957 about “strengthened efforts in construction and 
improvements of roads”, and furthered hence the policy outlined in the executive’s 
1958-61 Long-term Program.1026 However, The Party Commission for Transport 
and Communication Problems and the Road Act Committee’s recommendations 
triggered most likely opposition from the Labor Party’s phalanx in the peripheral 
and rural areas’ distributional coalition, as well as the traditionalists and anti-
motorists, because the Labor Party’s 1957 convention did not include establishment 
of a Road Fund, use of alternative road financing and the need for a new Road Act 
in the 1958-61 manifesto.1027 Modernists like Secretary Haakon Lie, minister of 
transport and communication Kolbjørn Varmann and minister of Justice Jens 
Haugland lost the power struggle prior to and at the 1957 convention with Prime 
Minister Einar Gerhardsen who was a traditionalist and considered cars a luxury. 
                                                 
1022 Styrets beretning for 1957, Opplysningsrådet 1958:38-56, OVA; Bjørnland (1989:217). 
1023 St. meld. nr. 67 (1957): Om langtidsprogrammet 1958-1961:64-65. 
1024 St. meld. nr. 67 (1957): Om langtidsprogrammet 1958-1961:62-63. 
1025 “Sak 8. Utvalg til å forberede arbeidsprogrammet 1957-61”, issue “e) Samferdselsutvalget”, note with 
the agenda items to the central board’s meeting 25/56, AAB-DNA cassette Da 127. 
1026 Minister of justice Jens Haugland oriented the Labor Party’s national board about the Transport and 
Communication Commission’s recommendations October 23rd 1956 (Minutes from the national board’s 
meeting October 23rd 1956:570, issue 5c, AAB-DNA cassette Ac 5; minustes from the national board’s 
meeting May 29th 1957:119, AAB-DNA cassette Ac 6).  
1027 “Arbeidsprogram for Det Norske Arbeiderparti stortingsperioden 1958-61”:Samferdselen, in Vi vil..! 
Norske partiprogrammer 1884-2001. 
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Another winner was the Ministry of Finance that avoided development of a Road 
Fund. 
 The third Gerhardsen executive appointed also a Vehicle Tax Commission 
(Bilskattkomitteen) in 1956 that submitted a divided recommendation in August 
1957 prior to the election. The motorist organizations and Directorate of Public 
Roads required vehicle taxation according to the so-called cost principle, and 
establishment of a Road Fund for surplus revenues, similarly as in Denmark and 
Sweden. But the ministries’ representatives required purely fiscal taxation and 
opposed hence establishment of a Road Fund.1028 The ministries’ position in the 
Vehicle Commission was noticeable because they opposed here views championed 
by the Ministry of Transport and Communications’ economists 1955-56 in The 
Party Commission for Transport and Communication Problems. The ministries had 
obviously been instructed, either by the Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister Einar 
Gerhardsen or by both after the Labor Party’s 1957 convention, and were in August 
1957 aligned with the Labor Party’s 1958-61 manifesto. 
 Norway’s road policy or lack of such got noticed even abroad, because 
Swedish Road Plan questioned whether the 1947 Trunk Road Plan ever would be 
completed.1029 The 1947 Trunk Road Plan was initially supposed accomplished 
within a decade, but was not yet accomplished in 1970!1030 Karl Gustav Hjorth, the 
Swedish Road and Water Construction Administration’s recently retired Director 
General, lectured at Polytechnic Association’s public meeting February a 11th 1958 
about the recently submitted Swedish Road Plan. Road Director Thomas Offenberg 
Backer used this opportunity to demonstrate vigor and proposed development of a 
similar road plan for Norway. Minister of transport and communications Kolbjørn 
Varmann endorsed Backer’s idea and told the press after the meeting he desired a 
Norwegian Road Plan “ as soon as possible”.1031 Kolbjørn Varmann’s response 
indicated clearly a forthcoming road policy shift, such as outlined by the Party 
Commission for Transport and Communication Problems and in the executive’s 
1958-61 Long-term Program. The non-socialist opposition parties did not object. 
 The Gerhardsen executive appointed the Transport Economic Council 
(Transportøkonomisk utvalg) in 1958.1032 Nordic Road Association championed 
already in 1951 a Norwegian professorate in transport economics.1033 Robert F. 
Nordén, economist from University of Oslo and one of the Labor Party’s young 
technocrats who served in the Ministry of Finance’s Economy Section 1952-58 
together with among others Bjørn Larsen, became the Transport Economic Board’s 
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first secretary.1034 Establishment of the Transport Economic Council indicated 
clearly the Labor Party executive responded to the growing critique against 
Norway’s outdated transport and communication infrastructures. Another impetus, 
according to Bjørn Larsen, was those days’ very grim road accident statistics.1035 
269 persons were killed in road accidents in 1958, while 341 persons were killed in 
road accidents in 2000.1036 The death risk in 1958 was almost seven times higher 
than in 2000, given the number of vehicles. Establishment of the Transport 
Economic Council was an important institutional move for development of a 
rational transport and communication policy based on facts and scientific principles 
and methods. 
 The head of the Labor Party’s faction Nils Hønsvald expressed November 25th 
1958 in Stortinget concern for need for construction of several new aluminum 
smelting works to provide sufficient foreign currency to finance unconstrained 
import of cars.1037 The notion about lack of foreign currency was obviously deeply 
rooted, but clearly not in accordance with the realities, given the Ministry of 
Finance’s conclusions in June 1956. Norway had 58.175 passenger cars in 
December 1949 and 43.693 trucks, lorries and vans. These numbers increased to 
166.162 passenger cars and 91.407 trucks, lorries and vans in December 1958, 
despite the rationing.1038 The car rationing delayed clearly the mass motoring’s 
reemergence in Norway, but was not able to stem the tide.  
 A possible explanation of why the Labor Party executives upheld the car 
rationing after completing the initial reconstruction may be the links between the 
executive’s plan economy and the labor market’s corporative negotiation system. 
Increased prices on imported goods such as coffee triggered namely the National 
Federation of Labor’s demands for wage compensation. Liquidation of the car 
rationing represented thus an imminent risk for demands for significant real wage 
increases according to the Ministry of Finance’s economist Bjørn Larsen, to 
facilitate common ownership of cars.1039 Car rationing may therefore have been one 
of Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen’s tactical moves to safeguard the Labor Party 
and the National Federation of Labor’s domestic peace and to constrain the heavy 
industries’ wage costs, because these industries were directly exposed to 
international competition. The alleged lack of foreign currency may also have been 
one of Einar Gerhardsen’s tactical moves to check the Labor Party’s very influential 
railroad lobby. 
 Stortinget’s majority prolonged December 9th 1958 the temporary Car 
Rationing Act until June 30th 1961.1040 This decision came three weeks prior to 
introduction of fully convertible currencies from January 1959.1041 But currency 
restrictions or the currency balance could not motivate the car rationing from 
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January 1959. The Labor Party’s exit from the car-rationing impasse went via the 
Ministry of Finance. Stortinget imposed namely import taxes that increased new 
passenger cars’ sales price 15 to 25 percent in a secret meeting February 2nd 1959, 
among others against the Conservative Party’s protests.1042 The Labor Party’s 
official organ of speech Arbeiderbladet claimed that increased import taxes paved 
the way for liquidation of the car rationing, even if the Conservative Party’s Kåre 
Willoch and Erling Petersen claimed tax increases to a level where rationing was 
unnecessary was “introduction of rationing through the wallet”.1043 Prime Minister 
Einar Gerhardsen had earlier strong personal objections against rationing through 
the wallet.1044 But Einar Gerhardsen considered most likely in 1959 rationing of cars 
through the voters’ wallets a necessary pragmatic adaptation to the voters’ desire for 
cars. 
 The 1959 vehicle tax hikes together with the 1949 temporary fuel tax 
completed the Ministry of Finance’s decoupling of the motorists’ payments of 
vehicle and fuel taxes from the annual road appropriations, after the ruling Labor 
Party had abandoned the idea about establishment of a Road Fund. The Danish and 
Swedish motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes were linked to the annual 
road appropriations until 1972 and 1980 as discussed earlier in chapter 2 and 3. 
 Rationing of vans was liquidated in September 1959.1045 The genie was then 
partly escaped from the bottle. The political costs for furthering the rationing would 
be prohibitive. Neither was further car rationing compatible with Norwegian 
membership in EFTA. But car rationing was not on the agenda in any of the Labor 
Party’s central board’s meetings between January 1957 and March 1960.1046 But 
Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen, who most likely feared loosing the 1961 election, 
announced at a press conference October 8th 1959 liquidation of the car rationing in 
1960.1047 Einar Gerhardsen who was an exceptionally skilled political player 
defused here one of the non-socialist opposition parties’ favorite issues well in 
advance of the forthcoming 1961 election.  
 Norway’s public rural road system in 1959 measured 50.383 kilometers. 
14.841 kilometers had been built since 1925. 16.277 kilometers were defined as 
trunk roads, 8.093 kilometers as county roads and 26.013 kilometers as parish roads. 
Only 3.751 kilometers or 7,5 percent of the public roads were paved in 1959, the rest 
was gravel road.1048 The public road system’s length increased 6.403 kilometers 
since 1945. 2.196 kilometers had been paved, 4.284 kilometers less than agreed in 
the 1947 Trunk Road Plan. Almost every Danish trunk road and close to 60 percent 
                                                 
1042 Stortingstidende (1959):268-290. 
1043 ”Høyere avgifter vedtatt: Bilrasjoneringen går nå mot slutten”, Arbeiderbladet, February 3rd 1959; 
”De økte bilavgiftene ledd i opphevingen av rasjoneringsordningen”, Artbeiderbladet, Februrary 4th 1959; 
Styrets beretning for 1959, Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1960:17-19, OVA; Fasting and 
Hagerup (1966:96-99); Østby (1995:217-218). 
1044 Einar Gerhardsen opposed vigorously rationing through the voters’ wallet, according to Bjørn Larsen 
(2005 [Interview]). Einar Gerhardsen’s aversion against rationing through the wallet was also confirmed 
by the historian Finn Olstad (1999:251-253) when Gerhardsen was forced to abandon the initial 
reconstruction’s stabilization policy. 
1045 Fasting and Hagerup (1966:102-103). 
1046 Cf. studies of minutes from the central board’s meetings from January 8th 1957 until March 16th 1960, 
AAB-DNA cassette Ac 6. 
1047 Østby (1995:291). 
1048 Historisk statistikk 1968, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo 1969:415 Tabell 205. 
Chapter 4 – Norway – the deviant case 
268 
of the local roads was paved in 1959.1049 The Swedish executive forced similarly 
construction of a modern high-level road system through Swedish Road Plan 
approved in 1959.  
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Norwegian case between 1945 and 1959? First, this study’s main 
hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road 
policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good 
was both weakened and strengthened between 1945 and 1959, because the majority 
of Stortinget’s legislators considered trunk roads national collective goods and 
pursued the common good, at least in principle when they approved the 1947 Trunk 
Road Plan for construction of modern, paved trunk roads between the regions and 
the most important export markets. But the Gerhardsen and Torp executives were 
soon solitary defenders of the national interests and common good, because 
Stortinget’s majority, hereunder many Labor Party legislators, was more concerned 
with their own constituencies’ parochial interests, and voted geographically rather 
than according to the party line in low politics issues such as road policy and road 
construction. The legislators and counties’ local egoism prevailed therefore in many 
instances on the national interests and the common good’s expense 1945-59, even if 
the executive and Directorate of Public Roads changed the road policy during the 
second half of the 1950s. Most road appropriations were allocated to trunk roads 
during the second half of the 1950s, even if the road appropriations only was a 
fraction of those needed to develop a functional road system. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads as local collective or 
private goods governed by the constituencies’ resource struggles was significantly 
strengthened by the Norwegian case between 1945 and 1959, because Stortinget’s 
majority headed by the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition guarded 
vigorously their own counties’ share of the annual road investments determined by 
Stortinget’s 1929 allocation key. The majority of legislators preferred similarly 
investments in local roads in their own constituencies’ local roads rather than 
accomplishment of the 1947 Trunk Road Plan, and defended vigorously the 
Combined Road Administration and the Liberal Party’s System for resource 
allocation when the Gerhardsen and Torp executives questioned the 1912 Road Act 
and the Combined Road Administration. 
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was both strengthened and weakened by the Norwegian case 
between 1945 and 1959, because the Labor Party’s majority 1945-61 made most 
issues to intraparty matters, and the Labor Party’s struggling wings and factions 
usually determined the outcomes. The Norwegian Labor Party bosses reasoned 
seemingly fundamentally different from their Danish and Swedish fellow believers. 
The party discipline was seemingly far stricter concerning car rationing than road 
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policy. The Labor Party bosses’ desire for domestic peace explain largely why the 
car rationing was upheld until late in 1960, almost 12 years after the initial 
reconstruction was completed in 1948/49. This study found the Labor Party’s 
commonly used currency balance argument to be only a smokescreen to mask 
intraparty struggles, because the Ministry of Finance concluded already in 1956 that 
liquidated car rationing and increased road construction would not harm the State 
economy. But leading Labor Party legislators used the currency balance argument 
publicly at least until November 1958. The railroad lobby’s strong position in the 
Labor Party and in the National Federation of Labor explain partly the mass 
motoring’s delayed reemergence in Norway. The commonly held belief has been the 
non-socialist parties opposition parties chased the governing Labor Party with regard 
to road policy and road construction in the 1950s, but the Labor Party’s 1955-56 
Party Commission for Transport and Communication Problems headed by minister 
of justice Jens Haugland, with among others Secretary Haakon Lie, minister of 
transport and communications Kolbjørn Varmann and Oslo and Akershus’ County 
Governor Trygve Lie as members, proposed radical road policy reforms to catch up 
Norway’s lag with regard to road construction and road standard. Many of these 
proposals had striking similarities with ideas championed by the non-socialist 
opposition parties and the road and motoring lobby. But the Labor Party’s 
traditionalists and railroad lobby rejected these ideas prior to or at the 1957 
convention, and shelved also the Road Act Committee’s 1957 proposal that would 
have replaced the Combined Road Administration with a Swedish style road 
administration and largely abolished the Liberal Party’s System that governed 
Stortinget’s resource allocation to among others roads. This study has thus lain open 
the governing Labor Party was far more divided internally in the 1950s with regard 
to road policy than what has been taken for granted. 
 This study’s final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Norwegian case 
between 1945 and 1959. First, the 1945 liberation led to a regime change, because 
the Labor Party or rather the new Civil Servant State replaced the totalitarian 
Quisling regime. But the prewar Liberal Party’s System that had governed 
Stortinget’s resource allocation since the 1890s rose again, and was soon even 
stronger than prior to World War Two, most likely because Prime Minister and party 
leader Einar Gerhardsen gave concessions to the Labor Party’s phalanx within the 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition. The peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition strengthened also its position during the German occupation, 
because of more pronounced resistance in peripheral and rural than in central and 
urban areas. Both the Liberal Party’s System and the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition were examples of path dependence. Second, the Directorate 
of Public Roads was weakened after World War Two, and the County Road Boards 
and Public Roads Administrations punctuated partly the 1928 equilibrium that gave 
the Directorate of Public Roads a more prominent position. But the Directorate of 
Public Roads assisted by the Ministry of Transport and Communications regained 
partly its former position in the second half of the 1950s, and managed to carry out a 
road policy largely governed by the professionals’ norms and standards despite 
minuscule road appropriations. Third, Stortinget’s ban against accomplishment of 
public works through competitive bidding from 1894 until 1956 delayed of 
mechanized road construction and maintenance in Norway, and gave the legislators 
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increasing returns, because provision of employment on hundreds of small 
construction sites increased their likelihood of reelection. This ban against road 
construction based on competitive bidding was clearly an example of path 
dependence. Fourth, abolition of the Farmer’s Paragraph prior to the 1953 election 
was only formal, not substantial. The 1953 election system did not introduce the 
principle one person – one vote such as in Denmark and Sweden. The peripheral and 
rural constituencies’ malapportionment established in the 19th century was upheld, 
and even the 1953 election system gave thus the peripheral and rural constituencies’ 
voters increasing returns. The election system was clearly an example of path 
dependence. Fifth, the Labor Party’s postwar Strategic Capitalism based on 
politically governed allocation of investments to hydroelectric power plants and 
smokestack industries located in the export enclaves weakened traditional domestic 
sectors such retail and detail trades, manufacturing and services highly dependent of 
road transports. Sixth, the Road Act Commission’s 1957 recommendations was one 
attempt from the Labor Party modernists to punctuate the Liberal Party’s System for 
resource allocation, the 1912 Road Act and the Combined Road Administration. But 
this attempt failed because of intraparty reasons and the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition’s pivotal position in Stortinget. Seventh, the Gerhardsen 
executive’s transport and communication policy shifted in 1956 when minister of 
transport and communications Kolbjørn Varmann abandoned further construction of 
new railroads. The executive’s 1958-61 Long-term Program promised construction 
of modern roads rather than unprofitable railroads. Finally, Stortinget’s imposition 
in February 1959 of significantly increased import taxes for cars paved the way for 
abolition of the car rationing in 1960. But the new vehicle taxes together with the 
1949 extraordinary fuel tax punctuated the equilibrium established through the 1912 
and 1926 Motor Vehicle Acts that had linked the vehicle and fuel tax revenues to 
road maintenance. The annual road appropriations were from then governed by the 
Ministry of Finance’s budget constraints and sector allocation, and completely 
decoupled from the motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes, despite several 
attempts throughout the 1950s for establishment of a Road Fund, among others from 
the Labor Party modernists. This reform gave the Ministry of Finance increasing 
returns, but prevented effectively catch-up when the car rationing was abolished and 
the number of cars multiplied, because the road appropriations lagged behind. The 
Danish and Swedish road appropriations were linked to the motorists’ payments of 
vehicle and fuel taxes though Road Funds and safeguarded thereby increased road 
appropriations when the number of cars increased. 
1960-80 – The Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation 
and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s 
counterreformation 
The Labor Party executive’s liquidation of the car rationing October 1st 1960 
necessitated a complete road policy turnaround, because the public road system was 
some places in worse condition than prior to World War Two given the number of 
cars. Liquidation of the car rationing became the window of opportunity for the 
Labor Party modernists’ 1960-65 road policy reformation, but the Labor Party lost 
the 1965 election. The first non-socialist executive since 1935 carried out a road 
policy counterreformation that made construction of local roads in peripheral and 
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rural areas job number one, similarly as in the early 1950s. The Labor Party 
modernists lost the intraparty power struggles during the 1965-71 opposition, and 
the 1970s’ Labor Party executives furthered the Borten executive’s road policy 
counterreformation. The result was a road policy debacle because of massive traffic 
infarcts in Norway’s three major cities from the turn of the 1970s and 80s. 
The Labor Party or new Civil Servant State from success to distress 
Some of the Labor Party’s most prominent NATO opponents were excluded in April 
1961 and established a new leftwing populist and pacifist party Socialist Peoples’ 
Party (Sosialistisk Folkeparti) that won 2 seats in the 1961 election. The Labor 
Party’s lost majority changed the political balance and increased the non-socialist 
parties’ influence.1050 The 1961 election became the beginning of decades with 
minority executives. Einar Gerhardsen’s third Labor Party executive was forced to 
resign in August 1963 when the Socialist Peoples’ Party joined the non-socialist 
parties’ critique of the Kings Bay affair.1051 The Conservative Party’s John Lyng 
established a four party minority executive that was forced to resign four weeks 
later. Einar Gerhardsen established his fourth and final executive that remained in 
power until the 1965 election.1052  
 John Lyng’s interregnum became a political turning point, because the non-
socialist parties’ had been struggling since 1935 and the middle parties’ attempt of 
cooperation prior to the 1961 election had failed.1053 The Liberal, Agrarian, 
Christian Peoples’ and Conservative Parties that won the majority in 1965 election 
had then adopted or accepted Strategic Capitalism, low interest policy and many 
other Labor Party policies they opposed vigorously in the 1940s and 50s.1054 The 
Agrarian Party’s Per Borten became Prime Minister after intense struggles behind 
the scene, because the Liberal Party gained most votes.1055 Per Borten’s particular 
leadership style distinguished this four party coalition, according to the Conservative 
Party’s John Lyng and Kåre Willoch, who served as minister of foreign affairs and 
minister of trade 1965-70.1056 One of the Agrarian Party’s fundamental business 
ideas after its 1945 whitewash was full menu of public financed welfare goods, no 
matter where the inhabitants preferred to live.1057 The Labor Party’s aim for 
“decentralized centralization” triggered particularly the Agrarian Party’s 
resistance.1058 The Conservative Party had traditionally represented urban voters all 
across Norway, and usually not feared centralization, but accommodated to the 
middle parties’ preferences, because the Borten executive represented first and 
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foremost the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s interests. The 
Borten executive furthered many policies questioned by the Labor Party modernists. 
 The Labor Party had petrified and turned stale after almost three decades in 
office.1059 The party had not been able or willing to renew itself such as for instance 
the Swedish Social Democratic Party did, even if it had been in office since 1932. 
Trygve Bratteli, deputy leader since 1945, succeeded Einar Gerhardsen as leader 
prior to the 1965 election. Reiulf Steen, one of Einar Gerhardsen’s young protégés, 
became new deputy leader.1060 Reiulf Steen initiated a few days after the lost 1965 
election development of a new manifesto that emphasized democratization and 
decentralization. The Labor Party’s 1969 convention approved this new manifesto 
unanimously.1061 But Trygve Bratteli refused cooperation with parties to the Labor 
Party’s left, according to the political scientist Hege Skjeie. This decision fueled the 
Labor Party’s internal leftwing opposition. Trygve Bratteli came soon in troubles. 
The Labor Party had been governed by an oligarchy 1945-65, but Trygve Bratteli 
believed in more democratic procedures.1062 Guttorm Hansen, a Labor Party 
legislator representing Nord-Trøndelag and Stortinget’s President 1973-81, claimed 
Stortinget’s influence increased on the party headquarter’s expense when Trygve 
Bratteli became party leader, because Trygve Bratteli was “never Youngstorget’s or 
the Oslo Party’s man”, even if he had spent most of his political life in those 
circles.1063 Trygve Bratteli as partly leader increased the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition power even within the Labor Party. Haakon Lie, the very 
powerful Secretary since 1945, resigned at the 1969 convention and was succeeded 
by Ronald Bye.1064 Ronald Bye was not willing to utilize Haakon Lie’s methods, 
and the leftwing, traditionalists, anti-motorists, populists and the peripheral and rural 
areas’ distributional coalition strengthened their position through establishment of 
miscellaneous unholy alliances.1065 A new distributional coalition based on 
economic growth vs. environmental protection, or so-called “Old Politics” vs. “New 
Politics”, emerged also from the second half of the 1960s.1066 The Borten executive 
imploded in 1971, among others because of the coalition partners’ divergent views 
concerning Norwegian membership in EEC.1067 The EEC issue created also 
significant tensions within the Labor Party that was a broad alliance of divergent 
interest groups from all across Norway. 
 Trygve Bratteli’s first minority executive 1971-72 abandoned many principles 
Bratteli had been struggling for during the 1950s and early 60s, because numerous 
new intraparty alliances developed during the 1965-71 opposition undermined 
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Trygve Bratteli and other modernists’ position, among others because of Trygve 
Bratteli’s belief in democratic procedures.1068 In addition came Trygve Bratteli’s age 
and ailing health.1069 The EEC-issue and the 1972 referendum became a political 
“earthquake”, where the Labor Party’s internal opposition against Norwegian 
membership in EEC conflicted with the ruling elites’ advocacy of Norwegian 
membership.1070 The alliance pattern was often the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition against the others. The voters’ no changed partly the political 
landscape, and led to Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli’s resignation. A Liberal, 
Agrarian and Christian Peoples’ Parties mini coalition headed by the Christian 
Peoples’ Party’s Lars Korvald representing the popular movement against EEC and 
the peripheral and rural areas’ distribution coalition governed until after the 1973 
election. The Korvald executive’s main task was negotiating Norway’s free trade 
agreement with EEC after the voters’ no.1071  
 The 1973 election became a second political earthquake. The ECC issue 
splintered the Liberal Party once again in 1972.1072 The Socialist Peoples’ Party, the 
Communist Party and some Labor Party members opposing NATO and EEC 
established a new leftwing populist and pacifist coalition, Socialist Election Alliance 
(Sosialistisk Valgforbund) that in 1975 became the current Socialist Left Party 
(Sosialistisk Venstreparti).1073 Anders Lange established similarly his rightwing 
populist Anders Lange’s Party (Anders Langes Parti) that in 1977 became the 
current Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet).1074 The anti EEC parties, the peripheral 
and rural areas’ distributional coalition and the traditionalists and anti-modernists 
won the 1973 election.1075 Norway’s political landscape was reshaped 
fundamentally, with left and rightwing populist parties in permanent and often 
prominent positions. This new political landscape delayed or postponed many 
modernization processes that had gained momentum during the 1960s. 
 Trygve Bratteli’s second minority executive 1973-76 pursued many policies 
aiming at marginalizing the Socialist Election Alliance/Socialist Left Party, but 
Trygve Bratteli’s position was seriously weakened.1076 The executive and 
Stortinget’s willingness to carry out costly regional policy reforms favoring the 
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peripheral and rural areas were almost unconstrained. Trygve Bratteli left the party 
headquarters to deputy leader Reiulf Steen, and announced similarly in June 1974 he 
would resign as party leader. This announcement made Trygve Bratteli a lame duck, 
and facilitated power struggles between deputy leader Reiulf Steen and Odvar 
Nordli, head of the Labor Party faction within the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition in Stortinget, who was considered more centrist than Reiulf 
Steen. Former Prime Minister and party leader Einar Gerhardsen orchestrated the 
compromise prior to the 1975 convention with Reiulf Steen as party leader and 
Odvar Nordli as Prime Minister. The only problem was that Trygve Bratteli still 
served as Prime Minister. The 1975 convention approved this compromise. The 
modernist Gro Harlem Brundtland from Oslo succeeded Reiulf Steen as deputy 
leader, and Ivar Leveraas succeeded Ronald Bye as Secretary. Odvar Nordli 
succeeded Trygve Bratteli as Prime Minister in January 1976.1077 But Odvar Norli 
struggled soon internally with Reiulf Steen, according to Hege Skjeie, among others 
because Steen desired cooperation with the Socialist Left Party, while Prime 
Minister Odvar Nordli desired cooperation with the Agrarian Party to splinter the 
non-socialist block. Reiulf Steen’s personal problems did not reduce the power 
struggles. Odvar Nordli remained in power until February 1981, when a palace 
revolution made Gro Harlem Brundtland Prime Minister.1078 The 1970s and early 
80s’ Labor Party was not for the fainthearted. 
 A constitutional amendment April 21st 1972 changed the election system prior 
to the 1973 election. Stortinget’s number of seats increased to 155. Oslo got 2 and 
Akershus 3 of the new seats. Bergen with 5 seats was merged with Hordaland with 
10 seats to one county and constituency with 15 seats.1079 These adjustments were 
highly consequential, because the merger of Bergen and Hordaland gave the coastal 
constituencies from Rogaland to Finnmark 78 seats, exactly half plus one, a true 
MWC. The peripheral and middle constituencies maintained similarly their 2/3 
majorities with 108 seats, compared to the central Oslofjord counties’ 47 seats. The 
1972 constitutional reform entrenched the EEC referendum’s alliance patterns and 
the Liberal Party’s System for resource allocation. 
 The middle and peripheral constituencies and the socialist and middle parties’ 
members of Stortinget dominated also the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications 1961-81, similarly as in the 1950s.1080 The peripheral and rural 
areas’ distributional coalition maintained thereby the control of the Standing 
Committee on Transports and Communications 1961-81, similarly as 1949-61, even 
if the political center of gravity and the median started to shift slightly and almost 
unnoticeable to the right after the 1973 election.  
 The Cooperation Council’s ‘voluntary’ credit rationing was in June 1965 
replaced by credit rationing by law, when Stortinget approved the Money and Credit 
Act (Penge- og kredittloven). The Gerhardsen executive established also the Credit 
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Political Committee (Kredittpolitisk utvalg), headed by the Ministry of Finance that 
managed the interest rates and allocation of credits.1081 Both the Borten executive 
and the entailing Labor Party executives tried to limit the credits, but none of them 
were willing to abandon the low-interest policy, because that would have limited the 
demand, affected the investments and the social distribution of wealth.1082 The 
demand for credits exceeded by far the supply even after 1965, which led to further 
tightening of the politically governed credit allocation until the rationing system 
started to crumble in the 1970s. 
 The Norwegian economy struggled with stagnating growth despite high 
investments. The growth rates lagged behind the other OEEC member countries at 
the turn of the 1950s and 60s. Weak economic growth became both an “economic 
and political problem” according to the historian Trond Bergh. The last two 
Gerhardsen executives’ response in the early 1960s was a combination of growth 
and regional policies.1083 Chartered engineer Erik Brand Olimb, head of the Institute 
of Transport Economics (Transportøkonomisk institutt) 1960-68, claimed the Labor 
Party’s postwar economic policy led to low productivity.1084 Olimb’s observation 
seems reasonable, because politically governed investments in the export enclaves 
crowded out more profitable investments in initially faster growing sectors. Limited 
and misallocated investments in modern transport and communication 
infrastructures constrained similarly mainland Norway’s growth potential outside 
the export enclaves. 
 Phillips Petroleum discovered oil in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea 
December 23rd 1969. Ekofisk was in full production from about 1975. Discovery of 
oil would soon change the Norwegian economy’s structure.1085 Norway joined the 
“Snake” after the Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1972, and took part in the 
Snake until 1978, when the EU member countries established their European 
Monetary System (EMS). Norges Bank established then its own currency basket.1086 
The first oil-price shock 1973-74, OPEC 1, became the third political earthquake 
within two years. The entailing stagflation decimated both Norwegian ship owners 
and shipbuilding industry and later also many of the export enclaves’ smokestack 
industries. Per Kleppe, minister of finance in Trygve Bratteli’s second minority 
executive, responded with a State loan financed counter cyclic policy 1974-77 that 
prevented mass unemployment. But the price was high inflation, permanent 
reduction of the Norwegian trade and industry’s competitiveness and deteriorating 
balance of trade.1087 The counter cyclic policy was particularly beneficial for 
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agriculture, fisheries and shipbuilding. Stortinget’s majority guaranteed also the 
farmers almost equal income as industrial workers.1088 This counter cyclic policy 
worked well in the short run, but created new problems in the long run, among 
others accelerated deindustrialization throughout the 1980s. 
 Odvar Nordli’s executive abandoned the counter cyclic policy immediately 
after the 1977 election, when the Socialist Left Party’s voter support had been 
reduced to the former Socialist Peoples’ Party’s level. The fast growing foreign debt 
was then 45 percent of the GDP, and the exports lagged. The shipping industry 
fought for its life, the oil revenues were delayed and the oil prices significantly 
below the 1974 level. The Norwegian State’s creditworthiness was at stake.1089 
Thousands of jobs in the peripheral and rural areas created through the regional 
policy and the 1970s’ counter cyclic policy vanished when the Nordli executive 
pulled the plug. The policy reversal in 1977-78 started the neo-liberal shift, even if 
this shift was veiled behind thick layers of social democratic rhetoric. The second oil 
price shock 1979-80 or OPEC 2, caused by the Iranian revolution, came on top of 
this, and sent the economy into a deep recession. But the increased oil price that was 
a problem for most other countries increased the Norwegian State’s wealth. The 
early 1960s fast rising wealth ended thus with severe macro economic shocks, 
stagflation and recession from 1974, similarly as in Denmark and Sweden, but 
Norway was definitely better off because of the prospects of future oil and gas 
revenues. 
 How was Norway’s economic performance during the 1960s and 70s? 
Norway’s GDP per capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, 
was 7.208 dollars in 1960, 10.033 in 1970, 11.247 in 1973 and 15.129 in 1980. The 
average for the 12 West European countries was 7.607 dollars in 1960, 10.959 in 
1970, 12.156 in 1973 and 14.057 in 1980. Norway had West-Europe’s eight highest 
GDP per capita in 1960, ninth highest in 1970 and 1973, and third highest in 
1980.1090 Norway lagged behind the West European average in 1960, 1970 and 
1973. But the oil and gas revenues changed everything, because Norway was well 
above the West European average in 1980, despite OPEC 2, recession and reduced 
public spending in many policy areas. The Norwegian executives and legislators 
faced therefore never similar stern choices as their Danish and Swedish opposite 
numbers during the second half of the 1970s and early 80s, because the fast growing 
oil and gas revenues filled the State’s coffers and lubricated the economy. 
The Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation 
The Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation gained momentum April 23rd 
when Trygve Bratteli, deputy leader since 1945 and minister of finance 1951-55 and 
1956-60, became minister of transports and communications.1091 Bratteli gave the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications a hitherto unknown political strength, 
and brought with him the lawyer Sigurd Juell Lorentzen, who had been the Ministry 
of Finance’s Finance Section’s (Finansavdelingen) deputy undersecretary since 
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1952, and responsible for the annual budgets, taxes and fees. Lorentzen was 
appointed as the Ministry of Transport and Communication’s permanent 
undersecretary.1092 Trygve Bratteli appointed also the Transport Economic Board’s 
secretary Robert F. Nordén as Parliamentary Secretary.1093 Robert F. Nordén was as 
mentioned earlier economist from University of Oslo, and represented 
fundamentally different ideas compared to Lorentzen who most likely designed the 
1959 vehicle tax increases that facilitated liquidation of the car rationing and 
decoupled the vehicle and fuel tax revenues from the annual road appropriations. 
 Norwegian Road Federation launched its annual motoring week in 1960 
denoted Norway entering the motoring age (Norge inn i bilalderen) together with 
Polytechnic Association and Norwegian Chartered Engineer’s Association April 
25th, two days after Trygve Bratteli became minister of transport and 
communications. The first meeting’s topic was “Planning the motoring age”, with 
the Agrarian Party’s leader of Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transports and 
Communications Lars Elisæus Vatnaland from Rogaland as keynote speaker. The 
second meeting April 26th was Justice of the Supreme Court Axel Heiberg’s lecture 
about “Norway under one Construction Act”. The third meeting, April 27th about 
“Road construction in the motoring age”, was headed by Norwegian Technical 
Institute’s professor Ole D. Lærum and chartered engineer Harald Ekström, head of 
the Swedish Road and Water Construction Administration’s Planning Section. The 
fourth meeting, April 28th, was a joint meeting with Norwegian Urban Planning 
Association (Norsk Byplanforening) about “The urban society in the motoring age”, 
where Oslo’s Labor Party mayor Brynjulf Bull and the Swedish Road and Water 
Construction Administration’s Stig Nordquist lectured.1094 Norwegian Road 
Federation furthered hence its public meetings, but the new topics reflected clearly 
Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen’s decision October 8th 1959 about liquidating the 
car rationing, because the 1960 agenda was not any more car rationing but how to 
adapt Norway to mass motoring.  
 The early 1960s’ most important road policy moves were not initiated by 
Norwegian Road Federation, but by the ruling Labor Party modernists that launched 
a road policy reformation. Their most important moves were the 1961 manifesto, 
appointment of a new Road Director and removal of the Directorate of Public 
Roads’ ancient regime, the 1962 Motorway Plan, the 1963 Road Act, and finally 
development of a national road plan. 
 The Labor Party’s 1961-65 manifesto was in process already during the 
summer of 1959. Transport and communication policy, hereunder road policy was 
one of the main issues together with regional, trade and industry policies. Norges 
Bank’s Governor Erik Brofoss, who also was member of the Labor Party’s central 
board, characterized in a note to Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen’s Parliamentary 
Secretary Dagfin Juel August 28th 1959 the 1950s’ transport and communication 
policy as “cash transfers to the districts”, and required bold and strategic moves to 
solve Greater Oslo’s increasing road and railroad problems. Erik Brofoss questioned 
whether the transport and communication sector’s public administrations were 
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capable of such moves, but stressed the Road Director had to be involved in such 
planning.1095 Erik Brofoss, who designed postwar Norway’s economic policy, 
questioned here both the Labor Party’s official transport and communication policy 
and the transport and communication sectors’ public administrations that earlier had 
been subject to critique from among others Trygve Lie, Fritz Rieber, the 1951 Road 
Act Committee, the Conservative Party and Norwegian Road Federation. The Labor 
Party’s central board appointed therefore November 16th 1959 a Transport and 
Communication Commission (Samferdselsutvalget) headed by Bergen and 
Hordaland’s County Governor and former minister of finance Mons Lid to prepare 
the 1961-65 manifesto. The Transport Economic Board’s secretary Robert F. 
Nordén was appointed as secretary.1096  
 Erik Brofoss used the opportunity at Oslo Labor Party’s executive 
committee’s meeting May 10th 1960 to launch a preemptive strike against the 
forthcoming political challenges because of the dysfunctional road system. Erik 
Brofoss claimed that in the “hundred thousand of cars” heading towards Oslo, 
trapped in congestion, there will be “sitting a quarter million humans cursing and 
swearing the incompetent executive and the negligent city council unable to provide 
functional roads in due time”. Stortinget’s allocation of the road appropriations was 
namely governed by the early 1930s’ unemployment and not by the actual traffic 
conditions, because “90 percent of Norway’s road traffic went on 10 percent of the 
roads”. But Stortinget was “not affected by such considerations”. Erik Brofoss 
proposed organizing construction of a motorway from eastern Oslo to Eidsvoll as a 
non-profit joint stock company owned by the State, City of Oslo and Akershus 
County, financed through loans and amortized through turnpikes, because 
construction of this motorway was “a public duty”, not a project for private 
“profits”.1097 Erik Brofoss considered obviously turnpikes in the most crowded areas 
a possible exit from Stortinget’s impasse, because Stortinget’s resource allocation 
was governed by the Liberal Party’s System. Turnpikes on motorways were some of 
the few taxes the Norwegians paid voluntarily, according to Brofoss. The Labor 
Party’s road policy was seemingly about to shift almost 180 degrees when the dam 
burst. 
 The Labor Party’s Transport and Communication Commission submitted its 
recommendations July 1st 1960, and concluded it was more likely that Norwegian 
families would purchase cars when the standard of living increased, than in most 
other countries, because of Norway’s dispersed settlement and poorly developed 
public transports.1098 The commission’s recommendations were clearly influenced 
by Robert F. Nordén and the Transport Economic Board’s studies, but also by 
Swedish Road Plan and the Danish Traffic Economic Commission’s contemporary 
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discussions about the future high-level transport and communication infrastructures, 
formerly discussed in chapter 2 and 3. The Labor Party’s Transport and 
Communication Commission recommended significantly increased transport and 
communication investments, but issued also a warning because transport and 
communication infrastructures were “long-term and very capital intensive 
investments” with significant risk for misallocation that created inefficiencies, and 
recommended therefore allocation of the investments according to rational methods, 
such as systematic use of transport economic studies and long term planning. The 
Transport and Communication Commission estimated the costs for development of a 
functional road system to “billions” of NOK.1099 The Labor Party’s Transport and 
Communication Commission reasoned here almost similarly as Axel Dammann’s 
1955 study and the Conservative Party’s 1957 10 Years Plan for Transports and 
Communications that was based on Dammann’s studies, and furthered also ideas 
launched by the Labor Party’s 1955-56 Party Commission for Transport and 
Communication Problems. 
 The Labor Party’s Transport and Communication Commission distinguished 
between construction of “access roads “in desolate areas and update of “production 
roads” in areas with poor road connections. Roads that could be updated profitably, 
because of saved transport costs were similarly denoted “traffic roads”. The 
Transport and Communication Commission stressed the need for “development of 
access and production roads” in the peripheral and rural areas, because such roads 
was “a precondition for economic and cultural progress” in backwards areas, but 
stressed also that construction of traffic roads had to be “forced” when the road 
traffic increased. The balance between investments in access, production and traffic 
roads had to be determined politically, not only by future transport costs.1100 Even 
the Transport and Communication Commission recommended “dedicating the 
vehicle taxes” to road appropriations, to safeguard swift construction of a modern 
and functional public road system, similarly as The Party Commission for Transport 
and Communication Problems did in May 1956, and recommended also 
considerations about “particular financing in addition to the ordinary appropriations” 
within and near the major cities, similarly as Trygve Lie had argued for in May 1956 
and Erik Brofoss in May 1960. The Transport and Communication Commission 
stressed finally the need for political processing of the Road Act draft submitted in 
1957.1101 The Labor Party modernists argued thus once again for dedicated vehicle 
taxes to road purposes, similarly as in Denmark and Sweden, for possible 
introduction of turnpikes in the most crowded areas, and for introduction of a new 
Road Act that facilitated construction of a functional road system all across Norway. 
 The Labor Party’s central board appointed October 7th 1960 minister of 
transport and communications Trygve Bratteli as leader of the 1961-65 manifesto’s 
editorial committee.1102 Trygve Bratteli was obviously well aware what was 
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politically possible given the Labor Party’s internal power relations, and omitted 
most of the Transport and Communication Commission’s controversial 
recommendations, because transport and communication questions were hardly on 
the agenda prior to the 1961 convention. Most discussions were about foreign and 
security policy matters, because of the emerging Socialist Peoples’ Party.1103 The 
risk for party splintering was clearly the Labor Party bosses’ issue number one 
during the winter and spring 1961.  
 All major political parties argued for increased transport and communication 
appropriations, hereunder increased road investments during the term 1961-65, but 
only the three middle parties promised explicit dedicated vehicle and fuel taxes to 
road appropriations; i.e. establishment of a Road Fund. The Conservative Party 
promised a reasonable balance between vehicle and fuel taxes and road 
appropriations. Only the Liberal and Christian Peoples’ Parties championed 
alternative road financing, even if the Christian Peoples’ Party opposed turnpikes on 
trunk roads and major bridges. Only the Labor and Conservative Parties advocated 
allocation of the road investments according to rational methods and systematic 
plans. They were also the only parties that explicit championed construction of trunk 
roads, entrance roads and local roads all across Norway. The non-socialist parties 
championed road construction based on private construction companies and 
competitive bidding. The novelty in the 1961 manifestos was the Christian Peoples’ 
Party’s introduction of road safety as a particular issue.1104 The Labor Party 
modernists faced obviously stiff internal resistance from the traditionalists, railroad 
lobby and peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, similarly as prior to the 
1957 election, because neither establishment of a Road Fund, turnpike financing nor 
approval of a new Road Act was mentioned in the 1961 manifesto. The road policy 
reformation was obviously a controversial issue even within the Labor Party. Only 
the Labor, Conservative and partly the Christian Peoples’ Parties advocated 
investments in roads with national collective goods characteristics prior to the 1961 
election. 
 Parliamentary Secretary Robert F. Nordén served formally as politician only a 
few months, because he was appointed as deputy undersecretary in the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication’s new Elucidation Section (Utredningsavdelingen) in 
January 1961.1105 The historian Per Østby denoted Nordén and some chartered 
engineers in the Directorate of Public Roads’ top management as the “motoring’s 
craftsmen”.1106 The 1961 election shifted fundamentally Stortinget’s political 
balance of power, because the Labor Party lost its majority, and forced the Labor 
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Party to implicit cooperation with the non-socialist parties to marginalize the 
Socialist Peoples’ Party. This shift had also road policy implications. 
 Minister of transport and communications Trygve Bratteli did the same April 
10th 1962 as Fritz Rieber did in February 1957, and launched his road policy 
reformation from Polytechnic Association’s rostrum. The three most important tasks 
according to Trygve Bratteli were the major cities’ entrance roads, trunk roads 
between the regions and to the neighboring countries, and finally construction of 
local roads.1107 These tasks were similar to those outlined in the Labor Party’s 1961 
manifesto, but Trygve Bratteli prioritized entrance roads to trunk roads, because the 
traffic counting made it evident that Oslo’s entrance roads were Norway’s most 
crowded. Greater Oslo’s congestion, accident and environmental problems 
deteriorated rapidly.1108 Trygve Bratteli used clearly this opportunity to announce 
publicly the Labor Party’s new position concerning road policy and road 
construction, based on industrial reasoning and transport economic considerations, 
after the Labor Party abandoned its 1947-60 car rationing.  
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Figure 17: Oslo’s central areas’ average traffic per day (number of vehicles) in 
1963. 
 
Source: Transportanalysen for Oslo-området, Oslo Byplankontor, Oslo 1965:10. 
 Many of the Combined Road Administration’s employees were taken by 
surprise when minister of transport and communications Trygve Bratteli appointed 
Bærum municipal’s technical deputy mayor, the 51 years old chartered engineer 
Karl Olsen, as Road Director March 9th 1962. Olav A.B. Torpp had been the 
Combined Road Administration’s internal candidate.1109 Karl Olsen graduated as 
chartered engineer from Norwegian Institute of Technology in 1934. Road Director 
Thomas Offenberg Backer got hold of a Marshall Aid scholarship in 1950, and sent 
Karl Olsen and two other engineers for 3-4 months on the job training at the US 
federal road administration, the Bureau of Public Roads, where Karl Olsen studied 
high-level road planning.1110 Karl Olsen approached Trygve Bratteli after he had 
been appointed, to thank him and to get acquainted. Bratteli told Olsen his tasks 
were to “improve the Norwegian road policy’s order, and to develop a proper and 
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more rational road system”.1111 Thomas Offenberg Backer retired October 1st 
1962.1112  
 It seems not unreasonable to conclude the Directorate of Public Roads’ ancient 
regime retired with Thomas Offenberg Backer, because Arne J. Grotterød was in 
1961 appointed as head of the new Planning Department.1113 Chartered engineer 
Olav A. B. Torpp, Hordaland’s Chief County Officer since 1951, was similarly 
appointed head of the Road Department in 1961, Technical Director in 1962 and 
Deputy Road Director in 1964.1114 Torpp was first and foremost a very efficient 
administrator and skilled professional.1115 Torpp knew almost every section of the 
public road system. The Ministry of Transport and Communication’s permanent 
undersecretary Sigurd Juell Lorentzen appointed similarly in 1962 the lawyer Rolf 
Normann Torgersen, who rewrote the 1957 draft Road Act to what later became the 
1963 Road Act, as head of the Directorate of Public Road’s new Road Traffic 
Section.1116 The new top management revitalized seemingly the Directorate of 
Public Roads. The expectations, particularly to Road Director Karl Olsen, were 
high. Many perceived then Thomas Offenberg Backer as an elderly gentleman, but 
Backer managed actually during the second half of the 1950s to carry out a road 
policy according to the road engineers’ professional norms and standards, despite 
minuscule road appropriations. 
 Trygve Bratteli became the political father of Norway’s first and so far only 
national motorway plan, when the Ministry of Transport and Communications in 
1961 ordered the Directorate of Public Roads to provide an overview of trunk roads 
where motorway standard was necessary within 10 years.1117 Olav Søfteland, Road 
Director since 1992, graduated as chartered engineer from Norwegian Institute of 
Technology in 1960 where among others Swedish Road Plan had been part of the 
curriculum. Søfteland made the 1962 Motorway Plan together with Arne J. 
Grotterød.1118 Stortinget approved The 1962 Motorway Plan December 12th 1962 
because the Labor, Conservative and Liberal Parties cooperated about the 1963 road 
appropriations. But the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
emphasized that approval of the 1962 Motorway Plan was not carte blanche, 
because Stortinget approved the road appropriations annually.1119 It was then 13 
years since Stortinget approved the 1947 Trunk Road Plan that also outlined 
construction of roads with national collective good characteristics. The million 
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dollar question was whether the 1962 Motorway Plan ever actually would be 
accomplished, or face the same destiny as the 1947 Trunk Road Plan. 
Figure 18: Norway’s 1962 Motorway Plan – recommended motorways on Østlandet 
within 1980. 
 
Source: St. prp. nr. 1 (1962-63) Om bevilgning til samferdselsformål:102. 
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 The 1962 Motorway Plan’s aim was safe and efficient trunk roads through 
systematic implementation of traffic separation and traffic differentiation.1120 Arne J. 
Grotterød’s knowledge about traffic engineering from Yale University, and 
influence from Swedish Road Plan and the emerging SCAFT-paradigm were clearly 
evident. Many principles concerning road safety and efficiency outlined in the 1962 
Motorway Plan had not been seen in Norway since the Quisling regime’s Greater 
Oslo’s Road and Railroad Plan of September 1942 and Organisation Todt’s plan for 
an Autostrada from Halden to Trondheim via Oslo. 
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Figure 19: Norway’s 1962 Motorway Plan – recommended motorways in 
Trøndelag, Vestlandet and Sørlandet within 1980. 
 
Source: St. prp. nr. 1 (1962-63) Om bevilgning til samferdselsformål:103. 
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 The 1962 Motorway plan estimated the need for construction of at least 785 
kilometers four-lane motorways in Norway’s most densely populated areas within 
1980, such as shown on Figure 18 and 19. 305 kilometers had to be completed as 
four-lane motorways within 1972, together with 105 kilometers two-lane 
expressways that later could be expanded to four-lane motorways. The estimated 
costs for 305 kilometer motorways and 105 kilometer expressways within 1972 was 
1.060 millions 1963 NOK, approximately 717,7 millions 1990 PPP USD.1121 The 
outlined motorways served in 1962 about 50 percent of the population, 60 percent of 
the enterprises, more than 80 percent of the retail trade, and gave all major cities 
except Tromsø motorway connections or modern entrance roads.1122 Completing the 
1962 Motorway Plan, such as outlined by the Directorate of Public Roads, would 
have given Norway an almost similar motorway system as in Denmark and Sweden 
within 1980. But this development path was soon derailed, even if construction of 
Norway’s first motorways, Oslo’s western entrance road E18 and Oslo’s 
northeastern entrance road E6 just had started.1123 Comparing Figure 18 and 19 with 
Figure 2, 21, 22 and 26 is rather thought provoking. 
 The 1963 Road Act was of great importance for the Norwegian public road 
system’s forthcoming modernizing, because the Road Act governed the road 
sector’s basic rules of the game. But the 1963 Road Act finally approved differed 
fundamentally from the draft Road Act submitted by the Road Act Committee in 
1957. The Labor Party traditionalists, railroad lobby and peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition had obviously recovered after Haakon Lie’s purges and Olav 
Meisdalshagen’s death at the turn of the 1950s and 60s. The 1963 Road Act was 
highly controversial, because Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications held more than 50 meetings before it concluded March 28th 
1963.1124 The 1963 Road Act divided the road system into three tiers; highways 
(riksveger), hereunder trunk roads and motorways, which were managed by each 
county’s Public Roads Administration but with county co-financing, county roads 
(fylkesveger) managed by each county’s Public Roads Administration but with State 
co-financing, and municipal roads (kommunale veger), managed and financed by 
each municipal. The 1912 Road Act distinguished only between main or trunk roads 
and parish roads.1125 The ministry of Transport and Communication expanded the 
largely State financed highway system from approximately 16.000 to 24.000 
kilometers as part of the 1963 Road Act’s preparations.1126 The Gerhardsen 
executive concluded obviously it was politically necessary to spread the State road 
appropriations thinly and evenly across many kilometers of highways, rather than 
concentrating on the most crowded or economically most important trunk roads, 
                                                 
1121 Utbygging av motorveger, Tillegg til budsjettproposisjonen for 1963, Statens vegvesen 
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such as proposed by the Road Act Committee in 1957. Consolidation of the State 
road appropriations was then established policy in Denmark and largely also in 
Sweden. Dispersed road appropriations was obviously a concession to the peripheral 
and rural areas’ distributional coalition similarly as furthering the Combined Road 
Administration that also had been recommended liquidated by the Road Act 
Committee in 1957. The road policy reformation outlined by the 1951 Road Act 
Committee and the Labor Party’s internal Transport and Communication 
Commission in 1960 was clearly at stake. It was obviously risk for furthering the 
Liberal Party’s System and the 1912 Road Act’s principles with other means even in 
the 1963 Road Act. 
 The counties’ co-financing was the 1963 Road Act’s most controversial issue. 
Stortinget settled finally for 50 percent co-financing from Oslo and Bergen, 
exclusive land purchase, and 18 percent from the other Oslofjord counties, 7 percent 
from the three northernmost counties and 14 percent from the other counties, 
inclusive land purchase.1127 Stortinget debated the new Road Act five times, before 
the plenary finally approved it unanimously June 19th 1963. The constitution 
dictated then a closed procedure and approval with at least 2/3s majority.1128 Each 
county’s economy and tax redistribution overshadowed thereby clearly the need for 
a functional and modern road infrastructure. The Gerhardsen executive’s emphasis 
on tax redistribution rather than functional roads was most likely a concession to the 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition.  
 The 1963 Road Act did not distinguish between roads with national collective 
and local collective good characteristics, because roads with national collective good 
characteristics were not defined as a particular class of roads and not completely 
State financed such as recommended by the Road Act Committee in 1957. The 1963 
Road Act was hence born with at least one serious design flaw, if the aim was swift 
construction of a modern and functional road infrastructure. But the 1963 Road Act 
was still an improvement seen from Oslo and Bergen’s point of view, because the 
1912 Road Act gave them 0 percent of the State road appropriations. However, the 
1963 Road Act finally approved by Stortinget was clearly a strategic setback for the 
Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation, and can be understood as an omen 
about the forthcoming road policy counterreformation. 
 A joint meeting between the Labor Party’s faction in Stortinget, the central 
board and the National Federation of Labor’s secretariat September 12th 1963, when 
the Labor Party bosses had decided to remove John Lyng’s executive from office, 
agreed also about forced restructuring of the transport and communications with 
“particular emphasis on the roads”.1129 Road policy and road construction was hence 
of utmost importance for Einar Gerhardsen’s last executive. 
                                                 
1127 Innst. O. XIV. (1962-63) Tilråding frå samferdselsnemda om ny veglov:12, 27. 
1128 The proposed Road Act was discussed in Odelstinget May 20th, Lagtinget May 30th, Odelstinget June 
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Odelstinget nr. 70-71, June 11th 193:547-564; Forhandlinger i Lagtinget nr. 16-17, June 14th 1963:121-
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63):4065-4080).  
1129 Joint meeting between the Labor Party’s faction in Stortinget, the central board and the National 
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 Trygve Bratteli was forced to resign as minister of transport and 
communications January 20th 1964, because of intraparty intrigues from those who 
tried to prevent him succeeding Einar Gerhardsen as the Labor Party’ s leader. Einar 
Gerhardsen desired Bratteli’s resignation already immediately after his final 
executive came to power.1130 Bratteli’s resignation was also a serious setback for the 
Labor Party modernists, even if the economist Erik Himle, who had been Bratteli’s 
Parliamentary Secretary prior to the Kings Bay affair, became new minister of 
transport and communications.1131 Erik Himle furthered Trygve Bratteli’s rational 
and technocratic road policy, but lacked clearly Bratteli’s position within the Labor 
Party.1132  
 The 1964 Transport and Communication Act (Samferdselsloven av 1964) 
furthered many of the 1947 Transport and Communication Act’s regulations, and 
introduced a particular permit for pooling of goods from several customers on 
unscheduled transports. Stortinget’s majority feared obviously pooling could 
undermine the scheduled transports, even if pooling of goods reduced transport 
costs, road traffic and pollution. The contemporary Danish and Swedish regulations 
facilitated both competition and effectiveness.1133 The 1964 Transport and 
Communication Act opposed many ideas outlined by the Labor Party’s internal 
1960 Transport and Communication Commission.1134 Maintenance of the 1947 
Transport and Communication Act’s intentions indicated clearly Prime Minister 
Einar Gerhardsen and the Labor Party’s left turn after the non-socialist interregnum 
in August and September 1963, and can be understood both as a setback for the 
Labor Party modernists and a victory for the very powerful railroad lobby that 
opposed road transport of passengers and goods. 
 The Labor Party’s internal workgroup concerning transport and 
communication policy for the forthcoming 1966-69 manifesto, then headed by 
minister of transport and communications Erik Himle, recommended in 1964 once 
again establishment of a Road Fund. Establishment of a Road Fund was this time 
motivated by the possibility for increased user financing of road construction and 
maintenance, or that increased vehicle and fuel taxes could be dedicated to road 
purposes, such as in Denmark, Sweden and West Germany.1135 Lack of resources 
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was still constraint number one for development of a functional road system, even if 
the road investments had been increased significantly since 1960. 
 The Gerhardsen executive appointed June 14th 1964 the Road Plan Committee 
(Vegplankomiteen) and the Road Plan Council (Vegplanrådet). Their task was 
development of a Norwegian Road Plan (Norsk Vegplan) within three years.1136 
Only 6 percent of the Norwegian highways permitted then more than 8 tons axle 
loads or 12 tons bogie loads. Almost every contemporary Swedish highway 
permitted 8/12 tons, and 26 percent permitted 10/16 tons axle and bogie loads.1137 
The Norwegian public road system was hence still in urgent need of modernization, 
because permitted axle and bogie loads were crucial for the transport economy, 
similarly as in the 1950s. Low permitted axle and bogie loads delayed the shift from 
railroad to road transports, this was excellent for the railroad lobby but perceived as 
a problem by most transport users. Development of a national road plan emulating 
the 1959 Swedish Road Plan or the Danish Traffic Economic Commission’s 1961 
recommendations would complete the Labor Party modernists’ road policy 
reformation, where modern trunk roads were perceived as national collective goods.  
 All major political parties except Socialist Peoples’ Party and the Agrarian 
Party promised increased road investments in their 1965-69 manifestos. The Liberal 
and Agrarian Parties championed still dedicated vehicle and fuel taxes. The 
Christian Peoples’ Party and Conservative Party required balance between the 
motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes and public spending on roads. The 
Labor Party modernists’ championed once again establishment of a Road Fund, but 
this idea did not make it to the manifesto. The Liberal and Christian Peoples’ Parties 
championed turnpikes or other kinds of alternative financing. The Liberal Party 
considered alternative road financing particularly useful in central areas and for 
financing of bridges and tunnels. Socialist Peoples’ Party opposed turnpikes or other 
kinds of alternative road financing, and championed completely State financed trunk 
roads. But the novelty in the 1965 manifestos was public transports in urban areas as 
a substitute for cars. The Socialist Peoples’ Party and the Labor Party that also 
championed construction of modern entrance roads to the major cities promoted this 
idea. The Labor Party’s new position with regard to the urban areas was clearly a 
compromise between the modernists, leftwing and railroad lobby. The early 1960s’ 
fast growing road traffic was accompanied by deteriorating road safety records. 
Road safety received therefore prominent positions in the Labor, Liberal, Christian 
Peoples’ and Conservative Parties’ manifestos for the term 1965-69. The Labor, 
Liberal and Conservative Parties advocated construction of safe roads. The Christian 
Peoples’ Party advocated police controls. The Liberal, Christian Peoples’ and 
                                                                                                                   
 
 
cf. minutes from the central board’s meeting December 2nd 1963:57, 59, AAB-DNA cassette Ac 8. See 
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Conservative Parties championed all use of private construction companies and 
competitive bidding.1138 Road policy and road construction were thus prominent 
issues for most parties prior to the 1965 election, because this election campaign 
took place during the mass motoring’s second breakthrough in Norway, when the 
number of car increased dramatically. 
The peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s road policy 
counterreformation 
Håkon Kyllingmark, who had represented Nordland in Stortinget’s Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communications since 1954, became minister of 
transports and communications October 12th 1965 when the Borten executive came 
to power.1139 Kyllingmark championed as mentioned earlier the Conservative 
Party’s 10 Years Plan for Transports and Communications prior to the 1957 
election, and championed also Oslo and Bergen’s cause 1962-63 when Stortinget 
deliberated the 1963 Road Act. But Håkon Kyllingmark would soon advocate other 
causes, because the Conservative Party’s new bedfellows championed first and 
foremost the peripheral and rural areas’ interests.  
 The peripheral and rural areas’ road political counterreformation was launched 
officially February 24th 1966, when the Conservative Party’ s Olav Knudson from 
Buskerud complained in Stortinget that construction of the new motorway, E18 
between Oslo and Drammen, drained resources from Buskerud’s secondary 
highways. Because the 1963 Road Act did not, as mentioned earlier, distinguish 
between roads with national and local collective good characteristics. Buskerud 
County had to finance 18 percent of the construction costs for a motorway that first 
and foremost benefited the through traffic and national interests. Knudson demanded 
therefore that somebody else financed the motorways, for instance through 
turnpikes, to safeguard swift construction and to shield Buskerud’s other highways, 
which were local collective goods.1140 Knudson’s question opened a floodgate, 
because the 1963 Road Act’s requirements for local co-financing created already 
then significant common pool problems for trunk roads and motorways, which were 
national collective goods. 
 Minister of transport and communications Håkon Kyllingmark’s answer to 
Olav Knudson and others shelved the 1962 Motorway Plan when Kyllingmark 
promised construction of two-lane expressways rather than four-lane motorways live 
from Stortinget’s rostrum, because expressways were supposed to reduce the total 
construction costs and thereby also the resource drain from the counties’ secondary 
highways. But Kyllingmark refused explicitly to define motorways or other trunk 
roads as a particular class of roads with a dedicated budget chapter, because that 
would not increase the total road budgets. Kyllingmark concluded turnpikes were 
costly and inefficient compared to traditional tax financing, but he did not oppose 
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turnpikes per se, and would ask for Stortinget’s approval, if turnpikes were 
demanded locally.1141 Håkon Kyllingmark’s abandoning of further construction of 
motorways launched the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s 
counterreformation that rolled back significant parts of the reforms launched by his 
predecessors Trygve Bratteli and Erik Himle. Shelving the 1962 Motorway Plan was 
also one of the Borten executive’s moves against the Labor Party’s idea about 
decentralized centralization, because the planned motorways would have fueled the 
major cities’ growth. 
 Håkon Kyllingmark’s move in Stortinget February 24th 1966 was also a 
devastating blow for the most crowded Norwegian trunk roads’ road safety, because 
construction of narrow two-lane expressways without physical separation between 
the directions of traffic instead of motorways led often to far more serious accidents 
than on the old and bendy gravel roads. The new expressways encouraged high 
speeds, but gave the motorists minimal safety margins compared to contemporary 
Swedish expressways with generous shoulders that in practice worked as four lane 
roads. 
 How about Norwegian Road Plan initiated by the previous Labor Party 
executive in June 1964? The Road Plan Committee headed by Road Director Karl 
Olsen outlined the plan 1964-69. The Road Plan Committee’s other members were 
head of the Directorate of Public Road’s Planning Department Arne J. Grotterød; the 
Directorate of Public Road’s Chief Financial Officer Egil Killi; the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication’s deputy undersecretary Robert F. Nordén; the 
Institute of Transport Economics’ head Erik Brand Olimb, and finally Thor Skrindo, 
deputy undersecretary in the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Labor (Kommunal- 
og Arbeidsdepartementet).1142 Regional policy was one of the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs and Labor’s main tasks. 
 Several researchers have studied the Road Plan Committee’s undertakings. 
The political scientist Morten Thornquist emphasized the newspapers and county 
politicians’ response to the Road Plan Committee’s final recommendations.1143 The 
economist and transport historian Dag Bjørnland, then a researcher at Institute of 
Transport Economics who carried out studies for the Road Plan Committee, 
emphasized Norwegian Road Plan as a rational undertaking.1144 The historian Per 
Østby emphasized the inherent conflicts between the Road Plan Committee’s 
engineers and the Road Plan Council’s assumed political function, but claimed 
Norwegian Road Plan reflected an understanding of the society based on “technic-
economic rationality”.1145 The economic historian Sverre Knutsen and the political 
scientist Knut Boge found the commonly held idea about Norwegian Road Plan as a 
“technocratic plan” was “an ideological construction”, because the politicians and 
not the engineers governed the road plan process, such as claimed by Dag Bjørnland 
and Per Østby.1146 The historian of ideas Rune Slagstad read Per Østby’s 
dissertation, and designated Road Director Karl Olsen and Arne J. Grotterød as a so-
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called “national strategists”. Slagstad claimed also the road sector received a 
“system with a long time horizon and economic generosity any other sector, except 
the armed forces, could envy”.1147 The forthcoming discussion reveals that 
Slagstad’s claims were not in accordance with the realities, but rather ideological 
constructs.  
 This study emphasizes particularly the Road Plan Council; the corporative 
body that supervised the Road Plan Committee and sanded most strategic or high-
level policy decisions. Norwegian Institute of Technology’s professor Ole Didrik 
Lærum headed the Road Plan Council.1148 The Road Plan Council met once in 1964, 
three times annually in 1965, 1966 and 1967, once in 1968 and finally four times in 
1969. The Road Plan Council submitted its final report in January 1970.1149 Most 
scientists, except Per Østby, have so far overlooked the Road Plan Council, but Per 
Østby overlooked partly the Road Plan Council’s political function. The Road Plan 
Council sanded and legitimized namely the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional 
coalition’s capture of Norwegian Road Plan. The Road Plan Council illustrates thus 
how professionals were used as pieces in the high-level resource struggle by those 
who orchestrated the political processes, in this case the Borten executive and the 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition. 
 The Road Plan Council’s probably most important decision was made already 
at its constitutive meeting November 25th 1964. The Ministry of Finance’s deputy 
undersecretary Bjørn Larsen, head of the new Planning Department 
(Planleggingsavdelingen) established in 1963, took charge immediately, and 
demanded the Road Plan Council’s shunning of budget issues. Professor Lærum 
obeyed.1150 Bjørn Larsen’s move placed the Ministry of Finance in the Road Plan 
Council’s driver seat, and blocked effectively development of a Norwegian Road 
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1150 Norsk Vegplan Vegplanrådet Protokoll 1/64, VDA binder Norsk Vegplan, Vegplanrådets protokoller. 
See for instance Erichsen (1999:61-66) concerning establishment of the Ministry of Finance’s Planning 
Department. 
Chapter 4 – Norway – the deviant case 
294 
Plan reflecting the actual need for roads. The Ministry of Finance governed from 
then the road plan process almost as a rider commanded a horse. 
 The Road Plan Committee’s Workgroup for Economy and Finance 
distinguished in April 1965 between “profitable ” and “social roads”.1151 Institute of 
Transport Economics concluded in March 1966 that profitable roads could justify 
further increased road investments financed through increased taxes or domestic 
loans, at the expense of reduced private consumption, but road financing through 
foreign loans was subject to State economic considerations. Institute of Transport 
Economics considered turnpikes an inefficient “emergency solution” that could 
prevent use of new roads, and thereby induce inefficiencies and welfare losses.1152 
The Ministry of Finance’s deputy undersecretary Bjørn Larsen agreed about possible 
loan financing but opposed turnpikes, and restated that road investments were 
governed by the Ministry of Finance’s budget constraints.1153 Bjørn Larsen 
emphasized here once again the Ministry of Finance’s primacy. The Road Plan 
Council’s other members understood obviously their roles, because nobody 
objected. This road plan process differed fundamentally from those in Denmark and 
Sweden where the actual need for roads and the professionals’ norms and standards 
governed the road planning. The resource discussion came afterwards when the need 
for roads had been clarified and the executives and legislators implemented the 
desired projects. 
 The Ministry of Finance’s undersecretary Bjørn Larsen’s flat rejection of 
turnpikes in March 1966 was interesting, because Erik Brofoss had in May 1960 
advocated turnpikes in the most crowded areas, the same did the Labor Party’s 
internal Transport and Communication Commission prior to the 1961 election. The 
Liberal and Christian Peoples’ Parties advocated similarly turnpikes prior to the 
1957, 1961 and 1965 elections. The Agrarian and Conservative Parties advocated 
only turnpikes prior to the 1957 election. The Borten executive’s four parties’ 
divergent views concerning turnpikes may have led to internal discussions, even if 
minister of transport and communications Håkon Kyllingmark in February 1966 
informed Stortinget that he would not oppose turnpikes.  
 How to explain Bjørn Larsen’s position in the Road Plan Council concerning 
introduction of turnpikes? Did he advocate the Ministry of Finance or the Borten 
executive’s position or both? The Liberal Party’s minister of finance Ole Myrvoll 
was professor in economics at Norwegian School of Economics and Business 
Administration (Norges Handelshøyskole) in Bergen. Myrvoll did not challenge the 
ministry’s prevailing views, according to the Ministry of Finance’s permanent 
undersecretary Eivind Erichsen.1154 Turnpikes could seen from the Ministry of 
Finance’s point of view challenge the Strategic Capitalism, because construction of 
roads could divert resources from other regional policy motivated projects, unless 
enlargement of the resource pool through increased taxes or foreign loans. But 
turnpikes could on the other hand facilitate construction of profitable roads, and 
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thereby improve the utilization of the available resource pool. The non-socialist 
parties had in 1966 adopted both Strategic Capitalism and low interest policy, and 
were finally in position to govern both credit allocation and interest rates, because 
the 1965 Money and Credit Act made interest rates and credit rationing the Ministry 
of Finance’s responsibility. Turnpikes could, seen from the Borten executive’s point 
of view, facilitate increased road construction in the central and urban areas on the 
peripheral and rural areas’ expense. The Agrarian Party, which had the Prime 
Minister, prioritized consequently the peripheral and rural areas on the central and 
urban areas expense, if in doubt.1155 It was thus neither possible to rule out that 
Bjørn Larsen advocated the Ministry of Finance’s position, nor that he advocated the 
Borten executive’s position, because common introduction of turnpikes could both 
undermine the Ministry of Finance’s economists’ fine-tuning of the economy, and 
establish a road policy contrary to the Borten executive’s interests. Bjørn Larsen’s 
position made sense seen both from the Ministry of Finance’s and from the 
governing middle parties’ point of view. It is also reasons to assume the Ministry of 
Finance’s economists achieved a more autonomous position during the Borten 
executive than under the former Labor Party executives. 
 Lack of resources and possible use of alternative financing was also on the 
Road Plan Council’s agenda in March 1966, February 1967 and October 1968.1156 
The road investments increased significantly throughout the 1960s, but not enough 
to catch-up the fast growing number of cars, because the road appropriations had 
been decoupled from the motorists’ payments of fuel and vehicle taxes and 
increased less than the number of cars. Norwegian Road Federation championed 
loan and turnpike financed construction of new motorways after Håkon Kyllingmark 
in February 1966 shelved the 1962 Motorway Plan. Norwegian Road Federation’s 
initiative led ultimately to Stortinget’s approval in 1973 of the E18 turnpike 
expressway bridge across Drammen.1157 But Norwegian Road Federation’s 1967 
motorway campaign, based on the 1962 Motorway Plan was otherwise a fiasco.1158 
Stortinget’s majority was not willing to prioritize further construction of motorways 
after the 1965 election, even if they were financed through turnpikes, because those 
days’ credit rationing and restrictions on foreign loans meant namely that turnpikes 
diverted resources from other domestic projects. The politically governed interest 
rates were also below those on the international capital markets, and prevented 
effectively funding of Norwegian banks through foreign capital markets.1159 The low 
interest policy created queues of politically desirable projects, often with low return 
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on the investments that crowded out less politically desirable projects with higher 
return on the investments. 
 Even the historian Per Østby studied the Road Plan Council, but concluded the 
Road Plan Committee interfered with the Ministry of Finance, the executive and 
Stortinget’s domains when it questioned the available resources and tried to figure 
out alternatives to overcome the constraints.1160 Per Østby overlooked here clearly 
the resource constraints’ road policy implications. Østby overlooked similarly the 
road policy implications of the Ministry of Finance’s capture of the Road Plan 
Council. Tight resource constraints made soon the Norwegian road plan process a 
zero sum. The similar Danish and Swedish road plan processes resembled more 
variable sum games because the resource constraints had far less prominent 
positions in those discussions. 
 The so-called DYPRI model developed at Institute of Transport Economics 
allocated the road investments dynamically according to each road sections’ return 
on the investments. DYPRI could omit upgrades of unprofitable road sections. Peter 
Kjeldseth Moe, member of the Road Plan Council and the Labor Party and Møre 
and Romsdal County’s member of Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport 
and Communications, questioned DYPRI’s allocations in October 1967. Kjeldseth 
Moe required allocations according to “common sense” rather than through DYPRI 
that could omit road investments in peripheral and rural areas, because transport 
economy and regional policy were not always commensurable. It became also 
evident that major bridges, ferry quays and roads in urban areas were not included in 
DYPRI’s allocations. Motorways and sections through urban areas had similarly to 
be calculated manually, according to the Road Plan Committee’s Workgroup for 
Dimensioning and Costs. But nobody in the Road Plan Council questioned these 
omissions, and sanded thereby partly omission of roads in crowded areas from 
Norwegian Road Plan.1161 These decisions explain also why the Norwegian road 
plan process soon deviated from fundamentally from similar processes in Denmark 
and Sweden. 
 The Road Plan Council agreed similarly in December 1967 excluding urban 
road sections from the Road Plan Committee’s traffic forecasts.1162 The Road Plan 
Committee furthered also planning of roads with “passable” rather than adequate 
standard from December 1967, after the Road Plan Council recognized there would 
not be sufficient resources for development of a road system with adequate standard 
on every road section.1163 Lack of financial resources became once again the 
bottleneck that hindered development of a modern and functional road system, 
similarly as in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. Lack of resources was clearly an 
example of path dependence that gave strong incentives for construction of many 
kilometers of narrow gauge roads rather than few kilometers of modern trunk roads 
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and motorways due to Stortinget’s power relations. The similarity with Norwegian 
19th century legislators that prioritized construction of low budget narrow gauge 
railroads rather than trunk railroads with long lifespan such as in Sweden was 
striking. 
 Omitting the crowded areas from Norwegian Road Plan was one of the Road 
Plan Council’s most consequential decisions, similarly as acceptance of the Ministry 
of Finance’s primacy in November 1964. But the Ministry of Finance’s deputy 
undersecretary Bjørn Larsen was not able to recall any debates in the Road Plan 
Council.1164 The Road Plan Council sanded thereby most of the Road Plan 
Committee’s recommendations, most likely as expected by the Borten executive. 
The peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s capture was soon completed 
through salami tactics, slicing piece by piece at almost every of the Road Plan 
Committee and Road Plan Council’s meetings. 
 Another very consequential decision was the Ministry of Finance’s imposition 
of 10 percent discount rate for road investments in December 1967, combined with 
limiting the road investments’ time horizon to 18 years. 1165 Norges Bank’s 
politically governed discount rate was 3,5 percent from February 1955 until 
September 1969.1166 The Road Plan Committee accepted 10 percent discount rate 
without discussions, according to secretary Chester Danielsen. The Public Roads 
Administrations’ regular discount rate was then 5 percent, approximately the interest 
rate on long-term loans.1167 Neither the Ministry of Finance’s deputy undersecretary 
Bjørn Larsen was able to recall any particular discussions in the Road Plan Council 
concerning the discount rate.1168 Chartered engineer Erik Brand Olimb, member of 
the Road Plan Committee and head of the Institute of Transport Economics until 
1968, claimed it was the Ministry of Finance’s permanent undersecretary Eivind 
Erichsen who imposed 10 percent discount rate.1169  
 Eivind Erichsen’s imposition of 10 percent discount rate for road investments 
forces the question. Why? Did the Ministry of Finance act in ‘self-defense’ against 
irresponsible executive and irresponsible legislators? The Ministry of Finance’s 
economists did not oppose road investments per se, according to deputy 
undersecretary Bjørn Larsen, but were highly skeptical to the counties’ former fixed 
share of the annual road appropriations and to the counties’ dispersion of the road 
appropriations to numerous minuscule and unprofitable projects.1170 However, the 
Directorate of Public Roads and the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
abandoned this policy already in the second half of the 1950s. Table 9 indicates 
clearly Stortinget’s approval of the 1963 Road Act and the Labor Party modernists’ 
road policy reformation changed the road investments’ allocation fundamentally 
compared to the 1929 allocation key. It was thus very difficult to explain Eivind 
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Erichsen and the Ministry of Finance imposition of 10 percent discount rate for road 
investments as a kind of ‘self-defense’ against an irresponsible executive or against 
irresponsible legislators, at least compared to the second half of the 1960s’ road 
policy. But the Road Plan Committee and Road Plan Council paved the way for a 
reversal of the second half of the 1960s’ established road policy towards the late 
1940s and early 50s’ road policy based on construction of social roads in peripheral 
and rural areas – exactly what the Ministry of Finance opposed according to Bjørn 
Larsen. However, it was not possible to rule out that Eivind Erichsen imposed 10 
percent discount rate to prevent overheating, because the Norwegian economy 
operated near full capacity during the second half of the 1960s. But this study has 
not been able to determine whether the Ministry of Finance imposed 10 percent 
discount rate on its own, or if the Borten executive had instructed Eivind Erichsen. 
 Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, Professor at Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration in Bergen, which was University of Oslo’s competitor 
concerning education of economists, held a lecture February 21st 1968 in Oslo’s 
chapter of Norwegian Chartered Engineer’s Association, where he claimed 
investments in roads and other transport and communication infrastructures were 
exactly as other investments. Scarce resources had to be allocated to those projects 
with highest return on the investments, according to the “opportunity cost” principle 
if the aim was economic growth. Arnljot Strømme Svendsen referred to Gabriel 
Roth, a transport economist and adviser for British Road Federation, who questioned 
whether roads were social welfare or collective goods supposed financed by the 
community through taxes, or public utilities like electricity, water, sewage and 
garbage collection supposed financed by those who benefited from the utilities. 
Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, who clearly sympathized with Gabriel Roth’s views, 
claimed that if roads and bridges were perceived as public utilities, then financing 
through non-profit turnpike companies was perfectly acceptable, hereunder 
financing through foreign loans. Arnljot Strømme Svendsen used the Bergen areas’ 
three tunnels and three bridges and one road championed by among others the 
industrialist Fritz Rieber as examples of successful turnpike projects. But the main 
reason for turnpike financing according to Arnljot Strømme Svendsen was that most 
political parties desired reduced direct taxes. Turnpikes were the only realistic 
option, because the Norwegian economy operated on full capacity. Increased road 
investments would otherwise reduce other sectors’ investments.1171 1172 Professor 
Arnljot Strømme Svendsen, who seemingly belonged to the Conservative Party’s 
think tank, because of his personal endorsement on the manuscript and the 
references to Gabriel Roth in his lecture, used this opportunity to launch an 
alternative to the Ministry of Finance’s prevailing view. Arnljot Strømme 
Svendsen’s ideas had many similarities with those championed by Trygve Lie in 
1956, Fritz Rieber in 1957, and Erik Brofoss and Robert F. Nordén in 1960. The 
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Borten executive’s four parties struggled obviously still internally about how to 
handle the voters’ desire for new roads. The Conservative Party was clearly forced 
to adapt to the three middle parties’ positions, because the forthcoming road plan 
diverged in many areas fundamentally from the 10 Years Plan for Transports and 
Communications championed by Håkon Kyllingmark in 1957, even if there also 
were a number of common denominators. 
 Professor Arnljot Strømme Svendsen’s lecture explained partly why the 
Ministry of Finance’s permanent undersecretary Eivind Erichsen in December 1967 
imposed 10 percent discount rate on road investments, because the economy 
operated near full capacity. But imposition of 10 percent discount rate disarmed in 
practice the minister of transport and communications prior to the executive’s 
internal resource negotiations, because very few roads gave 10 percent return on the 
investments. 10 percent discount rate combined with the Ministry of Finance’s 
opposition against turnpike financing, further credit rationing and restrictions on 
foreign loans ruled effectively out future investments in modern trunk roads, 
motorways and other costly projects with national collective good characteristics 
and long time horizon. 10 percent discount rate established also a ceiling on future 
road investments. The net beneficiaries were those who desired limited road 
investments and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, because high 
discount rate facilitated politically governed allocation of the minuscule road 
investments, and thereby maintenance of the Liberal Party’s System which 
safeguarded the middle parties’ interests. 
 Even Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
engaged the fall 1968 in the forthcoming road plan, and required increased road 
appropriations, because adequate road construction required annual road 
appropriations at least equal to the motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes. 
But the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications was not able to 
achieve increased road appropriations, and refused therefore future allocation of 
road investments according to cost/benefit calculations, because regional 
development was of great importance.1173 Stortinget’s plenary rejected similarly 
December 10th 1968 allocation of road investments according to the cost/benefit 
principle.1174 These decisions were highly consequential. First because the Ministry 
of Finance’s budget constraints prevailed, and second because Stortinget furthered 
its established practice with allocation of road investments according to a political 
rather than an economical logic, contrary to for instance in Denmark and Sweden. 
Stortinget’s rejection of the cost/benefit principle upheld thereby the Liberal Party’s 
System and weakened clearly Per Østby and others claims’ about Norwegian Road 
Plan as governed by rational engineer logic. The road plan process was clearly 
governed by the executive and Stortinget’s legislators, not by engineers and other 
professionals that subordinated themselves to the Ministry of Finance’s budget 
constraints and the executive and Stortinget’s political logic. The Road Plan 
Committee’s forthcoming recommendations differed therefore already in 1968 
fundamentally from the Danish and Swedish road and infrastructure plans made by 
the professionals and according to the professionals’ norms and standards. 
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 The financial issues and resource struggles dominated even the Road Plan 
Council’s discussions during the Road Plan Committee’s final spurt. An ad hoc 
work group representing the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Labor and the Directorate of Public Roads was 
established to reconsider DYPRI’s priorities of new road links. The counties’ Chief 
County Road Officers were similarly authorized to adjust DYPRI’s priorities within 
their counties. No counties would experience reduced road appropriations, according 
to the Ministry of Transport and Communications deputy undersecretary Robert F. 
Nordén.1175 The ministries’ workgroup and the Chief County Road Officers’ 
politically motivated adjustments of DYPRI’s allocations reestablished seemingly 
more or less status quo, which was the geographical allocation of the road 
investments after Stortinget’s approval of the 1963 Road Act. Robert F. Nordén’s 
championing of the Borten executive’s road policy in 1969 rather than his own 
economically motivated road policy outlined in 1960 illustrates clearly how the roles 
changed during the Borten executive’s road policy counterreformation, because the 
ministers and legislators made the professionals spectators. The professionals 
abandoned their former positions motivated by professional norms and standards. 
The Borten executive’s co-optation or capture of the Combined Road 
Administration, the Road Plan Committee and the Road Plan Council was almost 
completed. 
 The Road Plan Committee submitted its recommendations to Prime Minister 
Per Borten June 30th 1969.1176 The Ministry of Finance’s budget constraints were 
3.006 millions 1968 NOK in the first road plan period 1970-73, or approximately 
1.673,7 millions 1990 PPP USD, and 3.812 millions 1968 NOK, or about 2.122,5 
millions 1990 PPP USD, in the second road plan period 1974-77, a total of 6.818 
millions 1968 NOK or approximately 3.796,17 millions 1990 PPP USD.1177 The 
Road Plan Committee recommended construction of highways or establishment of 
highway ferry services to every settlement with more than 750 inhabitants within 
1977. The least crowded highways were similarly recommended upgraded to so-
called passable standard with oil gravel paving and 8/12 tons capacity within 1977. 
Road projects omitted were proposed carried out as turnpikes. Saved road 
appropriations because of turnpike financing were supposed to benefit the concerned 
counties.1178 The Road Plan Committee postponed three tasks to the third road plan 
period between 1978 and 1989, namely construction of trunk roads, roads in urban 
and central areas, and new highway links.1179 The most profitable road investments 
were thus postponed at least 8 to 20 years, while the least profitable investments 
were accomplished first. Only 14 percent of Norwegian Road Plan’s total 
investments were allocated according to DYPRI’s recommendations.1180 86 percent 
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were allocated according to political considerations, dictated by Stortinget’s 
geographical and political balance of power, and the political logic prevailed on the 
economic and technocratic logic’s expense.  
 The Road Plan Council and the Road Plan Committee had spent nearly four 
years and thousands of man-hours to produce a road plan governed by technic and 
economic rationality similarly as Swedish Road Plan, but submitted a road plan that 
more or less reproduced status quo with regard to high-level resource allocation, 
because 28,1 percent of the State road appropriations 1970-73 were recommended 
allocated to central counties, while 35,4 and 36,5 percent were recommended 
allocated to middle and peripheral counties.1181 This was almost a blueprint of the 
actual allocation 1964-69. But the submitted Norwegian Road Plan differed 
fundamentally from its initial role model Swedish Road Plan that emphasized 
construction of national collective goods such as a modern trunk road system, and 
local collective goods such as high standard secondary roads all across Sweden. 
Norwegian Road Plan had been transformed to political pork barrel or universalism 
by the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, because most 
constituencies received something, while others were almost omitted and supposed 
to finance the plan. 
 The Road Plan Council that kept quiet most of the time between 1964 and 
1969 and sanded every decision that undermined the road policy’s technical and 
economical rationality, blew the whistle in its final report submitted in January 
1970, 6 months after the Road Plan Committee had submitted its recommendations 
to Prime Minister Per Borten. The Road Plan Council’s final report complained 
namely about the Ministry of Finance’s budget constraints, 6,8 billions 1968 NOK, 
or approximately 3,8 billions 1990 PPP USD, because the costs for 16.400 
kilometers of highways with adequate standard were estimated to 13,5 billions 1968 
NOK, approximately 7,5 billions 1990 PPP USD. Construction of ‘narrow gauge’ 
roads with passable rather than adequate standard gave significant short-term 
investment savings, but the Road Plan Committee’s estimation models did not take 
the roads’ carrying capacity, traffic density or accident costs into consideration such 
as the contemporary Swedish models did. Neither did roads with passable standard 
facilitate traffic differentiation, one of the most powerful road safety measures.1182 
The estimation models did not reflect the costs for building the same road sections 
several times. Neither did the Road Plan Committee’s initial model for choice 
between four and two-lane roads include accident costs, such as for instance the 
Swedish National Road Administration’s investment allocation models did.1183 The 
Borten executive reoriented thus Norwegian Road Plan almost 180 degrees 
compared to its starting point as a blueprint of Swedish Road Plan, and reestablished 
instead de facto the late 1940s and early 50s’ road policy such as imposed by 
Stortinget’s majority and the counties. 
 How about the forthcoming 1969 election? The Road Plan Committee 
submitted its recommendations only a few months prior to the election. Socialist 
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Peoples’ Party advocated a ban against use of private cars in the cities’ central areas, 
and free public transports and construction of trunk roads that circumvent the city 
hubs instead of trunk roads through the city hubs. Socialist Peoples’ Party was 
thereby the first party that linked environmental and road policies. Only the Labor, 
Liberal, Agrarian and Conservative Parties championed increased road 
appropriations for the forthcoming 1969-73 term. The Liberal, Christian Peoples’ 
and Agrarian Parties – the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalitions’ core 
parties – advocated turnpike projects in crowded areas. Even the Conservative Party 
advocated turnpikes, but did not state where. The Borten executive’s four parties 
agreed hence about turnpikes, but not where. The Socialist Peoples’, Labor and 
Liberal Parties considered improved public transports an alternative to road 
construction and use of cars in crowded areas. The road safety issue revealed even in 
1969 some interesting differences, because the Liberal Party emphasized a 
combination of road planning, road construction, education and police controls. The 
Christian Peoples’ Party emphasized police controls only. The Agrarian Party 
emphasized a combination of road planning and law enforcement. The Conservative 
Party advocated construction of safe roads. The Agrarian Party championed also a 
national program for construction of roads and bridges in coastal areas that 
substituted ferries.1184 The 1969 manifestos linked road policy, road safety and 
environmental concerns for the first time, an indication of the late 1960s’ shift when 
the political parties started to adopt green issues. The road safety issue divided the 
four governing non-socialist parties that barely won the 1969 election, because the 
voters went to bed with Trygve Bratteli and woke up with Per Borten. The Socialist 
Peoples’ Party was voted out of Stortinget. 
 The peripheral and rural areas’ politicians and newspapers were not satisfied 
with the Road Plan Committee’s recommendations. Many considered Norwegian 
Road Plan a program for depopulating the peripheral and rural areas. The Labor and 
middle party newspapers were generally negative or very negative. The 
Conservative Party newspapers were somewhat more positive, according to Morten 
Thornquist’s study, while the county councils’ responses usually were somewhat 
more balanced.1185 Minister of transport and communications Håkon Kyllingmark 
submitted Norwegian Road Plan to Stortinget October 23rd 1970.1186 The Borten 
executive resigned in March 1971 because of internal struggles about the EEC issue.  
 Stortinget’s plenary’s deliberations about Norwegian Road Plan October 26th 
and 27th 1971 revealed that Reiulf Steen, minister of transport and communications 
in Trygve Bratteli’s first executive that came to power in March 1971, was a quick 
learner with regard to road policy and road construction. The plenary discussions 
illustrated clearly the different parties and interest groups’ positions with regard to 
road policy, and how the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition was 
organized and operated. The Standing Committee on Transport and 
                                                 
1184 “SF –Arbeidsprogram 1969-73”:Distriktspolitikk, Bolig- og tomtepolitikk; “Politikk for en ny tid. 
Vekst – Trygghet – Trivsel. Arbeidsprogram for Det Norske Arbeiderparti 1970-1973”:Utbygging og 
samordning av samferdselsen; “Venstre arbeidsprogram for stortingsperioden 1969-73”:6 Samferdsle; 
“Valgprogram Kristelig Folkeparti 1969-1973”:Kommunikasjoner; “Senterpartiets valgprogram 1969-
1973”:Samferdselsspørsmål; “Høyres hovedprogram og arbeidsprogram 1969-73”:Samferdsel, all in Vi 
vil..! Norske partiprogrammer 1884-2001. 
1185 Thornquist (1971: 170 Tab. 20; 173 Tab. 23,189-190). 
1186 St. meld. nr. 14 (1970-71) Om Norsk Vegplan. 
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Communications’ priority number one was “a minimum standard on the entire 
highway system and roads to desolate parishes”, and limited use of turnpikes, 
because turnpikes could result in suboptimal allocation of the road 
appropriations.1187 The peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition 
championed first and foremost construction of those roads that were not self-evident, 
and reasoned most likely that others would safeguard construction of the self-
evident roads. 
 Legislators belonging to the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition 
initiated Stortinget’s plenary debate with an attempt of evading and dividing 
Norwegian Road Plan, but this procedural discussion failed.1188 Minister of 
transport and communications Reiulf Steen was skeptical to introduction of 
turnpikes in central and urban areas to facilitate further transfers to the peripheral 
and rural areas, such as advocated by the Liberal Party’s Ingvar Helle who 
represented Rogaland and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition. 
Steen claimed the counties on Østlandet paid 58,5 percent of the vehicle and fuel 
taxes, but received only 35,5 percent of the gross investments. The counties on 
Vestlandet paid 11,1 percent of the vehicle and fuel taxes and received 17,8 percent 
of the gross investments. The counties in Nord-Norge paid similarly 7,4 percent of 
the vehicle and fuel taxes and received 19,5 percent of the gross investments.1189 
The Conservative Party’s Paul Thyness from Oslo supported Reiulf Steen and the 
Bratteli executive’s position concerning turnpikes, because of Liberal Party’s 
System’s mismatch between payments of vehicle and fuel taxes and the allocation of 
road investments. Oslo’s motorists paid six times more in vehicle and fuel taxes than 
they received in road appropriations according to Thyness, received zero State 
financing to the subway which then was under construction, and was also forced to 
co-finance the Norwegian State Railroads tunnel through Oslo.1190 The Conservative 
Party’s Erling Norvik, who represented Finnmark, championed the Liberal Party’s 
System’s cross subsidization.1191 Stortinget approved Norwegian Road Plan 
unanimously October 27th 1971.1192 The Conservative Party was similarly as the 
Labor Party divided internally with regards to road policy and road construction, 
because that was distributive low-politics. 
 The middle parties’ championing of turnpikes in central and urban areas was 
hardly surprising given their 1969-73 manifestos, because the Liberal Party’s 
System’s cross subsidization was their business idea. Many Labor and Conservative 
Party legislators representing the central constituencies opposed turnpikes in central 
and urban areas, but there were also Labor and Conservative Party legislators who 
belonged to the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition and supported the 
middle parties’ position. Stortinget’s debate demonstrated clearly that road policy 
was low politics. Many legislators were therefore more concerned with their 
constituencies than the party line and the national interests, similarly as in the early 
1950s. 
                                                 
1187 Innst. S. nr. 256 (1970-71) Innstilling frå samferdselsnemda om Norsk Vegplan (St. meld. nr. 14):513, 
519, 521-522; Stortingstidende (1971-72):371-490.  
1188 Stortingstidende (1971-72):385-388. 
1189 Stortingstidende (1971-72):410. 
1190 Stortingstidende (1971-71):450. 
1191 Stortingstidende (1971-71):472-473. 
1192 Stortingstidende (1971-72):488. 
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 Norwegian Road Plan’s most important result was not reallocation of the State 
road appropriations, but rather partly punctuation of the 1851 Road Act’s 
equilibrium where Stortinget individually approved each road project that received 
partial State financing. Norwegian Road Plan punctuated also the established 
practice where members of Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications could introduce new road projects beneficial for their own 
constituencies during late night budget negotiations. Norwegian Road Plan 
instituted a new procedure where road projects were initiated locally, ‘filtered’ 
politically through the municipal and county councils, and similarly administratively 
through the Public Roads Administrations and Directorate of Public Roads, before 
they met in the Ministry of Transport and Communications that compiled the list of 
projects in each county in the quadrennial revisions of the road plan submitted to 
Stortinget. Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
accepted from then the counties’ rank ordered lists, and limited its own efforts to 
manipulation of the projects’ order and financing when allocating the annual 
appropriations. Norwegian Road Plan introduced hence far more plan and 
predictability in the road policy processes.  
The never-ending story - Oslo’s congestion, accident and environmental 
problems 
Norway’s first modern road political initiative after World War Two was not 
national but local. County Governor Trygve Lie and Norges Bank’s Governor Erik 
Brofoss’ intraparty lobbying succeeded, because City of Oslo’s aldermen appointed 
June 29th 1961 The Commission for the Oslo-Area’s Transport Analysis (Utvalget 
for Oslo-områdets transportanalyse), managed and staffed by Oslo’s Urban 
Planning Office (Byplankontor) that submitted a seminal city development and road 
plan in 1965.1193 This plan included both bold moves and development of 
computerized tools for urban and traffic planning, hereunder use of operational 
analysis and statistical forecasts.1194 Alternative 3 was denoted Maximum Balance 
between settlement and employment and was The Commission for the Oslo-Area’s 
Transport Analysis’ recommended solution together with road plan alternative C, 
and is hereafter denoted Maximum Balance.1195  
                                                 
1193 The Commission for Oslo-area’s Transport Analysis’ professional advisory board consisted of among 
others Norwegian Institute of Technology’s professor Ole D. Lærum, Bærum’s technical deputy mayor 
and later Road Director Karl Olsen, the Directorate of Public Road’s Arne J. Grotterød, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication’s assistant undersecretary Robert Nordén. Oslo’s aldermen engaged also 
foreign experts as professional advisers. The most prominent were Professor Colin Buchanan from 
Imperial College in London, architect John Allpass from Copenhagen, chartered engineer Oluf 
Gunnarson from Chalmers Technical Institute who took part in development of the SCAFT paradigm, 
and the Swedish Road and Water Construction Administration’s chartered engineer Stig Nordquist 
(Transportanalysen for Osloområdet, Oslo Byplankontor, Oslo 1965:2; Styrets beretning for 1957, 
Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1958:25-27, OVA). 
1194 Eckhoff (1969:66-76). 
1195 Transportanalysen for Osloområdet, Oslo Byplankontor, Oslo 1965:49, 126. 
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Figure 20: Average traveling speed (km/h) through Oslo’s central areas during the 
peak hours in 1963. 
 
Source: Transportanalysen for Oslo-området, Oslo Byplankontor 1965:11. 
 Maximum Balance outlined construction of an expressway ring encircling 
Oslo’s city hub, which in principle would be available only for public transports and 
occupational traffic when the expressway ring was completed. The average speed 
through Oslo’s city hub in 1965 varied between 20 and 5 km per hour. The through 
traffic that congested Oslo’s narrow city streets was supposed removed through 
construction of road plan alternative C’s Y-shaped six-lane east-west urban 
motorway north of the expressway ring. This urban motorway was the road plan’s 
novelty and the ‘missing link’ between Oslo’s southeastern, northeastern and 
western entrance roads, which then were under construction. Maximum Balance was 
finally based on increased settlement in Oslo’s central areas, to reduce the 
inhabitants’ need for commuting.1196 Increased urban settlement was one of the few 
sustainable solutions if the aims were reduced road traffic, reduced air pollution and 
reduced inconveniences from mass motoring, in addition to reduced settlement in 
the entire Greater Oslo area, which was the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional 
                                                 
1196 Transportanalysen for Osloområdet, Oslo Byplankontor, Oslo 1965:8, 69-70, 73-84, 87, 113-123, 
126. 
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coalition’s preferred solution. The estimated construction costs for the outlined 
motorways and expressways were 1.960 millions 1965 NOK or approximately 
1.228,7 millions 1990 PPP USD included land purchase. Maximum Balance was 
supposed accomplished within 30 years. One of Maximum Balance’s most important 
premises was road construction from the city hub and outwards, to remedy the 
central urban areas’ congestion problems.1197 The new entrance roads which then 
were under construction would namely within a few years pour traffic into Oslo’s 
western and eastern residential areas and further into the narrow city streets not built 
for mass motoring. Oslo city council’s majority approved Maximum Balance April 
20th 1967, a few months prior to the local election.1198  
Figure 21: Oslo’s recommended future trunk road system. 
 
Source: Transportanalysen for Oslo-området, Oslo Byplankontor 1965:68. 
 Oslo’s city council elected in 1967, with the Socialist Peoples’ Party in a 
pivotal position, questioned immediately Maximum Balance and particularly the 
urban motorway, and prioritized instead construction of Oslo’ subway that had been 
approved by the city council already in 1954 and was financed entirely by City of 
                                                 
1197 Transportanalysen for Osloområdet, Oslo Byplankontor, Oslo 1965:122 Tabell 6.05, 126. 
1198 Eckhoff (1969:78); Sæland (1993:33); Lund (2000:73). See for instance Tvedt et al. (2000:90) 
concerning Oslo city council’s political seat allocation 1945-99. 
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Oslo.1199 Arne J. Grotterød questioned in January 1968, in a note to his friend Robert 
F. Nordén, whether Maximum Balance and other parts of the planned motorway 
system within and near Greater Oslo outlined in the 1962 Motorway Plan that partly 
had been recommended by The Oslo-Area’s Regional Planning Committee 
(Regionplankomiteen for Oslo-området) in February 1960 ever would be 
accomplished.1200 The two major obstacles according to Grotterød were lack of 
financing and the numerous conflicting interests that surfaced when planning trunk 
roads in urban and densely populated areas. The 1963 Road Act’s requirement for 
50/100 percent local financing of highways and land purchase, and no State co-
financing of the subway made it very costly for City of Oslo to solve the 
accelerating congestion, accident and environmental problems. The difference 
compared to Stockholm’s financing model for trunk roads and public transports 
established through the 1964 Hörjel-agreement was striking. 
 The Socialist Peoples’, Labor, Liberal and Agrarian Parties won the majority 
in Oslo city council even in the 1971 local election, with the Agrarian and Liberal 
Parties in pivotal positions.1201 Oslo’s city council substituted in 1973 Maximum 
Balance with the far less ambitious Street Utilization Plan (Gatebruksplanen).1202 
But remnants from Maximum Balance survived and prevented establishment of new 
jobs in Oslo’s central areas. The result was moving of many enterprises from Oslo’s 
central areas to the suburbs, which in turn increased the road traffic both to the 
suburbs and through the city hub in both directions because of poor public transports 
and many inhabitants living and working in different parts of the city.1203 The Street 
Utilization Plan introduced many ideas from the British Buchanan Report, such as 
traffic reconstruction and emphasis on public transports, but omitted almost 
exclusively most planned trunk roads and motorways, hereunder the urban 
motorway that was supposed to link E6 from south and northeast and E18 from west 
and drain the through traffic from Oslo’s congested city streets and residential 
areas.1204 The Street Utilization Plan was most likely a result of local and popular 
protests against the very technocratic Maximum Balance, particularly protests from 
voters in the most congested residential areas combined with deteriorating municipal 
                                                 
1199 Erik Oluf Melvold, “Bymotorvei anno 1965”, St. Halvard, Vol. 83, No. 4, 1998:16-23; Nyhamar 
(1990:55-59, 248-252); Tvedt et al. (2000:449-450). 
1200 Note from Arne Grotterød to to the Ministry of Transport and Communication’s deputy 
undersecretary Robert Nordén, January 12th 1968 Gr/LSN ”Det framtidige hovedvegsystem i Oslo-
området”, VDA cassette 322 Grunnlinjen i Oslo 1960-1971. See for instance Arne Jacob Grotterød, Fra 
vegstikking til vegplanlegging, unpublished manuscript, 2001:3, VDA; Årsberetning for 1951, 
Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1952:7; Styrets beretning for 1955, Opplysningsrådet for 
Biltrafikken, Oslo 1956:15; Styrets beretning for 1956, Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1957:14; 
Styrets beretning for 1957, Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, Oslo 1958:58. OVA; Thomassen 
(1997:350); Hegdalstrand (1988:59-60) about The Oslo-Area’s Regional Planning Committee headed by 
Oslo and Akershus’ County Governor Trygve Lie. 
1201 See for instance Tvedt et al. (2000:90) about Oslo city council’s political seat allocation. 
1202 Sæland (1993:33); Lund (2000:73). Se also miscellaneous documents in VDA cassette 322 Oslo 
1976-1985 Pan concerning Oslo city council’s abandoning of the formerly approved urban motorway. 
1203 See for instance Nielsen (2001a:84-85). 
1204 Arne J. Grotterød and Egil Tombre employed by Oslo’s Urban Planning Office translated and 
summarized the Buchanan Report, about how to solve the urban areas’ traffic problems, while 
maintaining the road traffic’s conveyance and the inhabitants’ well being after Professor Colin D. 
Buchanan from Imperial College in London lectured in Oslo in April 1964. The Buchanan Report was 
one of the 1960s’ seminal works concerning urban road planning (Buchanan-rapporten og norske byer, 
Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken, publikasjon nr. 48, Oslo December 1964, OVA). 
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economy and political pressure from the Bratteli and Korvald executives, due to the 
peripheral and rural areas’ legislators’ complaints about depopulation and 
centralization.1205  
 Reduced road investments constrained effectively Oslo’s growth in the early 
1970s, when Oslo lost thousands if inhabitants. Many from the middle class moved 
to the wealthy surrounding municipals. This in turn increased the need for transports 
and aggravated Oslo’s traffic problems because of congested roads and poor public 
transports. Oslo’s city council did not prioritize construction of trunk roads in the 
1970s.1206 The city council’s reduced ambition with regard to construction of the 
missing trunk roads was most likely a result of ideology, and because the city 
council’s majority took Oslo’s declining resources for granted. Oslo’ co-financing 
for highways were reduced from 50 to 30 percent in 1975 and to 18 percent in 1977. 
The State financed land purchase in Oslo similarly as in the other counties from 
August 1978.1207 Oslo became hence treated similarly as the other central counties 
concerning co-financing of highways from 1978, after the tax redistribution system 
had been changed because of the county reform. 
 It was many similarities between Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm’s road 
policy and road construction during the second half of the 1960s and early 70s, 
because grand road plans were developed and approved but only partially 
accomplished. But there was one fundamental difference, the Danish and Swedish 
authorities managed to establish functional and competitive public transports in 
Copenhagen and Stockholm. This was definitely not the case all across Greater 
Oslo. The result was acute congestion and accident and environmental problems in 
Oslo’s central areas, and near slum conditions in some eastern and western 
residential areas were the partly completed entrance roads joined the narrow city 
streets. Oslo suffered therefore, similarly as Norway’s second and third largest cities 
Bergen and Trondheim, from severe traffic infarcts from the late 1970s and early 
80s. 
The 1970s - regional policy disguised as road and environmental policies  
Road Director Karl Olsen initiated in June 1970 development of a particular road 
plan for those central and urban areas omitted from Norwegian Road Plan.1208 But 
the former Road Plan Committee had already determined most of the new road 
plan’s decisive terms. Minister of transport and communications Reiulf Steen 
appointed the Road Plan Committee for Urban and Densely Populated Areas 
(Utvalg for arbeid med vegplan for byer og tettsteder) January 28th 1972. Norway 
had then approximately 490 densely populated areas, hereunder 169 with more than 
1.000 inhabitants. Road Director Karl Olsen headed even the Road Plan Committee 
for Urban and Densely Populated Areas, and Arne J. Grotterød took also part. The 
                                                 
1205 St. meld. nr. 27 (1971-72) Om regionalpolitikk og landsdelsplanleggingen; LO/Arbeiderpartiet 
(1974:120-121); Lund (2000:82). 
1206 Oslo kommuneplan 1976-1985. Fylkes- og generalplan. Administrasjonens forslag. Oslo, December 
4th 1975, VDA cassette 367 Fylkenes utbyggingsplaner – Samferdselsplaner Oslo 1976-1980.  
1207 Sæland (1993:40). 
1208 Letter from the Directorate of Public Roads to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, 
“Videreføring av vegplanarbeidet i tettstedene”, June 30th 1970, VDA binder NVP II Arb. dok og 
møteref. 
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committee’s other eight members changed during the course of planning, and 
represented among others the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the 
Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Labor, and the new Ministry of Environment 
established May 8th 1972.1209 The new Ministry of Environment can be understood 
as the Bratteli executive’s policy response to the early 1970s’ so-called “green 
wave” when many championed zero growth and decentralized development.1210 The 
Ministry of Environment used this opportunity to get involved in urban planning, 
road planning and road policy. 
 The major political parties’ road policy positions shifted fundamentally from 
the 1950s and 60s’ emphasis on road construction to road safety and environmental 
concerns prior to the 1973 election. This shift largely explained the priorities in the 
forthcoming road plan for urban and densely populated areas. All parties except the 
rightwing populist Anders Lange’s Party, which had no formulated road policy in 
the manifesto, championed public transports as an alternative to road construction in 
urban areas. None of the parties promised increased road investments. Only the 
Agrarian Party championed turnpike financing in central and urban areas 1973-77, 
and advocated also establishment of a State owned turnpike company.1211 The 
political parties’ road policy positions were largely unchanged 1977-81 compared to 
the 1973-77 manifestos. 
 Annemarie Lorentzen from Finnmark, minister of transport and 
communications in Trygve Bratteli’s second minority executive that came to power 
after the 1973 earthquake election, abandoned further construction of motorways.1212 
Lorentzen liquidated thus formally the 1962 Motorway Plan that had been shelved 
by Håkon Kyllingmark in February 1966. Norway’s only motorways completed in 
the 1970s were E18 between Oslo and Drammen in Oslo, Akershus and Buskerud 
Counties, sections of E6 in northeastern Oslo and Akershus County, and a few 
kilometers on E18 between Forus and downtown Stavanger in Rogaland County. 
The new road policy imposed by Annemarie Lorentzen was clearly part of the Labor 
Party’s political reorientation, after the lost 1972 EEC referendum and 1973 
election, when the Labor Party accommodated to the leftwing populists and the 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, to marginalize the new Socialist 
Election Alliance/Socialist Left Party to heal the wounds after the disruptive EEC 
struggles, and strengthened also Reiulf Steen and his followers within the Labor 
Party. The first oil price shock OPEC 1 1973-74 strengthened similarly the 
environmentalists, and weakened the modernists that had argued for further 
                                                 
1209 Tilråding Om mandat for og sammensetning av et utvalg for arbeid med vegplan for byer og 
tettsteder. Godkjent ved Kronprinsregentens resolusjon 28. januar 1972. Foredratt av Reiulf Steen. Ref nr. 
47/1971-72, VDA binder Norsk vegplan II Møtedokumenter 1/72-1/75 K. Olsen; NOU 1977:40A Norsk 
Vegplan II Trafikk og bymiljø:14-16; St. meld. nr. 9 (1978-79) Om trafikk og bymiljø – Norsk Vegplan for 
byer og tettsteder:5-6. 
1210 See for instance Mjøset (1986:181-183) for further discussions about Norway’s “green wave”. 
1211 “Sosialistisk Folkeparti, Sosialistisk framtid, valgprogram 1973-77”:H. By og boligpolitikk, L. 
Samferdselspolitikk; “SV – Sosialistisk Valgforbund 33 punkter 1973”:25. Gratis lokaltrafikk; Trygghet 
for folket, “Det Norske Arbeiderpartis arbeidsprogram for perioden 1974-73”:Samordnet samferdsel; 
“Venstres arbeidsprogram 1973-1977”:VII Samferdsle; “Kristelig Folkeparti program for 
stortingsperioden 1973-77”:Samferdsel; “Senterpartiet Program stortingsvalget 73”:Samferdsel; “Høyres 
program stortingsvalget 1973”:Samferdsel og trafikkmiljø; “Anders Langes Parti 1973, Vi er lei av å bli 
utbyttet av statskapitalismen”, all in Vi vil..! Norske partiprogrammer 1884-2001. 
1212 Danielsen (2002a [Plenary discussion]). 
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economic growth and construction of modern trunk roads and motorways, 
particularly in central and urban areas. 
 The 1976 Transport and Communication Act tightened further the 1964 
Transport and Communication Act’s regulations. Those engaged in commercial, 
unscheduled road transports needed a permit from the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, and such permits were subject to an investigation of need. 
Vehicles heavier than 18 tons were not permitted to transport goods from more than 
customer at a time. The only exception was agreements between a holder of a 
transport permit and a group of customers approved by the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications. The Labor Party executive’s aim was among others reduced 
parallel traffic between roads and railroads in areas with heavy traffic. Many of the 
regulations imposed by the 1976 Transport and Communication Act were not 
tenable. The first concessions came in 1979 as result of the neo-liberal shift.1213 The 
1976 Transport and Communication Act’s regulations were not able to stem the tide, 
but were most likely concessions to the Labor Party’s powerful railroad lobby, 
because increased road construction after Stortinget’s approval of Norwegian Road 
Plan accelerated the shift from sea and railroad to road transports. 
 Almost every desolate area with more than 7-800 inhabitants was connected to 
the public road system in 1977, such as decided in Norwegian Road Plan. The only 
exceptions were in Finnmark. The accident rate had similarly been reduced almost 
11 percent from 1972 to 1976, according to Road Director Karl Olsen. But 
approximately 50 percent of the accidents in 1976 took place on 5-10 percent of the 
highways, through densely populated areas with many exits. An increasing problem 
in the middle of the 1970s was unused road appropriations. Most unused road 
appropriations had been allocated to urban and densely populated areas. The main 
reasons for the unused road appropriations according to Karl Olsen were lack of 
planning capacity, delayed expropriations and an increasing number of delayed 
investment decisions, because county and municipal councils were not able to agree, 
or did not abide former decisions.1214 The urban and densely populated areas’ 
congestion, accident and environmental problems were not only a result of lack of 
investments, but also result of local political processes. The early 1970s’ green wave 
made it often very difficult to accomplish formerly agreed road projects, such as for 
instance in Oslo. 
                                                 
1213 Bjørnland (1989:224-227). 
1214 Vegvesenets årsberetning 1976, Vegdirektoratet, Oslo 1977:2-3, VDA; Vegvesenets årsberetning 
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Figure 22: Norwegian Road Plan II – Traffic and Urban Environment. 
 
Source: NOU 1977:40A Norsk Vegplan II Trafikk og bymiljø:17. 
 The Road Plan Committee for Urban and Densely Populated Areas submitted 
Norwegian Road Plan II – Traffic and Urban Environment (Norsk Vegplan II – 
trafikk og bymiljø) to minister of transport and communications Ragnar Christiansen 
May 31st 1977. The urban areas’ road appropriations were here dispersed across 72 
densely populated areas with more than 5.000 inhabitants all across Norway, with 
approximately 2,2 millions inhabitants, almost half the population. The investments 
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were not concentrated to those areas with the most acute congestion, accident and 
environmental problems. Norwegian Road Plan II – Traffic and Urban Environment 
emphasized also public transports, parking, traffic reconstruction and choking, 
bicycle and pedestrian roads instead of construction of trunk roads and motorways 
that drained through traffic from residential areas and narrow city streets, and 
championed similar ideas as Oslo’s 1973 Street Utilization Plan. Oslo’s future road 
investments were also reduced compared to Norwegian Road Plan’s allocation.1215 
The Road Plan Committee for Urban and Densely Populated Areas was hence 
captured by the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, similarly as the 
Road Plan Committee 1964-69, but also by the emerging environmental protection 
lobby who utilized this window of opportunity to influence future road planning and 
road construction. But the planning procedures in urban and densely populated areas 
were far more complicated than the Combined Road Administration had been 
involved in earlier, according to Road Director Karl Olsen. One of the challenges 
was to establish functional interfaces between the Combined Road Administration, 
counties and municipals.1216 Norwegian Road Plan II – Traffic and Urban 
Environment became far more important for the road planning procedures than for 
substantial road investments, because it facilitated more decentralized road planning, 
hereunder increased local involvement and influence. The submitted Norwegian 
Road Plan II – Traffic and Urban Environment became also a textbook example of 
political pork barrel or universalism similarly as the first Norwegian Road Plan, 
because those areas with the most serious congestion, accident and environmental 
problems received hardly anything except the bill, because the available resources 
were spread thinly across 72 densely populated areas all across Norway. Comparing 
Figure 2, 4, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 26 is rather instructive, and provides 
Norwegian road policy and road construction in a nutshell. 
 The tax financed State road investments reached their all time high in 1978, 
but were thereafter significantly reduced because the Nordli executive abandoned its 
counter cyclic policy after the 1977 election when the Socialist Left Party had been 
marginalized. Minister of finance Per Kleppe warned the executive about 
forthcoming amendments of the long-term program at the budget conference 
January 30th and 31st 1978. The main reasons for this course change according to the 
Ministry of Finance’s permanent undersecretary Eivind Erichsen, was the sum of 
development abroad, at home and in the oil sector. Asbjørn Jordahl from Møre and 
Romsdal who succeeded Ragnar Christiansen as minister of transport and 
communications January 11th 1978, accepted the Ministry of Finance’s budget 
reductions, but warned that reduced road investments would lead to reduced 
employment. Road Director Karl Olsen recommended reducing the road investments 
only and maintaining the roads as planned. The Ministry of Transport and 
Communications endorsed this advice.1217 The Nordli executive devaluated the 
NOK unilaterally 8 percent in February 1978 to maintain the trade and industry’s 
competitiveness. This was the third devaluation since 1977.1218 Minster of finance 
                                                 
1215 NOU 1977:40A Norsk Vegplan II Trafikk og bymiljø. 
1216 Vegvesenets årsberetning 1977, Vegdirektoratet, Oslo 1978:2-3, VDA. 
1217 “Regjeringskonferanse på Staur gård i Stange mandag 30. januar og tirsdag 31. januar 1989”, No. 9, 
protocol Statsminister Odvar Nordli referater fra regjeringskonfer, RA-PMO-ON cassette 3. 
1218 Erichsen (1999:113-114); Skånland (2004:14). See also Nordli (1985:174-182) and Steen (1986:224-
230) concerning the Nordli executive’s policy shift 1977-81. 
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Per Kleppe was early in 1978 not particularly concerned about reduced employment 
because of smaller road appropriations, and overlooked seemingly also new roads’ 
effect on the domestic trade and industries’ transaction costs, competitiveness and 
future investments opportunities. 
 Asbjørn Jordahl proposed early in June 1978 reallocating State road 
appropriations to urban areas, and to permit financing of local roads and rail 
infrastructures with State road appropriations. The Ministry of Finance questioned 
State financing of local tasks, but concluded reallocation of road appropriations from 
the peripheral and rural areas to urban areas and particularly Østlandet would lead to 
“increased exertion of pressure for increased total road appropriations”, but decided 
not to oppose more “flexible utilization of the highway appropriations”.1219 The 
Nordli executive’s minister of municipals and labor, Arne Nilsen, a railroad worker 
from Hordaland, stated at the executive’s meeting June 5th that he would look further 
into the rules for utilization of the State road appropriations. Minister of finance Per 
Kleppe concluded the urban areas had been “put somewhat aside”, but assumed the 
necessary resources were found “through reallocation within the budget 
constraints”.1220 Per Kleppe was thus not willing to provide extra road 
appropriations to solve the urban areas’ congestion, accident and environmental 
problems, but pitted instead the central and urban constituencies against the middle 
and peripheral constituencies. Lack of resources aggravated the geographical 
distributional conflict, and the minister of finance was seemingly far more 
concerned with the short-term budget balance than by the long-term consequences 
of a dysfunctional road system. The central and urban constituencies were almost 
determined to lose this resource struggle by default, because of Stortinget’s 
geographical seat allocation and the political median’s support of the peripheral and 
rural areas. Minister of transport and communications Asbjørn Jordahl submitted 
About Traffic and Urban Environment Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages 
(Om trafikk og bymiljø Norsk Vegplan for byer og tettsteder) to Stortinget June 16th 
1978.1221 
 The Nordli executive imposed, on minister of Per Kleppe’s initiative, a 
combined price and wage freeze September 15th.1222 The economic policy shifted 
hence almost 180 degrees after the 1977 election, from a counter cyclic to a 
contractive policy. The major urban areas’ congestion, accident and environmental 
problems were seemingly used as means for constraining the activity level, because 
they were largely ignored by the executive. 
 Odvar Nordli reorganized his executive in October 1979 after the Labor Party 
lost control of many urban areas and even some former Labor Party strongholds in 
the local elections. This was clearly an attempt of reducing the intraparty conflicts. 
Former secretary Ronald Bye, as modernist from Oslo, replaced Asbjørn Jordahl as 
minister of transport and communications.1223 But the State economic problems 
                                                 
1219 ”Stortingsmelding om trafikk og bymiljø Norsk Vegplan for byer og tettsteder”, note to the executive 
from the minister of transport and communications, June 2nd 1978, RA-PMO-ON cassette 21. 
1220 ”Regjeringskonferanse mandag 5. juni 1978 kl. 1200 til 1400 i Regjeringens møterom”, No. 50, 
protocol Prime Minister Odvar Nordli referater fra regjeringskonfer. Fra 30/3-78 – 8/6-78, RA-PMO-ON 
cassette 3.  
1221 St. meld. nr. 9 (1978-79) Om trafikk og bymiljø – Norsk Vegplan for byer og tettsteder. 
1222 Erichsen (1999:114-115); Skånland (2004:14-15). 
1223 Nyhamar (1990:336-344). 
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aggravated further when the second oil price shock OPEC 2 sent the world economy 
into a new recession. The demand for the export enclaves’ products went down, 
even if increased oil prices reduced the Norwegian State’s deficits. 
 Stortinget approved Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages 
unanimously March 25th 1980. Stortinget’s delayed approval of this road plan 
indicated clearly both the State economic problems and the controversy concerning 
the central and urban areas’ congestion, accident and environmental problems. The 
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications required reduced subsidies 
for public transports, because these subsidies were substantial. Stortinget approved 
barely the Labor, Socialist Left and Liberal Parties’ proposal for financing of public 
transport investments with road appropriations. The tax financed road investments 
were further reduced, and the major urban areas received very few or no fresh 
money compared to the formerly approved Norwegian Road Plan.1224 Norwegian 
Road Plan for Cities and Villages furthered also many of the Østlands Committee’s 
(Østlandskomiteen) 1969 recommendations about construction of a constrained road 
system near Oslo, to constrain the Oslo-area’s growth, and was not able to solve the 
major cities’ congestion, accident and environmental problems.1225 The fact the 
public transports’ relative prices increased almost twice as much as the relative 
prices on fuel and the consumer’s price index 1979-1985, because of reduced public 
transport subsidies, did not improve the crowded areas’ situation.1226 It became often 
far cheaper to go by car than by public transports. This was the last straw. The major 
urban areas’ roads were soon clogged, and traffic infarcts set in. 
Table 9: The Norwegian tax financed State road investments’ relative geographical 
allocation 1960-81. 
Constituencies Stortinget’s 
1929 
allocation (%) 
Actual 
allocation 
1960-1963 
(%) 
Actual 
allocation 
1964-1969 
(%) 
The Borten 
executive’s 
recommended 
allocation 1970-1973 
(%) 
Actual 
allocation 
1970-1973 
(%) 
Actual 
allocation 
1974-1977 
(%) 
Actual 
allocation 
1978-1981 
(%) 
Center 12,6 19,3 27,1 28,1 24,7 22,2 23,1 
Middle 39,1 36,2 33,3 35,4 35,6 36,8 36,2 
Periphery 48,3 44,0 39,6 36,5 39,4 40,8 40,1 
Sum 100,0 99,5 100,0 100,0 99,6 99,8 99,4 
Sources: 1227 
 Table 9 provides an overview of Stortinget’s geographical allocation of road 
investments 1929-81. The central constituencies had 34,9 percent of the settlement 
in 1960 and 36 percent in 1980. The middle constituencies had 37,3 percent of the 
settlement in 1960 and 38,3 percent in 1980. The peripheral constituencies had 27,8 
                                                 
1224 Innst. S. nr. 165 (1979-80) Innstilling fra samferdselskomiteén om trafikk og bymiljø – Norsk Vegplan 
for byer og tettsteder; Stortingstidende (1979-80):2581-2637. See also for instance Knutsen and Boge 
(2005:143-149, 154). 
1225 Cf. Innstilling fra Østlandskomitéen, Kommunal og Arbeidsdepartementet, Oslo 1969:58-60. 
1226 Vegvesenets årsberetning 1985, Statens vegvesen, Oslo 1986:2, VDA. 
1227 Stortinget’s 1929 allocation key (Bjørnland 1989:158). The actual allocation 1960-81 is calculated 
from the Directorate of Public Roads’ annual reports 1960-81. The Borten executive’s recommended 
allocation 1970-73 is derived from St. meld. nr. 14 (1970-71) Om Norsk Vegplan:89. The columns for the 
actual allocations 1960-63, 1970-73, 1974-77 and 1987-81 do not always sum to 100 percent because 
some appropriations were allocated to the Directorate of Public Roads. 
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percent of the settlement in 1960 and 26,1 percent of the settlement in 1980.1228 The 
actual allocation 1964-69 compared to Stortinget’s 1929 allocation key and the 
actual 1960-63 allocation indicates clearly the Labor Party modernists’ road policy 
reformation 1960-65. The actual allocation of the road investments 1970-81 indicate 
similarly the Borten executive and the entailing Labor and middle party executives’ 
road policy counterreformation 1966-81, hereunder the Labor Party’s peripheral and 
rural turn, and the first Bratteli executive’s no to turnpikes in central and urban areas 
in October 1971. 
 The 1970s’ reallocation of the road investments compared to 1964-69 
reflected also Stortinget’s new seat allocation after the 1973 election that made the 
middle and peripheral coastal constituencies from Rogaland to Finnmark an MWC. 
The changed allocation reflected also the leftwing and middle parties’ and the 
middle and peripheral constituencies’ hegemony in Stortinget’s Standing Committee 
on Transport and Communications. The net result was construction of a road system 
in the peripheral and rural areas with many similarities with Norway’s 19th century 
narrow gauge railroads. These ‘narrow gauge’ substandard social roads were usually 
acceptable for commuting with passenger cars, but constrained use of heavy 
vehicles. These roads became later obstacles against development of new trade and 
industries dependent of road transports, and harmed thereby the peripheral and rural 
areas’ future development. The peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s 
road policy, based on quantity instead of quality, was at best shortsighted. Most 
lobbying efforts were directed towards local collective goods, construction of 
highways that usually were local roads, rather than towards national collective 
goods, construction or modernizing of trunk roads between the regions. But the 
1960s and 70s Norwegian regional policy, hereunder the road policy imposed from 
1965 was only able to delay the centralization and urbanization, not stop the tide.1229 
Maintenance of dispersed settlement, almost at any costs, has been one of 
Norwegian politics’ sacred cows since the 1950s. 
 Road Director Karl Olsen retired in September 1980 and was succeeded by 
Eskild Jensen, Prime Minister Odvar Nordli’s Parliamentary Secretary from January 
1976 until January 1980. Minister of transport and communications Asbjørn Jordahl 
asked Eskild Jensen in 1979 if he would apply for the position as Road Director. 
Eskild Jensen applied when even the Prime Minister asked him.1230  
 Karl Olsen was first and foremost a technocrat, but retired as a very 
disappointed man. Karl Olsen complained publicly about the Nordli executive’s 
budget reductions after the all-time high in 1978, delayed political clarifications with 
regard to the major urban areas’ traffic problems and whether the executive and 
legislators abided their former promises and decisions.1231 Karl Olsen’s complaints 
prior to his resignation provide several reasons to question Rune Slagstad’s 
frequently quoted claims about the road sector’s predictability, “economic 
generosity”, and transport and communication projects “beyond any social economic 
                                                 
1228 See the Data Appendix Table 4.4. 
1229 See the Data Appendix’ Table 4.2-4.4 for an overview of the settlement’s development between 1950 
and 2000. 
1230 Jensen (2003 [Interview]). 
1231 Vegvesenets årsberetning 1978, Vegdirektoratet, Oslo 1979:2-3, VDA; Vegvesenets årsberetning 
1979, Vegdirektoratet, Oslo 1980:2-3, VDA. 
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governance” almost except from public debates.1232 The discussions so far in this 
chapter indicate clearly that Rune Slagstad’s claims were not based on empirical 
research. 
 Eskild Jensen was economist and the first and so far only non-engineer Road 
Director. Eskild Jensen served as deputy undersecretary in the Ministry of Transport 
and Communication’s Elucidation Section from 1974 until he became Road 
Director, except during his tenure as the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary 
Secretary.1233 1234 Eskild Jensen was a politician and the first Road Director that 
undisguised challenged the counties’ hegemony concerning road policy and road 
construction, because he had his own power base within the Labor Party. 
 The two decades from 1960 to 1980 became Norway’s great leap forward 
concerning road construction, because the public road system’s length increased 
from 51.233 kilometers in 1960 to 81.717 kilometers in 1980, inclusive city streets. 
The trunk road and highway system’s length increased from 16.378 kilometers in 
1960 to 25.282 kilometers in 1980.1235 Only 4.066 kilometers public roads were 
paved in 1960, hereunder 2.861 kilometers trunk roads and highways, 616 
kilometers county roads and 589 kilometers municipal roads. 44.472 kilometers 
public roads were paved in 1980, hereunder 21.169 kilometers trunk roads and 
highways, 13.437 kilometers county roads and 9.864 kilometers municipal roads.1236 
The highway system was expanded to almost every corner of Norway between 1960 
and 1980, and most trunk roads and highways were paved. The total road system 
and the road system’s standard improved significantly 1960-80, even if this section 
questioned some aspects concerning Norwegian road policy and road construction 
1960-80. 
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Norwegian case between 1960 and 1980? This study’s main 
hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road 
policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good 
was clearly strengthened by the Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation 
between 1960 and 1965 that prioritized construction of trunk roads between the 
regions and entrance road roads to the major cities, hereunder motorways, and 
Stortinget’s approval of the 1962 Motorway Plan. But the Borten executive that 
came to power after the 1965 election launched a road policy counterreformation 
that clearly weakened this hypothesis. Minister of transport and communications 
                                                 
1232 Slagstad (1998:307). 
1233 Skari (1995:100-102); Jensen (2000:11-23);  
1234 GESTAPO arrested Eskild Jensen in April 1942, when he was 17 years old, for distributing illegal 
newspapers. Eskild Jensen was first sent to the Norwegian concentration camp Grini and thereafter to 
Sachsenhausen in Germany where he among others met Trygve Bratteli. Eskild Jensen was saved from 
Sachsenhausen March 18th 1945 by the Swedish Red Cross’ so-called white buses. Eskild Jensen was 
arrested as an upper class boy with conservative sympaties, but returned from Sachsenhausen as a 
convinced socialdemocrat. Eskild Jensen studied economics at University of Oslo after the liberation, and 
got a part time position at Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen’s office during his studies and a full time 
position in the Ministry of Finance’s Economy Department after he had graduated (Jensen 2000:11-27). 
1235 Historisk statistikk 1994, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger 1995:499 Tabell 20.30. 
1236 Bil- og veistatistikk 2002, Opplysningsrådet for Veitrafikken, Oslo 2002:67, OVA. 
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Håkon Kyllingmark shelved in February 1966 the 1962 Motorway Plan. Norwegian 
Road Plan submitted by the Road Plan Committee in 1969 and approved by 
Stortinget in 1971 postponed construction of trunk roads between the regions and 
roads in urban areas at least until 1978-89, because Stortinget’s majority chose 
quantity to quality and road safety. Minister of transport and communications 
Annemarie Lorentzen liquidated the 1962 Motorway Plan in 1973, when she 
abandoned further construction of motorways. The result was lack of modern trunk 
roads between the regions and aggravated congestion, accident and environmental 
problems in the major urban areas. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly strengthened by the Norwegian case 
between 1960 and 1980, because Norwegian Road Plan initiated in 1964 with 
Swedish Road Plan as role model changed character fundamentally 1965-69 after 
the Borten executive came to power. Both Norwegian Road Plan approved in 1971 
and Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages approved in 1980 were textbook 
examples of political pork barrel or universalism orchestrated by the peripheral and 
rural areas’ distributional coalition, because both plans gave something to almost 
every constituency, except some central and urban constituencies that were 
supposed to finance the plans. The peripheral and middle constituencies’ share of 
the annual State road appropriation increased significantly throughout the 1970s. 
Most road investments were allocated to substandard roads with local collective 
good characteristics. The road policy 1966-80 reflected clearly the peripheral and 
rural areas’ distributional coalition’s dominant position in Stortinget and in the 
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications that allocated most road 
investments until approval of Norwegian Road Plan. The 1970s’ road policy 
reflected also Stortinget’s revised seat allocation after the 1973 election that made 
the middle and peripheral coastal constituencies from Rogaland to Finnmark an 
MWC. The peripheral and rural constituencies’ legislators perceived obviously road 
policy and road construction in zero sum terms 1960-80 rather than in variable sum 
terms, even if allocation of road appropriations according to cost/benefit calculations 
could have increased the economic growth and thereby facilitated further 
redistribution to the peripheral and rural constituencies. The Ministry of Finance’s 
very tight budget constraints, given the voters’ demand for roads, explained many of 
Stortinget’s resource struggles.  
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was also clearly strengthened by the Norwegian case between 1960 
and 1980. The Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation between 1960 and 
1965 was partly accomplished despite internal resistance from the traditionalists and 
railroad lobby. The Labor Party’ modernists advocated establishment of a Road 
Fund prior to the 1961 and 65 elections and introduction of turnpikes prior to the 
1961 election, but the traditionalists and railroad lobby opposition these initiatives, 
and they were not introduced in the Labor Party’s manifestos. The Labor Party’s 
road policy preferences changed fundamentally during its 1965-71 and 1972-73 
opposition, when the environmentalists, traditionalists, railroad lobby and anti-
motorists achieved far more prominent positions. Per Borten’s majority executive 
dominated by the three middle parties reversed the Labor Party modernists’ road 
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policy reformation through the counterreformation between 1965 and 1971. This 
counterreformation was clearly part of the non-socialist parties’ regional policy, 
because maintained settlement, almost at any cost, was one of their aims. The 
Ministry of Finance increased its power and influence during the Borten executive. 
Most political parties took the Ministry of Finance’s resource constraints and sector 
allocations for granted from the second half of the 1960s. Almost every political 
party advocated public transports rather than road investments in central and urban 
areas from approximately 1973, but Stortinget’s majority was not willing to invest in 
attractive and competitive public transports in the major population clusters such as 
for instance in Denmark and Sweden. The Norwegian public transport initiatives 
were usually symbol policy, to facilitate further transfers to the peripheral and rural 
areas, which held prominent positions within most parties. 
 This study’s final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was also strengthened by the Norwegian case between 
1960 and 1980. First, the 1963 Road Act punctuated both the 1912 Road Act’s 
equilibrium that gave the urban areas 0 percent of the State road appropriations, and 
Stortinget’s allocation key that had governed the counties’ annual share of the State 
road appropriations since 1929. The result was increased road appropriations to the 
most crowded areas 1964-69. But the 1963 Road Act did not institute trunk roads 
and motorways with national collective good characteristics as a particular class of 
roads; they were only as a subset of highways that usually were local collective 
goods. Second, the development path established through the Labor Party 
modernists’ 1960-65 road policy reformation was punctuated by the Borten 
executive’s 1965-71 counterreformation, when quantity prevailed to quality and 
road safety. Third, Norwegian Road Plan approved 1971 punctuated largely the 
equilibrium where members of Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications could introduce new road projects during late night budget 
negotiations, and established a far more rational and predictable procedure based on 
quadrennial road plan revisions. But the budget constraints for road investments 
were very tight given the voters’ demand for roads. This was one of the results of 
the Ministry of Finance’s decoupling the vehicle and fuel tax revenues from the road 
appropriations in the 1940s and 50s, and imposition of 10 percent discount rate for 
roads in December 1967. The tradition for tight budget constraints for road 
investments can be understood as a kind of path dependence. Fourth, minister of 
finance Per Kleppe pitted the central and urban areas against the peripheral and rural 
areas in 1978 when the Nordli executive significantly reduced the road investments, 
to maintain the budget constraints after abandoning the 1975-77 counter cyclic 
policy. The Ministry of Finance was obviously far more concerned with the short-
term budget balance than the long-term effects of a dysfunctional road system. 
Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages approved by Stortinget in March 1980 
diverted the urban areas’ road investments between 72 densely populated areas all 
across Norway, and emphasized similarly as Oslo’s Street Utilization Plan traffic 
reconstruction, choking and public transports rather than construction of trunk roads. 
Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications required 
similarly reduced subsidies for public transports. This was the straw that broke the 
camel’s back. Finally, Karl Olsen retired in September 1980 as a disappointed man 
who questioned the executive and legislators’ credibility with regard to road policy 
and road construction. Appointment of the economist and Labor Party politician 
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Eskild Jensen as new Road Director punctuated the chartered engineers’ monopoly 
on the position as Road Director. 
1981 – A nouveau riche State shifting its responsibility for 
provision of national collective goods to counties, municipals and 
private actors 
Norwegian road policy and road construction since 1981 has clearly been influenced 
by the neo-liberal shift, NPM policy and public sector reforms, particularly abolition 
of the credit rationing in 1984, and can be understood as a more than 20 years 
regime change process. The Norwegian State became exceptionally wealthy from 
the 1980s because of the oil and gas revenues, but the Ministry of Finance, executive 
and Stortinget reduced the State’s efforts in many policy areas. The responsibility 
for provision of national collective goods, such as modern trunk roads and 
motorways, was de facto shifted from the State to the counties, municipals and in 
some instances even private actors, even if trunk roads and highways were explicit 
State tasks according to the 1963 Road Act. More institutional reforms took place 
1981 until approximately 2005 than since the 1890s, because a new road polity and 
new road policy equilibrium emerged from the second half of the 1990s. But the 
Ministry of Finance maintained its role as Norway’s de facto Ministry of Transport 
and Communications.  
The neo-liberal shift and transition to an oil economy 
Gro Harlem Brundtland replaced Odvar Nordli as Prime Minister in February 1981, 
but lost the election. Gro Harlem Brundtland’s Labor Party minority executive was 
succeeded by Kåre Willoch’s Conservative Party minority executive, which was 
expanded to a majority coalition with the Christian Peoples’ and Agrarian Parties in 
June 1983. This coalition became a minority executive after the 1985 election with 
the Progress Party in a pivotal position. Gro Harlem Brundtland’s second minority 
executive came to power in May 1986 when the Progress Party refused supporting 
the Willoch executive’s proposed fuel tax increase. A new Conservative, Christian 
and Agrarian minority executive headed by the Conservative Party’s Jan P. Syse, 
came to power after the 1989 election, but dissolved from within in November 1990 
because of the EEA-agreement. The non-socialist parties’ disagreement paved the 
way for Gro Harlem Brundtland’s third minority executive. The voters refused 
Norwegian membership in EU for the second time in the November 28th 1994 
referendum, while Sweden, Finland and Austria joined EU January 1st 1995. The 
same interest groups that opposed Norwegian membership in EEC in 1972, an 
unholy alliance between the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition and 
urban radicals, rose again. Norway remained and outside country, even if the EEA 
agreement gave almost full access to EU’s common market except for fish and 
agricultural products. Gro Harlem Brundtland resigned in October 1996 and handed 
over the power to Torbjørn Jagland who lost the 1997 election. A Christian 
Peoples’, Agrarian and Liberal Parties minority executive headed by the Christian 
Peoples’ Party’s Kjell Magne Bondevik governed until March 2000, when a new 
minority Labor Party executive headed by Jens Stoltenberg came to power. Jens 
Stoltenberg lost the 2001 election and a new Christian Peoples’, Conservative and 
Chapter 4 – Norway – the deviant case 
320 
Liberal Party minority executive headed by Kjell Magne Bondevik came to 
power.1237 A new red-green alliance consisting of the Labor, Socialist Left and 
Agrarian Parties won the September 2005 election, and established a three-party 
executive headed by Jens Stoltenberg, Norway’s first majority executive since 1983-
85, 1965-71 and 1945-61. 
 Stortinget approved the Election Act in 1985, which reintroduced electoral 
pacts that had been abolished since the 1945 election.1238 Stortinget amended also 
the constitution in 1984, and the number of seats increased by 2 from the 1985 
election, to 157. These 2 extra seats went to Akershus, which more than doubled its 
number of inhabitants between 1950 and 1980. These 2 seats shifted the 
geographical balance between the central and peripheral counties, because the 
coastal constituencies from Rogaland to Finnmark that had enjoyed half plus one 
seat 1973-85 and thereby established an MWC almost by default lost their 
majority.1239 Norway’s most populated counties and constituencies, those with major 
cities; Akershus, Oslo, Vest-Agder, Rogaland, Hordaland and Sør-Trøndelag 
increased their number of seats to 67. The 1985 constitutional reform shifted hence 
the political balance slightly in the central and most populated areas’ direction, and 
can be understood as one of the first fractures in the Liberal Party’s System and the 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition. 
 Stortinget amended the election system even in 1988, after lengthy 
discussions. The final compromise became a ban of electoral pacts, 157 district 
seats, 8 equalization seats, and 4 percent limit for the equalization seats.1240 The 
equalization seats went to the most populated constituencies, because they had 
usually most ‘unused’ votes. The 1988 election system came into power from the 
1989 election and shifted the political balance further in the central and urban areas’ 
direction, even if the peripheral areas still governed Stortinget’s majority. But the 
1988 reform deepened the fractures in the Liberal Party’s System and the peripheral 
and rural areas’ distributional coalition. 
 What about Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transports and 
Communications? The peripheral and middle constituencies dominated this 
committee even 1981-2005, but the middle constituencies governed the committee’s 
majority 1993-97 during the EU struggles. The central constituencies increased their 
representation 1989-93 and 2001-05. The balance between the leftwing, middle and 
rightwing parties shifted considerably compared to 1945-81.1241 The early 1980s’ 
so-called ‘right-wave’ weakened clearly the middle parties 1981-93.1242 The 
                                                 
1237 Regjeringar, statsrådar, statssekretærar og politiske rådgjevarar1945 - 2004 [Online December 1st 
2004] – URL: http://www.odin.dep.no/smk/norsk/regjeringen/p10000969/bu.html. See See Nyhamar 
(1990:341-352) concerning Gro Harlem Brundtland’s takeoverover as Prime Minister in 1981 and 
concerning the power struggles with Reiulf Steen, which also was discussed in the 1960-80 section. See 
for instance Skjeie (1999:42-47, 60-63, 74, 76, 89-92, 123-135, 136-146) and Brundtland (1998:106-132, 
175-193, 247-271, 365-392) how Gro Harlem Brundtland first consolidated her power and thereafter 
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the massive loss of voters in the 2001 election is thoroughly discussed in Takvam (2002). 
1238 NOU 2001:3 Velgere, valgordning, valgte:Chapter 3.3. 
1239 Nordby (1985a:194-224). See also the Data Appendix’ Table 4.1 and 4.7. 
1240 NOU 2001:3 Velgere, valgordning, valgte:Chapter 3.3. See also the Data Appendix’ Table 4.6 and 
4.7. 
1241 See the Data Appendix Table 4.19-4.24. 
1242 See for instance Mjøset (1986:182-183). 
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rightwing parties had until then first and foremost represented the central and urban 
constituencies, but increased from then their voter support even in the peripheral and 
middle constituencies. The left and rightwing parties held all the committee’s formal 
positions 1981-85, while they were divided among the three blocks 1985-93 and 
1997-2005. The rightwing parties lost all formal positions in the committee 1993-97 
during the EU struggles. The middle parties’ weakened representation in the 
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 1981-2005, except during 
the third EU-struggle 1993-97, indicated clearly a weakening of the traditionalists 
and the peripheral areas’ distributional coalitions, and can be understood as further 
fractures in the Liberal Party’s System and the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition.  
 The neo-liberal shift became clearly evident after the 1981 election. The Labor 
Party or the new Civil Servant State was gradually replaced by what can be denoted 
the Neo-Liberal State with significantly reduced governance ambitions compared to 
the 1970s, when the Labor Party executives tightened the regulations prior to the 
neo-liberal shift and the postwar corporative negotiation system’s collapse. The 
Willoch executive is often credited for this policy shift, but the neo-liberal shift 
started already after the 1977 election when Odvar Nordli’s executive gave up the 
counter cyclic policy. But the Willoch executive was more candid about its 
intentions, and carried out visible NPM inspired public sector reforms. Gro Harlem 
Brundtland’s second and third executives furthered the Willoch and Syse 
executives’ NPM policies, and carried out some of Norway’s most comprehensive 
public sector reforms, even if the wrapping and wording was somewhat different to 
prevent unnecessary conflicts with the National Federation of Labor.  
 The oil and gas economy made Norway one of the wealthiest countries in the 
world throughout the 1980s and 90s, even if the first years of the 1980s were 
characterized by an international recession because of the second oil price shock, 
OPEC 2. The sociologist Lars Mjøset claimed the Norwegian economy was “saved 
by Khomeiny” in 1979. The export enclaves’ traditional smokestack industries and 
the coastal areas’ shipyards were gradually crowded out by the oil industry during 
the 1980s. Norway had still a dual economy with export enclaves, included the oil 
industry, and a small group of emerging high-tech industries.1243 Aquaculture 
achieved similarly a prominent position in many coastal peripheral and rural areas 
throughout the 1980s and 90s. The economist Øystein Noreng claimed the oil 
revenues 1978-83 were spent in an “economic counterrevolution” to amortize the 
State debt accumulated 1974-77 and to establish financial buffers.1244 The NOK was 
devaluated twice in 1982, twice in 1984 and once in 1986, because of problems with 
the internal balance that gave far higher interest rates and inflation level in Norway 
than in many other countries throughout the 1970s and 80s, according to the 
Ministry of Finance’s permanent undersecretary Eivind Erichsen.1245 The Willoch 
executive abolished the credit rationing in January 1984, but maintained the low 
interest policy, which led to a credit financed real estate bubble. Market based 
interest rates on loans were first introduced in January 1987 by the second 
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Brundtland executive.1246 Parts of the oil revenues were spent on a private 
consumption spree 1984-86 after abolition of the credit rationing. The economist 
Øystein Noreng warned in 1987 about the State and the Norwegian economy’s 
vulnerability because of the dependence of oil revenues, deteriorating balance of 
trade and reduced competitiveness, and recommended basing the future standard of 
living on non-oil sectors exposed to competition.1247 Norway was hit by a new 
recession, banking crisis and rising unemployment in 1987, after the credit driven 
real estate boom, the 1986 dollar and oil price drop, and the 1987 stock exchange 
crash.1248  
 Stortinget established in 1990 the Petroleum Fund governed by the Ministry 
of Finance and managed by Bank of Norway as a buffer against fluctuations in the 
State’s annual oil and gas revenues and to insulate the economy from the oil 
revenues.1249 The Petroleum Fund have since then transformed the State’s oil and 
gas revenues to a broad based investment portfolio of international securities, among 
others as savings for future pensions. Establishment of the Petroleum Fund was 
largely results of lessons learned during the simultaneous oil price and US dollar 
drop 1986-87 that gave noticeable reductions in the State’s revenues. 
 The Syse executive pegged the NOK unilaterally to the ECU October 22nd 
1990, but the German Bundesbank carried out a tight monetary policy to counter the 
reunion of West and former East Germany’s inflationary effects. The Norwegian 
monetary policy was tightened because the pegging of NOK to the ECU, which in 
turn aggravated the effects of the 1987-93 banking crisis. Norway’s fixed exchange 
rate came under pressure from September 1992 when the Swedish Riksbank was 
forced to devaluate the SEK. Norges Bank defended the NOK until December 10th 
when it gave in and let the NOK float. The interest rates fell thereafter, and the 
economy gained soon momentum.1250 The 1997-97 Asian, Latin American and 
Russian financial crises combined with a sudden drop in the oil prices and increased 
Norwegian interest rates created further economic turmoil in 1998.1251 This shaking 
increased the Ministry of Finance and the legislators’ concerns for the fast growing 
public expenditures, due to the social welfare goods’ fast growing costs, and 
facilitated a budget agreement between Kjell Magne Bondevik’s Christian Peoples’, 
Liberal and Agrarian Parties executive and the Conservative and Progress Parties 
that also had far reaching road policy implications. 
 Norges Bank’s aim for the monetary policy 1994-2001 was stable exchange 
rate for the NOK, but the Stoltenberg executive introduced inflation targets in March 
2001.1252 Stortinget decided similarly in 2001 to consume only the Petroleum Fund’s 
expected annual real return on the investments, as further insurance against Dutch 
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Disease and future unemployment.1253 The Norwegian State was hence in a 
fundamentally different financial position compared to the Danish and Swedish 
States after the turn of the 20th and 21st century. The Norwegian problem was not 
lack of financial resources, rather the opposite. This is probably why the executive 
and legislators tied themselves to the mast through introduction of inflation targets 
and limits on the annual spending of the oil revenues, even if the executives and 
legislators satisfied the inhabitants’ hunger for oil revenues through priority of social 
welfare goods rather than investments in for instance research, development and 
infrastructures that facilitated future business opportunities. 
 How was Norway’s economic ability during the 1980s and 1990s? Norway’s 
GDP per capita measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, was 15.222 
dollars in 1981, 18.466 in 1990 and 24.364 in 2000. The average for the 12 West 
European countries was 14.045 dollars in 1981, 16.872 in 1990 and 19.806 in 
2000.1254 Norway went from the second wealthiest country in West Europe in 1981 
and 1990, measured as GDP per capita, to the wealthiest in 2000. The Norwegian 
State became partly Europe’s rentier and experienced a financial freedom during the 
second half of the 1990s and post 2000 that most others envied. 
The New Norwegian System’s emergence paved the way for the turnpike 
industrial complex 
It was Gro Harlem Brundtland’s first Labor Party executive that came to power in 
February 1981 that launched the road policy regime change process that came as a 
result of the neo-liberal shift, NPM-inspired public sector reforms and the major 
urban areas’ acute congestion, accident and environmental problems. The car was 
namely no longer “a luxury item” but part of peoples “everyday life”, according to 
the Labor Party’s 1981 manifesto, even if the Labor Party still argued for 
constrained use of cars in urban areas. The Labor Party had until then opposed 
turnpikes principally, but 1981 became the turning point: “Important tasks, which 
have to be postponed or left out because of tight economic constraints, can be 
carried out by utilization of other and more untraditional means of financing.”1255 
Minister of transport and communications Ronald Bye initiated already in 1975, 
before he resigned as Secretary, development of a new centrist doctrine. His aims 
were replacement of the 1969 leftwing doctrine, and recapturing the centrist 
voters.1256 The Labor Party’s new doctrine approved by the 1981 convention 
“sharpened the knives” for the forthcoming slaughter of sacred cows that gained 
momentum from 1987.1257 Gro Harlem Brundtland’s takeover was clearly noticed 
through a more centrist policy that soon gave the modernists a far more prominent 
position than during the 1970s. 
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 Ronald Bye elaborated further in his speech in Polytechnic Association 
September 7th 1981, where he claimed the State’s budget was not flexible enough to 
provide sufficient investments in transports and communications at the right time 
and in the right amounts, and desired therefore alternatives as supplement to the tax 
financed road investments, because he would like to carry out profitable road 
investments that otherwise were politically impossible.1258 Ronald Bye was forced to 
accept turnpikes or other alternative means of financing given the investment level, 
because Road Director Eskild Jensen claimed the “political meat weight” 
determined Stortinget’s geographical allocation of the road investments.1259 The first 
Bratteli executive’s no to turnpikes in central and urban areas in October 1971 
created an impasse, because the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition 
responded, as discussed in the previous section, with blocking increased road 
appropriations to densely populated constituencies and increased redistribution to 
sparsely populated peripheral and rural constituencies. 
 The Labor Party’s acceptance and introduction of alternative road financing in 
the 1981 manifesto was according to William Engseth from Troms, who served as 
Gro Harlem Brundtland’s minister of transport and communications 1988-89, a 
delicate compromise between the Labor Party’s “road builders, environmentalists 
and anti-motorists”, because alternative road financing facilitated forced road 
construction. But turnpikes could also limit the traffic and shift the costs to the 
motorists, according to the Labor Party’s environmentalists and anti-motorists.1260 
So-called alternative road financing, particularly turnpikes, gave something to 
everyone, given the Ministry of Finance’s tight budget constraints and Stortinget’s 
geographical seat allocation that made any attempts of reallocating the road 
appropriations a political impossibility. 
 Gro Harlem Brundtland and the Labor Party lost the 1981 election. The 
Conservative Party’s Inger Koppernæs from Møre and Romsdal, who belonged to 
the peripheral areas’ distributional coalition, became the first Willoch minority 
executive’s minister of transport and communications. Inger Koppernæs supported 
obviously Ronald Bye’s initiative, because one of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication’s assistant secretaries restated Ronald Bye’s ideas about alternative 
road financing at Norwegian Institute of Technology’s annual transport and 
communication conference (NTH-dagene) in January 1982. Inger Koppernæs 
conveyed also to the Directorate of Public Roads that counties that forced road 
construction through user financing, for instance turnpikes, would not be punished 
financially but instead be rewarded financially.1261 Inger Koppernæs’ initiative 
changed partly the counties’ equations concerning road policy and road 
construction, and modified thereby the political economy. 
 City of Bergen that merged with Hordaland County in 1972 was the first to 
utilize the window of opportunity created by Ronald Bye and Inger Koppernæs’ 
turnpike initiatives. Several of Bergen’s entrance roads planned in the 1960s was 
ready for construction in the 1970s, but most of these projects were canceled or 
postponed, because Norwegian Road Plan omitted the urban areas and postponed 
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construction of trunk roads at least until 1978-89, and Norwegian Road Plan for 
Cities and Villages did not as mentioned earlier encourage construction of new trunk 
roads.1262 Bergen received 30-40 percent of Hordaland’s annual State road 
appropriations at the turn of the 1970s and 80s, but the gap between needed and 
available road investments was significant.1263 The proposed road appropriations 
1982-85 and 1986-89 covered only 25 percent of the necessary investments within 
1990.1264 Hordaland County’s Transport and Communication Committee 
(Samferdselsnemnd), the former County Road Board’s successor, decided therefore 
in December 1979 to investigate different kinds of user financing.1265 The late 1970s 
and early 80s’ traffic conditions gave the most densely populated counties and 
municipals few choices, because neither the executive nor Stortinget indicated 
political willingness to solve these areas’ congestion, accident and environmental 
problems, rather the opposite. The State shifted de facto the responsibility to the 
counties and municipals, even if trunk roads and highways was an explicit State 
task. 
 Chartered engineer Arild Eggen, head of the Directorate of Public Road’s 
Motorway Department (Motorvegavdelingen) then located in Bergen at Hordaland’s 
Public Roads Administration conceived a “wild idea” in 1983. Why not do as they 
did in the Middle Ages, encircle Bergen with a city wall, where you had to pay to 
get inside?1266 Bergen’s inhabitants were used to ferry tickets and the industrialist 
Fritz Rieber’s non-profit turnpikes at the city’s bridges and tunnels built before 
Bergen merged with Hordaland.1267 Hordaland’s County Road Manager Josef 
Martinsen approved the idea.1268 The 1963 Road Act required namely locally 
initiated turnpikes. Stortinget was not authorized to impose turnpikes unless they 
were initiated locally. 
 Hordaland’s Public Roads Administration invited Bergen’s three leading local 
politicians to a very informal meeting the fall 1983. The participants were the Labor 
Party’s Gunnar Simonsvik, the Conservative Party’s Henrik Liseth, the Christian 
People’s Party’s Arne Næss, Chief County Road Officer Josef Martinsen and Arild 
Eggen. The Labor, Conservative and Christian Peoples’ Parties held the majority of 
seats in Bergen’s city council. Arild Eggen outlined his idea, a turnpike ring 
encircling Bergen, rather than many uncoordinated turnpike projects scattered all 
across the Bergen-area, which made it possible to remedy Bergen’s congestion, 
accident and environmental problems within 10 to 15 years, instead of 30-35 years 
given Bergen’s annual State road appropriations. The three politicians accepted 
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finally the idea.1269 This is how Chief County Road Officer Josef Martinsen and 
Arild Eggen bypassed Bergen’s municipal administration, and the city council’s 
minority parties that strongly opposed further road construction and/or user 
payments.  
 Arild Eggen interpreted Inger Koppernæs’ initiative literally, and proposed a 
deal based on tit-for-tat, additional State road appropriations equal to the additional 
local co-financing provided through turnpikes.1270 Arild Eggen’s proposal 
established the role model for many later so-called urban packages. Bergen’s city 
council and Hordaland’s county council approved Arild Eggen’s model in December 
1983, April 1984, January and March 1985.1271 The Agrarian Party’s leader Johan J. 
Jakobsen, who succeeded Inger Koppernæs as minister of transport and 
communications in June 1983 when the Willoch executive was expanded to a three 
party majority coalition, supported Bergen’s plan, and offered 133 millions in extra 
road appropriations 1986-89, given establishment of the turnpike ring.1272 1273 Johan 
J. Jakobsen furthered hence Ronald Bye and Inger Koppernæs’ turnpike policy, but 
Stortinget had the final say. 
 But let’s look further into how and why the Norwegian road policy regime 
changed fundamentally from the early 1980s, after the tax financed State road 
investments had been reduced 11 percent in 1979, 22 percent in 1982 and 29 percent 
in 1985 measured in real terms compared to the 1978 all time high.1274 The Liberal 
Party’s System for resource allocation was not able to solve the major population 
clusters’ accelerating congestion, accident and environmental problems, and lost 
gradually legitimacy, particularly among the central and urban constituencies’ 
voters, taxpayers and motorists. But the Liberal Party’s System lost also legitimacy 
among the coastal areas’ inhabitants who desired mainland connections, bridges, sub 
sea road tunnels or combinations thereof, instead of ferries. Add the old common 
pool problem, because of absence of modern trunk roads between the regions and to 
the neighboring countries, because the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional 
coalition had prioritized construction of roads with local collective rather than 
national collective good characteristics since the second half of the 1960s. The 
combination of Stortinget’s geographical seat allocation and the Liberal Party’s 
System prevented effectively reallocation of the State road appropriations to those 
areas where they were most urgently needed. The Liberal Party’s System’s failure 
coincided with the neo-liberal shift, the ‘right-wave’, NPM ideas about direct user 
financing to constrain the demand for publicly financed goods, and numerous local 
initiatives because the Combined Road Administration had not been able to provide 
the desired roads. But other actors were able and willing to provide the desired 
roads. 
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 Turnpikes had long traditions in Norway. Turnpikes were frequently used 
prior to the neo-liberal shift. Many roads during the 18th and 19th century were 
financed through turnpikes. The same was several bridges in the 20th century.1275 
But the postwar Strategic Capitalism, low interest policy, credit rationing and 
restrictions on foreign loans made it difficult to finance roads through turnpikes after 
World War Two. But user payments through turnpikes matched one of the 
Conservative Party’s favorite issues, namely reduced direct income taxes.1276 
Various actors had championed trunk roads during the Strategic Capitalism’s 
heydays, but with limited success. These included among others Oslo and Akershus’ 
County Governor Trygve Lie in the Party Commission for Transport and 
Communication Problems in 1956, the industrialist Fritz Rieber in 1957, all the non-
socialist parties prior to the 1957 election, Norges Bank’s Governor Erik Brofoss in 
1960, the Labor Party’s Transport and Communication Commission in 1960, the 
Liberal and Christian Peoples’ Parties prior to the 1961 and 1965 elections, 
Norwegian Road Federation’s turnpike campaign in 1967, Professor Arnljot 
Strømme Svendsen in 1968, all non-socialist parties prior to the 1969 election and 
the Agrarian Party prior to the 1973 election, such as mentioned earlier. The 
Directorate of Public Roads recommended in 1978 imposition of turnpikes in Oslo 
because of the revenue potential.1277 But the time was obviously not yet ripe; neither 
were the traffic conditions bad enough to warrant such politically costly measures. 
 Only the Agrarian and Progress Parties advocated turnpike financing in their 
1977-81 manifestos, even if the motivations were different. The Labor, Conservative 
and Progress Parties advocated turnpike financing prior to the 1981 election, while 
the Socialist Left, Liberal, Christian Peoples’ and Agrarian Parties’ manifestos were 
quiet about turnpike financing prior to the 1981 elections.1278 The turnpikes’ 
renaissance at the turn of the 1970s and 80s was most likely a result of the neo-
liberal shift and influence from the emerging NPM ideas, because only parties with 
many modernists championed turnpike financing prior to the 1981 election. But the 
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Willoch executive’s liquidation of the credit rationing in January 1984 made 
turnpikes a feasible alternative or supplement to tax financed road investments, and 
became the second turning point after the Labor Party’s course change in 1981. The 
new road policy and resource allocation regime that gradually emerged throughout 
the 1980s and 90s had many similarities with the 19th century’s so-called Norwegian 
System where Stortinget pitted the different constituencies’ projects against each 
other, in a kind of auctions, to weed out poorly founded projects and to safeguard 
local co-financing.  
 Stortinget amended the 1963 Road Act’s § 21 in 1985 and introduced 
complete State financing of construction and maintenance of trunk roads and 
highways, because of an amendment of the counties and municipals’ income transfer 
system.1279 But completely State financed trunk roads and highways was only a 
formal, not a substantial provision, because what is here denoted the New 
Norwegian System instituted soon partly or fully substitution of State road 
appropriations with loans from private finance institutions amortized through direct 
user payments, even if the fiscal vehicle and fuel taxes were upheld. The New 
Norwegian System instituted also Stortinget’s allocation of road investments to 
those constituencies most willing to accept turnpikes, similarly as the 19th century’s 
Norwegian System allocated the road appropriations to those constituencies most 
willing to accept local co-financing through local taxes when there was no State 
income tax.  
 Turnpikes made it possible for the Ministry of Finance to maintain tight 
budget constraints for road appropriations during the 1980s, 90s and after the turn of 
the 20th and 21st century, and made it also possible for those constituencies willing to 
accept turnpikes to advance in the very long queue for road appropriations. 
Turnpikes saved the executive and legislators from politically costly reallocation of 
the road appropriations. Last but not least, turnpikes provided significant and almost 
risk free business opportunities for banks and other actors, because establishment of 
the New Norwegian System facilitated also establishment of what is here denoted 
the turnpike industrial complex.1280 The turnpike industrial complex consisted of 
municipal and county politicians, legislators, consultants, private financial 
institutions, construction companies, local turnpike companies, and later also 
suppliers of electronic toll collection systems and service companies specializing in 
toll collection. The turnpike industrial complex consisted also of trade and industries 
dependent of road transports, because the Norwegian State had not been able or 
willing to provide a functional road system all across Norway. Many within the 
turnpike industrial complex had advocated turnpikes since the 1960s and 70s, when 
the turnpike projects’ number and scale were very limited, because the credit 
rationing made it very difficult to obtain the necessary loans. 
 How about Oslo that struggled with Norway’s most acute congestion, accident 
and environmental problems from the turn of the 1970s and 80s? These local 
problems became soon national because Oslo’s central areas were Norway’s largest 
crossroads because of the major trunk roads E6 and E18’s intersection. These 
congestions delayed transports of passengers and particularly goods from the entire 
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country. Oslo’s city council managed finally to agree about construction of a tunnel 
through the city hub, after the formerly planned urban motorway supposed to link 
Oslo’s southeastern (E6, E18); northeastern (E6) and western (E18) entrance roads 
that poured traffic into the narrow city streets had been rejected. Minister of 
transport and communications Asbjørn Jordahl supported in September 1978 
construction of the E18 tunnel below Oslo’s city hub from the fiscal year 1979, but 
minister of finance Per Kleppe and minister of municipal and labor Arne Nilsen had 
their objections at the executive’s conference September 18th 1978. But Asbjørn 
Jordahl considered construction from 1979 the “substantial” question. The Nordli 
executive agreed finally about allocating 19 millions 1979 NOK or 4,65 millions 
1990 PPP USD to construction of the tunnel in 1979.1281 This start-appropriation 
was only a fraction of the actual costs for the tunnel. 
 Ronald Bye succeeded Asbjørn Jordahl as minister of transport and 
communications October 10th 1979, and ordered November 20th full stop for Oslo’s 
city council’s attempts of accomplishing the E18 tunnel. The Ministry of Transport 
and Communications’ official reason was that a road along Oslo’s waterfront – an 
alternative rejected decades ago – would be sufficient. Arbeiderbladet, the Labor 
Party’s official organ of speech, claimed the tunnel’s excessive construction costs 
made no sense because of the global energy shortage.1282 But the real reason for the 
stop order was most likely struggles about Oslo’s future airport. The Nordli 
executive shelved namely December 14th further planning of the partly approved 
airport in Hobøl southeast of Oslo, and advocated instead moderate development of 
the airport at Gardermoen northeast of Oslo.1283 Prime Minister Odvar Nordli 
represented Hedmark County slightly north of Gardermoen, one of the Labor Party’s 
strongholds. Accomplishment of the E18 tunnel through Oslo would improve the 
east west traffic conditions, and thereby increase Hobøl’s likelihood of 
accomplishment. The Oslofjord area was the Conservative Party’s stronghold. Road 
Director Karl Olsen was not happy with the executive’s E18 tunnel flip-flop, which 
he considered a genuine breach of promise and absence of “willingness to abide 
former decisions”.1284 Oslo’s municipal road administration prepared the fall 1979 
invitation to competitive bidding. The Nordli executive’s stop order brought Oslo 
almost back to square one, because Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages 
approved by Stortinget in March 1980 gave Oslo minuscule road appropriations 
given the lack of road capacity. Oslo’s inhabitants’ and local politicians got thus no 
signals about future substantial measures against the accelerating congestion, 
accident and environmental problems. 
 Even Oslo’s local politicians recognized minister of transport and 
communications Inger Koppernæs’ signals in 1982 about financial rewards for 
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counties that accepted turnpikes, but Oslo’s city council struggled internally about 
how to finance the necessary trunk roads and which alternative that was supposed to 
solve the congestion, accident and environmental problems. These issues had to be 
settled within the spring 1985 to safeguard inclusion in Norwegian Road Plan 1986-
89. The next road plan revision was scheduled four years later. Oslo Labor Party and 
its supporting parties in the city council championed a congestion fee not warranted 
by the 1963 Road Act. The Conservative and Progress Parties advocated traditional 
turnpikes based on arrears payment.1285 The financial issue had clear national 
ramifications because of the forthcoming 1985 election. The political situation was 
somewhat delicate, because the Christian Peoples’ Party governed in the Willoch 
executive together with the Conservative and Agrarian Parties, but supported the 
Labor Party in Oslo’s city council. Oslo’s traffic problems and financing issues was 
the Labor Party’s opportunity to divide and conquer the Willoch executive.  
 Minister of transport and communications Johan J. Jakobsen invited in 
September 1984 Oslo to a similar deal as Bergen, and offered to solve the acute 
congestion, accident and environmental in Oslo’s eastern residential areas 
Gamlebyen and Vålerenga, which were partly slummed because of E6’ through 
traffic, if Oslo built the E18 tunnel through the city hub as a 100 percent turnpike 
financed project.1286 But Oslo’s city council turned down Jakobsen’s offer in 
October and November 1984, because the majority voted twice for a congestion fee 
rather than traditional turnpikes.1287 The congestion fee alternative required 
payments from all motorists within a defined area except from the trunk roads’ 
through traffic that congested Oslo’s city hub. Oslo’s Christian Peoples’ Party voted 
against the Conservative Party, its executive partner.1288 The Ministry of Transport 
and Communication’s immediate response was that Stortinget could first consider 
possible congestion fees during the spring 1986, after Stortinget had approved 
Norwegian Road Plan 1986-89.1289 Minister of transport and communications Johan 
J. Jakobsen closed further discussion in Stortinget December 3rd 1984, when he 
                                                 
1285 Sæland (1993:116). 
1286 Egil Wettre Johnsen, ”Eksperimentering med ny avgiftsnorm og nye utredninger beklage Grunnlinjen 
blir utsatt og Oslo taper statlig støtte?”, Aftenposten evening edition, September 28th 1984. 
1287 Oslo samferdselsplan 1984, Bystyrets vedtak 17. oktober 1984, finansrådmannen December 7th 1984, 
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edition ”Et begredelig vedtak”, October 20th 1984; Morten Malmø, ”Grunnlinjen blir sak for Stortinget”, 
Aftenposten evening edition, October 31st 1984; Aftenposten morning edition ”Vedtak om kjøreavgift ble 
anket”, November 22nd 1984. 
1288 Egil Wettre Johnsen, ”Eksperimentering med ny avgiftsnorm og nye utredninger. Beklager 
Grunnlinjen blir utsatt og Oslo taper statlig støtte?”, Aftenposten evening edition, September 28th 1984; 
Aftenposten eventing edition, ”Kr.F. presser sine for å stoppe kjøreavgiften”, November 10th; Egil Wettre 
Johnsen, ”Kristelig Folkeparti uenig med seg selv om kjøreavgiften”, Aftenposten evening edition, 
November 10th 1984; Egil Wettre Johnsen, ”Åpen strid i Kr.F. om bompenger eller kjøreavgift”, 
Aftenposten evening edition, December 18th 1984; Per Høybråten, Tor Holtan Hartwig og Robert Wright, 
”Kjørepenger bomavgift”, Aftenposten evening edition, December 20th 1984. 
1289 Letter from the Ministry of Transport and Communications to City of Oslo’s City Manager 
(Finansrådmannen), ”Alternativ finansiering av hovedveisystemet i Oslo sentrum – statlig behandling”, 
5586/84-441.0/2 October 17th 1984 ) signed by Steinar Killi and Ivar Sørlie, VDA cassette 322 Oslo 
1976-1985 Pan; Egil Wettre Johnsen, ”Staten frykter at Grunnlinjen forsinkes: Oslo må forklare seg”, 
Aftenposten evening edition, November 8th 1984; Sørlie (2000:15). 
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refused submitting any Road Act amendments permitting congestion fees.1290 
Jakobsen’s decision increased the pressure on Oslo’s Christian People’s Party. 
 Johan J. Jakobsen encouraged February 9th 1985 Oslo’s city council to 
reconsider the financial issue. Jakobsen would otherwise not submit the white paper 
about E18 through Oslo’s city hub to Stortinget. The city council’s majority gave 
finally in, and approved the Directorate of Public Roads’ tunnel alternative against 
18 votes. Financing with traditional turnpikes in arrears instead of congestion fees 
not warranted by the 1963 Road Act was similarly approved with 43 against 42 
votes.1291 Johan J. Jakobsen submitted the white paper about E18 through Oslo’s 
city hub to Stortinget in April 1985. The tunnel’s estimated costs were 1.285 
millions 1985 NOK or approximately 185,6 millions 1990 PPP USD included 
capital costs, slightly more than the earlier mentioned Nordli executive’s planned 
1979 kick-off appropriation.1292 But why was solving Oslo’s congestion, accident 
and environmental problems far more tedious and complicated than solving the 
similar problems in Bergen? One reason was that Oslo’s trunk roads and highways 
were managed by a municipal road administration subordinated Oslo’s city council 
until 1991. Another reason was that City of Oslo was almost unmanageable before 
introduction of parliamentary rule in 1986. Oslo’s old decision system made it 
possible to obstruct contested issues such as urban development and road 
construction almost ad infinitum. Some examples were Maximum Balance, the 
Street Utilization Plan and development of the Vaterland area near Oslo’s Central 
Station that went on between the 1950s and 90s. 
 The entire Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transports and 
Communications, except the Socialist Left Party’s Hanna Kvanmo representing 
Nordland, supported May 23rd 1985 construction of a new E18 in a tunnel through 
Oslo’s city hub.1293 The committee discussed also Norwegian Road Plan 1986-89 
and three projects in Møre and Romsdal County, namely the 100 percent user 
financed sub sea tunnels in Ålesund, Kristiansund and Frei’s mainland connection 
(KRIFAST), and the Atlantic Road (Atlanterhavsvegen). Hanna Kvanmo opposed 
also Bergen’s toll ring, when the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications deliberated Norwegian Road Plan 1986-89. The Standing 
Committee on Transports and Communications deliberated Bergen’s toll ring June 
4th, one day prior to the plenary’s final decision concerning Oslo, Møre and 
Romsdal’s projects and Norwegian Road Plan 1986-89. These projects went 
together to the plenary June 5th 1985, at the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications’ request. All projects were approved.1294 However, Stortinget’s 
                                                 
1290 Einar Solvoll, ”Sammenknytning E6 E18: Veisystemet i Oslo må høyprioriteres”, Aftenposten, 
evening edition, December 4th 1984. 
1291 Letter from the Directorate of Public Roads to the Ministry of Transport and Communications signed 
by traffic director Olav Søfteland, ”Finansiering av E 18 gjennom Oslo sentrum”, Ragnar H. Nilsen, -85/ 
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1292 St. meld. nr. 78 (1984-85) Om E18 gjennom Oslo:6. 
1293 Inst. S. nr. 231 (1984-85) Innstilling fra samferdselskomiteen om E18 gjennom Oslo:2-3. 
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approval of Norwegian Road Plan 1986-89 was not the formal approval of Bergen’s 
turnpike ring, only formal approval of the tit-for-tat principle, extra road 
appropriations against turnpikes, and instituted what is here denoted the New 
Norwegian System. The plenary approved Bergen’s turnpike ring formally June 20th 
1985. Bergen’s turnpike ring was operational already January 2nd 1986.1295 Johan J. 
Jakobsen described June 5th 1985 as the climax during his three years as minister of 
transport and communications.1296 June 5th 1985 became a turning point, similarly as 
the Danish Folketinget’s June 1986 Great Belt deal. 
 Bergen’s turnpike ring and the turnpike financed E18 in tunnel below Oslo’s 
city hub were both major projects in urban areas. Their approval in Stortinget was 
most likely directly linked to approval of Møre and Romsdal’s three projects and 
most likely even to other projects in middle and peripheral constituencies outlined in 
Norwegian Road Plan 1986-89. Stortinget’s decisions June 5th 1985 can hence be 
understood as a major pork barrel deal, because it was few reasons for “regional 
riots” in 1985 or 1986, according to Johan J. Jakobsen.1297 It seems hence reasonable 
to interpret the two mainland connections and the Atlantic Road in Møre and 
Romsdal County as direct contra entries to the Bergen package and the E18 tunnel 
through Oslo’s city hub. But the Liberal Party’s System for resource allocation was 
not dead, despite the New Norwegian System’s birth June 5th 1985. The Christian 
People’s Party’s cooperation with the Labor Party in Oslo’s city council may also 
have been deliberate moves in a high-level policy gamble, because: First, the 
Christian Peoples’ Party’s leader, minister of church and education Kjell Magne 
Bondevik, represented Møre and Romsdal in Stortinget. Few mastered the Liberal 
Party’s System better than Kjell Magne Bondevik and Johan J. Jakobsen, who were 
two of the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition’s leaders in the 1980s. 
Second, Kristiansund’s mainland connection (KRIFAST) was mentioned explicitly 
in Christian Peoples’ Party’s 1981-85 manifesto.1298 Finally, Oslo and Ålesund, and 
partly even Bergen, were the Conservative Party’s turfs.  
 It may look somewhat paradoxical that Johan J. Jakobsen became the New 
Norwegian System’s ‘obstetrician’, but Johan J. Jakobsen was not only a very 
skilled and cunning political horse trader who mastered the Liberal Party’s System 
to perfection. He was also a political realist that understood the major urban areas’ 
congestion accident and environmental problems had to be solved as soon as 
possible, because the Liberal Party’s System’s mismatch between contributions to 
the community and allocation of publicly financed investments undermined the 
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entire political system’s legitimacy. Johan J. Jakobsen’s moves prior to June 5th 
1985 had many similarities with President Nixon’s visit to China or Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, because Johan J. Jakobsen had 
sufficient credibility within the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition to 
challenge the Liberal Party’ System without significant risk for underhand attacks. 
Johan J. Jakobsen reasoned most likely the Liberal Party’s System’s cross-
subsidization had to be maintained, but with other means, and Stortinget’s system 
for resource allocation had therefore to be reformed by the peripheral and rural 
areas’ distributional coalition. Even the Ministry of Finance supported most likely 
Johan J. Jakobsen’s development of the New Norwegian System, because turnpikes 
made it possible to maintain the road budgets’ tight constraints and accomplish the 
most urgently needed road investments through voluntarily extra taxes from the 
motorists. The New Norwegian System could hence protect the State’s new wealth 
against future demands for increased infrastructure investments. 
 The New Norwegian System differed fundamentally from those turnpike 
regimes established later in Denmark and Sweden, because the Norwegian Ministry 
of Finance refused in 1985 financing turnpike projects through foreign loans.1299 The 
Ministry of Finance refused similarly State loan guarantees and financing through 
foreign loans in 1989, and required the affected counties or municipals as majority 
owners of the local non-profit turnpike companies.1300 Turnpike companies without 
county or municipal loan guarantees were in 1993 permitted to borrow directly from 
the international capital markets, while turnpike companies with such guarantees 
were only permitted to borrow from Norwegian finance institutions, most likely 
because of the exchange rate risk. The counties or municipals were also obligated to 
finance the turnpike projects’ possible deficits.1301 The Danish and later also 
Swedish turnpike models were based on State loan guarantees and financing through 
the international capital market. State loan guarantees and use of the international 
capital markets reduced the road users’ interest costs significantly compared to the 
Norwegian model, but reduced also the domestic banks’ business opportunities. The 
Norwegian real interest rates increased from approximately 2 percent in 1982 to 
approximately 10 percent in 1991.1302 The late 1980s’ interest rate hike was clearly 
noticed by some Norwegian turnpike companies that also experienced reduced road 
traffic because of the 1987-93 recession.  
 Road Director Eskild Jensen was the first Road Director since Andreas 
Baalsrud and Arne Olai Korsbrekke who involved personally in the urban areas’ 
congestion, accident and environmental problems. Eskild Jensen pulled some 
strings, among others to Oslo’s advantage, even if he formally was prevented from 
doing so, because Oslo’s trunk roads and highways were managed by Oslo’s 
municipal road administration until 1991. But Eskild Jensen did his best to pilot the 
turnpike financed first Oslo package (Oslopakke 1) through Stortinget 1985-89 that 
solved Greater Oslo’s most urgent traffic problems within 2000. The first Oslo 
package safeguarded construction of several new trunk roads, many in tunnels that 
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drained through traffic from the central urban and residential areas.1303 The first 
Oslo package together with the new airport at Gardermoen and the Olympic Winter 
Games at Lillehammer in 1994 facilitated also improvements of Greater Oslo’s 
entrance roads. But many of Greater Oslo’s planned trunk roads are still not 
completed, because the construction costs increased significantly, due to 
construction of many trunk roads with better environmental standards than initially 
planned. But these extra costs will hardly be noticed in the long run, because Greater 
Oslo’s environmental conditions improved dramatically compared to the second half 
of the 1980s. 
Figure 23: Oslo’s new trunk road system approximately 2001 established through 
the first Oslo package (tunnels as dotted lines). 
 
Source: Statens vegvesen Oslo, Årsmelding 2001, Oslo 2002 [Online December 30th 2005] – URL: 
http://www.vegvesen.no.  
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 Establishment of the New Norwegian System gave soon the major population 
clusters’ congestion, accident and environmental problems a far more prominent 
position on the executive and the legislators’ agenda, because all major population 
clusters in the second half of the 1980s had become bottlenecks in the trunk road 
system. It was usually not capacity problems on trunk roads and highways outside 
the major population clusters. However, the Willoch executive amended the 1976 
Transport and Communication Act in 1982. The investigation of need for 
occupational transport permits and the permits’ geographical limitations were 
abolished. The transport providers were also permitted to transport goods from up to 
three customers at the time on one vehicle involved in unscheduled transports. A 
second reform took place in June 1986 when the distinctions between scheduled and 
unscheduled transports were abolished.1304 One result of the 1980s’ deregulations 
was development of several new express bus services and accelerated shift from rail 
to road transports of passengers and goods, which in turn further increased the 
demand for functional roads in central and urban as well in peripheral and rural 
areas. 
 The 1990-93 road plan revision was renamed Norwegian Road and Road 
Traffic Plan to indicate the Ministry of Transport and Communications and the 
Combined Road Administration’s emphasis had shifted from roads only to the road 
transport system. William Engseth from Troms, minister of transport and 
communications in Gro Harlem Brundtland’s second minority executive proposed in 
March 1989 in Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plan 1990-93 development of 
integrated local road, urban planning, environment and public transport plans for 
Norway’s ten major population clusters in diminishing order, Oslo, Bergen, 
Trondheim, Stavanger, Fredrikstad/Sarpsborg, Porsgrunn/Skien, Drammen, 
Kristiansand, Tønsberg and Tromsø with approximately 1,94 millions inhabitants. 
These plans were supposed developed in cooperation between the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, Ministry of Environment, Directorate of Public 
Roads, the Public Roads Administrations and the concerned counties and 
municipals. William Engseth’s initiative recognized that cars had become Norway’s 
most important mean of transport, but introduced also several means for reducing 
the mass motoring’s inconveniences, such as time differentiated turnpike fees in 
urban areas, use of road appropriations and turnpike revenues for investments in 
public transport infrastructures, and so on.1305 The measures introduced by 
Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plan 1990-93 safeguarded substantial solutions 
of the major population clusters’ congestion, accident and environmental problems 
compared to Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages based on idealistic 
premises that only provided symbol policy measures, and in some instances even 
aggravated the problems. Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plan 1990-93 indicated 
also the Ministry of Environment had become part of the road polity. The 1986-89 
Labor Party executive’s road policy can be understood as reintroduction of many 
ideas introduced during the Labor Party modernists’ 1960-65 road policy 
reformation, but discarded during the road policy counterreformation. 
 Eskild Jensen was the first Road Director that challenged the counties’ 
hegemony, and siphoned 1986-89 off some of the counties’ road appropriations to 
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the Directorate of Public Roads and governed some trunk road investments 
centrally. Some legislators and county politicians understood this move was highly 
rational.1306 Eskild Jensen outlined here a possible exit from the institutionalized 
local egoism that governed Norwegian road policy. Eskild Jensen retired in 
September 1992, and was succeeded by chartered engineer Olav Søfteland, who had 
spent his entire career in the Combined Road Administration.1307 Eskild Jensen was 
a transitional leader between the Labor Party State and the Neo-liberal State and 
NPM reforms. Olav Søfteland took the neo-liberal shift and NPM for granted.  
The 1990s and post 2000 – when the executives and legislators established a 
new road polity and tied themselves to the mast 
Kjell Opseth from Sogn and Fjordane, a former business manager, became minister 
of transport and communications in Gro Harlem Brundtland’s third minority 
executive that came to power November 3rd 1990. Kjell Opseth became the most 
powerful minister of transport and communications since Håkon Kyllingmark, and 
served until October 25th 1996. Opseth was fortunate with the circumstances, 
because his tenure started with a deep recession. But the business cycles shifted 
from 1993 when the interest rates went down after Norges Bank’s floating of the 
NOK. Kjell Opseth piloted Oslo’s new airport at Gardermoen through Stortinget’s 
investment decision in 1992. This project had been in process since the second half 
of the 1960s, and included also feeder systems and services that led to major road 
and railroad investments in Greater Oslo.1308 Kjell Opseth was very concerned about 
the executive and legislators’ trustworthiness. The executive or Stortinget should, 
according to Opseth, have “very good reasons” to deviate from former promises or 
decisions, because many inhabitants based their future and/or invested according to 
the executive or Stortinget’s decisions.1309 Kjell Opseth was also one of the few 
ministers of transport and communications that managed to convince the Ministry of 
Finance that increased road investments was sensible both in the short run because 
of reduced unemployment, and in the long run through improved effectiveness and 
competitiveness for Norwegian trade and industry. But the Ministry of Finance had 
clearly problems distinguishing between consumption and durable investments.1310 
The significantly increased tax financed road investments 1990-94 such as shown in 
Figure 24 illustrate how Kjell Opseth utilized the 1990-93 recession when Gro 
Harlem Brundtland’s executive agreed about a counter cyclic policy, because the 
Combined Road Administration had plenty of plans but limited financial resources. 
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Figure 24: Norwegian tax financed road investments’ geographical allocation 
1960-2000 (1990 PPP USD). 
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 Road Director Olav Søfteland furthered Eskild Jensen’s efforts targeting the 
major population clusters traffic problems. The same did minister of transport and 
communication Kjell Opseth. The ten major population clusters’ transport plans 
developed 1989-92 differed fundamentally from the idealistic Norwegian Road Plan 
II – Traffic and Urban Environment because these new plans aimed at development 
of functional and integrated urban areas with transport systems that safeguarded 
effectiveness, conveyance, road safety and environmental requirements for all 
transport users.1311 The New Norwegian System made it finally possible to finance 
such undertakings, even if the road users had to pay significant amounts through 
direct user payments in addition to substantial vehicle and fuel taxes that among 
others financed the Liberal Party’s System cross subsidization of the peripheral and 
rural areas. The slight adjustments of Stortinget’s seat allocation after the 1985 and 
1989 elections improved the major population clusters’ political representation 
somewhat, and explain also partly the development towards more realistic road, area 
development and transport plans. Add also the Labor Party’s 1990-93 manifesto that 
made the major population clusters’ congestion, accident and environmental 
problems to “national concerns”.1312 The political economy had shifted almost 
unnoticeable during the 1980s, and this shift paved the way for several forthcoming 
reforms with regard to road polity and road policy. 
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 An empirical study of the road appropriations’ allocation 1990-93 indicated 
clearly the Liberal Party’s system was still alive, because the road appropriations 
were only allocated according to cost/benefit calculations on Østlandet, particularly 
in densely populated areas. The study indicated also distributional coalitions and 
regional policy considerations, but these findings were not statistically significant. 
The study revealed finally the Public Roads Administrations’ allocation of road 
appropriations was contingent local interest groups.1313 1990-93 was clearly a 
transition period between the Liberal Party’s System and the New Norwegian 
System. This study’s finding inspired further studies of the road appropriations’ 
allocation. 
 A statistical Box-Ljung test of the variations in the tax financed Norwegian 
State road investments’ geographical allocation 1960-2000 revealed several 
interesting patterns; cf. Figure 24 and Table 16. First, the central constituencies’ 
Akershus, Oslo and Buskerud, and the middle constituencies Aust-Agder, Rogaland 
and Sør-Trøndelag and the peripheral constituencies Hedmark, Oppland and Nord-
Trøndelag’s annual variations in the road appropriations were random, which 
indicates stable road political equilibriums. Second, the central constituency Østfold, 
the middle constituencies Telemark, Vest-Agder and Møre and Romsdal, and the 
peripheral constituencies Sogn and Fjordane and Finnmark’s annual variations in the 
road appropriations were not random, which indicates unstable equilibriums with 
bargaining processes and zero-sum games, because high road appropriations in these 
constituencies were entailed by low road appropriations. Finally, the middle 
constituency Hordaland and the peripheral constituency Nordland with second most 
and most members in Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications 1957-2001 had 4 and 2-years political business cycles respectively 
in their road appropriations’ annual variations.1314 The Norwegian constituencies’ 
total road investments and total road investments per capita 1960-2000 were usually 
positively correlated with the constituencies’ representation in Stortinget’ Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communications during the same period.1315 Statistical 
tests of 41 years time series were thus not able to refute the impressions that many 
Norwegian legislators have perceived the road investments’ budget constraints and 
geographical allocation in zero sum terms. This study revealed also that 
representation in the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications usually 
paid off, which clearly is in accordance with Figure 24 and 25 and the Data 
Appendix’ Table 4.10-4.24. And yes, there have been distributional coalitions in 
Stortinget 1960-2000, at least concerning road policy. 
 Bergen, Oslo, Trondheim, Tromsø and other major population clusters’ urban 
packages had usually peripheral and rural contra entries such as established through 
Stortinget’s pork barrel deal June 5th 1985. Many of these were so-called mainland 
connections consisting of sub sea road tunnels, bridges or combinations thereof. The 
Combined Road Administration completed 23 sub sea road tunnels 1982-2002 that 
substituted ferries or long detours around the fjords. Representatives from local trade 
and industry, particularly within fisheries, aquaculture and tourism initiated many of 
these mainland connections. The same did other actors within the turnpike industrial 
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complex specialized in financing, planning and construction of mainland 
connections and urban packages.1316 The coastal areas’ inhabitants and legislators 
could not loose on these turnpike projects for a defined number of years, because 
their alternative was eternal payments on the ferries. The mainland connections’ 
increased flexibility, effectiveness and freedom were bonuses. Table 10 provides an 
overview of Norwegian sub sea road tunnels. 2 of these were located in the central 
constituencies, 12 in the middle and 9 in the peripheral constituencies. 
Table 10: Norwegian sub sea road tunnels completed 1983-2002 
Completed Tunnel (Road no.) County (C, M, P) Length (km) Maximum 
depth below 
the seabed (m) 
Average 
number of 
vehicles per day  
1983 Vardø (E75) Finnmark (P) 2.9 -88 670 
1987 Ellingsøy (Rv658) Møre and Romsdal (M) 3.5 -140 2.700 
1987 Valderøy (Rv658) Møre and Romsdal (M) 4.2 -145 2.250 
1988 Kvalsund (Rv863) Troms (P) 1.6 -56 500 
1989 Godøy (Rv658) Møre and Romsdal (M) 3.8 -153 725 
1989 Flekkerøy (Rv457) Vest-Agder (M) 2,3 -101 1.100 
1989 Hvaler (Rv108) Østfold (C)  3,7 -120 1.300 
1990 Nappstraumen 
(E10) 
Nordland (P) 1.8 -60 600 
1990 Fannefjord (Rv64) Møre and Romsdal (M) 2.7 -100 1.150 
1991 Maursund (Rv866) Troms (P) 2.1 -92,5 600 
1992 Freifjord (Rv70) Møre and Romsdal (M) 5.1 -132 1.850 
1992 Mastrafjord (E39) Rogaland (M) 4.4 -132 3.000 
1992 Byfjord (E39) Rogaland (M) 5.8 -223 2.800 
1994 Tromsøysund (E8) Troms (P) 3.4 -101 6.730 
1994 Hitra (Rv714) Sør-Trøndelag (M) 5.6 -264 635 
1996 Bjorøy (Fv207) Hordaland (M) 2 -85 350 
1997 Sløverfjord (E10) Nordland (P) 3.2 -100 100 
1999 Nordkapp 
(FATIMA) (E69) 
Finnmark (P) 6.8 -212 300 
2000 Frøya (Rv714) Sør-Trøndelag (M) 5.3 -164 530 
2000 Oslofjord (Rv23) Akershus/Buskerud (C) 7,2 -134 4.300 
2000 Ibestad (Rv848) Troms (P) 3.4 -112 400 
2000 Bømlafjord (E39) Hordaland (M) 7.9 -262 2.500 
2002 Skatestraumen 
(Rv616) 
Sogn and Fjordane (P) 1,9 -80 250 
Source: Kjell Wold, “Kostbart direktiv”, Vegen og vi, Vol. 2, 2003, No. 3:12-13. 
 The mainland connections’ emergence from the 1980s may be symptomatic 
both for the rightwing parties’ increased support in the peripheral and rural areas and 
for the rightwing parties’ increased representation in the Standing Committee on 
                                                 
1316 See for instance Knutsen and Ecklund (2000:288 ff.); Letter from Sunnmørsbanken v/ O. Balsnes og 
M. Molver, February 20th 1987, VDA cassette Vegsambandet Godøy – Giske i Møre og Romsdal; 
Fastlandsforbindelse til Magerøya Nordkapp kommune, Finnmark. Konsekvensanalyse, Bruer 
IKB/FATIMA AS, Drammen 1985, VDA cassette Finnmark Rv. 95 FATIMA – Bilag; ”Notat om 
forhåndsinnkreving av bompenger til Hardangerbrua og Trekantsambandet Sveio – Stord – Bømlo”, 
Directorate of Public Roads JA/AF December 16th 1991, VDA cassette Rv. 7 Hardangerbrua Vallavik- 
Bu 1988-1991 88/2733; ”Bergens utfordring”, Bergens Tidende, morning edition, December 27th 2000, 
ATEKST; Informasjonskompendie for trekantsambandet Bømlo - Stord – Sveio, Sunnhordaland bru- og 
tunnelselskap, July 15th 1987, VDA cassette Hordaland, Trekantsambandet; Note “Risiko ved finansiering 
av bompengeprosjekter – Trekantsambandet i Sunnhordland”, from Jan Senneseth, Den Norske Bank, to 
county manager (fylkesrådmann) Harry Herstad, January 19th 1994, VDA cassette Rv. 7 Hardangerbrua 
Vallavik- Bu 1992-1995 88/2733. 
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Transports and Communications. The rightwing parties’ legislators pursued often a 
more trade and industry friendly road policy than the middle party legislators. 
Norway’s first sub sea road tunnel, to Vardø in Finnmark, was completed 1982/83. 
Most sub sea road tunnels, except the tunnel to Vardø, were organized as partly or 
fully user financed turnpike projects, usually according to the New Norwegian 
System’s economic logic.1317 But there were also examples of sub sea road tunnels 
organized as turnpikes, but created according to the Liberal Party’s System’s 
political logic, with minuscule user payments because of limited revenues due to the 
projects’ geographical location. The most prominent example is FATIMA, the sub 
sea road tunnel on E69 to Magerøya and North Cape in Finnmark. FATIMA was 
approved by Stortinget in 1993 and completed in 1999.1318 The total costs were 
approximately 1,1 billions 1993 NOK or approximately 107 millions 1990 PPP 
USD, with a cost overrun of about 63 percent. FATIMA serves about 3.500 
inhabitants plus tourists, and had an average traffic of approximately 300 vehicles 
per day in 2003.1319  
                                                 
1317 See for instance Knutsen and Boge (2005:173-185, 215-258) for further discussions about bridges, 
subsea road tunnels and mainland connections. 
1318 St. prp. nr. 47 (1992-93) Om fastlandsforbindelse til Magerøya i Finnmark; Innst. S. nr. 177 (1992-
93) Innstilling fra samferdselskomiteen om fastlandsforbindelsen til Magerøya i Finnmark; 
Stortingstidende (1992-93):4040. See also Knutsen and Boge (2005:231-243) for further details about a 
project characterized by rent seeking.  
1319 Innst. S. nr 205 (1999-2000) Innstilling fra kontroll- og konstitusjonskomiteen om Riksrevisjonens 
antegnelser til statsregnskapet for 1998 – FATIMA-prosjektet:12; Kjell Wold, ”Kostbart direktiv”, Vegen 
og Vi, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2003:12-13. 
Chapter 4 – Norway – the deviant case 
341 
Figure 25: An overview of Norwegian turnpikes the spring 2005. 
 
Source: Kart bompengeanlegg [Online March 3rd 2005] – URL:http://www.norvegfinans.com  
 The common denominator between the central areas’ urban packages and the 
peripheral and rural areas’ mainland connections since the middle of the 1980s has 
been organizing and financing through non-profit joint stock turnpike companies 
owned by the counties, and in some instanced even municipals or private 
interests.1320 Most countries that finance road construction through turnpikes have 
                                                 
1320 Formål og historikk [Online 7. mars 2003] – URL: http://www.fjellinjen.no; Vedtekter for A/S 
Fjellinjen.; “Avtale mellom Samferdselsdepartementet og A/S Fjellinjen om bompenger på E18 Fjellinjen 
i Oslo”, Febuary 18th and April 3rd 1987; “Avtale mellom Samferdselsdepartementet og A/S Fjellinjen”, 
October 11th and 20th 1988, VDA case Vegdirektoratets avd. Osloplan 20 Drift av ringen, binder A/S 
Hovedvegfinans Oslo /Akershus. 
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usually had low vehicle and fuel taxes, low general tax levels or executives with few 
degrees of financial freedom. But this was not the case in Norway during the 1980s, 
90s and post 2000. The Norwegian turnpike projects became an extra tax for the 
central urban and the most densely populated coastal areas’ inhabitants, to maintain 
the Liberal Party’s System and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional 
coalition. The turnpike financing peaked 1990-93 when minister of transport and 
communications Kjell Opseth carried out a counter cyclic road policy, and 2002-
2005 during the second Bondevik executive, that carried out a neo-liberal road 
policy compared to former executives. 
Table 11: Norwegian turnpike financed road investments and their relative 
geographical allocation 1986-2005. 
Geographical 
allocation / 
Road plan 
period 
1986-
1989 
(actual) 
1990-
1993 
(actual) 
1994-1997 
(proposed) 
1998-2001, 
highways 
(proposed) 
1998-2001, 
trunk roads 
(proposed)  
2002-2005, 
Highways 
(proposed) 
2002-2005, 
trunk roads 
(proposed) 
Central 
constituencies 
(%) 
39,4 27,1 54,5 39,3 NA 61,7 NA 
Middle 
constituencies 
(%) 
51,7 64,7 32,8 40,7 NA 31,9 NA 
Peripheral 
constituencies 
(%) 
8,9 8,2 12,7 20,0 NA 6,4 NA 
Grand total 
turnpike 
financing 
(millions 1990 
PPP USD) 
589,23 700,95 408,63 235,13 215,76 392,52 292,30 
Turnpike 
financing’s 
share of total 
investments (%) 
30,3 28,8 19,6 23,1 24,4 34,7 31,2 
Source: 1321 
 The counties’ proposals for the quadrennial road plan revisions originated 
usually from the Public Roads Administrations, and had been through the municipal 
and county councils’ political processing that created numerous constraints. The 
Directorate of Public Roads transferred an increasing number of major road projects 
from the counties’ allocations to the Directorate of Public Road’s, according to Road 
Director Olav Søfteland, to overcome these constraints, and to improve major 
projects’ likelihood of approval and completion.1322 Kjell Opseth’s most important 
move, as minister of transport and communications, was introduction of the 
Combined Road Administration’s new governance system, because this reform 
destabilized and punctuated the road policy equilibrium established since 1893. The 
result was first development of new road policy and thereafter a fundamentally new 
road polity, which in turn established a new road policy equilibrium. Four 
institutional changes were decisive for this regime change that took place from 1991 
until 2003. 
                                                 
1321 St. meld. nr. 32 (1988-89) Norsk veg- og vegtrafikkplan 1990-93:105 Tabell 8.1; St. meld. nr. 34 
(1992-93) Norsk veg- og vegtrafikkplan 1994-97:162, 166, 173, 179, 182, 184, 189, 194, 198, 201, 205, 
208, 215, 220, 224, 231, 234, 239, 241; St. meld. nr. 37 (1996-97) Norsk veg- og vegtrafikkplan 1998-
2007:100-116, 117 Tabell 7.4 og 118-125; St. meld. nr. 46 (1999-2000) Nasjonal transportplan 2002-
2011:230 Tabell 14.7, 249 Tabell 14.8. 
1322 Søfteland (2004 [Interview]). 
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 The first institutional change started in June 1991 when Kjell Opseth 
appointed the so-called Holler Commission, headed by Kjell Holler, the Labor 
Party’s former minister of industry and head of the Norwegian Telephone and 
Telegraph Board, because the established system was ripe for reforms.1323 The 
Holler Commission recommended in June 1993 that Stortinget approved investment 
strategies, instead of individual projects. The proposed “conveyance”, 
“environment”, “road safety” and “regional development” strategies were linked to 
the Combined Road Administration’s budget and high-level governance system. 
Governing according to strategies instead of micro managing each project was 
clearly influenced by those days’ governing NPM ideas. The conveyance strategy 
gave highest net present value on the investments, but would reorient the road policy 
fundamentally from investments in the peripheral and rural areas’ local roads to the 
crowded areas’ trunk roads, and deviated clearly from the road policy established in 
1971 through Norwegian Road Plan. A second recommendation was 10 years 
instead of 4 years road plans, because of the road investments’ long time-horizon 
and need for predictability. A third recommendation was to reduce the counties’ and 
the Standing Committee on Transport and Communication’s influence on the road 
policy. The Holler Commission’s ideal was a Swedish style governance system, 
where the legislators established goals, provided necessary financing and left 
implementation to the Combined Road Administration’s professionals.1324 The 
Holler Commission explained the increasing turnpike financing as a result of too 
tight budget constraints and the “rigid county allocation” that lead to suboptimal 
allocation of the road investments.1325 The Holler Commission advised also against 
organizing new trunk roads as turnpikes, because construction and financing of 
trunk roads was a State responsibility according to the 1963 Road Act.1326 Many of 
the Holler Commission’s recommendations aimed directly at the Liberal Party’s 
System, and challenged several established ‘truths’ that had governed Norwegian 
road policy for decades. 
 Kjell Opseth did not support the Holler-Commission’s proposed transfer of 
responsibility for planning of trunk roads from the counties’ Public Roads 
Administrations to the Directorate of Public Roads, because the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications argued for the counties’ right to utter about 
construction of trunk roads, similarly as for other highways, but Opseth was well 
aware the existing system had to be reformed.1327 The Holler Commission’s 
recommendations led obviously to internal struggles between the Labor Party 
modernists, traditionalists and members of the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition. But the Standing Committee on Transports and 
Communications’ majority consisting of the Labor and Conservative Parties agreed 
to establish formal distinctions between trunk roads and other highways, where the 
Directorate of Public Roads allocated the trunk road investments within the given 
budget constraints according to the professionals’ standards. The Standing 
                                                 
1323 NOU 1993:23 Nytt overordnet styringssystem for Statens vegvesen:8-9; Opseth (2005 [Interview]). 
1324 NOU 1993:23 Nytt overordnet styringssystem for Statens vegvesen:3, 11-12, 55-56, 82-83, 85-89, 92; 
Søfteland (2004 [Interview]). 
1325 NOU 1993:23 Nytt overordnet styringssystem for Statens vegvesen:132. 
1326 NOU 1993:23 Nytt overordnet styringssystem for Statens vegvesen:133. 
1327 St. meld. nr. 41 (1993-94) Nytt overordnet styringssystem for Statens vegvesen:20; Opseth (2005 
[Interview]). 
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Committee on Transport and Communications’ minority, the Socialist Left, 
Christian Peoples’ and Agrarian Parties would rather strengthen the counties’ 
control of the Combined Road Administration.1328 The two major parties’ 
modernists used obviously this opportunity to reduce the peripheral and rural areas’ 
distributional coalition’s influence, and to further weaken the Liberal Party’s 
System. Stortinget agreed finally June 15th 1994 to transfer management of the trunk 
road investments to the Directorate of Public Roads, which for the first time since 
1965 was permitted to operate according to the professionals’ norms and standards. 
Management of the other highways was transferred to the counties’ Public Roads 
Administrations and the county councils. This new governance system had many 
similarities with the 1928 regime that instituted the Directorate of Public Roads’ 
centralized management of the trunk roads. 
 Stortinget approved also the Holler-commission’s proposed reorganizing of 
the Directorate of Public Roads and the counties’ Public Roads Administrations 
according to a purchaser-provider split, but the production units remained within the 
Combined Road Administration, even if the Conservative Party desired a 
separation.1329 The new governance system may have been one of the Brundtland 
executive’s adaptations to a possible Norwegian membership in EU, but was most 
likely also the Labor Party and Conservative Party modernists’ attempt of tying the 
legislators to the mast, because construction of roads with national collective good 
characteristics had been subject to almost unconstrained local egoism since 1971. 
The purchaser/provider split was in fashion according to those days’ NPM ideas. 
 Stortinget’s introduction of a new governance system for the Combined Road 
Administration from 1995 combined with Stortinget’s institution of the New 
Norwegian System June 5th 1985 facilitated the second institutional change, namely 
establishment of a road policy hybrid regime where two opposing logics coexisted 
or cohabitated. The Directorate of Public Roads managed trunk roads – national 
collective goods – centrally and according to professional norms standards, such as 
the investments’ profitability, effect on road safety, environmental conditions or 
industrial necessity. Stortinget’s resource allocation to trunk roads was governed by 
the New Norwegian System’s economic logic. Most new trunk roads were turnpike 
projects. The county councils and the counties’ Public Roads Administrations 
managed locally the other highways, which were local collective goods. Stortinget’s 
resource allocation to these roads was governed by the Liberal Party’s System’s 
political logic. Which logic that dominated this new hybrid regime depended on the 
political economy; i.e. which executive was in position, Stortinget’s power relations, 
and last but not least the Standing Committee on Transport and Communication’s 
balance of power between the central, middle and peripheral constituencies and the 
three political blocks.1330 This first part of the road policy regime change was largely 
facilitated by the 1989 revised election system, the New Norwegian System, the 
                                                 
1328 Innst. S. nr. 184 (1993-94) Innstilling fra samferdselskomiteen om nytt overordnet styringssystem for 
Statens vegvesen: Chapter 2. 
1329 Innst. S. nr. 184 (1993-94) Innstilling fra samferdselskomiteen om nytt overordnet styringssystem for 
Statens vegvesen: Chapter 3; Årsmelding 1995 Statens vegvesen Vegdirektoratet, Vegdirektoratet, Oslo 
1996:5, VDA. 
1330 See the Data Appendix’ Table 4.6-4.9 and 4.19-4.24 for an overview of the changing geographical 
and political balance of power 1981-2005. 
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turnpike industrial complex and the Labor Party’s slaughtering of sacred political 
cows in 1981 and since 1987. 
 The 1980s’ deregulations of the transport and communication sector that led to 
increased road transport of passengers and goods increased also the executive and 
legislators’ awareness of the road system’s significance for the society. The 
challenge in March 1996, according to the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, was to safeguard “the population and the trade and industry’s 
conveyance given concerns for the environment and a high degree of road 
safety”.1331 This can be read as a critique of the road policy since 1965 – or a 
concession – the road policy since 1965 had partly been a failure. The Ministry of 
Transport and Communications introduced also new standards for trunk roads.1332 
The trunk roads’ relative share of the tax financed road investments recommended 
by the Ministry of Transport and Communications increased from 7,2 percent 1982-
85 to 45,8 percent 1994-97.1333 The effect of Norwegian Road Plan’s postponement 
of investments in trunk roads at least until 1978-89 was hence clearly evident. The 
Jagland executive concluded similarly in Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plan 
1998-2007 submitted April 18th 1997 the central areas’ road investments had been 
downgraded, and this policy harmed the peripheral and rural areas.1334 Even this 
statement could be read as a critique of the road policy instituted in 1971 through 
Norwegian Road Plan, and a second concession. These signals led to construction of 
new motorways, an activity that ceased in 1973. Norwegian Road and Road Traffic 
Plan 1998-2007 divided also the trunk road system into 18 trunk road routes 
between the regions and to the export markets, and 47 percent of the total road 
investments 1998-2001 were proposed allocated to trunk roads.1335 The second half 
of the 1990s can thus be understood as a new road policy reformation and 
reintroduction of ideas about transport economy and traffic engineering championed 
by the Labor Party modernists 1960-65. Because the executive and legislators 
sobered up from the late 1960s and 70s’ regional policy spree during the second half 
of the 1990s and recognized the road system’s shortcomings and instituted a less 
idealistic and far more realistic road policy, 30-40 years delayed compared to for 
instance Denmark and Sweden. 
 Not only the executive reconsidered the road policy at the turn of the 20th and 
21st century. Even some county politicians and Public Roads Administration 
employees recognized that trunk roads were necessary for development of 
competitive and viable trade and industry in the peripheral and rural areas. Some 
county politicians discovered even it could be in their own best interest to increase 
the neighboring counties’ trunk road investments, to reduce their own county’s trade 
and industry’s transportation costs.1336 Most legislators, county politicians and Chief 
County Road Officers had until then struggled for maximum appropriations to their 
                                                 
1331 St. meld. nr. 32 (1995-96) Om grunnlaget for samferdselspolitikken:Introduction. 
1332 St. prp. nr. 44 (1995-96) Stamvegnettets omfang mm. 
1333 St. meld. nr. 80 (1980-81) Om Norsk Vegplan 1982-85:76; St. meld. nr. 34 (1992-93) Norsk veg- og 
vegtrafikkplan 1994-97:161 Tabell 7.1. 
1334 St. meld. nr. 37 (1996-97) Norsk veg- og vegtrafikkplan 1998 – 2007:57. 
1335 St. meld. nr. 37 (1996-97) Norsk veg- og vegtrafikkplan 1998-2007:98 Tabell 7.1, 100-116, 117 
Tabell 7.4, 118-125. 
1336 Westlie (2002 [Interview]). 
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own constituency or county, almost no matter the consequences for their own trade 
and industry’ transportation costs. 
 The third institutional change started in 1997 when Stortinget required 
development of a common plan for roads, railroads, coastal navigation and air traffic 
infrastructures. The Combined Road Administration became secretariat. National 
Transport Plan (Nasjonal transportplan) replaced Norwegian Road and Road Traffic 
Plan.1337 National Transport Plan 2002-2011 submitted September 29th 2000 by the 
Stoltenberg executive’s minister of transport and communications Terje Moe 
Gustavsen furthered the road policy shift introduced in Norwegian Road and Road 
Traffic Plan 1998-2007, and emphasized road construction in the most crowded 
areas.1338 Stortinget approved National Transport Plan 2002-2011 February 15th 
2001.1339 Similar ideas were furthered in National Transport Plan 2006-2015 
submitted by the second Bondevik executive’s minister of transport and 
communications Torild Skogsholm March 12th 2004.1340  
                                                 
1337 Årsmelding 1998 for Statens vegvesen, Vegdirektoratet, Oslo 1999:23, VDA; Knut Opeide, ”Nå skal 
vi lage Nasjonal transportplan: - Dette blir travelt”. Vegen og Vi, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1998:4-5. 
1338 St. meld. nr. 46 (1999-2000) Nasjonal Transportplan 2002-2011. 
1339 Stortingstidende (1999-2000):1989. 
1340 St. meld. nr. 24 (2003-2004) Nasjonal transportplan 2006-2015:9-14, 36-41. 
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Figure 26: Norwegian trunk roads approximately 2005 with average traffic per day. 
 
Source: Directorate of Public Roads, National Road Data Base. 
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 National Transport Plan 2002-2011 can be understood as a turning point 
similarly as the first Norwegian Road Plan approved in 1971, because National 
Transport Plan 2002-2011 emphasized coordination between the different means of 
transport and communications’ infrastructure plans, and instituted transport 
economy as one of its guiding principles and furthered the thinking established 
through Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plan 1990-93 about development of 
integrated and functional transport systems, but this time on a national level not only 
in the major population clusters. Coordinated, efficient and sustainable transport 
systems became an explicit stated goal. The trunk roads were now merged into 8 
national “transport corridors”, instead of Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plan 
1998-2007’s 18 trunk road routes. One of National Transport Plan 2002-2011’s 
aims was reducing the Norwegian trade and industry’s time and distance handicaps, 
compared to its European competitors, and reduced further the legislators’ 
opportunities to micro manage the road policy. 45 percent of the total road 
investments 2002-05 were proposed allocated to trunk roads.1341 The legislators 
maintained the responsibility for the high level governance and financing of the 
infrastructures, but left implementation and detailed planning to the respective 
infrastructure administrations’ professionals. National Transport Plan 2002-2011 
can thus be understood as the legislators’ second attempt of tying themselves to the 
mast with regard to road policy and road construction, and entrenched many 
principles introduced by the Holler Commission in 1993 and approved by Stortinget 
in 1994. National Transport Plan 2002-2011 was clearly also an attempt of making 
the Norwegian road policy governance system more similar the Swedish system. 
 The fourth institutional chance started in January 1998 when Odd Einar 
Dørum, the first Bondevik executive’s Liberal Party minister of transport and 
communications initiated reclassification and restructuring of the public road 
system. Dørum’s intention was most likely a small State managed trunk road 
system, such as in Denmark. Odd Einar Dørum tried to hand over the responsibility 
for the secondary highways and county roads to the counties.1342 A de facto two-tier 
road system had almost been established from 1995 because of Kjell Opseth’s 
governance system reform. But the Directorate of Public Roads opposed Dørum’s 
initiative. Two of the arguments were some counties’ small size and ailing 
economy.1343 Road Director Olav Søfteland and the Directorate of Public Roads 
defended status quo, most likely to maintain the Combined Road Administration and 
to safeguard the secondary road system’s standard because that was of utmost 
importance for the trade and industries dependent of road transports. 
 But Odd Einar Dørum did not deflect, and questioned in September 1998 the 
Combined Road Administration’s purchaser/provider split introduced through the 
                                                 
1341 St. meld. nr. 46 (1999-2000) Nasjonal transportplan 2002-2011:69-86, 230 Tabell 14.7, 249 Tabell 
14.8. 
1342 Letter from the Ministry of Transport and Communications to the Directorate of Public Roads, 
“Riksveger”, Anders Martin Fon 98/60, January 16th 1998, enclosed a note to the minister 
”Omklassifisering av riksvegnettet”, Samferdselsdepartementet Avdeling for miljø, kollektivtransport og 
veg, Vegseksjonen, Anders Martin Fon, January 9th 1998. VDA. 
1343 Letter to the Ministry of Transport and Communciations from the Directorate of Public Roads, 
“Riksveger”, Kjell Knudsen/Hilde Nygaard 98/00526-2 711, February 20th 1998. VDA. 
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1995 reform.1344 Dørum was also well aware the road investments were insufficient 
given the road users’ demand for roads, and invited those who desired new roads to 
a “Dutch treat”. New roads meant thereafter usually turnpikes. Road Director Olav 
Søfteland understood that Dørum meant business, and claimed in September 1998 
the 1995 purchaser/provider split had made the Combined Road Administration too 
bureaucratic and increased the transaction costs. Sweden had only 7 regional road 
administrations; Norway had 19 Public Roads Administrations. Several studies 
questioned the 1995 reform and the purchaser/provider split after Dørum and 
Søfteland’s initiatives.1345 Odd Einar Dørum’s January and September 1998 
initiatives indicated clearly the 1995 reform had not established a new and stable 
equilibrium, but rater destabilized the 1893 equilibrium and the Combined Road 
Administration.  
 Road Director Olav Søfteland signaled in January 2001 his support for 
regionalization of the Combined Road Administration. He was then aware Jens 
Stoltenberg’s Labor Party executive favored transfer of the Public Roads 
Administrations to the counties, such as initiated by Odd Einar Dørum. The 
Stoltenberg executive planned also downsizing the remaining parts of the Combined 
Road Administration. Søfteland pulled the strings to avoid ending up with trunk 
roads only, such as the Danish Directorate of Public Roads.1346 The Stoltenberg 
executive accepted the Ministry of Transport and Communication’s deputy 
undersecretary Knut Rønnning’s proposal, reorganizing the Combined Road 
Administration from 19 counties to 5-8 regions transcending the counties and 
constituencies with 30 local offices, instead of the Ministry of Local Government 
and Regional Development’s proposed transfer of the Public Roads Administrations 
to the counties.1347 The Stoltenberg executive would also maintain the production 
units as a division within the Combined Road Administration, similarly as in the 
Swedish Road Administration, and ignored thereby Statskonsult’s recommendation; 
to spin out the production units to a State owned Joint Stock Company. Road 
Director Olav Søfteland preferred a division rather than spinning out the production 
units.1348  
 But Jens Stoltenberg lost the 2001 election. Kjell Magne Bondevik’s second 
executive, a coalition between the Christian Peoples’, Liberal and Conservative 
Parties, had other plans than Jens Stoltenberg’s former Labor Party executive. The 
19 Public Roads Administrations were January 1st 2003 merged in 5 regions 
transcending the county and constituency borders, similarly as approved by the 
Stoltenberg executive, but the Liberal Party’s minister of transport and 
                                                 
1344 Ann Karin Midtgaard, ”Om konkurransedyktighet, egenproduksjon og framtida”. Vegen og Vi, Vol. 
37, No. 5, 1998:10-11. 
1345 Lisa Sundstrøm, ”Vegvesenets framtid: Vegbygging basert på spleiselag med ikke-kvalifisert 
arbeidskraft og færre vegkontor?”. Vegen og Vi, Vol. 37, No. 5, 1998:12-13; Steinar Gullvåg, ”Dommen 
over omorganiseringen i 1995: Noen brikker mangler fortsatt”. Vegen og Vi, Vol. 38, No. 2, 1999:6-7; 
Steinar Gullvåg, ”TØIs dom over Det ny Vegvesenet: - Dette tar vi alvorlig!”. Vegen og Vi, Vol. 38, No. 
2, 1999:8-9. See also Siri Legernes, “Pulsen på organisasjonen”. Samtaler med 29 medarbeidere i 
etaten, Guide Consulting AS, October 1999, VDA 
1346 Søfteland (2004 [Intervju]). 
1347 Søfteland (2004 [Interview]).  
1348 “Blir produksjon statseid selskap?”, Vegen og Vi, Vol. 40, No. 2, 2001:4-5; “Hvis Stortinget ikke vil 
noe annet: Produksjon opp en divisjon”, Vegen og Vi, Vol. 39, No. 6, 2000:4-5; Søfteland (2004 
[Interview]). 
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communications Torild Skogsholm located the five regional offices in small towns 
rather than in the regions’ major cities, such as proposed by the Directorate of Public 
Roads. The Public Roads Administrations’ production units that had built and 
maintained roads in direct competition with private construction companies since the 
1995 reform were similarly January 1st 2003 spun out to a new joint stock company, 
MESTA, owned by the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Only the 
planners and managers remained in the Directorate of Public Roads. The new 
regionalized Public Roads Administrations retained also their motor vehicle 
inspectors.1349 The Directorate of Public Roads and the new regionalized road 
administrations bought from January 1st 2003 all construction and maintenance 
services in the market, similarly as the Danish Directorate of Public Roads.  
 It was hence the Liberal Party’s minister of transport and communications 
Torild Skogsholm that liquidated the Combined Road Administration established by 
the Liberal Party in 1893, and punctuated thereby a 110 years old equilibrium. This 
reform had at least two profound implications. Establishment of regions 
transcending the county and constituency borders disrupted the traditionally very 
close ties between the Chief County Road Officers, the county politicians and the 
legislators, because the new Chief Regional Road Officers interacted with several 
county councils. This move strengthened the regional Public Roads Administrations 
as well as the Directorate of Public Roads’ professional autonomy towards the 
county politicians and legislators, and established fundamentally new rules of the 
game. Spinning out the Directorate of Public Roads and Public Roads 
Administrations’ production units disrupted similarly the traditionally close ties 
between the Combined Road Administration and the trade unions. The new joint 
stock construction company MESTA had to compete on equal terms with private 
construction companies. The result was a fundamentally new road polity from 
January 2003 and significantly reduced road maintenance costs. 
 The fifth institutional change started with the 1998 budget compromise 
between Kjell Magne Bondevik’s middle party executive and the Conservative and 
Progress Parties, and paved the way for introduction of PPP-projects in Norway. The 
initiator was Oddvard Nilsen from Hordaland, the Conservative Party’s leader of the 
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications.1350 PPP or Public Private 
Partnership means outsourcing of planning, financing, construction, maintenance 
and operations of roads from the Directorate of Roads to private consortiums on 
long-term contracts. The title to the roads is handed over to the State at the 
contracts’ expiration, because the roads serve as collateral for the PPP-consortiums’ 
loans. The Christian Peoples’ Party’s minister of transport and communications 
Jostein Fjærvold ordered studies about PPP-projects which then were popular among 
                                                 
1349 Statens vegvesens fem regioner [Online March 21st 2004] – URL: 
http://www.vegvesen.no/1042188916620/vegvesen-Page-SVVsubSideInnholdMal_1043322812622.html; 
Inger Lise Sagmo, “Aksjeselskap så raskt som mulig”, Vegen og Vi, Vol. 40, No. 6, 2001:4-5; St.prp. nr. 
1 (2001-2002) for budsjetterminen 2002. Utgiftskapitler: 1300-1380 og 2450. Inntektskapitler: 4300-
4380, 5450, 5612, 5618-5619, 5623 og 5671: Chapter 4.2.2; St.prp. nr. 1 Tillegg nr. 4 (2001-2002) for 
budsjetterminen 2002 Om endring av St.prp. nr. 1 om statsbudsjettet medregnet folketrygden 
2002:Chapter 3.4.11. 
1350 B.innst. S. nr. 13 (1998-99) Innstilling fra samferdselskomiteen om bevilgninger på statsbudsjettet for 
1999 vedkommende rammeområde 18, Fiskeridepartementet og Samferdselsdepartementet: Chapter 2.7. 
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the EU countries, because they could reduce the budget deficits, one of the obstacles 
against introduction of EU’s common currency.  
 But budget deficits were definitely not a concern in Norway in 1999, because 
the Norwegian State operated with significant surpluses. Hardly any could borrow 
money cheaper on the international capital markets than the Norwegian State, but 
the Norwegian State could also finance most road projects directly through the 
budget surpluses because of the oil and gas revenues. The Norwegian arguments for 
PPP-projects were more efficient accomplishment of the road projects and reduced 
financial risk for the State, even if few were better equipped to handle financial risks 
than the Norwegian State at the turn of the 20th and 21st century.1351 PPP-projects 
passed a new veto point in 2000 when Terje Moe Gustavsen, the Stoltenberg 
executive’s minister of transport and communications traded trials with PPP-projects 
against a temporary halt in the discussions about privatizing the Public Roads 
Administrations’ production units.1352 Stortinget’s approval of trials with PPP-
projects in 2000 was de facto approval of binding long-term road budgets, because 
the Directorate of Public Roads’ PPP-contracts got 25 years period of currency.1353 
Introduction of PPP-projects made financial engineering almost equally important as 
more traditional engineering skills in the Directorate of Public Roads. 
 The Directorate of Public Roads signed the first PPP-contract in April 2003 
with Orkdalsvegen AS, a consortium owned 50/50 by Laing Roads Ltd, a British 
road investment corporation, and Skanska BOT AB (Build Operate Transfer), for 
construction and operation of E39 in Trøndelag, a section of the so-called coastal 
trunk road.1354 PPP-projects had the spring 2004 almost halved the planning and 
construction period compared to traditional road projects managed by Combined 
Road Administration. The Directorate of Public Road’s annual payments to E39 
Orkdalsvegen AS consist of State road appropriations and revenues from the 
intermunicipal turnpike company Bomvegselskapet E39 Øysand-Thamshavn AS, 
which is owned and operated independently of the PPP-consortium E39 
Orkdalsvegen AS.1355  
 How to explain introduction of PPP-projects in the nouveau riche Norway? 
The Norwegian State did not struggle with budget deficits such as many EU member 
countries, rather the opposite. PPP-projects are also rather costly compared to 
traditionally tax financed road projects because PPP-projects mean purchase of 
roads through installment plans with significant capital costs. But the PPP-projects’ 
time spent on planning and construction seems to be significantly reduced compared 
to road projects managed by the Public Roads Administrations, particularly if the 
Public Roads Administration’s cash flow is constrained by Stortinget’s annual 
                                                 
1351 Knut Opeide, ”Nå utredes privatfinansierte veger: A/S E6 & Co?”. Vegen og Vi, Vol. 38, No. 2, 
1999:4-5. 
1352 Steinar Gullvåg, ”OPS på prøve”. Vegen og Vi, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2000:4-5; Knut Opeide, ”Nå starter 
OPS-eventyret”, Vegen og Vi, Vol. 40, No. 5, 2001:8-9; Billehaug (2004 [Interview]). 
1353 Bjørvig (2004 [Interview]); Billehaug (2004 [Interview]). 
1354 OPS-prosjekt E39 Klett-Bårdshaug/PPP-project E39 Klett-Bårdshaug [Online May 21st 2004] – URL: 
http://www.vegvesen.no/vegvesen-SVVartikkel-
SVVartNoRelatedRight_1049191705923.html;Orkdalsvegen AS [Online May 21st 2004] – URL: 
http://www.orkdalsvegen.no/ . 
1355 Billehaug (2004 [Interview]); Finansiering og bompenger [Online May 21st 2004] - 
http://www.orkdalsvegen.no/; St. meld. nr. 24 (2003-2004) Nasjonal transportplan 2006-2015:61-62. 
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appropriations which in turn delays the construction and the society’s utilization of 
the roads’ benefits. 
 The most likely explanation of introduction of PPP-projects in Norway is 
Stortinget that has struggled with development of a functional road system since 
1851. PPP-projects can be understood as a third attempt from the legislators to tie 
themselves to the mast to overcome the institutionalized local egoism, protect 
themselves against special interest groups and safeguard development of a 
functional trunk road system. PPP-projects are costly, but many legislators reasoned 
most likely the costs for a dysfunctional trunk road system was far higher. PPP-
projects provided also low-risk business opportunities for many actors within the 
turnpike industrial complex. Some of these had close ties to some political parties. 
Introduction of PPP projects in Norway was also most likely a result of neo-liberal 
ideology. The Swedish solution, forced construction of trunk roads and motorways 
through State loans to Swedish Road Administration amortized through the annual 
tax financed road appropriations was far more cost efficient for the taxpayers and 
road users than partly turnpike financed PPP-projects, such as introduced in 
Norway. 
 The Norwegian public road system’s length increased from 81.818 kilometers 
in 1981 to 91.919 kilometers in 2003, but the trunk roads and highways’ length 
increased only from 25.282 kilometers in 1981 to 27.132 kilometers in 2003. 21.849 
kilometers trunk roads and highways were paved in 1981; 26.554 kilometers were 
paved in 2000.1356 Most trunk road and highway investments since 1981 were spent 
on standard improvements and updates of existing roads to improve the conveyance, 
road safety and environmental conditions. The road system’s width and technical 
standard increased far more than its length compared to 1960-80, when the road 
system’s length increased far more than its width. 
 The Norwegian road policy and road polity changed fundamentally between 
1985 and 2005. The most important institutional changes were establishment of the 
New Norwegian System from 1985 that also facilitated establishment of the turnpike 
industrial complex, because the Norwegian State was not able or willing to provide 
those roads demanded, and the market actors were more than willing to fill the void 
created by the State’s withdrawal. Substitution of Norwegian Road Plan with 
Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plan in 1989 expanded the Public Roads 
Administration’s horizon from roads to the road transport system. Introduction of 
the Combined Road Administration’s new governance system in 1995 terminated 
Stortinget’s micro management of the road construction since 1851. Introduction of 
National Transport Plan in 2000 improved the coordination between the different 
transport infrastructures and gave transport economy, road safety and environmental 
questions a more prominent position. Liquidation of the Combined Road 
Administration January 1st 2003 through regionalization of the Public Roads 
Administrations and spinning out the production units to a State owned joint stock 
company together with approval of the first PPP-contract the spring 2003 completed 
the transformation from one road policy equilibrium to another. The sum of these 
reforms and institutional development was a window of opportunity to catch-up 
                                                 
1356 Bil- og veistatistikk 2002, Opplysningsrådet for Veitrafikken, Oslo 2002:64, 67, OVA; Årsmelding for 
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Norway’s lack of modern trunk roads and motorways between the regions and to the 
most important export markets. 
 However, the Ministry of Financed had other plans, and imposed 8 percent 
discount rate the spring 2003, based on 3,5 percent risk free interest rate and 4,5 
percent risk premium for road investments. Norges Bank’s key rate was reduced 
from 6,50 percent December 12th 2002 to 4,00 percent June 26th 2003, and went 
further down. The Ministry of Finance’s increased discount rate for road 
investments was strongly criticized by leading transport economists such as 
Professor Arild Hervik.1357 The Ministry of Finance’s move in 2003 had many 
similarities with imposition of 10 percent discount rate in December 1967 prior to 
the Road Plan Committee’s final spurt. The increased discount rate indicated clearly 
the Norwegian Ministry of Finance had a very short time horizon concerning 
infrastructure investments compared to most other countries that usually planned 
infrastructure investments with 30-50 years time horizon. 
 The increased discount rate made Norwegian road investments highly 
unprofitable, compared to similar projects in Germany and Sweden that used 3 
percent discount rate, Netherlands that used 4 percent, and Finland and France that 
used 5 percent. The Danish executive discussed the spring 2003 reducing the 
discount rate for road investments from 6 to 4 percent. The British executive 
discussed similarly reducing the discount rate from 6 to 3 percent. But the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance reasoned fundamentally different.1358 However, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance ignored the critique, because National Transport 
Plan 2006-2015 submitted March 12th 2004 by minister of transport and 
communications Torild Skogsholm maintained 8 percent discount rate for road 
investments – and argued for the risk premium for long-term infrastructure 
investments – even if Norges Bank the same day reduced its key rate from 2,0 to 
1,75 percent.1359 The Ministry of Finance was still Norway’s de facto Ministry of 
Transport and Communications even after the turn of the 20th and 21st century, 
despite a fundamentally changed road polity. 
 The current situation is somewhat paradoxical. Norway was in 2002 OECD’s 
third wealthiest country measured as GDP per capita in current prices PPP USD. 
Only Luxembourg and USA were wealthier. Norway was barely behind USA.1360 
But the Norwegian trunk road and motorway system in 2005 lagged 30 to 60 years 
after those in many western industrialized countries. Denmark and Sweden that 
struggled with serious State economic problems in the 1980s and early 90s borrowed 
from the international capital markets after the neo-liberal shift to complete their 
trunk road and motorway infrastructures. The Danish and Swedish motorway 
systems are currently more or less completed, almost without turnpike financing. 
The Danish and Swedish executives and legislators reasoned obviously that 
investments in modern infrastructures were sensible pension savings, because 
functional trunk roads and motorways safeguarded their trade and industry’s future 
                                                 
1357 Norges Bank’s key rate [Online December 30th 2005] – URL: http://www.norges-
bank.no/english/monetary_policy/key_rate/; Wormnes (2003a; 2003b). 
1358 Odeck (2003). 
1359 St. meld. nr. 24 (2003-2004) Nasjonal transportplan 2006-2015:24-25; Norges Bank’s key rate 
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competitiveness and thereby future tax revenues and standard of living. The 
Norwegian State has since 1990 invested most of its oil fortune abroad, on the 
international capital markets through the Petroleum Fund. Many of the Petroleum 
Fund’s investments are in State bonds that provide far less return on the investment 
than construction of modern trunk roads and motorways in mainland Norway. The 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance question seemingly mainland Norway’s future 
prospects, through investing most of the community’s fortune in other countries’ 
trade, industry and infrastructures, as savings for the Norwegians’ future pensions. 
This policy maintains Norway’s dependence of raw material, semi finished goods 
and energy exports. 
Conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Norwegian case from 1985 until about 2005? This study’s main 
hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national collective goods with road 
policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good 
was strengthened significantly by the Norwegian case from 1985, because the major 
population clusters’ congestion, accident and environmental problems came on the 
agenda, due to the early 1980s’ road policy debacle. Construction of mainland 
connections provided similarly ferry free trunk road connections in many coastal 
areas. Construction of modern trunk roads and even motorways between the regions 
was firmly established on the agenda from the second half of the 1990s, when the 
executive questioned and fundamentally reoriented the trunk road policy since 1965. 
The 1990s’ Norwegian Road and Road Traffic Plans and from 2001 National 
Transport Plan replaced partly the 1970s and early 80s’ universalism or political 
pork barrel with emphasis on national collective goods. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly weakened by the Norwegian case 
from the second half of the 1980s, even if establishment of the New Norwegian 
System took place through a major pork barrel deal linking projects in Oslo and 
Bergen with projects in Møre and Romsdal. The numerous mainland connections 
and sub sea road tunnels were clearly contra entries to the 1980s and 90s’ urban 
packages. A statistical test of the road appropriations’ allocation 1990-93 did not 
find significant support for the hypothetical distributional coalitions, but a statistical 
test of the tax financed State road appropriations’ allocation 1960-2000 found 
significant support for distributional coalitions, hereunder the peripheral and rural 
areas’ distributional coalition’s governing of the road investments’ allocation. The 
Combined Road Administration’s new governance system established in 1995 
reduced the constituencies’ resource struggles because Stortinget abandoned its 
micro management of the road policy. This reform reduced thus the Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communication’s direct influence on road policy 
details, but increased on the other hand the committee’s opportunities to govern the 
road policy’s general direction. 
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was somewhat weakened by the Norwegian case between 1981 and 
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about 2005, because the political parties’ road policy preferences changed 
fundamentally 1981-2005. The rightwing parties achieved a far more prominent 
position from the early 1980s. The neo-liberal shift, rightwing parties and NPM-
inspired ideas such as common turnpike financing shifted the road policy in a more 
trade and industry friendly direction. The middle parties recognized similarly from 
the second half of the 1980s’ the needs for solving the major population clusters’ 
congestion, accident and environmental problems. The pivotal middle parties 
recognized also the need for construction of modern trunk roads between the regions 
from the 1990s. Stortinget’s conflict level concerning road policy and road 
construction was significantly reduced from the middle of the 1980s, compared to 
the 1950s, 60s and 70s, even if turnpikes and road pricing became an issue in the 
late 1990s because the voters questioned turnpikes. The conflict level between the 
road and motorist lobby and the railroad and anti-motorist lobby was gradually 
reduced, because the major political parties recognized the need for functional 
transport systems for passengers and goods to maintain Norwegian trade and 
industry’s competitiveness and to reduce the environmental problems caused by 
transport of passengers and goods. The 1990s can thus be understood as a 
renaissance for many ideas developed during the Labor Party modernists’ road 
policy reformation from approximately 1960 to 1965 that were discarded during the 
Borten executive’s road policy counterreformation. 
 This study’s final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was also strengthened by the Norwegian case from 
1981 until about 2005. First, the corporative Labor Party State was replaced by the 
Neo-Liberal State from approximately 1981. The Neo-Liberal State withdrew from 
many tasks that earlier had been considered as State responsibilities. This regime 
change paved the way for numerous NPM public sector reforms. The result was 
often more market and/or a fundamentally different public sector. Second, the New 
Norwegian System established June 5th 1985 by the Agrarian Party’s minister of 
transport and communications Johan J. Jakobsen weakened the Liberal Party’s 
System for resource allocation, but maintained also the Liberal Party’s System 
through introduction of turnpikes as an extra tax in the most populated areas. The 
New Norwegian System paved the way for the turnpike industrial complex, because 
the Neo-Liberal State was not always able or willing to provide the desired trunk 
roads and highways, but shifted instead the responsibility to counties, municipals 
and even private actors, even if trunk roads and highways were explicit State 
responsibilities according to the 1963 Road Act. Local public and private sector 
actors were able and willing to fill the vacuum created by the State’s withdrawal, 
and utilized this window of opportunity for local initiative and private profits. Third, 
Stortinget’s introduction of a new governance system for the Combined Road 
Administration in 1995 initiated by the Labor Party’s minister of transport and 
communications Kjell Opseth abolished Stortinget’s micro management of the road 
policy instituted by the 1851 Road Act, and instituted a system where the 
Directorate of Public Roads’ professionals managed trunk roads – national collective 
goods – centrally, according to the professionals’ norms and standards, financed 
according to the New Norwegian System’s economic logic. The new governance 
system instituted also the county councils and the Public Roads Administrations’ 
local management of other highways – local collective goods – usually financed 
according to the Liberal Party’s System’s political logic. The 1995 reform tied partly 
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the legislators to the mast, because they were forced to concentrate on the major 
issues and providing necessary financing similarly as in Sweden. The 1995 reform 
had also many similarities with the road policy regime instituted from 1928 when 
the Directorate of Public Roads centrally managed the trunk roads. Fourth, 
introduction of National Transport Plan in 2000, a common plan for all transport 
and communication infrastructures, increased Stortinget’s emphasis on the major 
issues instead of details and pork barrel deals. Fifth, the Liberal Party’s minister of 
transport and communication’s Torild Skogsholm’s liquidation of the Combined 
Road Administration January 1st 2003 punctuated the road policy equilibrium since 
1893 through spinning out the construction units to a State owned joint stock 
company, MESTA, and merging the 19 counties’ Public Roads Administrations to 5 
regions transcending the county borders. Sixth, the Directorate of Public Roads’ 
approval of the first PPP-contract in 2003 established de facto 25 years binding road 
budgets. PPP-contracts gave increasing returns to the turnpike industrial complex 
and tied the legislators further to the mast. The net result of the 1985-2003 reforms 
was a new road polity, a new road policy equilibrium and fundamentally new rules 
of the game. Finally, something hardly changes. The Ministry of Finance imposed 
the spring 2003 8 percent discount rates for road investments, and slammed the 
window of opportunity created by the new road polity and road policy equilibrium. 
The Ministry of Finance maintained thereby its position as Norway’s de facto 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. The Ministry of Finance’s difficulties 
with distinguishing between long-term investments, consumption and the short-term 
budget balance were almost a textbook example of path dependence established by 
the so-called Oslo School of Economics after World War Two. 
Summary and conclusions 
What about this chapter’s findings about the study’s four working hypotheses 
concerning the Norwegian case? Table 12 provides an overview of the empirical 
findings from the Norwegian case concerning the study’s four working hypotheses. 
Table 12: Empirical findings from the Norwegian case concerning the four working 
hypotheses. 
Period/Hypothesis Road policy and road 
construction 
governed by 
politicians pursuing 
the common good 
Road policy and road 
construction governed 
by the constituencies’ 
resource struggles 
Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by the 
political parties’ 
rivalry 
Road policy and 
road construction 
governed by path 
dependence 
Prior to 1945 -/+ + + + 
1945-1959 -/+ + +/- + 
1960-1980 +/- + + + 
1981-2005 + +/- - + 
 
 First, this study’s main hypothesis or benchmark, roads perceived as national 
collective goods with road policy and road construction governed by politicians 
pursuing the common good was more weakened than strengthened by the 
Norwegian case. National concerns and common good concerning road policy were 
clearly secondary from 1893 until the 1928 reform that made trunk roads the 
Directorate of Public Roads’ task and gave national concerns and common good 
more prominent positions. This pattern was upheld until after World War Two when 
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Stortinget’s majority and the counties at the turn of the 1940s and 50s did their best 
to weaken the 1928 equilibrium through allocation of most road appropriations to 
local roads in peripheral and rural areas. But the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications and the Directorate of Public Roads managed to consolidate the 
road investments to trunk roads during the second half of the 1950s, despite 
minuscule road appropriations. The Labor Party technocrats’ road policy 
reformation between 1960 and 1965 emphasized particularly construction of trunk 
roads and even motorways after abolition of the car rationing in October 1960. But 
the Borten executive’s 1965-71 road policy counterreformation reestablished the 
early 1950s’ road policy. Stortinget approved Norwegian Road Plan in 1971, which 
started as a blueprint of Swedish Road Plan but materialized as a program for 
construction of substandard secondary highways to desolate areas. Construction of 
roads in central and urban areas were omitted, and construction of modern trunk 
roads between the regions was postponed at least until between 1978 and 1989. The 
major cities’ traffic infarct at the turn of the 1970s and 80s was thus result of a 
deliberate policy, because local egoism prevailed on the national interests and the 
common goods’ expense. The executive and legislators rediscovered roads with 
national collective good characteristics from approximately 1985 when Stortinget 
linked turnpike financed urban packages to mainland connections in coastal areas. 
The emphasis on construction of roads with national collective good characteristics 
increased further in the 1990s. The executive and legislators recognized then the 
dysfunctional trunk road system that harmed the trade and industry’s 
competitiveness, and gave poor road safety in the most crowded areas. 
 This study’s second working hypothesis about roads perceived as local 
collective or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles was clearly strengthened by the Norwegian case, 
because Stortinget approved individually each road project with partial State 
financing after the 1851 Road Act came into power. These rules of the game gave 
the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications and its predecessors a 
powerful position, because Stortinget’s geographical resource allocation took 
usually place in the committees, often through pork barrel deals. The Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communications 1949-2005 was completely 
dominated by legislators representing the middle and peripheral constituencies, and 
prioritized usually road projects with local collective good characteristics beneficial 
for their own constituencies. Most road investments were allocated to sparsely 
populated middle and peripheral rural constituencies, even if most cars were located 
in densely populated central and urban constituencies. Norwegian Road Plan 
approved in 1971 and Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages approved in 
1980 were both textbook examples of universalism or political pork barrel 
orchestrated by the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, because these 
plans gave something to almost every constituency but shifted most of the costs to a 
few constituencies almost excluded from the deals. These plans established many of 
the premises when the mass motoring had its second break-through in Norway. 
However, Norwegian Road Plan introduced more plan, rationality and predictability 
compared to the former system dominated by the legislators’ pork barrel deals, 
because road policy was low-politics where most legislators voted geographically 
rather than according to the party line. The constituencies’ influence on the road 
policy was further reduced in 1995 when the Combined Road Administration’s new 
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governance system came into power, because Stortinget governed through choice 
between investment strategies rather than individual road projects. The Directorate 
of Public Roads’ professionals governed from then allocation of investments in 
trunk roads with national collective good characteristics, while the county councils 
and counties’ Public Roads Administrations governed allocation of investments in 
other highways with local collective good characteristics. The constituencies’ power 
and influence concerning road policy was even further reduced in 2003 when the 
Combined Road Administration was liquidated and replaced by regional Public 
Roads Administrations transcending the constituency borders, and similarly through 
introduction of PPP-projects that established de facto 25 years binding road budgets. 
 This study’s third working hypothesis about roads perceived as local collective 
or private goods with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry was clearly strengthened by the Norwegian case. Establishment of 
parliamentary rule from 1884 together with formal political parties facilitated 
Stortinget’s allocation of road investments according to party tactical considerations. 
The interwar years were characterized by protracted struggles between road and 
railroad proponents. The Labor Party differed somewhat from the Danish and 
Swedish Social Democratic Parties, because the Labor Party was a national coalition 
of divergent interests, such as self employed rural small holders and fishermen, 
industrial workers in the urban areas and the peripheral and rural areas’ export 
enclaves, urban civil servants and public sector employees all across Norway. The 
parliamentary democracy was suspended 1940-45 because of the German 
occupation. The traditional view has been the majority Labor Party executives 1945-
61 decoupled road, trade and industry policies, among others through the car 
rationing imposed in 1947, while the non-socialist opposition parties advocated a 
more active road policy and abolition of the car rationing. But this study found that 
road and motoring policies were far more contested within the governing Labor 
Party than what has been taken for granted so far, even if the Labor Party modernists 
lost the 1950s’ power struggles with the anti-motorists, traditionalists and railroad 
lobby. The Labor Party executive’s liquidation of the car rationing in October 1960 
was the Labor Party modernists’ window of opportunity that paved the way for a 
road policy reformation between 1960 and 1965 based on transport economic 
considerations and traffic engineering. But the Borten executive dominated by the 
middle parties and peripheral and rural interests governing from 1965 until 1971 
discarded transport economic and traffic engineering considerations, and instituted a 
road policy counterreformation. This counterreformation propped up these parties’ 
regional policy. The Labor Party leftwing, anti-motorists, traditionalists, 
environmentalists and railroad lobby strengthened their position during the 1965-71 
opposition. Stortinget; i.e. the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, 
strengthened also its position within the Labor Party after Trygve Bratteli in 1965 
succeeded Einar Gerhardsen as party leader. The 1970s’ minority Labor Party 
executives furthered the Borten executive’s road policy counterreformation until 
1981 when the modernists regained their power through Gro Harlem Brundtland. 
The early 1980s’ Conservative Party executive shifted the road policy in a somewhat 
more trade and industry friendly direction. Even the middle parties that became part 
of the Willoch executive in 1983 recognized the dysfunctional road system. The 
1986-1989 and 1990-97 minority Labor Party executives’ road policy had many 
similarities with the Labor Party modernists’ 1960-65 road policy reformation. The 
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1997-2000 and 2001-05 minority non-socialist executives and the 2000-01 minority 
Labor Party executive largely furthered this policy where transport economy and 
traffic engineering once again achieved far more prominent positions, 30-60 years 
delayed compared to Denmark and Sweden. 
 This study’s final working hypothesis about road policy and road construction 
governed by path dependence was clearly strengthened by the Norwegian case. 
First, the 1814 Constitution gave the rural constituencies 2/3 of Stortinget’s seats. 
The 1859 Farmer’s Paragraph froze Stortinget’s geographical seat allocation, and 
facilitated establishment of the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition in 
Stortinget prior to establishment of formal political parties. The peripheral and rural 
areas’ distributional coalition was upheld by the 1905, 1921, 1953, 1972 election 
systems, and partly even by the 1985 and 1989 election systems, even if the 
Farmer’s Paragraph was abolished formally prior to the 1953 election. Norway has 
never had a national election system based on one person – one vote. The election 
system’s malapportionment of middle and peripheral constituencies, and the 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition were both examples of path 
dependence, because of increasing returns to the sparsely populated middle and 
peripheral constituencies’ inhabitants. Second, the Norwegian System governed 
Stortinget’s allocation of investments to among others roads from the second half of 
the 1840s. The Norwegian System safeguarded allocation to efficient projects, 
because requirements for the constituencies’ local co-financing weeded out 
inefficient projects, but prevented also construction of necessary but costly public 
goods in those constituencies opposing local taxes. Introduction of parliamentary 
rule from 1884, establishment of formal political parties and reintroduction of State 
taxes from 1892 that gave Stortinget increased opportunities for redistribution, and 
punctuated the former Civil Servant State and the Norwegian System. The Liberal 
Party State replaced the Civil Servant State. Stortinget’s allocation of State road 
investments was from the 1890s governed by what is here denoted the Liberal 
Party’s System that facilitated party tactical considerations and redistribution rather 
than economic effectiveness. The Liberal Party’s System instituted the central and 
urban constituencies’ cross-subsidization of peripheral and rural constituencies. The 
German occupation 1940-45 punctuated the Liberal Party State. Reestablishment of 
the prewar election system in 1945, when the Labor Party or New Civil Servant 
State replaced the Quisling regime, became a renaissance for the Liberal Party’s 
System and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition despite the Labor 
Party’s majority 1945-61. The Liberal Party’s System gave increasing returns to the 
middle and peripheral constituencies’ inhabitants, and was a textbook example of 
path dependence. Third, the Liberal Party State and The Liberal Party’s System 
facilitated establishment of the Combined Road Administration through the 1893 
Road Act Amendment and the 1912 Road Act. The Combined Road Administration 
instituted local management and partly State financing of most roads. The 1912 
Road Act blocked State road appropriations to urban constituencies. Stortinget’s 
1929 allocation key froze the rural constituencies’ share of the annual State road 
appropriations until 1964 when the 1963 Road Act came into power. The 1963 road 
Act upheld largely status quo, but made the urban areas partly eligible for State road 
appropriations but increased also the State financed road system’s length 50 percent. 
Even the Combined Road Administration was an example of path dependence, 
because of increasing returns to the middle and peripheral constituencies. Fourth, the 
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Labor Party modernists’ road policy reformation between 1960 and 1965 challenged 
the Liberal Party’s System and the Combined Road Administration, but was 
rebuffed by the Borten executive’s road policy counterreformation between 1965 
and 1971 that made road policy an instrument for maintaining the dispersed 
settlement. The road policy counterreformation was partly instituted through 
Norwegian Road Plan approved in 1971 and Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and 
Villages approved in 1980. Fifth, what is here denoted the New Norwegian System 
was established June 5th 1985, when Stortinget linked turnpike financed trunk road 
projects in Oslo and Bergen with turnpike financed mainland connections in Møre 
and Romsdal. The New Norwegian System auctioned de facto road investments to 
those constituencies most eager to accept turnpikes, almost as the 19th century 
Norwegian System, but made it possible to circumvent Stortinget’s geographical 
seat allocation that prevented reallocation of road investments to those 
constituencies with the most serious congestion, accident and environmental 
problems. The neo-liberal shift, NPM ideas and the non-socialist Willoch 
executive’s abolition of the credit rationing facilitated the New Norwegian System 
that gave increasing returns to those constituencies with congestion, accident and 
environmental problems, despite the turnpikes, because the alternative was often far 
worse. Sixth, the Norwegian State withdrew from many tasks after the neo-liberal 
shift, among others road construction, because the Ministry of Finance was far more 
concerned with the short-term budget balance than for instance the long-term 
consequences of a dysfunctional road system. The New Norwegian System paved 
the way for what is here denoted the turnpike industrial complex, consisting of local 
public and private actors able and willing to provide the demanded roads not 
supplied by the State, given local acceptance of turnpikes. The New Norwegian 
System created significant business opportunities and increasing returns for the 
turnpike industrial complex. Seventh, the 1989 election system reform, together with 
the New Norwegian System, weakened the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional 
coalition, and paved the way for the Combined Road Administration’s new 
governance system in 1995 that distinguished between roads with national collective 
good characteristics, financed through the New Norwegian System based on an 
economic logic, and roads with local collective good characteristics, financed 
through the Liberal Party’s System based on a political logic. The 1995 reform 
terminated also Stortinget’s micro management of the road investments’ allocation 
since the 1851 Road Act came into power, and destabilized the equilibrium since 
establishment of the Combined Road Administration in 1893. The non-socialist 
executive’s 2003 reform established 5 regional instead of 19 county Public Roads 
Administration and spun out the Directorate of Public Roads and the Public Roads 
Administrations’ construction units to a State owned joint stock company. Approval 
of the first PPP-contract in 2003 introduced similarly de facto 25 years binding road 
budgets. The 2003 reforms established a new and stable equilibrium with a 
fundamentally altered road polity and complete new rules of the game, a window of 
opportunity to catch-up Norway’s lag concerning modern trunk roads between the 
regions. Finally, the Ministry of Finance had other plans, and imposed 8 percent 
discount rate for road investments in 2003 when many other countries reduced the 
discount rate for infrastructure investments. The high discount rates constrained 
effectively the total road investments, and gave increasing returns to those 
everybody opposing road investments. 
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This final chapter’s forthcoming sections are all attempts of explaining the puzzles 
that triggered this study. Why have three wealthy and otherwise seemingly similar 
countries carried out different road policies and developed very different road 
systems? And why have Norwegian road policy been contrary to those in most other 
western, industrialized countries? This study’s main findings is that the Danes and 
Swedes safeguarded a rational road policy, efficient resource allocation and 
construction of a functional road system through insulating road policy and road 
construction from the legislators, and partly even from the Ministry of Finance’s 
annual budget constraints. This was definitely not the case in Norway. 
 The first section examines and compares the empirical findings concerning the 
main working hypothesis, trunk roads as national collective goods governed by 
legislators who pursue the common good. The second section examines and 
compares the findings concerning the hypothesis about roads as local collective or 
private goods, with road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles. The third section examines and compares the 
findings concerning the hypothesis about roads as local collective or private goods 
and road policy, with road policy and road construction governed by the political 
parties’ rivalry. The fourth section examines and compares the finding concerning 
the final working hypothesis about path dependence as feedback mechanism 
maintaining the road polity, road policy and road construction until sudden 
breakdown. The fifth section summarizes the empirical and theoretical findings and 
discusses why Norway became the deviant case with regard to road policy and road 
construction. The final section discusses some questions and implications for further 
research. 
Has trunk roads been considered as national collective goods?  
This study’s primary working hypothesis has been trunk roads perceived as national 
collective goods, and road policy and road construction governed by legislators who 
pursue the common good. This section presents and discusses the empirical findings 
concerning the four research implications deduced in chapter 1 that have been 
examined through time in the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian cases in chapter 2, 3 
and 4. Table 13 provides an overview of the empirical findings concerning the first 
working hypothesis in Denmark, Sweden and Norway during time. 
Table 13: Empirical findings concerning the national collective good hypothesis. 
Period/Country Denmark Sweden Norway 
Prior to 1945 +/- - -/+ 
1945-1959 + + -/+ 
1960-1980 + + +/- 
1981-2005 + + + 
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Are there well-developed modern trunk roads all across the country? 
Denmark had well-developed modern trunk roads and motorways all across the 
country in 2005, because the motorway H was completed about 2000. Almost every 
community in Denmark’s peripheral and rural areas was connected to the major 
population clusters and mainland Europe via modern trunk roads and motorways in 
2005. The Danish executive imported ideas about development of a national trunk 
road system from France in the second half of the 18th century. Rightwing 
nationalists championed construction of national motorway systems in among others 
Italy, Germany and Denmark during the interwar years. The Social Democratic 
Parties in Denmark and Sweden adopted these ideas after World War Two, but 
hardly so in Norway, except between the late 1950s and 1965. Even Sweden had 
well-developed modern trunk roads and motorways all across the country in 2005, 
except some ‘missing links’ within and near the capital Stockholm, and between 
Stockholm and Gothenburg and Stockholm and Malmö. Swedish civil servants 
imported ideas about construction of national transport and communication 
infrastructures from mainland Europe in the first half of the 19th century. The 
Swedish executive and legislators considered modern trunk roads as national 
collective goods after World War Two, similarly as the trunk railroads built by the 
Swedish State during the second half of the 19th century. Most of Sweden’s 
peripheral and rural communities were linked to the major population clusters and 
neighboring countries via modern trunk roads and motorways in 2005 similarly as in 
Denmark.  
 Norway lagged in 2005 30 to 60 years after most comparable countries with 
regard to construction of modern trunk road and motorways between the regions and 
to the export markets. Few Norwegian peripheral and rural areas were connected to 
the major population clusters or neighboring countries via modern trunk roads and 
motorways. Norway’s peripheral and rural areas remained satellites or desolate 
islands unlike most such similar areas in Denmark and Sweden. Many major 
Norwegian population clusters still struggle with congestion, accident and 
environmental problems. Norwegian trade and industry dependent of road transports 
struggle with far higher transport costs and longer transports times than Danish and 
Swedish competitors. Many East European former communist countries have passed 
wealthy Norway with regards to construction of motorways. An important shift took 
place in 1994 when the majority of legislators formally recognized that modern 
trunk roads and motorways were national collective goods. But the entailing catch-
up has been very slow because of small road investments given the Norwegian 
State’s financial leverage. The Ministry of Finance’s re-imposition of a very high 
discount rate for road investments in 2003 further delayed this catch-up. Some 
Norwegian interest groups that lobbied for liquidation of the car rationing and for 
construction of modern trunk roads in the 1950s established a new lobby campaign 
for construction of modern trunk roads and motorways prior to the 2005 election.1361 
But this new campaign seems to cast its lot with the 1950s and 1960s’ campaigns for 
construction of modern roads. 
                                                 
1361 See the website Veivalg 2005 [Online June 19th 2005] – URL: http://www.veivalg2005.no  
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 Both the Danish and Swedish cases provide strong support for John A. Hird 
and David Soherr-Hadwiger’s claims about politicians pursuing the common good, 
because of these countries’ national trunk road and motorway systems.1362 The 
Norwegian case does not support the idea about politicians pursuing the common 
good with regard to road policy and road construction similarly as the Danish and 
Swedish cases because of far less developed national trunk road and motorway 
systems. 
Have the road appropriations been allocated to efficient projects? 
Danish and Swedish executives, legislators and road administrators allocated most 
road investments to efficient projects from the second half of the 1950s because 
cost/benefit calculations or other scientific or professional principles for rational 
utilization of the available resources governed allocation of most road investments. 
The Swedish executives and legislators considered it almost irrational not to 
household strictly with the community’s common pool of resources.1363 State reason 
seems to have governed the Danish and Swedish executives’ road policy and road 
construction during most of the 20th century. 
 Norwegian executives and legislators reasoned obviously different, because 
the road investments were usually allocated to economically inefficient projects until 
the second half of the 1990s when the executive and majority of Norwegian 
legislators rediscovered trunk roads as national collective goods. Norwegian 
legislators have traditionally been far more concerned with political and than 
economic cost/benefit calculations. The 1947 Trunk Road Plan approved by 
Stortinget in 1949 for paving the most crowded trunk roads was never completed. 
The first edition of Norwegian Road Plan, approved by Stortinget in 1971, did not 
include significant road investments within and near the major population clusters, 
allocated 86 percent of the road investments to economically inefficient projects and 
postponed investment in modern trunk roads between the regions and to the export 
markets at lest until between 1978 and 1989.  
 Most of Denmark and Sweden’s modern trunk roads and motorways were 
built from the major population clusters, radiating from the city hubs towards more 
sparsely populated areas. This was a logical consequence of allocating the road 
investments according to cost/benefit calculations. Norwegian highways and trunk 
roads have generally been built from the sparsely populated areas towards the major 
population clusters, usually with numerous missing links or substandard sections 
with regard to capacity, road safety and/or environmental standard. Many missing 
links were near or within the major cities. This road policy was similarly a logical 
consequence of Stortinget’s explicit rejection of the cost/benefit principle in 1968, 
ignoring the most profitable projects and prevalence of an almost hostile policy 
against the major urban areas from the second half of the 1960s until the 1990s. The 
Norwegian case indicates that road policy and road construction in Norway has been 
more characterized by pork barrel politics and rent seeking than by concerns for 
adequate supply of national collective goods.1364  
                                                 
1362 Cf. Hird (1991) and Soherr-Hadwiger (1998). 
1363 See for instance Hultcrantz and Nilsson (2004:15). 
1364 For further discussions about pork barrel politics vs. national collective goods see for instance Shepsle 
and Weingast (1981); Weingast et. al. (1981); Moe (1984). 
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 Road safety and accident costs were introduced as arguments for construction 
of motorways in Denmark already in the interwar years. Road safety and accident 
costs became similarly parameters for Swedish road planning immediately after 
World War Two. Road safety and accident costs were also parameters in the 
Germans and the Quisling regime’s motorway plans for Oslo and southern Norway 
developed during the German occupation, but these plans were shelved immediately 
after the liberation. Danish and Swedish road engineers imported and utilized US 
ideas about traffic engineering immediately after World War Two, and Danish and 
Swedish executives and legislators endorsed this knowledge’s road political 
implications almost immediately. Norwegian road engineers attempted also to 
import US ideas about traffic engineering in the 1950s, but many Norwegian 
legislators and even some executives opposed this knowledge’s road political 
implications except 1960-65, when road safety and accident costs temporarily 
reemerged as road planning parameters and materialized in the 1962 Motorway 
Plan. Håkon Kyllingmark, the Conservative Party’s minister of transport and 
communications 1965-71, promised in 1966 construction of expressways rather than 
more costly motorways. Norwegian executives and legislators substituted 
construction of safe motorways in the most crowded areas with police controls from 
the second half of the 1960s. The Labor Party’s minister of transport and 
communications 1973-76 Annemarie Lorentzen abandoned further construction of 
motorways. Substantial measures for improved road safety and reduced accident 
costs on Norway’s most crowded trunk roads did not reemerge until the second half 
of the 1980s and in the 1990s. Ideas from traffic engineering that had been common 
knowledge among road engineers in most countries since the interwar years was first 
commonly accepted by Norwegian executives and the majority of the legislators in 
the second half of the 1990s. Symbol policy was obviously cheaper than substantial 
policy, at least in the short run. 
Have the legislators perceived road policy and road construction in variable 
sum terms? 
Most Danish and Swedish legislators understood that well developed trunk roads 
and motorways all across the countries made everybody better off in the long run 
given political approval of mass motoring. Road policy and road construction 
became also tightly intertwined with Danish and Swedish postwar trade, industry 
and economic policies. The Danish and Swedish Social Democratic postwar 
executives and legislators understood also that modern trunk roads and motorways 
would increase the size of pie, because spillovers such as the trade and industry’s 
improved effectiveness and competitiveness would facilitate future redistribution to 
their core voters. Danish and Swedish legislators perceived thus usually road policy 
and construction of modern trunk roads and motorways in variable sum terms after 
World War Two. 
 Norwegian legislators perceived usually road policy and construction of trunk 
roads in zero sum terms. The new Labor Party executive that came to power after 
the liberation in 1945 emphasized forced modernization through politically 
governed investments in hydroelectric power plants and in the export enclaves’ 
smokestack industries, rather than further development of mainland Norway’s 
traditional trade and industries dependent of road transports. These moves decoupled 
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road policy and road construction from Norwegian trade, industry and economic 
policies, and made road policy and road construction a part of the regional policy. 
This is the traditional perception of the postwar period. However, this study 
uncovered fundamental internal disagreements between 1955 and 1965 between the 
Labor Party modernists that advocated construction of modern trunk roads between 
the regions, and the Labor Party traditionalists and railroad lobby that opposed 
construction modern trunk roads. The small Norwegian postwar road investments, 
given the voters’ demand for roads, led to fierce resource struggles among the 
legislators and constituencies, and entrenched the idea about road policy and 
construction of trunk roads as a zero sum game. Many Norwegian legislators in the 
1960s and 1970s reasoned that construction of modern trunk roads and motorways 
in some constituencies would leave other constituencies behind. Modern trunk roads 
and motorways challenged thus many legislators’ norm about equality. Many 
Norwegian legislators reasoned thus completely opposite their Danish and Swedish 
colleagues who often perceived construction of modern trunk roads and motorways 
in variable sum terms.  
Has the road policy been stable and predictable despite the legislature’s 
changing political balance? 
The Danish road policy and road construction has been very stable, predictable and 
consistent since the second half of the 18th century. Folketinget’s changing 
majorities since 1953 has not affected the road policy’s direction. Swedish road 
policy and road construction has similarly been very stable, predictable and 
consistent since the 1950s, despite Riksdagen’s changing majorities after the 1976 
election. The only exceptions in Denmark and Sweden were some deviations during 
the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s because of the State economic 
problems entailing the oil price shocks OPEC 1 and OPEC 2. 
 Norwegian road policy and road construction has undergone several shifts 
prior to and after World War Two, but has still been consistent and predictable, 
because roads with local collective or private goods characteristics have generally 
prevailed instead of roads with national collective goods characteristics. However, 
few Norwegian road policy shifts have been results of Stortinget’s changing 
majorities, except 1965-71, but were first and foremost results of the Labor Party’s 
flip-flops.  
 The 1935-40 prewar Labor Party executive started to modernize some of the 
19th century trunk roads built for horse and cart. This policy was furthered by the 
civil servant rule, the commisarian minister rule and the Quisling regime under the 
German occupation. The new Labor Party majority executive that came to power 
after the liberation in 1945 reduced the road investments to a minimum until the 
second half of the 1950s, and imposed car rationing in 1947, which was upheld until 
October 1960, most likely of intraparty reasons. But the number of cars grew rapidly 
from the second half of the 1950s despite the car rationing. The Ministry of 
Transport and Communications championed a road policy governed by the 
Directorate of Public Roads’ professionals’ norms and standards, but Stortinget’s 
majority, the County Road Boards and the Public Roads Administrations dispersed 
the road appropriations to hundreds of construction sites on local roads in the 
peripheral and rural constituencies in the second half of the 1940s and first half of 
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the 1950s. The Ministry of Transport and Communications and the Directorate of 
Public Roads managed to consolidate the road investments in the second half of the 
1950s. Most road investments were then allocated to trunk roads, but the road 
appropriations were only a fraction of those demanded by the voters. This policy 
was furthered between 1960 and 1965 after abolition of the car rationing. The road 
investments were then significantly increased, and the Labor Party minority 
executives after the 1961 election did their best to emulate the contemporary Danish 
and Swedish road policies. The Labor Party modernists had partly the upper hand 
towards the traditionalists and railroad lobby between 1960 and 1965 and abandoned 
its anti-motoring policy established after World War Two. The non-socialist 
majority executive that governed between 1965 and 1971 reintroduced the road 
policy from the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s emphasizing construction 
of local roads in peripheral and rural areas. The Labor Party returned partly to its 
postwar anti motoring policy, when it regained the power 1971-72 and after the 
1973 election. The Labor Party executives that governed from 1986 and later 
reestablished partly the road policy introduced between 1960 and 1965 when the 
professionals’ norms and standards partly governed the road policy and road 
construction. Kjell Opseth, the Labor Party’s very powerful minister of transport and 
communications 1990-96, championed construction of modern trunk roads in 
peripheral and rural as well in central and urban areas. Kjell Opseth understood that 
modern trunk roads and even motorways were necessary to maintain competitive 
and viable trade and industries, to safeguard employment and added value all across 
Norway, and not only in the export enclaves and within the oil industry that had 
become part of the export enclaves since the neo-liberal shift. 
 Denmark joined EC in 1973. Sweden joined EU in 1995. The Norwegian 
voters rejected membership in EC in the 1972 referendum and similarly membership 
in EU in the 1994 referendum. Denmark and Sweden underwent significant State 
economic problems prior to and after the neo-liberal shift. But the Danish and 
Swedish executives and legislators prioritized further investments in national 
collective goods such as the most economically important trunk roads and 
motorways instead of publicly financed private goods, to overcome the 1980s and 
90s’ economic crisis. The Danish and later also the Swedish road policies have been 
harmonized with EU’s road and infrastructure policies that emphasize removal of 
bottlenecks. Norway is largely disconnected from EU’s efforts for improving the 
European transport and communication infrastructures, where construction of 
modern trunk roads and railroads has prominent positions. 
 Norway became a wealthy oil producer after the neo-liberal shift, and 
experienced never anything like Denmark and Sweden’s State economic problems, 
despite some reasons for concerns at the turn of the 1970s and 80s because of 
increasing State debt combined with low oil prices. But the Norwegian executives 
and legislators did not utilize the State’s new financial leverage throughout the 
1980s and 90s to catch up the lag concerning modern trunk roads and motorways 
and to improve mainland Norway’s effectiveness and competitiveness. 
Redistribution was obviously more important for the executives and legislators than 
facilitating future added value, because they prioritized new publicly financed 
private goods and cash transfers to pivotal voter groups rather than investments in 
national collective goods such as modern trunk roads and motorways. Norway’s 
surplus oil and gas revenues were from 1990 allocated to the Petroleum Fund’s 
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portfolio investments on the international capital markets as savings for future 
pensions. This policy made the Norwegians Europe’s rentiers after the turn of the 
20th and 21st century, almost like the Saudis and Kuwaitis, but less modern land 
based transport and communication infrastructures such as trunk roads, motorways, 
high-speed railroads and gas pipelines to the remaining heavy industries. 
Roads as local collective or private goods and road policy and 
road construction governed by the constituencies’ resource 
struggles? 
This study’ second working hypothesis is roads perceived as local collective or 
private goods, and the road policy and road construction governed by the 
constituencies’ resource struggles. This section presents and discusses the empirical 
findings concerning the five research implications deduced in chapter 1 that have 
been examined through time in the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian cases in chapter 
2, 3 and 4. Table 14 provides an overview of the empirical findings concerning the 
second working hypothesis in Denmark, Sweden and Norway during time. 
Table 14: Empirical findings concerning the constituencies’ resource struggle 
hypothesis. 
Period/Country Denmark Sweden Norway 
Prior to 1945 + - + 
1945-1959 - - + 
1960-1980 -/+ - + 
1981-2005 + - +/- 
Excellent roads in those constituencies participating in the distributional 
coalitions and congestion, accidents and environmental problems, and/or 
turnpikes in those constituencies omitted from the distributional coalitions? 
Most constituencies participating in Rigsdagen’s distributional coalition had 
excellent highways and local roads already prior to World War Two, because 5/6 of 
the Danish Road Fund’s reimbursements were dedicated to roads in rural 
constituencies. Most cars were then located in urban constituencies, but the 
peripheral and rural constituencies controlled Rigsdagen’ sanctioning body, 
Landstinget.1365  
 The Danish allocation of road investments changed slowly after introduction 
of the unicameral system in 1953, because the 1953 Constitution introduced a new 
election system based on one person – one vote that soon weakened Denmark’s 
peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition.1366 The Danish case prior to 1953 
strengthens thus Mancur Olson’s ideas about distributional coalitions, particularly 
geographical distributional coalitions.1367 But Folketinget’s legislators became first 
directly involved in road policy and construction of motorways in 1972. Roads 
considered as local collective or private goods remained the counties and 
                                                 
1365 See the Data Appendix’ Table 2.6 and 2.9. 
1366 See the Data Appendix’ table 2.5, 2.7 and 2.8. 
1367 Cf. Olson (1965/71; 1982). 
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municipals’ responsibility and had to be financed locally after the 1972 abolition of 
the Road Fund. The Danish case prior to 1972 indicated also universalism or 
political pork barrel, such as discussed by among others Rick K. Wilson and Melissa 
P. Collie, where some constituencies were excluded from the deals.1368 Denmark 
developed a balanced road system all across the country throughout the 1960s and 
70s, even if the crowded Copenhagen area still struggles with some congestion 
problems, but never anything near those within and near the major Norwegian cities 
throughout the 1960s, 70s, 80s and 90s. Danish executives and legislators 
emphasized early development of attractive and competitive public transports within 
and near the major population clusters. 
 The Swedish public roads were the municipals’ responsibility 1895-1943. 
Sweden’s bicameral system safeguarded development of a balanced road system all 
across the country after the State became responsible for management of most public 
roads in 1944, because common suffrage and the bicameral system effectively 
disarmed many of Riksdagen’s geographical distributional coalitions. The indirectly 
elected First Chamber representing the County and Municipal Councils, and the 
directly elected Second Chamber representing the constituencies, had to agree about 
investment and budget matters, and this arrangement checked most local egoists. 
The bicameral Riksdagen’s election system was largely based on the principle one 
person – one vote after introduction of common suffrage in 1921, despite the 
indirectly elected First Chamber.1369 The bicameral system’s legislators were usually 
not directly engaged in road political details, such as the members of Stortinget, but 
delegated instead responsibility for policy design and implementation to the 
executive, which in turn delegated the tasks further to the Road and Water 
Construction Administration and later to Swedish National Road Administration. 
The bicameral Riksdagen’s standing committees were organized according to the 
constitutional principle, usually responsible for several policy areas and emphasized 
goals and principles rather than details. Stortinget’s Standing Committee on 
Transport and Communications micromanaged the road policy until 1971, and 
maintained its interest for details rather than goals and principles until 1994. The 
Swedish bicameral system weakened thus Mancur Olson’s idea about distributional 
coalitions, at least geographical distributional coalitions.1370  
 Introduction of Sweden’s unicameral system after the 1970 election, hereunder 
a new election system based on the principle one person – one vote with a highly 
proportional seat allocation, increased Riksdagen’s geographical distributional 
coalitions’ influence on the road policy and road construction significantly, because 
the bicameral system’s requirement for agreement between the two chambers was 
abolished. But Sweden’s most economically and industrially important road 
investments were then accomplished. Riksdagen’s new Traffic Committee worked 
almost as Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications, but 
the Traffic Committee reflected Riksdagen’s geographical balance.1371 But 
Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee furthered the established tradition with road policy 
                                                 
1368 Cf. Wilson (1986); Collie (1988). 
1369 See the Data Appendix’ table 3.5 and 3.6. 
1370 Cf. Olson (1965/71; 1982). 
1371 See the Data Appendix’ table 3.8-3.10 and 3.17-3.27. 
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as national rather than local matters.1372 Sweden’s crowded middle constituencies 
dominated Riksdagen, similarly as the Norwegian middle constituencies dominated 
Stortinget, and dominated also Riksdagen’s’ Traffic Committee. The Swedish road 
investments were still allocated to crowded areas, even if the major cities’ road 
investments were reduced somewhat after introduction of the unicameral system and 
establishment of the Traffic Committee. The executives and legislators’ eagerness to 
centralize Sweden became also significantly reduced after introduction of the 
unicameral system. But introduction of the unicameral Riksdagen did not alter the 
Swedish road policy fundamentally such as after Denmark’s introduction of its 
unicameral system.  
Table 15: Aggregated geographical and political representation in Riksdagen’s 
Traffic Committee 1971-2006 and Sweden’s relative geographical settlement in 
2000. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing  Middle  Rightwing  Sum  % Relative settlement in 2000 (%) 
Central  18 11 10 39 22,5 32,7 
Middle  32 25 24 81 46,8 46,1 
Peripheral  37 13 3 53 30,7 21,2 
Sum 87 49 37 173 100 100 
% 50,3 28,3 21,4 100   
Sources: Data derived from the Data Appendix’ Table 3.4, 3.17-3.27. 
 Table 15 provides an overview of the aggregated representation in 
Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee 1971-2006 and Sweden’s relative geographical 
settlement in 2000. The central constituencies have clearly been strongly 
underrepresented given the settlement structure. The peripheral constituencies have 
similarly been strongly over represented. The middle constituencies have dominated 
the committee. But Sweden’s central constituencies has not been particularly poorly 
treated with regard to road investments compared to for instance the central 
Norwegian constituencies, despite weak representation in Riksdagen’s Traffic 
Committee. The Traffic Committee cannot have been crucial for allocation of the 
road investments such as in Norway. The geographical distributional coalition 
hypothesis is thus weakened in the Swedish case even after introduction of the 
unicameral system. There must be other mechanisms or institutions that have 
safeguarded the major Swedish urban areas’ road appropriations than representation 
in the Traffic Committee. The Swedish case after introduction of the unicameral 
system weakened thus Mancur Olson’s idea about distributional coalitions, at least 
geographical distributional coalitions.1373 Mancur Olson claimed distributional 
coalitions are mainly negative, because they lead to rigidity and prevent policy and 
institutional adjustments.1374 But Mancur Olson was clearly wrong with regard to 
Swedish road policy and road construction, because Sweden had political rather than 
geographical distributional coalitions, even if they affected the road policy 
somewhat different than for instance the Norwegian distributional coalitions. 
Mancur Olson was hence wrong that distributional coalitions are negative only. 
They may actually safeguard rational and efficient policies, such as in the Swedish 
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case with regard to road policy and road construction. Because the Swedish case did 
not support the idea about universalism or political pork barrel, such as discussed by 
among others Rick K. Wilson and Melissa P. Collie, because there were not 
established broad deals that excluded some constituencies and included others, such 
as for instance in Denmark under the bicameral system or in Norway in the 1960s 
and 1970s.1375 
Table 16: Aggregated geographical and political representation in Stortinget’s 
Standing Road and Railroad Committee 1946-1949 and the Standing Committee on 
Transport and Communications 1950-2005, and Norway’s relative geographical 
settlement in 2000. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing  Middle  Rightwing  Sum  % Relative settlement in 2000 (%) 
Central  17 1 16 34 16,7 37,3 
Middle  45 28 15 88 43,3 38,8 
Peripheral  39 23 19 81 39,9 23,9 
Sum 101 52 50 203 100 100 
% 49,8 25,6 24,6 100   
Sources: Data derived from the Data Appendix’ Table 4.4, 4.10-4.24. 
 Table 16 provides an overview of the aggregated representation in Stortinget’s 
Standing Road and Railroad Committee 1946-1949, the Standing Committee on 
Transport and Communications 1950-2005 and Norway’s relative geographical 
settlement in 2000. The peripheral constituencies have been strongly over 
represented, and the central constituencies have similarly been strongly 
underrepresented. But the Norwegian allocation of the road investments has largely 
reflected the representation in the Standing Road and Railroad Committee or the 
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications. The Norwegian case 
strengthens thus the constituencies’ resource struggle hypothesis because of the 
strong correlation between representation in the committees and the actual allocation 
of the road investments. Norway is a textbook example of excellent roads in those 
constituencies taking part in the legislature’s distributional coalitions, and 
congestion, accident and environmental problems and/or turnpikes in those 
constituencies omitted from the legislature’s distributional coalitions, and indicate 
clearly establishment of universalism or political pork barrel such as discussed by 
among others Rick K. Wilson and Melissa P. Collie.1376 Some constituencies have 
often been excluded from the deals, but the coalitions are usually larger than MWC 
or MNCs. The Norwegian legislators’ priority of local collective or private goods 
such as highways and local roads in sparsely populated constituencies rather than 
national collective goods such as modern trunk roads and motorways were 
particularly pronounced 1945-57 and 1965-85. Norwegian Road Plan approved in 
1971 and Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages approved in 1980 can thus 
both be understood as textbook examples of universalism or political pork barrel 
with far reaching implications for future road policy and road construction. Many 
Norwegian roads with local collective or private goods characteristics were also 
textbook examples of pork barrel politics and rent seeking. One of the most 
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prominent examples is FATIMA, the sub sea road tunnel to Magerøya and North 
Cape. 
 Congestion and traffic leaks to the residential areas at the turn of the 1970s 
and 80s paralyzed Norway’s major population clusters, because few or any modern 
trunk roads and motorways drained through traffic from the city hubs and residential 
areas, or bypassed the city hubs. Norway’s road policy failure was a fact. The 
contemporary Danish and Swedish population clusters had then well-developed 
trunk roads and motorway systems that drained through traffic from the city hubs 
and residential areas, and/or trunk roads and motorways that bypassed the city hubs 
and residential areas. The major Danish and Swedish population clusters had also 
usually attractive and competitive public transports. 
 Stortinget remedied Norway’s road policy failure through imposition of 
common turnpike financing in 1985, rather than through fundamental reallocations 
of the annual tax financed road appropriations, because that would have reduced the 
sparsely populated peripheral and middle constituencies’ road investments. 
Fundamental reallocations were also a political impossibility given Stortinget’s seat 
allocation and geographical balance of power. A turnpike ring encircled from 1986 
Norway’s second largest city Bergen. Oslo was similarly encircled in 1990. 
Norway’s third major city, Trondheim, was encircled in 1991. The motorists in 
Tromsø had to pay an extra local fuel tax instead of a turnpike ring. Turnpike rings 
later encircled also Stavanger, Kristiansand, Namsos and Tønsberg. The Norwegian 
case strengthened clearly Mancur Olson’s idea about distributional coalitions, 
particularly geographical distributional coalitions working across the party lines.1377 
 Norway’s road and transport policy failure was largely a result of national 
election systems that never have been based on one person – one vote.1378 These 
election systems gave significant malapportionment of peripheral and sparsely 
populated middle constituencies. Legislators representing the peripheral and middle 
constituencies were usually part of the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional 
coalition, and dominated the Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications and its preceding committees that governed allocation of the road 
appropriations at least until 1994.1379 These committees divided the spoils, and the 
Norwegian road polity and election system facilitated thus some constituencies’ rent 
seeking.  
Significant variations in the constituencies’ tax prices for roads?  
The Danish constituencies’ tax price for roads varied significantly under the 
bicameral system, but became more equal after introduction of the unicameral 
system because Folketinget’s middle and central constituencies’ number of seats 
balanced the peripheral constituencies number of seats.1380 The election system was 
thus decisive for the Danish constituencies’ tax prices for roads. The Swedish 
constituencies’ tax prices for roads became more equal after the State takeover, 
despite significant variations prior to 1944 because of the municipals’ varying 
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willingness to impose local road taxes to finance investments in the road 
infrastructure. 
 The Norwegian constituencies’ tax prices for roads have always varied 
significantly, with far higher tax prices for roads in the most populated 
constituencies than in sparsely populated constituencies. There were almost inverse 
relations between payments of vehicle, fuel taxes and turnpike fees and Stortinget’s 
geographical allocation of road investments since the turn of the 19th and 20th 
century. The 1912 and 1963 Road Acts instituted different tax prices for roads. 
Central and urban constituencies faced usually far higher tax prices than peripheral 
and sparsely populated middle constituencies. Stortinget’s approval of Norwegian 
Road Plan in 1971 and Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and Villages in 1980 can 
similarly as mentioned earlier be understood as textbook examples of universalism 
or political pork barrel, because even these national road plans instituted highly 
varying tax prices for roads in the different constituencies, and furthered the 
established cross subsidization. Stortinget’s introduction of common turnpike 
financing in 1985 did not alter these political and economical fundamentals, because 
the most costly turnpike projects were located in the crowded and urban 
constituencies. The Oslo-area’s motorists pay currently about 1/3-1/2 of the annual 
Norwegian turnpike revenues. The significant Norwegian vehicle and fuel taxes 
were upheld after introduction of common turnpike financing. The constituencies’ 
varying tax price for roads reflected clearly Stortinget’s geographical seat allocation, 
and which constituencies that have been represented in Stortinget’s Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communications at least until the second half of the 
1990s.1381 The road polity and election system governed thus clearly even the 
Norwegian constituencies’ tax prices for roads. This is clearly evident after 
comparison with Denmark and Sweden, because the Danish constituencies’ tax price 
for roads changed gradually after introduction of the unicameral system in 1953. 
The Swedish constituencies’ tax prices for roads changed after the State’s takeover 
of the responsibility for most public roads in 1944, when the executive desired 
uniform supply of roads all across Sweden, with a road system differentiated 
according to the road traffic and the desired road safety. Even these observations 
about the roads’ tax price indicate support of the ideas about universalism or 
political pork barrel in Denmark prior to 1972, and in Norway most of the time, but 
not in Sweden.1382 The significant differences in the Norwegian constituencies’ tax 
prices for roads indicate establishment of MWCs, such as discussed by among 
others William H. Riker, Steven J. Brahms, David P. Baron, Barry R. Weingast and 
John A. Ferejohn or MNCs discussed by Clifford J. Carruba and Craig Volden.1383 
The Danish case later than 1953 and the Swedish case do not provide similar support 
to establishment of MWCs or MNCs in the legislatures because of more equal tax 
price for roads in the different constituencies than in Norway. However, Stortinget’s 
reliance on open rules rather than closed rules may indicate the constituencies’ 
different tax prices for roads are more result of universalism or political pork barrel 
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than MWCs according to David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn.1384 But these 
differences have to be investigated further through use of formal models rather than 
by case studies. 
 Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico claimed proportional election systems 
split the spoils among the legislators according to their share of the votes, while 
winner-take-all systems concentrate the spoils of office to the winners.1385 Norway, 
Denmark and Sweden have all proportional election systems, but Norway had, 
judged by the constituencies’ tax price for roads, many similarities with a winner-
take-all system, compared to Denmark and Sweden which have far more equal tax 
prices for roads. This difference is most likely explained by the Norwegian election 
system’s malapportionment, because the election system is decisive for the 
legislature’s geographical resource allocation. The strategic test for this claim is 
Denmark’s introduction of a new election system in 1953. Denmark’s new election 
system based on one person – one vote gave soon a fundamentally different resource 
allocation with regard to road policy and road construction. 
More pronounced geographical distributional conflicts in Norway than in 
Denmark and Sweden? 
The political scientists Henry Valen, Hanne Marte Narud and Olafur Hardarson 
claimed that Denmark and Sweden had few territorial conflicts while Norway had 
more pronounced territorial conflicts between center and periphery, because Norway 
was a new nation state while Denmark and Sweden were old and established nation 
states.1386 There are reasons to question Valen, Narud and Hardarson’s 
interpretations of their empirical findings, because they explained the geographical 
conflicts through nation building theories. Valen, Narud and Hardarson found 
institutional differences in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, but explained these 
differences as a result of the nation states’ age. Why not explain territorial conflicts 
as a result of the resource allocation, and entailing resource struggles, caused by the 
institutional arrangements, rather than result of the nation states’ age? 
 Denmark, which was an old and well-established unitary state, had a very 
unfair geographical allocation of road investments under the bicameral system. 
Introduction of the unicameral system in 1953 with an election system based on one 
person – one vote led soon to a more just allocation of among others road 
investments.1387 The 1953 Constitution weakened thus Denmark’s peripheral and 
rural areas’ distributional coalition; made Danish road policy less contested and 
reduced thereby some of Denmark’s geographical distributional conflicts.  
 Even the Swedes established a fairly reasonably geographical resource 
allocation after the State became responsible for management of most public roads 
in 1944. Sweden experienced few distributional conflicts between the constituencies 
about the road investments’ allocation, because of the bicameral system’s 
requirement about agreements between the First and Second Chamber concerning 
investment and budget matters. Introduction of common suffrage in 1921 to 
Riksdagen’s Second Chamber and in local elections gave the constituencies a fairly 
                                                 
1384 Cf. Baron and Ferejohn (1989). 
1385 Lizzeri and Persico (2001:226 ff.). 
1386 Valen et al. (1998:62-64, 86-87). 
1387 See the Data Appendix’ Table 2.1-2.4 and 2.5-2.9. 
Chapter 5 – Votes count but the number of seats decides 
374 
equal number of inhabitants per seat in Riksdagen, and reduced the geographical 
distributional conflicts in Sweden.1388 These principles, hereunder an election 
system based on one person – one vote, were furthered under the unicameral system 
established after the 1970 election. 
 Norway’s national election systems have always had a high degree of 
malapportionment, and usually favored the peripheral and sparsely populated middle 
constituencies on the more populated central and middle constituencies’ expense.1389 
No other Scandinavian country has experienced more distributional conflicts 
concerning allocation of road investments and other publicly financed goods than 
Norway. Not only because of the election system, but because Norwegian legislators 
have been far more directly involved in road policy than their legislator colleagues 
in Denmark and Sweden.  
 A majority exploiting a large minority or a minority exploiting a majority 
seems thus to be a stronger explanation of geographical distributional conflicts than 
the nation state’s age, such as claimed by Valen, Narud and Hardarson. Norway has 
still very poor match between how much each constituency contributes 
economically to the community and how much publicly financed goods each 
constituency receives from the community, compared to Denmark and Sweden 
which have different balances between the constituencies’ contributions to the 
community and allocation of publicly financed investments. The election systems’ 
degree of malapportionment and the legislature’s geographical seat allocation 
largely explain the geographical conflicts or absence of such in Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway, not the nation State’s age, such as claimed by Valen, Narud and 
Hardarson. 
Do the legislators perceive the road investments’ budget constraints and 
geographical allocation in zero-sum terms? 
Danish legislators were not directly involved in road policy and road construction 
until 1972, but affected the road policy and road construction indirectly through the 
Road Fund’s allocation key. The Danish legislators perceived partly the resource 
allocation in zero sum terms under the bicameral system, but the budget constraints 
for road investments were determined by the motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel 
taxes since 1927, and kept largely the road investments’ budget constraints outside 
Rigsdagen and Folketinget until 1972. The linking of the road investments to the 
motorists’ annual payments of vehicle and fuel taxes was slightly adjusted at the 
turn of the 1950s and 60s, to facilitate increased and forced road investments 
because of the rapidly increasing number of cars. The minister of public works 
governed the Road Fund’s reimbursements and negotiated with the counties and 
municipals. Road considered local collective or private goods remained the Danish 
counties and municipals’ responsibility even after 1972. 
 Neither the Swedish legislators were directly involved in road policy and road 
construction until introduction of the unicameral system after the 1970 election. 
Parts of the Swedish road appropriations were linked to the motorists’ payments of 
vehicle and fuel taxes similarly as in Denmark until 1980, and thus partly decoupled 
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from Riksdagen’s budget processes. The Swedish executive’s doubling of the 
vehicle taxes in 1951 led to significantly increased budget constraints for the Road 
and Water Construction Administration from 1952. The Swedish legislators 
perceived usually the road investments’ budget constraints and allocation in variable 
sum terms until introduction of the unicameral system. 
 Most Norwegian legislators have perceived road policy, road construction, and 
the budget constraints and resource allocation in zero sum terms since the second 
half of the 19th century. The postwar Labor Party executive’s decoupling of road 
policy and road construction from the trade and industry policy, and the Ministry of 
Finance’s decoupling of the motorists’ annual payments of vehicle and fuel taxes 
from the road investments' budget constraints in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, 
maintained roads as the legislators’ bargaining chips. Roads with local collective or 
private good characteristics became soon goodies the legislators could hand out to 
their constituencies to safeguard reelection. A statistical test of the variations in 
Norwegian highway and trunk road appropriations’ geographical allocation 1960-
2000 was not able to refute the hypothesis that many Norwegian legislators have 
perceived the road investments’ budget constraints and geographical allocation in 
zero sum terms.1390  
Tight budget constraints for road investments? 
The Danish and Swedish budget constraints for roads that were local collective or 
private goods were usually more generous than the similar Norwegian budget 
constraints, even if most Norwegian road investments went to roads considered local 
collective or private goods. The linking of Danish and Swedish motorists’ payments 
of vehicle and fuel taxes to the road investments until 1972 and 1980 safeguarded 
road investments that kept up with the fast increasing number of cars from the 
1950s, and kept also partly the budget constraints on arms length distance from the 
legislators. The Danish Ministry Finance was seriously weakened after the 1894 
compromise that led to the Estrup regime’s resignation, and may explain Denmark’s 
relatively generous budget constraints for road investments. The Danish Ministry of 
Finance remained namely relatively weak until the Schlüter executive’s finance 
policy reforms almost 90 years later. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance decoupled 
the motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes from the road investments 1949-
63. Stortinget had similarly governed the Norwegian road investments’ budget 
constraints since the 19th century. That made it very difficult for the Norwegian road 
investments to keep up with the fast growing number of vehicles after abolition of 
the car rationing in 1960. 
 The Danish and Swedish Ministries of Finance and Ministries of Economy 
considered usually roads as investments and/or industrial necessities. The 
Norwegian postwar Ministry of Finance was skeptical to road investments, 
particularly investments in roads with local collective or private good 
characteristics, and considered usually such roads as expenses and not as 
investments. The Ministry of Finance maintained therefore tight budget constraints 
for roads, for instance through imposition of particularly high discount rates for 
roads such as in 1967 and 2003, compared to other publicly financed goods. 
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 Stortinget’s distributional coalitions, particularly within the Standing 
Committee on Transport and Communications, had far more influence on the road 
investments’ geographical allocation than their opposite numbers in Folketinget and 
Riksdagen until the 1970s, but took usually the Ministry of Finance’s budget 
constraints and sector allocations for granted. Neither saw Stortinget’s distributional 
coalitions any reasons for increased budget constraint for road investments when 
they had financed their own desired roads with local collective or private good 
characteristics, because that meant less to other pet projects in other policy areas.  
Roads as local collective or private goods and road policy and 
road construction governed by the political parties’ rivalry? 
This study’ third working hypothesis is roads perceived as local collective or private 
goods, and that the road policy and road construction has been governed by the 
political parties’ rivalry. This section presents and discusses the empirical findings 
concerning the four research implications deduced in chapter 1 that have been 
examined through time in the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian cases in chapter 2, 3 
and 4. Table 17 provides an overview of the empirical findings concerning the third 
working hypothesis in Denmark, Sweden and Norway during time. 
Table 17: Empirical findings concerning the party competition hypothesis. 
Period/Country Denmark Sweden Norway 
Prior to 1945 + - + 
1945-1959 + - +/- 
1960-1980 + + + 
1981-2005 + + - 
Has the road policy and road construction been biased towards those interests 
represented by the legislature’s pivotal party and within the executive? 
Donald Wittman’s hypothesis about political competition between political parties 
leading to efficient institutions and resource allocation was strengthened by the 
Danish and Swedish cases but almost refuted by the Norwegian case, particularly 
prior to the middle of the 1990s.1391 How to explain these differences between three 
seeming similar countries? The political parties’ rivalry has namely been decisive 
for the road policy and road construction in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and the 
road policy and road construction has clearly been biased towards those interests 
represented by the executives and legislatures’ pivotal parties in all three countries. 
 The Social Democratic Party governed Denmark either alone or in coalitions 
1924-26, 1929-43, 1945, 1947-50, 1953-68, 1971-73, 1975-82 and 1993-2001. The 
Danish Social Democratic Party represented first and foremost the urban areas’ 
industrial workers, their trade unions and later also public sector employees. The 
Radical Party that had been the Social Democratic Party’s coalition partner since the 
1920s represented initially rural smallholders, but became later the teachers and 
urban intellectuals’ party. The Liberal and Conservative Parties controlled 
Rigsdagen’s sanctioning body, Landstinget, until 1936. The Liberal Party 
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represented initially the rural and agricultural interests, but shifted gradually its 
attention towards urban voters after abolition of the bicameral system in 1953, and 
became a modern liberalistic party after the neo-liberal shift. Denmark’s modern 
Conservative Party represented the urban middle class and white-collar workers. It 
was thus no coincidence that Danish road policy shifted towards increased road 
construction in within and near the major population clusters after introduction of 
the unicameral system in 1953.  
 All of Rigsdagen and from 1953 Folketinget’s committees, except the Finance 
Committee, were ad hoc until 1972. But Folketinget’s standing Traffic Committee 
strengthened the political parties’ position on the constituencies’ expense, because 
the new standing committees were reshuffled annually. This institutional 
arrangement gave the party bosses plenty of opportunities to discipline the common 
legislators, and prevented also development of sector specialists and enthusiasts. 
Most Danish legislators remained therefore all round politicians who understood 
how linkages between different policy areas affected the economy’s total output. 
 The Swedish Social Democratic Party governed uninterrupted 1932-76, 1982-
91 and after the 1994 election. The Swedish Social Democratic Party represented 
first and foremost the densely populated areas’ industrial workers, their trade unions 
and later also many public sector employees, but had also many followers in 
sparsely populated areas. It was thus no coincidence that Swedish road policy and 
road construction from the second half of the 1950s prioritized the most crowded 
areas and safeguarded the trade and industry’s need for flexible and cost efficient 
transports. Appointment Gustav Vahlberg as the Road and Water Construction 
Administration’s Director General in late 1957 placed de facto Sweden’s Federation 
of Trade Unions and particularly the Metal Workers’ Union in the road policy 
driver’s seat. Gustav Vahlberg was one of the Swedish corporative system’s most 
influential persons. This was a fundamental difference compared to Norway because 
Norwegian trade unions did not champion construction of modern roads in the 
1950s. 
 Riksdagen’s new Traffic Committee reflected largely Riksdagen politically 
and geographically. This is clearly evident from Table 15 that provides an overview 
of the Traffic Committee’s political and geographical representation 1971-2005. The 
leftwing parties dominated the Traffic Committee 1970-73, 1982-91 and after 1994. 
Only the leftwing parties represented the central constituencies 1970-76. That may 
explain the reductions in the major cities’ road investments throughout the 
1970s.1392 The members of Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee have usually served 
more than one term, similarly as in Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport 
and Communications, and developed gradually into sector specialists and 
enthusiasts, similarly as members of Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport 
and Communications. But the Swedish legislators maintained the national 
perspective. 
 The Norwegian Labor Party governed alone 1935-40, 1945-65 except for a 
few weeks in 1963, and 1971-72, 1973-81, 1986-89, 1990-97, 2000-01, and through 
a formal coalition since the 2005 election. All Labor Party executives except 1945-
61 and since the 2005 election were minority executives. The Labor Party is an 
alliance between rural and peripheral smallholders and fishermen, and industrial 
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workers, public sector employees, hereunder civil servants, and their trade unions in 
central, middle and peripheral constituencies. The Labor Party’s peripheral and rural 
interest groups have usually had the final say since the 1930s, despite changing 
intraparty alliances and a leadership that often originated from Oslo. The power 
industrial complex dominated the Labor Party and the National Federation of Labor 
1945-77, but public sector employees and others thriving on the oil and gas exports’ 
surplus have since then dominated the party and later also the National Federation of 
Labor. All Norwegian executives since 1961, except the 1965-71 four party non-
socialist coalition, the 1983-85 three party non-socialist coalition and the current red 
green coalition, have been minority executives that facilitated legislator governance. 
The minority executives gave usually Norway’s middle parties, the Liberal, 
Agrarian and Christian People’s Parties pivotal positions. The middle parties have 
first and foremost represented the rural areas’ interests and the peripheral and 
sparsely populated middle constituencies, even if the Liberal and Christian People’s 
Parties also had urban followers. It was thus no coincidence that Norway’s postwar 
road policy and road construction usually favored the sparsely peripheral and rural 
areas’ interests on the crowded central and urban areas’ expense. 
 Table 15 and 16 that provides overviews of Riksdagen’s Traffic Committee’s 
aggregate representation 1970-2006 and Stortinget’s Standing Road and Railroad 
Committee and the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications’ 
aggregated representation 1945-2005 indicate opposite patterns in Norway and 
Sweden. The leftwing parties dominated Sweden’s peripheral constituencies, and the 
middle and rightwing parties the middle constituencies. The Norwegian leftwing and 
middle parties dominated the middle constituencies, while the rightwing parties 
dominated the peripheral constituencies. Stortinget’s Standing Road and Railroad 
Committee was dominated by the leftwing and middle parties 1946-49, which first 
and foremost represented the middle and peripheral constituencies.1393 This pattern 
persisted in the Standing Committee on Transport and Communications until the 
2005 election, despite the rightwing parties’ increased representation from the 
second half of the 1970s.1394 The Standing Road and Railroad and from 1949 the 
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications’ political representation 
explains largely Norwegian road policy and road construction since 1945, because 
the peripheral and rural areas’ interests were decisive both within the leftwing and 
middle parties that usually have governed Stortinget’s pivotal position since 1945. 
The leftwing and middle parties’ transport and communication policy reflected 
clearly Stortinget’s power relations, and considered road investments highly 
desirable in peripheral and rural areas but not in crowded and urban areas. This 
study has revealed significant internal Labor Party struggles between modernists 
championing investments in trunk roads and motorways, traditionalists championing 
investments in local roads and the railroad lobby opposing cars and road investments 
per se, particularly 1955-65, but even in the 1970s. Most members of Stortinget’s 
Standing Committee on Transport and Communications served many terms. Many 
became sector specialists and enthusiasts, but maintained usually a parochial 
perspective on transport and communication policy. 
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 The social democratic parties were thus decisive for road policy and road 
construction in Denmark, Sweden and Norway since the interwar years, but the 
Norwegian Labor Party was far more heterogeneous than its Danish and Swedish 
sister parties. The Labor Party’s internal struggles and changing alliances between 
different geographical areas, sector interests and political wings explain most of the 
Norwegian executives and legislators’ road policy flip-flops since the interwar 
years. The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian cases support all support Kåre Strøm, 
Jørn Y. Leipart’s findings that the interests represented by the legislature’s pivotal 
median party serve as a focal point that coordinate the road policies, such as 
suggested by Thomas Schelling’s studies about negotiations and tacit policy 
coordination.1395 
Have the committee leaders used pork barrel deals to strengthen their own 
position and to maintain party cohesion and discipline? 
The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian legislatures’ committee leaders have hardly 
used pork barrel deals to strengthen their own position, such as indicated by Joel A. 
Thompson’s study of North Carolina’s State legislature.1396 But pork barrel deals 
have been used to maintain the party cohesion, particularly within the social 
democratic parties that are broad alliances of divergent interest groups. Pork barrel 
deals have also been common among the Danish and Norwegian legislatures’ 
distributional coalitions.  
 Olof Palme confronted the leftwing populists and environmentalists in the 
1970s, and managed largely to renew the Swedish Social Democratic Party without 
abandoning to populism such as the Danish and Norwegian sister parties partly did. 
The Swedish Social Democratic Party maintained therefore largely the voters’ 
confidence and its political power after the neo-liberal shift, because the Swedish 
Social Democratic Party was able and willing to carry out unpopular but 
economically necessary decisions that served most of their voters’ best interests in 
the long run. Olof Palme, Ingvar Carlsson and Göran Persson were also good at 
playing the leftwing populists’ tunes, while pursuing realistic and economically 
rational policies. The Danish Social Democratic Party and the Norwegian Labor 
Party’s bosses turned the same trick concerning national security and foreign policy 
after World War Two, but were not always able or willing to do the same with 
regard to low-politics such as road policy. The leftwing populists and traditionalists 
held prominent positions within the Norwegian Labor Party between 1965 and 1981, 
when the modernists achieved a more prominent position. 
 The Green and Left Parties became Riksdagen’s pivotal parties after the 1998 
and 2002 elections. Their support to the Social Democratic executive was among 
others contingent linking further construction of modern trunk roads and motorways 
with construction of modern railroads. Some of these railroads’ profitability is 
questionable at least in the short run. The Swedish case since the 1998 election 
provides strong support to Kåre Strøm, Jørn Y. Leipart’s findings that the interests 
represented by the legislature’s pivotal median party serve as a focal point that 
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coordinates the road policies, such as suggested by Thomas Schelling’s studies 
about negotiations and tacit policy coordination.1397 The Green and Left Parties have 
almost been able to dictate the Persson executive’s road and railroad policies since 
1998. 
Have the political parties’ allocations of the road investments been contingent 
the election system? 
The political parties’ allocation of the road investments was clearly contingent the 
election systems, because the political parties have usually allocated the road 
investments to those constituencies where each DKK, SEK or NOK bought most 
seats, all other things equal. Because votes counts but the number of seats decides. 
Denmark’s 1953 Constitution introduced an election system based on one person – 
one vote that made it very costly for the political parties to overlook the crowded 
and urban areas’ congestion, accident and environmental problems such as under the 
bicameral system.1398 Sweden’s election systems were based on one person – one 
vote during most of the 20th century. The 1952 reform improved the Second 
Chamber’s election system’s political proportionality, but did not fundamentally 
alter the geographical representation. The new election system introduced from the 
1970 election established the principle one person – one vote for the entire 
unicameral Riksdagen.1399 Even Sweden’s post 1921 election systems made it very 
costly for the political parties to overlook the crowded constituencies’ voters. 
 Norway’s 1921-49 election system established a high degree of 
malapportionment. The central urban constituency Oslo had 62.007 inhabitants per 
seat in 1950. The peripheral urban constituencies in Hedmark and Oppland had 
8.793 inhabitants per seat. The other urban constituencies’ number of inhabitants’ 
varied between 11.509 in central Vestfold to 22.569 in the middle constituency 
Bergen. The middle constituency Aust-Agder’s rural areas had only 14.195 
inhabitants per seat, while the middle constituency Rogaland’s rural areas had 
32.680 inhabitants per seat. The other rural constituencies varied between 14.706 
inhabitants per seat in peripheral Finnmark to 25.740 inhabitants per seat in central 
constituency Akershus. The 1950 national average was 21.857 inhabitants per 
seat.1400 This election system made it very costly for the political parties to take the 
major cities’ voters into consideration. 
 Norway’s new election system introduced from the 1953 election, with 
common constituencies for urban and rural municipals, improved the most crowded 
constituencies’ inhabitants’ political representation somewhat. Oslo had 36.589 
inhabitants per seat in 1960; Finnmark had 18.026. The national average in 1960 
was 23.965 inhabitants per seat. Akershus, with Norway’s fastest growing 
population since the 1950s, had 46.341 inhabitants per seat in 1970; Finnmark had 
19.078. The national average in 1970 was 25.919 inhabitants per seat.1401 
Stortinget’s geographical allocation of the tax financed road investments reflected 
clearly the 1953 election system’s malapportionment, because those constituencies 
                                                 
1397 Cf. Strøm and Leipart (1993) and Schelling (1960/80). 
1398 See the Data Appendix’ table 2.5-2.7. 
1399 See the Data Appendix’ table 3.5-3.7. 
1400 See the Data Appendix’ table 4.5. 
1401 See the Data Appendix table 4.6. 
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with most inhabitants per seat received generally least tax financed road investments 
per inhabitant.1402 The 1989 election system that introduced 8 supplementary seats 
improved the most populated constituencies’ political representation somewhat and 
paved thereby way for the 1990s’ road political shift towards a more realistic 
policy.1403 The political parties could no longer afford to overlook the most 
populated constituencies’ voters, even if the most populated constituencies still had 
significantly more inhabitants per seat than the more sparsely populated 
constituencies.  
 The Norwegian case provides strong support to Frances E. Lee’s findings in 
the US Senate that that senators representing populous but not the most populated 
states could establish deals that excluded the most populated states.1404 A similar 
pattern has been common in Stortinget, because some constituencies were obviously 
more coalitionfähig than others, and established deals that excluded the most 
populated constituencies or with most inhabitants per seat. Because there are reasons 
to assume ration political parties spend the appropriations where each DKK, SEK or 
NOK buys most seats, all other things equal. 
Have the political parties allocated the road investments strategically? 
The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian political parties have clearly used road 
investments strategically either to maintain their voters’ support, to achieve support 
from new voter groups or to maintain the party cohesion. The Danish and Swedish 
Social Democratic Parties’ executives used road investments strategically during the 
interwar years to fight unemployment among their core voters. The Danish and 
Swedish annual road investments, measured as share of GDP peaked during the 
interwar years.1405 Denmark invested also in several major bridges prior to World 
War Two. 
 The Danish executives utilized the 1957 and 1963 Road Acts and the 1958 
Road Reimbursement Act to shift the road policy and road construction’s center of 
gravity towards the Social Democratic Party’s heartland. However, it is questionable 
whether the Danish Social Democratic Party used road policy and road construction 
strategically during the 1970s, because the decision in 1975 about reducing the 
formerly approved motorway H to a motorway h with no further construction of 
motorways north of Århus, harmed northern Jutland, one of the Social Democratic 
Party’s strongholds. The motorway h was motivated by Denmark’s State economic 
problems, the Social Democratic Party’s kneeling for the urban leftwing populists 
and environmentalists and the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Public 
Work’s forecasts indicating significantly reduced road traffic. But the Social 
Democratic Party’s members of Folketinget representing northern Jutland 
cooperated eagerly with their fellow non-socialist legislators and championed 
further construction of motorways after the neo-liberal shift when the Social 
Democratic Party was voted out of office. This cooperation led ultimately to 
Folketinget’s 1986 pork barrel deal that linked the Great Belt Connection with 
                                                 
1402 See Boge (2002b:91 tabell 6). 
1403 See the Data Appendix’ Table 4.6. 
1404 Cf. Lee (2000). 
1405 See chapters 2’s section about the interwar years and the Data Appendix Table 2.15 and 3.28. 
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further construction of motorways on northern Jutland, and reestablished the 
motorway H. 
 Sweden’s Social Democratic Party executives allocated plenty of road 
investments to the most crowded constituencies during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
but shifted gradually the investments throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s 
towards less crowded middle constituencies. Some of the investments were also 
reallocated from trunk roads and motorways to highways. This shift was most likely 
a countermove against the Agrarian Party that went after Social Democratic Party 
voters from the early 1960s. The middle and rightwing parties that governed Sweden 
1976-82 furthered this policy. However, the Social Democratic Party returned to its 
former high-growth road policy after the 1982 election, when construction of 
modern trunk roads and motorways were some of the Palme and Carlsson 
executives’ means for jumpstarting the ailing Swedish economy. 
 Norway’s postwar road policy and road construction was largely dictated by 
the Labor Party’s internal conflicts and changing alliance patterns, because road 
policy and road construction was obviously used strategically by the party bosses to 
maintain the party cohesion. The second half of the 1940s and the 50s car rationing 
and very limited road investments were results of an unholy alliance between Labor 
Party legislators representing peripheral and sparsely populated middle 
constituencies, the power industrial complex, the Railroad Worker’s Union and the 
Ministry of Finance’s economists. Most of the road investments prior to 1960 were 
allocated to the rural constituencies even if more than 2/3 of the cars were located in 
urban constituencies that struggled with congestion, accident and environmental 
problems. The 1963 Road Act provided significantly increased State road 
appropriations to the central and urban areas, particularly 1964-69. 
 Norwegian legislators representing the central and urban constituencies and 
the leftwing and middle parties pursued generally a far more idealistic, ideologically 
and less fact based road policy than their Danish and Swedish opposite numbers, 
particularly from the second half of the 1960s. This policy paved the way for 
Norway’s road policy failure after the Labor Party executive’s anti-urban policy 
peaked between 1976 and 1981, when Odvar Nordli, head of the Labor Party’s 
phalanx within the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition served as 
Prime Minister, and Reiulf Steen, head of the Labor Party’s leftwing populists 
served as party leader. Many Norwegian leftwing populists opposed economic 
growth per se in the 1960s and 1970s, and opposed also mobility, because mobility 
fueled economic growth. The Danish and Swedish executives and legislatures 
established realistic and functional urban policies already in the second half of the 
19th or early in the 20th century. Norwegian executives and legislators were not able 
or willing to establish realistic and functional urban policies until the 1990s, after 
Stortinget’s introduction of common turnpike financing in 1985 and the 1989 
election system reform significantly improved the most crowded constituencies’ 
inhabitants’ political representation. These differences between Denmark, Sweden 
and Norway were most likely a result of the political parties’ strategic allocation of 
the road investments, given the election systems’ seat allocation mechanisms, in 
addition to ideological differences between the political parties. 
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Has path dependence reproduced the road polity’s power 
relations and resource allocation? 
This study’s final working hypothesis has been that path dependence has governed 
the road policy and road construction. This section presents and discusses the 
empirical findings concerning the five research implications deduced in chapter 1 
that have been examined through time in the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian cases 
in chapter 2, 3 and 4. Table 18 provides an overview of the empirical findings 
concerning the final working hypothesis in Denmark, Sweden and Norway during 
time. 
Table 18: Empirical findings concerning the path dependence hypothesis. 
Period/Country Denmark Sweden Norway 
Prior to 1945 + + + 
1945-1959 + + + 
1960-1980 + + + 
1981-2005 + + + 
 
Have the constitution’s status quo bias and the election system reproduced or 
maintained the road polity’s power relations and established resource 
allocation? 
The constitutions’ status quo bias and the national election systems have been 
decisive for the road polities’ power relations and the high-level resource allocation 
in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. But the Danish case prior to 1953, and 
particularly the Norwegian case prior to the second half of the 1990s, weakens 
Donald Wittman’s claim about party competition leading to efficient institutions and 
resource allocation.1406 
 Denmark’s 1849 Constitution established Rigsdagen with two equal chambers, 
the directly elected Folketinget and the indirectly elected Landstinget, and instituted 
also minister rule similarly as in Germany and France. The landowner regime’s 
1866 Constitution gave Landstinget veto power and some members appointed by the 
King. The 1866 Constitution gave first the Conservative Party and from 1894 the 
Liberal Party increasing returns. The King approved introduction of parliamentary 
rule in 1901 based on the directly elected Folketinget, and upheld the minister rule. 
Denmark had well-established political parties prior to introduction of parliamentary 
rule. The 1915 Constitution introduced common suffrage. The 1920 Constitutional 
Amendment introduced proportional representation in the directly elected 
Folketinget and strengthened the Social Democratic Party’s position. However, the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties maintained their increasing returns until 1936 
because they governed Rigsdagen’s sanctioning body, Landstinget. The 
Conservative and parts of the Liberal Parties championed a new constitution when 
they lost control of Landstinget, to avoid being excluded from position for decades, 
even if there were factions within the Liberal Party that defended status quo and the 
bicameral system. The 1953 Constitution established the unicameral Folketinget 
                                                 
1406 Cf. Wittman (1989). 
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with an election system based on one person – one vote and reshaped Denmark’s 
political landscape fundamentally. The 1953 Constitution’s new political 
equilibrium gave the Social Democratic Party increasing returns until the second 
half of the 1960s, when the Social Democratic Party bosses embraced the leftwing 
populists while most voters’ preferences remained centrist. Some claim also the 
voters were tired of the Social Democratic Party that had governed Denmark most of 
the time since 1929. 
 Sweden’s bicameral system approved by the nobility and clergy in 1865 that 
came into force from 1867 established a new political equilibrium that gave the 
emerging middle class increasing returns. The Social Democratic Party achieved 
control of the directly elected Second Chamber from 1915, after the 1909 reform 
extended the vote. The Swedish King approved introduction of parliamentary rule in 
1917 based on Riksdagen’s both chambers, but Axel Oxenstierna’s autonomous 
boards and public administrations established since the 17th century persisted. The 
result was a unique polity with a strong executive, a strong legislature and 
autonomous boards and public administrations governed by the professionals 
according to the deeply rooted norm about State reason. Even Sweden had well-
established political parties prior to introduction of parliamentary rule. Introduction 
of common suffrage in local and national elections from 1921 paved the way for the 
Social Democratic Party’s takeover. The Social Democratic Party controlled the 
indirectly elected First Chamber’s majority from 1941, and achieved increasing 
returns until abolition of the bicameral Riksdagen in 1970 and governed Sweden 
uninterrupted 1932-76. The bicameral system was exceptionally stable because of 
the First Chamber’s lag and successive replacement. The Social Democratic Party 
defended the bicameral system, but changed its mind after the poor 1966 local 
election. The unicameral system reshaped even the Swedish political landscape 
similarly as in Denmark, and established a far more volatile political equilibrium 
after abolition of the First Chamber’s lag and successive replacement. But the 
unicameral system reduced the political parties’ risk significantly, because they were 
not kept away from power for decades on national level in case of poor local 
elections. The non-socialist parties governed Sweden 1976-82 and 1991-94. 
 Norway’s 1814 Constitution instituted a strong status quo bias and an election 
system with a high degree of malapportionment. The major cities and small towns 
had about 10 percent of the population in 1814, but got 1/3 of Stortinget’ seats. 
Stortinget is a hybrid, because the election systems have never distinguished 
between the two chambers. The 1859 Farmer’s Paragraph fixed the rural areas’ 
representation to 2/3 of Stortinget’s seats, despite increasing urbanization and 
centralization. The Farmer’s Paragraph gave the peripheral and rural areas’ 
inhabitants increasing returns through most of the 20th century. Stortinget introduced 
parliamentary rule in 1884 after the impeachment court’s verdict that confirmed 
Stortinget’s supremacy, but the Constitution was not amended to reflect this regime 
change. The first formal political party was established immediately prior to the 
impeachment court’s verdict, the other political parties were established after 
introduction of parliamentary rule. Weak executives, an exceptionally strong 
legislature with strong subject matter committees, strong County Councils, have 
often characterized Norwegian parliamentary rule and public administrations with 
close relations to the County Councils that often had close relations with Stortinget’s 
subject matter committees. Stortinget introduced common suffrage from 1913, but 
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the 1905 direct majoritarian election system gave the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties increasing returns, similarly as the former indirect election system. The 1921 
proportional election system gave the Labor Party increasing returns, because 
d’Hondt’s method for seat allocation favored large parties. The Farmer’s Paragraph 
governed Stortinget’s seat allocation until the 1953 election, when it was abolished 
formally but not substantially. The 1972 election system increased Stortinget’s 
peripheral and rural bias, but adjustments of the election system prior to the 1985 
and 1989 elections reduced it somewhat. The 1989 election system shifted the 
political balance slightly through improved political representation for the most 
crowded constituencies’ inhabitants. But the principle one person – one vote, such as 
in Denmark and Sweden, was not introduced in Norway. But the peripheral and 
middle constituencies inhabitants’ increasing returns were somewhat reduced. 
However, it is highly questionable whether the Norwegian election system’s 
geographical seat allocation will change within foreseeable future. First because it is 
almost a textbook example of path dependence, second because it is those who 
benefits from the malapportionment who have strategic control and power to modify 
the political system. 
 The three cases have thus provided strong support for the hypothesis about 
path dependence, such as advocated by among others Paul A. David, W. Brian 
Arthur, Douglass C. North, Kathleen Thelen, Sven Steinmo, Paul Pierson, Margaret 
Levi, Peter A. Hall and Ellen Immergut, at least with regard to how the constitutions 
and election systems have maintained the road polity’s power relations and resource 
allocation through the increasing returns mechanism.1407 
Have institutional conditions within the road polity reproduced the road 
polity’s power relations, road policy and road construction? 
The Danish executive governed the road policy and construction of roads with 
national collective good characteristics 1761-1867. The 1793 Road Act made roads 
with local collective or private goods characteristics the counties and municipals’ 
responsibility. The landowners’ 1867 Road Act redefined trunk roads to highways; 
wound up the military centralized State road administration and made road policy 
and construction the counties and municipals’ responsibility. The executive had then 
accomplished Denmark’s first national trunk road system, and prioritized instead 
State financed investments in railroads and harbors. The Danish Ministry of Finance 
was significantly weakened after the 1894 compromise between the Liberal and 
Conservative Parties’ that led to replacement of the almost totalitarian Estrup regime 
that had governed through provisory laws approved by Landstinget. The Danish 
Ministry of Finance did not regain its former position until the Schlüter executive 
fundamentally altered the finance policy approximately 90 years later. 
 Rigsdagen dedicated in 1910 the vehicle and fuel taxes to road construction 
and Copenhagen abolished its turnpikes in 1915. The Road Fund was completed in 
1927 when the revenues were dedicated to construction of highways. The minister 
of public works, who governed the reimbursement to the counties and municipals, 
paved the way for individual applications for reimbursements from the Road Fund in 
                                                 
1407 Cf. David (1985); Arthur et. al. (1987); Arthur (1989; 1990; 1994); North (1990); Thelen and Steinmo 
(1992); Pierson (1993; 2000; 2004); Levi (1997); Hall (2003); Thelen (2003). 
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1931. The Danish minister of public works’ strong position was clearly a result of 
the relatively weak Ministry of Finance. The counties and municipals built first and 
foremost roads with local collective or private good characteristics, but the executive 
desired construction of modern trunk roads and motorways with national collective 
good characteristics, particularly when road transports of passengers and goods 
substituted railroad transports. The executive established a new State road 
administration in 1949, the Directorate of Public Roads. Its first official task was 
management of the Road Fund’s reimbursements.  
 Folketinget reintroduced trunk roads in 1957, and authorized the minister of 
public roads to order construction or updates of particular roads and approved also 
construction of Denmark’s second national trunk road system, the motorway H. 
Folketinget gave similarly in 1958 the counties and municipals financial incentives 
to construction of motorways. The 1963 Road Acts made construction of trunk roads 
and motorways the Directorate of Public Road’s task, with full State financing, and 
authorized similarly the minister of public works to govern the road policy and 
construction of trunk roads and motorways. This was clearly in accordance with the 
Danish tradition for minister rule established in 1849. 
 Danish legislators became first directly engaged in road policy and 
construction of motorways in 1972, because the 1971 Road Act reintroduced from 
1972 the 1793 Road Act’s principles where each administrative level managed and 
financed its own roads. Folketinget established also a standing Traffic Committee in 
1972. The 1971 Road Act abolished the Road Fund and instituted thus a new 
governance and financing system for the road sector where Folketinget approved the 
annual road appropriations and governed construction of motorways, where the 
minister of public works governed construction of all other trunk roads given 
Folketinget’s budget constraints, and where the counties and municipals governed 
construction of highways and local roads. The Danish State withdrew partly from 
road policy and road construction in 1998 when the 1997 Road Act came into 
power, similarly as under the 1867 Road Act, when the motorway H was almost 
completed. 
 Swedish traditionalists and localists opposed establishment of a State road 
administration from the 1880s, while the modernists and centralists desired a State 
road administration. The municipals managed Sweden’s public roads from 1895 
until 1944, when the State became responsible for managing and financing of most 
public roads, both those with national collective good characteristics and most roads 
with local collective good characteristics. The reform within the road sector was 
largely a result of the strong Swedish minister of finance’s desire for a municipal tax 
reform. 
 Sweden’s bicameral system established a road polity with a clearly defined 
division of labor, where Riksdagen’s legislators established the road political goals 
and provided lump sum allocations. The executive outlined the policies for how to 
achieve Riksdagen’s goals and delegated the policy implementation to an 
autonomous public administration. This was clearly in line with principles 
established by Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna in the 17th century. The Road and Water 
Construction Administration, which in 1967 became Sweden’s National Road 
Administration and later only Swedish Road Administration, has since 1944 
governed Swedish road policy, road planning and road construction according to the 
professionals’ scientific and professional standards, with the executive as a court of 
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appeals. The bicameral Riksdagen’s committees were organized according to the 
constitutional principle similarly as in the former four-cameral Riksdagen. The 
committees were usually responsible for several policy areas and emphasized goals 
and principles rather than details. Riksdagen has never micro managed the road 
policy and road construction similarly as Stortinget, even after introduction of the 
unicameral system with its standing Traffic Committee. 
 Norway’s 1824 Road Act wound up the former Danish centralized State road 
administration and made the County Governors responsible for road policy and road 
construction. The 1837 Local Government Act established the Norwegian municipal 
and county councils, and made road policy and construction of roads with local 
collective or private goods characteristics the municipal and county councils’ tasks. 
The 1851 Road Act established the principle that Stortinget approved individually 
each road project eligible for partly State financing. Stortinget established similarly 
its first Standing Road Committee in 1854 and the Directorate of Public Roads in 
1864 to manage roads with partly State financing. The Standing Road Committee 
with succeeding committees became the place where the legislators and 
constituencies divided the spoils.  
 Legislators representing peripheral rural and small town constituencies fearing 
strong central institutions established the Combined Road Administration in 1893, a 
merger of the counties’ Public Roads Administration that managed locally financed 
roads with local collective or private good characteristics and the State’s Directorate 
of Public Roads that managed partly State financed roads with national collective 
good characteristics. There were usually close ties between the County Road Board 
members and each county’s legislators. They were often able to circumvent the 
executive and Directorate of Public Roads responsible for coordinating the road 
policy and road construction. 
 The Quisling regime reorganized the Combined Road Administration to a 
partly centralized and autonomous German style road administration, but these 
reforms were nullified after the liberation in May 1945. The Ministry of Finance 
became the executive’s coordinating body after the liberation, and became also 
Norway’s de facto Ministry of Transport and Communications through its governing 
of the budget constraints and sector allocations. The 1963 Road Act maintained the 
Combined Road Administration, but did not institute trunk roads a particular class of 
roads but a subset of highways. Neither did the 1963 Road Act provide financial 
incentives for construction of modern trunk roads, such as in Denmark and Sweden, 
rather the opposite. 
 Stortinget approved each road project eligible for partly State financing 
individually until 1971, when Stortinget approved the first quadrennial Norwegian 
Road Plan that changed Stortinget’s governance objects from individual road 
projects to lists of road projects in each constituency every fourth year. Stortinget 
introduced common turnpike financing of trunk roads in 1985. The legislators and 
particularly the members of Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications achieved increasing returns until 1994, when the Labor Party 
executive supported by the Conservative Party introduced the road sector’s new 
governance system. Stortinget has since then only approved the quadrennial and 
later ten-year road plans, chosen between different investment strategies, approved 
the annual appropriations and left allocation of the trunk road investments to the 
Directorate of Public Road’s professionals and allocation of other highway 
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investments to each county’s County Council and Public Roads Administration. The 
Norwegian road policy and road construction prior to 1995 differed fundamentally 
from Norway’s health care system, because the executives and legislators kept their 
hands off and delegated development of the health care policy, diagnosis and 
treatment of patients to the medical doctors, similarly as the Swedish executives and 
legislators delegated road policy and road construction to the road administration’s 
professionals.1408 Norway had world-class public health services in 1994, except for 
some queues because the executive and legislators gave the hospitals few financial 
incentives for treating patients. The increasing returns mechanism explains clearly 
how the Norwegian road polity’s power relations, road policy and road construction 
was reproduced.1409  
 The Norwegian County Councils’ influence on the road policy and road 
construction was largely punctuated in 2003 when the non-socialist executive 
liquidated the Combined Road Administration that had managed most public roads 
since 1893.1410 The 19 counties’ Public Roads Administrations were merged into 5 
regional road administration transcending county borders, similarly as the Swedish 
Road Administration. The maintenance and production units were spun out to a 
State owned joint stock construction company, MESTA. Norway’s 2003 road 
administration resembled thus also Denmark’s Directorate of Public Roads, without 
maintenance and construction units that bought all construction and maintenance 
services in the market. Approval of the first PPP-contract in 2003 that outsourced 
planning, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of a trunk road section 
to a private consortium for 25 years can be understood as the legislators’ attempt of 
tying themselves to the mast. The legislators had then demonstrated vividly through 
150 years they were not able or willing to keep their hands off and leave road policy 
and road construction to the professionals, even if they had delegated most medical 
matters to the professionals. The executive and Stortinget’s moves since 1985 
established a fundamentally new NPM inspired road polity that increased the 
professionals’ autonomy, and punctuated the former equilibrium that had been 
upheld by path dependence since the middle of the 19th century. Norway’s 2003 
reform can be interpreted as empirical support for Donald Wittman’s claim that 
competition between political parties and self-interest result in efficient 
institutions.1411 But the Norwegian reform process was unusually protracted and 
irksome compared to Denmark and Sweden, but this delay was clearly a result of 
path dependence, institutional rigidities and the economic interests involved. 
 The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian development paths with regard to the 
road polities’ organizing and power relations gave thus three fundamentally different 
systems that largely explain the different emphasis on construction of roads with 
national collective or local collective good characteristics in Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway. 
                                                 
1408 See for instance Nordby (1989) about development of the Norwegian postwar public health services. 
1409 Cf. Arthur et. al. (1987:40-47); Arthur (1989; 1990; 1994); North (1990); Pierson (1993; 2004). 
1410 Cf. Krasner (1984) about punctuated equlibriums. 
1411 Wittman (1989) 
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Have there been feedback loops via settlement, trade and industry structure 
that have reproduced the road polity’s power relations and resource allocation? 
Denmark’s settlement structure has been remarkably stable between 1950 and 2000, 
except for the peripheral counties’ increased share of the settlement since the 
1980s.1412 Denmark’s shift from almost unilateral dependence of export agriculture 
to other trade and industries during the 1950s and 60s affected clearly the road 
polity’s power relations and resource allocation, because the Danish executives 
prioritized investments in modern trunk roads and motorways within and near the 
major cities from the early 1960s, rather than further investments in rural highways 
and local roads, which had been the rule since the 1920s.  
Figure 27: Denmark’s relative settlement structure 1950-2000 in central, middle 
and peripheral constituencies. 
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Source: Data Appendix Table 2.1. 
 The motorway H with the Great Belt and Øresund Connections made 
Denmark smaller because of significantly reduced transport times and transport 
costs, and integrated Denmark’s eastern, western, northern and southern regions. 
Construction of the motorway H facilitated similarly modernization of Denmark’s 
industries developed from the 1850s until the outbreak of World War Two, which in 
turn reduced Denmark’s one-sided dependence of agricultural exports. The Øresund 
connection linked Denmark to the Scandinavian Peninsula, or rather Scandinavia to 
mainland Europe, and made Denmark the Scandinavian road system’s hub. Both 
Denmark’s prewar road system and the motorway H maintained and reproduced 
thus Denmark’s settlement, trade and industry structures, but facilitated also changes 
and development because the motorway H increased significantly the Danish 
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peripheral constituencies’ attractiveness as location for trade and industry. The 
motorway H maintained thereby the Danish peripheral constituencies’ settlement, 
despite increasing centralization in most other industrialized countries. 
Figure 28: Sweden’s relative settlement structure 1950-2000 in central, middle and 
peripheral constituencies. 
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Source: Data Appendix Table 3.1. 
 Sweden’s settlement structure became more centralized between 1950 and 
2000. The peripheral counties’ relative share of the settlement went down from 27 to 
21 percent. The middle counties’ relative share of the settlement remained 46 
percent. The central counties’ relative share of the settlement increased from 27 to 
33 percent.1413 The Swedish executive initiated this centralization process already 
during the interwar years. The postwar road investments went largely to construction 
of modern trunk roads, motorways and the economically most important highways 
and county roads, and propped up the desired centralization and urbanization, and 
had thus an opposite effect of that in Denmark, where the road policy maintained a 
decentralized development. The Swedish road policy and road construction 
supported also the executive’s efforts to further the trade and industries’ lead 
established during World War Two and the early 1950s. Trade unions within 
business sectors dependent of road transports held prominent positions within 
Sweden’s National Federation of Labor; the same was largely the case with regard 
to the employer and business sector organizations. The Swedish executive’s aim was 
efficient and flexible harvesting of raw materials and other natural resources, 
efficient transport to the processing and manufacturing facilities and thereafter 
efficient and safe distribution to domestic and foreign customers. The road policy 
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facilitated also efficient, safe, flexible and environmental friendly transport of 
passengers in rural as well as urban areas. The resource allocation outlined in the 
1950s and formalized through Swedish Road Plan governed Sweden’s road political 
great leap forwards until the early 1970s. 
 Norway’s 19th century elites were often engaged in export businesses such as 
fisheries, lumbering or shipping services, but were not particularly concerned with 
domestic economic integration or development of a national market. Those regions 
engaged in the export businesses developed usually local or regional economic 
systems. These were often more economically integrated with their export markets 
than other Norwegian local or regional economic systems. This was also the case for 
the particular Norwegian export enclaves that emerged during the second industrial 
revolution from the 1890s until the 1930s, similarly as in southern China from the 
1980s, and which were further developed by the Labor Party executive’s Strategic 
Capitalism after World War Two. The Norwegian export enclaves’ enterprises were 
often owned by foreign investors, and produced usually commodities or semi-
finished goods for the international markets. This pattern persisted during most of 
the 20th century. Norway developed therefore almost a colonial trade and industry 
structure compared to Denmark and Sweden. The export enclaves and other areas 
with dominant export industries had also almost colonial transport and 
communication infrastructures, because most roads and railroads immediately after 
World War Two radiated from the inland raw material sources towards the nearest 
export harbor. Norway’s economically most significant transports went by ship. No 
executives or legislators interfered with the sea transports, which were left entirely 
to the market, except for the contract stop imposed against the ship owners after the 
1947 currency crisis. The sea transports were too important for political 
interventions and symbol political initiatives.  
Figure 29: Norway’s relative settlement structure 1950-2000 in central, middle and 
peripheral constituencies. 
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 Norway’s settlement structure changed somewhat between 1950 and 2000. 
The peripheral counties’ relative settlement went down from 29 to 24 percent. The 
middle counties’ relative settlement increased from 37 to 39 percent, and the central 
counties’ relative settlement increased from 34 to 37 percent.1414 Even Norway’s 
trade and industry structure changed fundamentally between 1930 and 2000, such as 
shown in Table 19.  
Table 19: Structural changes in Norwegian economy 1930-2000. 
Trade and industry/Year 1930 1950 1990 2000 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery (% of GDP) 16,7 9,0 3,1 2,0 
Mining and oil production (% of GDP) 0,9 0,8 13,4 25,0 
Manufacturing (% of GDP) 23,0 21,3 13,7 11,0 
Electricity, gas and water supply and construction (% of GDP) 6,5 10,3 8,5 6,0 
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, restaurants, and transports and communication (% of 
GDP) 
27,8 35,4 21,1 10,0 
Other services (% of GDP) 25,1 23,1 40,2 46,0 
Sources: Historisk statistikk 1994, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo og Kongsvinger 1995:530 Figur 22.2; 
Statistisk årbok 2003:Tabell 327 [Online May 12th 2004] – URL: http://www.ssb.no/aarbok/tab/t-0901-
327.html. 
 The agriculture, forestry and fishery’s share of the Norwegian GDP was 
significantly reduced between 1930 and 2000. Mining and oil production’s share of 
GDP increased dramatically from the 1990s. The manufacturing’s share of GDP was 
halved between 1930 and 2000. Electricity, gas, water supply and construction’s 
share of GDP increased after World War Two, but returned to approximately the 
1930 level in 2000. Wholesale and retail trade, hotels, restaurants, transport and 
communications’ share of the GDP was significantly reduced from 1930 to 2000, 
while other serviced almost doubled during the same period. The Norwegian 
economy changed thus fundamentally character from 1930 to 2000. The most 
significant structural changes took place at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, 
approximately at the neo-liberal shift, when the Norwegian economy transformed 
from emphasis on the traditional smokestack industries located in the export 
enclaves to offshore production of oil and gas. 
 The Norwegian road polity’s power relations and resource allocation did not 
keep up with these structural changes, but reflected first and foremost the settlement 
and trade and industry structures prior to World War Two. Norway’s National 
Federation of Labor was dominated by trade unions organizing employees within 
the power industrial complex and public sector after World War Two. Trade unions 
organizing employees within sectors dependent of road transports had not prominent 
positions. The power industrial complex dominated similarly Norway’s employer 
and business sector organizations after World War Two. 
 The Norwegian postwar executives and legislators did not emphasize road 
investments in counties with many inhabitants and/or fast growing population, even 
if most future economic activities in mainland Norway outside the export enclaves 
would take place in these areas, whether the executives and legislators liked it or 
not. Norway’s 19th century road system was not able to handle the home market 
trade and industries’ growth prior to and immediately after World War Two. The 
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postwar Labor Party executive considered these industries inferior compared to the 
export enclaves’ smokestack industries. Neither was Norway’s modern ‘narrow 
gauge’ road system built from 1966 until about 1985 able to handle the 
transformation after the neo-liberal shift from smokestack export industries based on 
sea transport, to aquaculture, manufacturing, detail and retail trade dependent of fast 
and flexible road transports. The Norwegian economy’s transformation from a 
smokestack to an oil and gas economy after the neo-liberal shift prevented most 
likely the road political catch-up, because the oil and gas exports gave the executives 
and legislators plenty of slack resources, compared to Denmark and Sweden that 
struggled economically. The Norwegian executives and legislators were thus not 
forced to prioritize construction of economically vital trunk roads and motorways 
such as the Danish and Swedish executives and legislators were after the neo-liberal 
shift, to safeguard the Welfare State’s future. 
 Norway’s postwar road policy and road construction was also clearly affected 
by the Ministry of Finance’s economists that considered transport and 
communication infrastructures costs rather than investments in future capacity, 
competitiveness and opportunities, and constrained road investments and further 
investments in the telephone system, the obsolete railroads and civilian airports. 
This idea, equilibrium or delusion originated from the so-called Oslo School of 
Economics, and distinguished clearly Norway from most other advanced and 
industrialized countries. The Oslo School of Economics’ ideas conflicted also with 
endogenous growth theory and most other advanced and industrialized countries’ 
postwar economic policies. Both Sweden and Norway had strong Ministries of 
Finance after World War Two, but the Swedish Ministry of Finance did not 
constrain the road investments such as the Norwegian Ministry of Finance.1415 
Cognitive maps or taken-for-grantedness instituted through the Oslo School of 
Economics may explain why the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has constrained 
road and other transport and communication infrastructure investments and 
seemingly perceived such investments as costs, while the Swedish Ministry of 
Finance seemingly has perceived development of modern transport and 
communication infrastructures as investments in future opportunities. 
Have the physical road infrastructure equaled facts on the ground or non-
renegotiable agreements, and reproduced the settlement and industry structure 
that maintains the road polity’s power relations and resource allocation? 
Most of Denmark’s highways and local roads were completed prior to 1940, because 
of generous budget constraints, and because mechanized road construction was used 
as relief works during the interwar years. These highways and local roads were 
usually paved within 1960, and had in some instances better standard than Norway’s 
‘narrow gauge’ road system built 1965-85. The Danish public road system’s 
structure in 2005 was 2,2 percent trunk roads managed by the State, 13,4 percent 
highways managed by the counties and 84,3 percent local roads managed by the 
municipals. 61 percent of Denmark’s trunk roads and 1,4 percent of the total public 
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roads were motorways in 2005.1416 The prewar highways, local roads and the 
motorway H established firm facts on the ground, and reduced the time and distance 
handicaps all across Denmark and safeguarded the settlement structure. 
 Sweden’s public road system in 1944 when the State became responsible for 
most public roads was in almost similar condition as the contemporary Norwegian 
road system. Sweden’s modern road system built from the second half of the 1950s 
established clearly facts on the ground. Because the Road and Water Construction 
Administration built excellent roads in existing densely populated areas, areas 
planned as densely populated by the executive or were of importance for the future 
trade and industry or for harvesting of raw materials or other natural resources. The 
road investments allocated through Swedish Road Plan and succeeding national road 
plans funneled literally the trade, industry and settlement to those areas desired by 
the executive and Riksdagen. This in turn furthered and consolidated the structural 
changes initiated by the Swedish executive prior to and immediately after World 
War Two. Sweden’s modern road system established thus firm facts on the ground. 
 The Swedish public road system’s structure in 2005 was 71 percent managed 
by the State and 29 percent managed by the municipals. The State managed roads 
were in 2005 divided into 5 percent trunk roads, 10,6 percent highways and 84,4 
percent county roads. 34 percent of the Swedish trunk roads and 1,2 percent of the 
public roads in 2005 were motorways.1417 The trunk roads’ share of the total public 
road system was about 3,6 percent, the highways’ about 7,6 percent and the county 
roads’ about 60,1 percent. The rest was municipal roads. 
 Norway’s 1960 public road system, when the car rationing was abolished, was 
almost similar to the prewar road system, but often in worse condition, because of 
wear, tear and lack of investments since 1945. The economically rational road policy 
after liquidating the car rationing would have been construction of modern trunk 
roads and motorways in crowded areas or areas where the executive desired 
increased settlement, similarly as in Sweden, and to compensate economically those 
living in the backwards areas, such as indicated in the theory discussion in chapter 1. 
This was partly the Labor Party executive’s policy between 1960 and 1965, but 
explains also why the Labor Party lost the 1965 election. Because particularly the 
Agrarian Party desired full menu of publicly financed goods in every Norwegian 
municipal, whether they were sustainable or not, and implemented this policy when 
the party was in office 1965-71 and 1972-73 and when it held Stortinget’s pivotal 
position between the 1969 and 2001 elections. 
 Many inhabitants in Norway’s peripheral, rural and desolate areas feared the 
Labor Party executive planned similar centralization throughout the 1960s as the 
Swedish executive had carried out throughout the 1940s and 50s. Norway’s modern 
                                                 
1416 Vejlengder fordelt på vejbestyrelser [Online May 11th 2005] – URL: 
http://webapp.vd.dk/interstat/isPrint.asp?PAGE_ID=757&THEME_ID=1&subjectFilter1=&viewID1=&d
isplayAs1=Table. 
1417 Statistisk årsbok för Sverige 2004, Statistiska centralbyrån, Stockholm 2003:212 Tabell 227 [Online 
May 11th ] – URL: 
http://www.scb.se/statistik/AA/OV0904/2004A01/OV0904_2004A01_BR_SV_A01SA0401.pdf 
(municipal roads); Information om "Vägkategori" på det statliga vägnätet. Aktuellt per 050331 [Online 
May 11th 2005] – URL: http://www20.vv.se/vdb/webb-sidor/vagkategori.htm; Table 1.1 chapter 1; 
Information om "Vägtyp" på det statliga vägnätet. Aktuellt per 050331 [Online May 11th 2005] – URL: 
http://www20.vv.se/vdb/webb-sidor/vagtyp.htm. 
Chapter 5 – Votes count but the number of seats decides 
395 
‘narrow gauge’ road system built between 1966 and 1985 gave increasing returns to 
the peripheral, rural and desolate areas’ inhabitants and to their legislators until the 
neo-liberal shift when aquaculture emerged as a very important business in the 
peripheral, rural and desolate areas. Håkon Kyllingmark, the Conservative Party’s 
minister of transport and communications between 1965 and 1971, was the modern 
narrow gauge road system’s political architect and orchestrator. This road system 
was almost a blueprint of the Conservative Party’s plan for transport and 
communications outlined prior to the 1957 election by Kyllingmark, who 
represented Nordland and the peripheral and rural areas’ distributional coalition, and 
had been member of Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and 
Communications since 1954. This narrow gauge road system was also in accordance 
with the Liberal, Agrarian and Christian People’s Parties preferences. Construction 
of the narrow gauge road system instead of modern trunk roads and motorways such 
as in Denmark and Sweden did at best delay the centralization, in worst case rule out 
future development of viable trade and industries dependent of road transports in 
Norway’s peripheral, rural and desolate areas. Many new or updated roads had to be 
upgraded or built once more after the neo-liberal shift to facilitate use of heavy 
trailer trucks, almost similarly as Norway’s narrow gauge railroads had to be rebuilt 
to normal gauge early in the 20th century because they were completely obsolete 
with regard to carrying capacity and speed. Norway’s modern narrow gauge road 
system was thus an example of path dependence.  
 The Combined Road Administration was not able to catch up Norway’s lag 
concerning modern trunk roads and motorways because of reduced road investments 
after the Nordli executive gave up its counter cyclic policy after the 1977 election 
and after the Brundtland executive gave up its counter cyclic policy when the bank 
crisis ended about 1993. Norway’s relative settlement in the peripheral counties was 
in 2000 barely above that in Sweden, and far below that in Denmark, even if the 
starting points and terrain conditions were different.1418 The Norwegian postwar 
road policy constrained also the major cities’ development until the 1990s, even if 
the major cities were mainland Norway less the export enclaves’ economic 
locomotives. The emerging oil revenues and slack resources may explain this road 
policy from the second half of the 1970s, but not during the 1950s and 1960s and 
first half of the 1970s. 
 Construction of Norway’s modern narrow gauge road system can be 
understood as a deliberate attempt from legislators and county politicians 
representing the peripheral and middle constituencies and counties of creating 
irreversible or non-renegotiable agreements in the 1960s and 70s. Because this road 
system establish firm facts on the ground in the peripheral and sparsely populated 
middle constituencies, almost as the Israeli roads, walls, checkpoints and settlements 
on the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. Cash transfers or other kinds of 
economic compensation to Norway’s peripheral, rural and desolate areas could very 
easily be reversed or abandoned by Stortinget, but completed roads are costly to 
remove and safeguarded future public spending, and create literary path dependence. 
Construction of Norway’s modern narrow gauge road system created thus firm facts 
on the ground or non-renegotiable agreements, beneficial for the peripheral and 
sparsely populated middle constituencies, at least in the short run. 
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 The Norwegian public road system‘s structure in 2004 was 29,5 percent 
highways managed and financed by the State, 29,4 percent county roads managed by 
the State and financed by the counties and 41 percent municipal roads managed and 
financed by the municipals.1419 About 32 percent of the Norwegian highways or 9,4 
percent of the public roads were defined as trunk roads in 2005.1420 About 2,5 
percent of the trunk roads and only 0,2 percent of the public roads were motorways 
in 2004. 
Have the road polity, road policy and established resource allocation been 
maintained until sudden breakdown and establishment of new equilibria? 
Denmark’s road polity, road policy and resource allocation established by the 1793 
Road Act persisted until the landowner’s 1866 Constitution punctuated the 
equilibrium. The 1867 Road Act facilitated the Danish State’s withdrawal from road 
policy and road construction after completion of Denmark’s first national trunk road 
system, when railroads and steamships became the most important means of long 
distance transports. The 1953 Constitution and the mass motoring’s break through 
punctuated the 1867 Road Act’s road polity, road policy and resource allocation. 
Denmark’s new 1957-63 road polity, road policy and resource allocation made the 
Danish State responsible for the high-level road policy and construction of 
Denmark’s second national trunk road system, the motorway H. The 1957-63 
equilibrium was partly shaken by Folketinget’s direct involvement from 1972 in 
construction of motorways and appropriations to other trunk roads. The 1957-63 
equilibrium persisted until 1998, when the Danish State once again withdrew and 
handed over many tasks concerning road policy and road construction to the 
counties and municipals. The motorway H was then almost completed. The 1997 
Road Act reestablished thus almost the 1867 Road Act’s equilibrium, after the State 
had accomplished the second-generation high-level road infrastructure all across 
Denmark. 
 Sweden’s localist road polity, road policy and resource allocation established 
from 1895 punctuated in 1941 when the Social Democratic Party won the majority 
in Riksdagen’s First Chamber. This shift safeguarded strategic control that paved the 
way for State management of most public roads in 1944. Road transports were often 
far more flexible and cost efficient than railroad transports. The transition from 
railroad to road transports was well in advance prior to the outbreak of World War 
Two. The new road polity established from 1944 created a very robust equilibrium 
with regard to road policy and resource allocation that worked according to the 
bicameral system’s logic of delegation to autonomous public administrations 
governed by professionals. This equilibrium survived largely introduction of the 
unicameral system after the 1970 election and Sweden’s State economic problems in 
the 1970s, 80s and 90s, even if the executive and later also Riksdagen got a more 
prominent position with regard to road policy and resource allocation after 
introduction of the unicameral system. This was clearly a result of path dependence. 
The Swedish counties and municipals established also their own expertise within 
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1420 Statens vegvesen, Forslag til handlingsprogram for investeringer på stamvegnettet 2006-2015, 
Februry 2005:5 [Online May 11th 2005] – URL: http://www.vegvesen.no/hprog/hp_stamv/1-16.pdf. 
Chapter 5 – Votes count but the number of seats decides 
397 
area, traffic and environmental planning from the 1970s that gradually reduced 
Swedish Road Administration’s power and influence, but the most important roads 
were then completed, and the established equilibrium has largely persisted. 
 Introduction of parliamentary rule in 1884 punctuated the civil servants’ rule 
established from 1814 and the Norwegian System that had governed Stortinget’s 
allocation of State financed goods approximately from approximately the late 1840s 
according to an economic logic. The Liberal Party’s System that emerged from the 
1890s governed Stortinget’s allocation of State financed gods throughout most of 
the 20th century, and worked according to a political logic, based on redistribution of 
tax revenues. Parliamentary rule, establishment of political parties and the Liberal 
Party’s System paved the way for the Combined Road Administration in 1893 that 
established a new road polity, road policy and resource allocation that facilitated 
partly local governance of roads with national and local collective goods 
characteristics combined with State financing.  
 The Liberal Party’s System and the Combined Road Administration was 
temporarily punctuated by the German occupation 1940-45, but reemerged after the 
liberation. The road policy failure at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s because of the 
major population clusters’ congestion, accident and environmental problems 
punctuated almost the Liberal Party’s System. But the Liberal Party’s System was 
supplemented with what is here denoted as the New Norwegian System in 1985, 
based on auctioning of turnpike projects to those constituencies most willing to 
accept direct user payments, almost as under the 19th century’s Norwegian System. 
The New Norwegian System became soon an example of institutional layering.1421 
Because the New Norwegian System coexisted with the established Liberal Party’s 
System that still governed Stortinget’s allocation of tax financed road investments in 
peripheral and sparsely populated middle constituencies. The New Norwegian 
System paved also the way for the turnpike industrial complex that filled the void 
because of the State’s abandoning of an active road policy when the Nordli 
executive gave up its counter cyclic policy in 1978. Private and municipal actors 
were able and willing to provide those roads not supplied by the State, even if trunk 
road and highways were explicit State responsibilities according to the 1963 Road 
Act. But Norwegian counties and municipals had also financed State roads in 
advance in the 1950s. The State’s shifting of its responsibility to the counties and 
municipals was therefore not a novelty; it was rather the active road policy between 
1960 and 1978 that was an exception. Norway’s road polity established since 1893 
punctuated completely in 2003 when the Combined Road Administration was 
regionalized, downsized and through approval of the first long-term PPP-contract 
that outsourced planning, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of a 
trunk road section for 25 years to a private consortium.  
 The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian cases included all punctuated 
equilibriums, such as discussed by among others Stephen D. Krasner.1422 One of the 
most important shifts or punctuated equilibriums was the neo-liberal shift that led to 
road political regime changes in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, but the timing, 
reasons and reform content varied significantly. Denmark and Sweden underwent 
significant State economic problems; the Norwegian State had an abundance of 
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financial resources because of the oil revenues. The Danish and Swedish NPM 
arrangements for road financing reduced or maintained the motorists and/or 
taxpayers tax prices for roads. The Norwegian NPM arrangements for road 
financing increased usually the motorists and/or taxpayers’ tax prices for roads. 
 The Danish NPM road-financing model established by the Schlüter executive 
in 1987 for financing the Great Belt Connection came in addition to the established 
tax financing of other road investments and was thus an example of institutional 
layering.1423 The Great Belt Connection was built, owned and operated by a non-
profit State owned joint stock company that borrowed the necessary amounts 
directly on the international capital markets. State loan guarantees safeguarded the 
best possible terms. The interest payments and loan amortization was financed by 
the bridge users’ direct payments in the turnpikes. The Danish NPM road-financing 
model facilitated even construction of the Øresund Connection, a part of ScanLink 
and a joint venture with the Swedish State. The Danish NPM road-financing model 
was also in 2004 agreed used for financing construction of the planned Fehmarn 
Belt Connection, a joint venture with the German Federal State. The Danish NPM 
road-financing model gave thus the taxpayers and road users increasing returns 
because it prevented tax increases to finance construction of the Great Belt and 
Øresund Connections, which were mega projects.  
 Even the Swedish NPM road-financing model for forced construction of trunk 
roads and motorways came in addition to the ordinary tax financed road 
investments, and was also an example of institutional layering.1424 The Swedish 
NPM road-financing model was based on loans to the public administrations from 
Sweden’s National Debt Office that borrowed for the Swedish State from the 
international capital markets with State loan guarantees. Swedish Road 
Administration and its subsidiaries’ interest payments and loan amortization was 
financed by Riksdagen’s annual road appropriations. The motorists and taxpayers 
did not notice any difference compared to ordinary tax financing, except swift 
completion of many modern trunk roads and motorways. The Swedish NPM road-
financing model was initially established 1986-87 by the Carlsson executive to 
safeguard construction of sections on ScanLink between Stenungsund and 
Uddevalla. The Persson executive reintroduced it in 1997 prior to the 1998 election, 
after abandoning the Bildt executive’s not yet implemented turnpikes in Stockholm 
and Gothenburg that had been approved in 1992. These turnpikes were very 
unpopular among the voters that had been used to tax financed road investments 
since 1895, and was abolished well in advance of the 1998 election. The Swedish 
NPM road-financing model established a win-win situation with increasing returns 
for the taxpayers, motorists, trade and industry, as well for the executive and most 
legislators that could abandon or avoid unpopular turnpikes. 
 The Norwegian NPM road-financing model differed fundamentally from the 
Danish and Swedish models, because the Norwegian turnpike projects were 
organized through local non-profit joint stock companies owned by the counties, 
municipals and/or private actors where each project was located, not by State owned 
joint stock companies such as in Denmark and Sweden. Each turnpike project had to 
be initiated locally according to the 1963 Road Act, and not centrally such as in 
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Denmark and Sweden, and was usually local responses to far too small State road 
appropriations. Turnpikes were usually considered as necessary evils and an extra 
tax. Only the leftwing populists, railroad champions and environmentalists 
applauded turnpikes.  
 The Norwegian Ministry of Finance refused the local turnpike companies to 
borrow directly from the international capital markets until 1993, and refused also 
State loan guarantees. The turnpike companies were instead forced to borrow 
through Norwegian finance institutions that often were among the turnpike projects’ 
initiators and champions. The Ministry of Finance reduced the Norwegian tax 
financed road investments measured in real term after the neo-liberal shift. 
Turnpikes financed about 1/3 of the Norwegian road investments in 2004. Norway 
had about 40 operational turnpike projects in April 2005.1425 8 of these were 
turnpike rings encircling cities, 14 were trunk roads and motorways, and 6 were 
mainland connections with sub sea tunnels and/or bridges that substituted partly user 
financed highway ferries. The Norwegian NPM road financing model and the New 
Norwegian System gave first and foremost the turnpike industrial complex 
increasing returns through almost risk free business opportunities, but maintained 
also the Ministry of Finance’s de facto control of the road policy and road 
construction, except for the geographical allocation of the road investments. 
 The Danish, Swedish and Norwegian road policies and road construction after 
the neo-liberal shift have disclosed fundamentally divergent views about the State’s 
role and function in the three countries. The Danish and Swedish States and civil 
servants acted as if they were the citizens’ and the national trade and industry’s 
servants, and instruments for safeguarding the national interests and common good. 
Because the Danish and Swedish State utilized their credit worthiness and financial 
leverage to their own citizens’ and trade and industry’s advantage, among others to 
facilitate swift and cost efficient construction of modern trunk road and motorway 
infrastructures that improved the trade and industry’s competitiveness as well as the 
road safety. The Norwegian State and its civil servants acted as if the citizens and 
the trade and industry were the State and the civil servants’ servants and instruments 
for safeguarding the State assets and the civil servants’ interests, and not the 
opposite such as in Denmark and Sweden where national interests and the citizens’ 
common good prevailed. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance refused also utilizing 
the State’s new financial leverage to catch up Norway’s lag with regard to modern 
trunk roads and motorways that harmed the trade and industry’s competitiveness and 
led to poor road safety and unnecessarily high accident costs in the most crowded 
areas. 
Why became Norway the deviant case concerning road policy and 
road construction? 
Table 20 summarizes the empirical findings in the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian 
cases with regard to this study’s four working hypotheses. 
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Table 20: The four working hypotheses’ status after testing against empirical data. 
Hypothesis/Country Denmark Sweden Norway 
Road policy and road construction governed by politicians pursuing the common good + + -/+ 
Road policy and road construction governed by the constituencies’ resource struggles +/- - + 
Road policy and road construction governed by the political parties rivalry + + +/- 
Road policy and road construction governed by path dependence + + + 
 
 It is finally possible to provide some answers to the big questions, why 
became Norway the deviant case with regard to road policy and road construction? 
Why was Denmark and Sweden able to carry out rational road policies, achieve 
efficient resource allocation and safeguard construction of functional road system? 
Why did local egoism prevail in Norway but barely in Denmark and Sweden? And 
why was this seemingly dysfunctional Norwegian road policy upheld until 
approximately 1995? 
 The answers to these questions are found in the political systems as such and 
the three countries’ different political economies. Denmark’s minister rule 
established in 1849 meant that appointment of a new executive and a new minister 
of public works in principle facilitated a fundamentally new road policy, because the 
political parties’ rivalry kept the ministers and political parties in check and 
safeguarded a rational road policy, efficient resource allocation and construction of a 
functional road system. The Danish road financing was decoupled from the Ministry 
of Finance’s direct control and insulated from the budget constraints from 
approximately World War One until 1972. The legislators were similarly kept on 
arms length distance from direct involvement in the road policy until 1972, when 
many of the most important roads were approved or completed. Neither the Ministry 
of Finance nor the legislators were thus able to interfere directly in the road policy 
and road construction during the mass motoring’s formative phase and 
breakthrough. Road policy was then a matter for the minister of public works and 
the counties and municipals. Introduction of the unicameral system and an election 
system based on one person – one vote in 1953 facilitated gradually reallocation of 
the Road Fund’s reimbursements and introduction of a road policy beneficial even 
for the urban areas, and not only the rural areas such as under the bicameral system. 
 The Swedes choose a fundamentally different approach when the State in 
1944 became responsible for managing most public roads, which also safeguarded a 
rational road policy, efficient resource allocation and construction of a functional 
road system similarly as in Denmark. The bicameral Riksdagen delegated the 
responsibility for road policy and road construction to the executive, which in turn 
delegated this responsibility further to the autonomous Road and Water Construction 
Administration that operated according to the road engineers’ professional norms 
and standards – and according to the norms about State reason that had governed 
Sweden’s autonomous boards since Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna established the 
first autonomous boards and the 1634 Constitution. The requirement for agreement 
between Riksdagen’s two chambers in budget and investment issues, combined with 
election systems for each chamber based on one person – one vote, checked local 
egoism and safeguarded the national interests’ prevalence with regard to road policy 
and road construction. Linking the motorists’ payments of vehicle and fuel taxes to 
road appropriations the early 1920s until 1980 safeguarded similarly swift 
construction of new and functional roads when the number of cars increased. The 
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1944 reform’s principles were largely upheld even after instruction of the 
unicameral Riksdagen. Delegation to professionals safeguarded thus a rational road 
policy, efficient resource allocation and construction of a functional road system 
almost no matter the political situation, and furthered Axel Oxenstierna’s principles 
based on autonomous boards staffed by professionals governed by State reason. The 
Swedish executive and the political parties achieved a more prominent position with 
regard to road policy and road construction after the neo-liberal shift, but furthered 
construction of roads facilitating efficient, flexible, safe and environmental friendly 
transports of passengers and goods, such as instituted since 1944. 
 Norway established a third model, which was not able to safeguard a rational 
road policy, efficient resource allocation and construction of a functional road 
system. Norwegian counties and constituencies achieved prominent positions with 
regard to road policy and road construction already in the 19th century. Road policy 
and road construction was thus not partly or completely insulated from the 
legislators such as in Denmark and Sweden during most of the periods studied. The 
1851 Road Act instituted Stortinget’s approval of each individual road project with 
partly State financing. Geographical distributional coalitions developed in Stortinget 
in the 19th century prior to development of formal political parties, and these 
distributional coalitions transcended later the party lines. A tradition for legislator 
rule and weak executives developed also in the 19th century, and was upheld during 
most of the 20th century. The election systems with a high degree of 
malapportionment favored gradually the peripheral and sparsely populated middle 
constituencies. Significant factions within the governing postwar Labor Party 
opposed mass motoring at least until 1960. The Ministry of Finance became 
Norway’s de facto Ministry of Transport and Communications after World War 
Two, and decoupled the road appropriations from the motorists’ annual payments of 
vehicle and fuel taxes. The Combined Road Administration’s engineers were in 
many instances not able to carry out a road policy according to their professional 
norms and standards, because Stortinget’s majority questioned mass motoring, 
traffic engineering and transport economics until the 1980s and 1990s. Stortinget’s 
majority instituted road policy as universalism or political pork barrel through 
Norwegian Road Plan approved in 1971 and Norwegian Road Plan for Cities and 
Villages approved in 1980. The constituencies’ direct involvement in road policy 
and road construction was gradually reduced after approval of Norwegian Road 
Plan in 1971, introduction of common turnpike financing in 1985, introduction of 
the Combined Road Administration’s new governance system in 1994, and 
establishment of a fundamentally new road polity in 2003. Norway’s pre 2003 road 
polity, which was upheld by election systems not based on the principle one person 
– one vote such as in Denmark and Sweden since 1953 and 1921, had not been able 
to provide those roads required by the voters and motorists, and had not been able to 
safeguard a rational road policy, efficient resource allocation and construction of a 
functional road system. Replacement of the Norwegian executive did usually not 
alter the road policy and road construction, because Norway is the only 
parliamentary democracy with completely fixed terms. Neither the Prime Minister 
nor the head of State is authorized to call for new elections. Minority executives 
were common during the 20th century. The Norwegian case’s bottom line with 
regard to road policy and road construction was therefore; to reformulate Stein 
Rokkan’s well-known adage, votes count but the number of seats decides. 
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Questions for further research 
This study has not been able to determine whether the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance itself or the Borten executive’s instructions imposed 10 percent discount 
rate for road investments in 1967. Norges Bank’s discount rate was then 3,5 percent. 
Neither has this study been able to determine whether the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance’s imposition of 8 percent discount rate for road investments in 2003, was 
initiated by the Ministry of Finance or result of instructions from the second 
Bondevik executive, because the Ministry of Finance imposed then a significant risk 
premium for long-term infrastructure investments. Norges Bank reduced its key rate 
from 2,0 to 1,75 percent March 12th 2004 when the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications published its National Transport Plan 2006-2015 that maintained 
8 percent discount rate for road investments – and argued for risk premium for long-
term infrastructure investments. Was the 1967 discount rate increase imposed to 
maintain the budget constraints, the regional policy or to maintain the peripheral and 
rural areas’ distributional coalition’s power and influence in Stortinget? Was the 
2003/2004 discount rate increase for road investments imposed to protect the 
ministers and legislators pet sectors from budget reallocations, to protect the 
Petroleum Fund from future demands for increased transport and communication 
infrastructure investments, or simply to maintain the turnpike industrial complex’ 
future business opportunities, or combinations thereof? 
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Table 2.1: The Danish counties’ settlement 1950-1960. 
County 1950 1950% 1960 1960% C, M, P 
Københavns Borough 765.580 17,9 721.381 15,7 C 
Fredriksberg Borough 119.382 2,8 114.285 2,5 C 
Københavns County 390.382 9,1 576.476 12,6 C 
Frederiksborg County 147.695 3,5 181.663 4,0 C 
Holbæk County 126.162 2,9 127.747 2,8 M 
Sorø County 125.884 2,9 129.580 2,8 M 
Præstø County 122.955 2,9 121.976 2,7 M 
Bornholm County 48.134 1,1 48.373 1,1 M 
Maribo County  135.337 3,2 131.699 2,9 M 
Svendborg County 149.671 3,5 149.163 3,3 M 
Odense County 245.864 5,7 264.745 5,8 M 
Vejle County 201.113 4,7 213.705 4,7 P 
Skanderborg County 134.133 3,1 137.865 3,0 P 
Aarhus County 198.267 4,6 221.895 4,8 P 
Randers County 167.335 3,9 170.231 3,7 P 
Aalborg County 225.394 5,3 239.041 5,2 P 
Hjørring County 169.688 4,0 177.778 3,9 P 
Thisted County 88.091 2,1 84.955 1,9 P 
Viborg County 155.628 3,6 161.232 3,5 P 
Ringkøbing County 186.841 4,4 205.772 4,5 P 
Ribe County 170.448 4,0 185.048 4,0 P 
Haderslev County 69.118 1,6 72.153 1,6 P 
Aabenraa-Sønderborg County 94.051 2,2 106.036 2,3 P 
Tønder County 41.998 1,0 42.457 0,9 P 
Sum 4.279.151 100,0 4.585.256 100,0  
Sources: Statistisk årbog 1951, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1951:6-7 Tabel 7; Statistisk 
årbog 1961, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1961:1 Tabel 1.
Data Appendix 
425 
Table 2.2: The Danish counties’ settlement and area 1970-2000. 
County 1970 1970% 1980 1980% 1990 1990% 2000 2000% Area (km2)  C, M, P 
København Borough 634.500 12,9 498.850 9,7 466.723 9,1 495.699 9,3 88,25 C 
Fredriksberg Borough 102.751 2,1 88.287 1,7 85.611 1,7 90.327 1,7 8,77 C 
København County 609.469 12,4 627.245 12,2 600.889 11,7 613.444 11,5 525,95 C 
Fredriksborg County 252.557 5,1 329.141 6,4 341.067 6,6 365.306 6,9 1347,42 C 
Roskilde County 147.434 3,0 202.017 3,9 216.964 4,2 231.559 4,3 891,44 C 
Vestsjælland County 256.997 5,2 277.833 5,4 283.641 5,5 295.086 5,5 2983,77 M 
Storstrøms County 251.815 5,1 260.081 5,1 256.912 5,0 259.106 4,9 3398,02 M 
Bornholm County 47.405 1,0 47.780 0,9 45.900 0,9 44.337 0,8 588,53 M 
Fyn County 430.958 8,8 452.965 8,8 459.354 8,9 471.974 8,9 3485,84 M 
Sønderjylland County 237.270 4,8 249.949 4,9 250.612 4,9 253.482 4,8 3939,12 P 
Ribe County 196.894 4,0 212.624 4,2 218.582 4,3 224.345 4,2 3131,61 P 
Vejle County 304.358 6,2 325.774 6,4 330.398 6,4 347.542 6,5 2996,64 P 
Ringkøbing County 240.014 4,9 262.751 5,1 267.295 5,2 272.857 5,1 4853,94 P 
Århus County 525.167 10,7 573.916 11,2 597.143 11,6 637.122 12,0 4560,73 P 
Viborg County 220.214 4,5 231.517 4,5 229.775 4,5 233.681 4,4 4122,48 P 
Nordjylland County 455.062 9,3 481.335 9,4 484.543 9,4 494.153 9,3 6173,37 P 
Sum 4.912.865 100,0 5.122.065 100,0 5.135.409 100,0 5.330.020 100,0 43.095,88  
Sources: Statistisk årbog 1971, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 1971:1 Tabel 1; Statistisk årbog 1981, 
Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 1981:1 Tabel 1; Statistisk årbog 1991, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 
1991:19 Tabel 1; Statistisk årbog 2000, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 2000:17 Tabel 1. 
Table 2.3: Denmark’s absolute settlement and area 1950-2000, center, middle and 
periphery. 
Partition 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Area (km2) 
Center 1.423.039 1.593.805 1.746.711 1.745.540 1.711.254 1.796.335 2861,83 
Middle 954.007 973.283 987.175 1.038.659 1.045.807 1.070.503 10.456,16 
Periphery 1.902.105 2.018.168 2.178.979 2.337.866 2.378.348 2.463.182 29.777,89 
Sum 4.279.151 4.585.256 4.912.865 5.122.065 5.135.409 5.330.020 43.095,88 
Table 2.4: Denmark’s relative settlement and area 1950-2000, center, middle and 
periphery. 
Partition 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % Area % 
Center 33,26 34,76 35,55 34,08 33,32 33,70 6,64 
Middle 22,29 21,23 20,09 20,28 20,36 20,08 24,26 
Periphery 44,45 44,01 44,35 45,64 46,31 46,21 69,10 
Sum 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
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Table 2.5: Folketinget’s geographical representation 1950-1970. 
Constituency 1950 Inhabitants per  
seat 1950 
1960 Inhabitants per  
seat 1960 
1970 C, M, P 
Søndre storkreds 6  7  7 C 
Østre storkreds 13  16  14 C 
Vestre storkreds 9 31.606 * 9 26.115 * 8 C 
København County 12 32.532 18 32.026 20 C 
Frederiksborg County 4 36.924 5 36.333 8 C 
Hobæk County 3 42.054 5 25.549 5 M 
Sorø County 4 31.471 4 32.395 5 M 
Præstø County 4 30.739 4 30.494 5 M 
Bornholm County 2 24.067 2 24.187 2 M 
Maribo County 6 22.556 6 21.950 5 M 
Odense County 8 30.733 10 26.475 9 M 
Svendborg County 7 21.382 6 24.861 5 M 
Hjørring County 7 24.241 6 29.630 7 P 
Thisted County 4 22.023 4 21.239 4 P 
Aalborg County 8 28.174 8 29.880 11 P 
Viborg County 5 31.126 7 23.033 6 P 
Randers County 4 41.834 7 24.319 7 P 
Aarhus County 9 22.030 9 24.655 11 P 
Skanderborg County 4 33.533 6 22.978 5 P 
Vejle County 8 25.139 10 21.371 10 P 
Ringkøbing County 8 23.355 9 22.864 7 P 
Ribe County 7 24.350 8 23.131 6 P 
Haderslev  County 7 29.310 9 24.516 8 P 
Sum/National average of inhabitants per seat 149 28.719 175 26.201 175  
Source: Statistisk årbog 1951, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1951:234-237 Tabel 240 (1950); 
Statistisk årbog 1961, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1962:306-309 Tabel 250 (1960); 
Statistisk årbog 1971, Danmarks Statistik, Copenhagen 1971:367 Tabel 297 (1968).  * Average for 
Copenhagen and Frederiksberg Boroughs. 
Table 2.6: Landstinget’s geographical representation 1947-1951. 
Constituency Seats C, M, P Number of inhabitants  
per seat 1950 
The capital 10 C 127.534 
Sjælland, Lolland and Falster (1951)  12 M 54.836 
Bornholm (1951)  1 M 48.134 
Fyn (1947)  6 M 65.923 
Sønderjylland (1951)  15 P 73.065 
Nordjylland (1947)  12 P 67.178 
Faeroes (1951)  1 P  
Sum constituencies (1947-51)/National average of inhabitants per district seat 1950 (57) 56  76.413 
Elected by the parties (1951) 19   
Total number of seats/ National average of inhabitants per seat 1950 76  56.305 
Source: Statistisk årbog 1951, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1951:2 Tabel 2, 238-241 Tabel 
241, 242 Tabel 243. 
Data Appendix 
427 
Table 2.7: Folketinget’s geographical representation 1980-2000. 
Constituency 1980 Inhabitants per 
seat 1980 
1990 Inhabitants per 
seat 1990 
2000 Inhabitants 
per seat 2000 
C, M, P 
Søndre storkreds 6  4  3  C 
Østre storkreds 12  10  10  C 
Vestre storkreds 6 24.464 * 4 30.685 * 5 32.557 * C 
København County 19 33.013 19 31.626 20 30.672 C 
Frederiksborg County 10 32.914 12 28.422 12 30.442 C 
Roskilde County 4 50.504 8 27.121 7 33.080 C 
Vestsjælland  County 9 30.870 10 28.364 9 32.787 M 
Storstrøm County 8 32.510 7 36.702 8 32.388 M 
Bornholm County 2 23.890 2 22.950 2 22.169 M 
Fyn County 18 25.165 15 30.624 15 31.465 M 
Sønderjylland County 7 35.707 8 31.327 8 31.685 P 
Ribe County 6 35.437 7 31.226 6 37.391 P 
Vejle County 12 27.148 13 25.415 12 28.962 P 
Ringkøbing County 9 29.195 11 24.300 10 27.286 P 
Århus County 19 30.206 21 28.435 22 28.960 P 
Viborg County 9 25.724 7 32.825 8 29.210 P 
Nordjylland County 19 25.333 17 28.503 18 27.453 P 
Sum/ National average of 
inhabitants per seat 
175 29.269 175 29.345 175 30.457  
Source: Statistisk årbog 1981, Danmarks Statistik, Copenhagen 1981:377 Tabel 342 (1979); Statistisk 
årbog 1991, Danmarks Statistik, Copenhagen 1991:82 Tabel 85 (1990); Statistisk årbog 2000, Danmarks 
Statistik, Copenhagen 2000:83 Tabel 71 (1998). * Average for Copenhagen and Frederiksberg 
Borroughs. 
Table 2.8: Folketinget’s absolute and relative geographical representation 1950-
2000, center, middle and periphery. 
Partition 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % 
Center 44 29,53 55 31,43 57 32,57 57 32,57 57 32,57 57 32,57 
Middle 34 22,82 37 21,14 36 20,57 37 21,14 34 19,43 34 19,43 
Periphery 71 47,65 83 47,43 82 46,86 81 46,29 84 48,00 84 48,00 
Sum 149 100,00 175 100,00 175 100,00 175 100,00 175 100,00 175 100,00 
Table 2.9: Landstinget’s absolute and relative geographical representation 1947-
1951, center, middle and periphery. 
District seats Seats % 
Center 10 18 
Middle 19 34 
Periphery 27 48 
Sum 56 100 
 
Data Appendix 
428 
Table 2.10: Folketinget’s political representation 1950-2000. 
Party 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 L, M, R 
Communist Party 7      L 
Left Socialists   4 6   L 
Unity List      5 L 
Socialist People's Party  11 11 11 15 13 L 
Social Democratic Party 59 76 62 68 69 63 L 
Radical Party 12 11 27 10 7 7 M 
Center Democrats    6 9 8 M 
Christian People's Party    5 4 4 M 
Justice Party 12   5   M 
Conservative Party 27 32 37 22 30 16 R 
Liberal Party 32 38 34 22 29 42 R 
Progress Party    20 12 4 R 
Danish People's Party      13 R 
Slesvig Party  1     R 
Others  6     R 
Sum 149 175 175 175 175 175  
Source: Statistisk årbog 1951, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1951:234-237 Tabel 240 (1950); 
Statistisk årbog 1961, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1962:306-309 Tabel 250 (1960); 
Statistisk årbog 1971, Danmarks Statistikk, Copenhagen 1971:367 Tabel 297 (1968); Statistisk årbog 
1981, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 1981:370-371 Tabel 341 (1979); Statistisk årbog 1991, Danmarks 
statistik, Copenhagen 1991:82 Tabel 85 (1990); Statistisk årbog 2000, Danmarks statistik, Copenhagen 
2000:83 Tabel 71 (1998). 
Table 2.11: Folketinget’s absolute political balance 1950-2000. 
Parties 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Leftwing parties 66 87 77 85 84 81 
Middle parties 24 11 27 26 20 19 
Rightwing parties 59 77 71 64 71 75 
Sum 149 175 175 175 175 175 
Table 2.12: Folketinget’s relative political balance 1950-2000. 
Parties 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Leftwing parties 44,30 49,71 44,00 48,57 48,00 46,29 
Middle parties 16,11 6,29 15,43 14,86 11,43 10,86 
Rightwing parties 39,60 44,00 40,57 36,57 40,57 42,86 
Sum 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
Table 2.13: Landstinget’s political representation 1951. 
Party 1951 L, R, M 
Communist Party 1 L 
Social Democrats 33 L 
Radical Party 6 M 
Liberal Party 22 R 
Justice Party 1 R 
Conservative Party 12 R 
Faeroes 1 M 
Sum 76  
Source: Statisktisk årbog 1951, Det Statistiske Departement, Copenhagen 1951:242 Tabel 243. 
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Table 2.14: Landstinget’s absolute and relative political balance 1951. 
Party 1951 % 
Leftwing parties 34 45 
Middle parties 7 9 
Rightwing parties 35 46 
Sum 76 100 
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Table 2.15: Approximate tax financed Danish road investments 1950-2000. 
Year Road 
investments 
millions DKK, 
all categories 
roads 
Road investments 
millions 1990 DKK 
Road inv mill 
1990 PPP USD 
GDP millons 1990 
Geary-Khamis 
dollars 
Tax financed road 
investments as % of 
GDP 
1950/51 772 809,1 92,89 29 852 0,31 
1951/52 719 753,5 86,51 30 144 0,29 
1952/53 954 999,8 114,79 31 859 0,36 
1953/54 1483 1554,2 178,44 32 478 0,55 
1954/55 1338 1402,2 160,99 32 828 0,49 
1955/56 1390 1456,7 167,25 33 225 0,50 
1956/57 1606 1683,1 193,24 35 746 0,54 
1957/58 1488 1559,4 179,04 36 551 0,49 
1958/59 1498 1569,9 180,24 39 270 0,46 
1959/60 1661 1740,7 199,85 40 367 0,50 
1960/61 1740 1823,5 209,36 42 926 0,49 
1961/62 1684 1764,8 202,62 45 295 0,45 
1962/63 1588 1664,2 191,07 45 579 0,42 
1963/64 1689 1770,1 203,22 49 843 0,41 
1964/65 2216 2322,4 266,63 52 117 0,51 
1965/66 3247 3402,9 390,68 53 539 0,73 
1966/67 3264 3420,7 392,73 55 339 0,71 
1967/68 3606 3779,1 433,88 57 613 0,75 
1968/69 4308 4514,8 518,34 61 283 0,85 
1969/70 4058 4252,8 488,26 62 524 0,78 
1970/71 4737 4964,4 569,96 64 191 0,89 
1971/72 5280 5533,4 635,30 67 578 0,94 
1972/73 1209 4731,5 543,22 70 032 0,78 
1973/74 1071 3834,8 440,27 69 379 0,63 
1974/75 1295 4021,5 461,71 68 921 0,67 
1975/76 1704 4828,2 554,32 73 382 0,76 
1976/77 1657 4307,3 494,53 74 573 0,66 
1977/78 2012 4707,6 540,48 75 674 0,71 
1978 2027 4742,7 544,51 75 674 0,69 
1979 2194 4666,8 535,79 78 356 0,69 
1980 2242 4351,1 499,56 78 010 0,65 
1981 1912 3304,3 379,37 77 316 0,48 
1982 2018 3122,2 358,46 79 650 0,44 
1983 1954 2745,8 315,25 81 656 0,37 
1984 1916 2518,6 289,17 85 241 0,33 
1985 2097 2593,2 297,73 88 897 0,32 
1986 1972 2329,1 267,41 92 135 0,29 
1987 1807 2058,1 236,29 92 406 0,25 
1988 1866 2043,6 234,62 93 482 0,25 
1989 1780 1865,4 214,17 93 728 0,23 
1990 1419 1419,0 162,92 94 863 0,17 
1991 1358 1326,2 152,26 96 184 0,16 
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1992 1488 1423,2 163,40 97 413 0,17 
1993 1762 1663,7 191,01 98 232 0,18 
1994 2218 2053,2 235,73 103 884 0,22 
1995 2578 2337,3 268,35 107 713 0,24 
1996 2971 2638,2 302,90 110 406 0,27 
1997 2990 2598,0 298,27 113 745 0,26 
1998 2908 2482,0 284,96 116 545 0,24 
1999 3119 2597,2 298,19 119 238 0,24 
2000 3800 3075,1 353,05 122 793 0,28 
Sources: 1950/51-1971/72 (1989 millions DKK), Trafikministeriet, Planlægningsafdelingen in Jørgensen 
(2001433 Tabell V.3); 1972/73-2003 Vejdirektoratet, Vejudgifter [Online June 3nd 2005] – URL: 
http://www.vejdirektoratet.dk/dokument.asp?page=document&objno=79746; 1999-2000, 
Virksomhedsregnskab 2000, Vejdirektoratet København 2001:21; GDP figures are from Angus 
Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003:50-52 Table 1b.  
The conversions to 1990 DKK and 1990 PPP in the years with fiscal years deviating from the calendar 
years are simplified and based on the last year, because these calculations are only approximations to 
indicate the investment level. 
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Table 3.1: The Swedish counties’ settlement and area 1950-2000. 
County 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Area (km2) C, M, P 
Stockholm County  1.101.017 1.271.014 1.478.012 1.528 200 1.641.669 1.823.210 6519,3 C 
Uppsala County 154.660 167.722 217.730 243.585 268.835 294.196 7036,7 C 
Södermanland County 214.012 227.807 248.413 252.536 255.636 256.033 6103,1 C 
Östergötland County 347.537 357.601 382.674 392.789 403.011 411.345 10.604,6 M 
Jönköping County 271.443 285.348 306.648 303.156 308.290 311.180 10.495,4 M 
Kronoberg County 157.638 158.867 166.736 173.691 177.882 176.639 8467,3 M 
Kalmar County 236.774 235.612 241.026 241.581 241.102 235.391 11.219,1 P 
Gotland County 58.995 54.196 53.723 55.346 57.108 57.313 3151,4 P 
Blekinge County 146.090 144.466 153.585 153.542 150.564 150.392 2946,7 P 
Skåne County 841.067 882.481 983.767 1.023.479 1.068.587 1.129.424 11035,4 M 
Halland County 163.455 169.995 193.108 230.924 254.725 275.004 5461,6 M 
Västra Götaland County 1.164.175 1.250.301 1.376.298 1.406.377 1.458.166 1.511.290 23.956,1 M 
Värmland County 281.396 291.074 284.688 284.070 283.110 275.003 17.591,3 P 
Örebro County 246.950 262.321 276.798 274.356 272.513 273.615 8546,3 C 
Västmanland County 203.553 232.973 260.293 259.538 258.487 256.889 6317,9 C 
Dalarna County 267.081 286.047 277.057 286.968 289.067 278.259 28.195,6 M 
Gävleborg County 284.934 293.246 293.458 294.020 289.294 279.262 18.200,1 P 
Västernorrland County 283.750 285.676 273.456 267.935 261.155 246.903 21.684,5 P 
Jämtland County 144.063 139.799 125.243 134.934 135.726 129.566 49.343,1 P 
Västerbotten County 231.750 239.619 233.134 243.856 251.968 255.640 55.189,7 P 
Norrbotten County 241.489 261.802 255.369 267.054 263.735 256.238 98.249 P 
Sum 7.041.829 7.497.967 8.081.216 8.317.937 8.590.630 8.882.792 410.335,4  
Source: Folkmängd efter region och tid [Online April 14th 2005] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp20054141005228BE0101E1.xls (Settlement); Statistisk 
årbok för Sverige 2004, Statistisk centralbyrå, Stockholm 2003:13-17 (area). 
Table 3.2: The Swedish counties’ relative settlement and area 1950-2000. 
County 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % Area % C, M, P 
Stockholm County 15,64 16,95 18,29 18,37 19,11 20,53 1,59 C 
Uppsala County 2,20 2,24 2,69 2,93 3,13 3,31 1,71 C 
Södermanland County 3,04 3,04 3,07 3,04 2,98 2,88 1,49 C 
Östergötland County 4,94 4,77 4,74 4,72 4,69 4,63 2,58 M 
Jönköping County 3,85 3,81 3,79 3,64 3,59 3,50 2,56 M 
Kronoberg County 2,24 2,12 2,06 2,09 2,07 1,99 2,06 M 
Kalmar County 3,36 3,14 2,98 2,90 2,81 2,65 2,73 P 
Gotland County 0,84 0,72 0,66 0,67 0,66 0,65 0,77 P 
Blekinge County 2,07 1,93 1,90 1,85 1,75 1,69 0,72 P 
Skåne County 11,94 11,77 12,17 12,30 12,44 12,71 2,69 M 
Halland County 2,32 2,27 2,39 2,78 2,97 3,10 1,33 M 
Västra Götaland County 16,53 16,68 17,03 16,91 16,97 17,01 5,84 M 
Värmland County 4,00 3,88 3,52 3,42 3,30 3,10 4,29 P 
Örebro County 3,51 3,50 3,43 3,30 3,17 3,08 2,08 C 
Västmanland County 2,89 3,11 3,22 3,12 3,01 2,89 1,54 C 
Dalarna County 3,79 3,81 3,43 3,45 3,36 3,13 6,87 M 
Gävleborg County 4,05 3,91 3,63 3,53 3,37 3,14 4,44 P 
Västernorrland County 4,03 3,81 3,38 3,22 3,04 2,78 5,28 P 
Jämtland County 2,05 1,86 1,55 1,62 1,58 1,46 12,03 P 
Västerbotten County 3,29 3,20 2,88 2,93 2,93 2,88 13,45 P 
Norrbotten County 3,43 3,49 3,16 3,21 3,07 2,88 23,94 P 
Sum 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,0  
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Table 3.3: Sweden’s settlement and area 1950-2000, center, middle and periphery. 
Partition 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Area (km2) 
Center 1.920.192 2.161.837 2.481.246 2.558.215 2.697.140 2.903.943 34 523,3 
Middle 3.212.396 3.390.640 3.686.288 3.817.384 3.959.728 4.093.141 98 216 
Periphery 1.909.241 1.945.490 1.913.682 1.942.338 1.933.762 1.885.708 277 574,9 
Sum 7.041.829 7.497.967 8.081.216 8.317.937 8.590.630 8.882.792 410 335,4 
Table 3.4: Sweden’s relative settlement and area 1950-2000, center, middle and 
periphery. 
Partition 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % Area % 
Center 27,27 28,83 30,70 30,76 31,40 32,69 8,41 
Middle 45,62 45,22 45,62 45,89 46,09 46,08 23,94 
Periphery 27,11 25,95 23,68 23,35 22,51 21,23 67,65 
Sum 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
Table 3.5: Riksdagen’s First Chamber’s geographical representation 1950-1970. 
Constituency/Seats 1950 Inhabitants per 
seat 1950 
1960 Inhabitants per 
seat 1960 
1970 Inhabitants per 
seat 1970 
C, M, P 
Stockholm City 14 53.153 16 50.518 16  C 
Stockholm County and Uppsala County 10 51.153 11 57.313 13 58.474 ** C 
Södermanland County and 
Västmanland County 
9 46.396 9 51.198 9 56.523 C 
Östergötland County and Norrköping 
City 
7 49.648 7 51.086 7 54.668 M 
Jönköping County 6 45.241 6 47.558 6 51.108 M 
Kronobärg County and Halland County 7 45.870 7 50.282 7 51.406 M 
Kalmar County and Gotland County 7 42.253 6 48.301 6 49.125 P 
Blekinge County and Kristianstad 
County 
9 44.980 9 44.540 8 52.219 P 
Malmöhus County with Malmö City and 
Helsingborg City 
12 48.528 12 52.174 13 55.354 M 
Gothenburg City  7  8  8  M 
Gothenburg and Bohus County 5 46.400 * 5 48.128 * 5 55.022 * M 
Älvsborg County 8 44.874 8 46.835 7 57.673 M 
Skaraborg County 6 41.398 5 49.990 5 51.460 M 
Värmland County 6 46.899 6 48.512 6 47.448 P 
Örebro County 5 49.390 5 52.464 5 55.360 C 
Kopparberg County 6 44.514 6 47.675 6 46.176 M 
Gävleborg County and Gävle City 6 47.489 6 48.874 6 48.910 P 
Västernorrlan County and Jämtland 
County 
10 42.781 9 45.658 8 51.148 P 
Västerbotten County and Norrbotten 
County 
10 47.324 10 50.142 10 48.850 P 
Sum/National average inhabitants per 
seat 
150 46.946 151 49.655 151 53.518  
Sources: Riksdagsmatrikel 1950, Stockholm 1950; Riksdagsmatrikel 1960, Stockholm 1960; 
Riksdagsmatrikel 1970, Stockholm 1970. * Included Gothenburg City. ** Included Stockholm City. 
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Table 3.6: Riksdagen’s Second Chamber’s geographical representation 1950-1970. 
Constituency/Seats 1950 Inhabitants per 
seat 1950 
1960 Inhabitants per 
seat 1960 
1970 Inhabitants per seat 
1970 
C, M, P 
Stockholm City 24 31.006 25 32.332 22  C 
Stockholm County 12 29.740 14 33.051 19 36.049 **** C 
Uppsala County 5 30.932 5 33.544 6 36.288 C 
Södermanlän County 7 30.573 7 32.544 7 35.488 C 
Östergötland County 11 31.594 11 32.509 11 34.789 M 
Jönköping County 9 30.160 9 31.705 9 34.072 M 
Kronoberg County 5 31.528 5 31.773 5 33.347 M 
Kalmar County 8 29.597 7 33.659 7 34.432 P 
Gotland County 3 19.665 3 18.065 3 17.908 P 
Blekinge County 5 29.218 5 28.893 5 30.717 P 
Kristianstad County 9 28.748 8 32.049 8 33.021 M 
Malmö, Helsingborg, Landskrona 
and Lund Cities 
10  11  12  M 
Malmöhus County 9 30.649 * 8 32.952 * 8 35.980 * M 
Halland County 5 32.691 5 33.999 5 38.622 M 
Gothenburg City 11  12  13  M 
Gothenburg and Bohus County 7 30.933 ** 7 32.930 ** 7 35.764 ** M 
Älvsborg County, northern 
constituency 
6  6  6  M 
Älvsborg County, southern 
constituency  
5 32.635 *** 5 34.062 *** 5 36.701 *** M 
Skaraborg County 8 31.049 8 31.244 7 36.757 M 
Värmland County 9 31.266 9 32.342 8 35.586 P 
Örebro County 8 30.869 8 32.790 8 34.600 C 
Västmanland County 6 33.926 7 33.282 7 37.185 C 
Kopparberg County 9 29.676 9 31.783 8 34.632 M 
Gävleborg County 9 31.659 9 32.583 9 32.606 P 
Västernorrland County 9 31.528 9 31.742 8 34.182 P 
Jämtland County 5 28.813 5 27.960 5 25.049 P 
Västerbotten County 8 28.969 7 34.231 7 33.305 P 
Norrbotten County 8 30.186 8 32.725 8 31.921 P 
Sum/ National average inhabitants 
per seat 
230 30.617 232 32.319 233 34.683  
Sources: Riksdagsmannavalen åren 1945-1948, Sveriges officiella statistik Allmänna val, Statistiska 
Centralbyrån, Stockholm 1949:6-7 Tab. 3; Riksdagsmannavalen åren 1959-1960 I, Sveriges officiella 
statistik Allmänna val, Statistiska Centralbyrån, Stockholm 1960:12-13 Tab. 2, 14-19 Tab. 3; 
Riksdagsmannavalen åren 1965-1968 Del I. Andrakammarvalen 1968, huvudresultatet, Sveriges 
officiella statistik Allmänna val, Statistiska Centralbyrån, Sthl 1969:20 Tabell 5. * included the three-city 
constituency. ** included Gothenburg City. *** both Älvsborg County’s constituencies. **** included 
Stockholm City. 
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Table 3.7: The unicameral Riksdagen’s geographical representation 1970-2000. 
Constituency/Seats 1970 Inhabitants 
per seat 1970
1980 Inhabitants 
per seat 1980
1990 Inhabitants 
per seat 1990
2000 Inhabitants 
per seat 2000 
C, M, P 
Stockholm City 36  31  30  28  C 
Stockholm County 28 23.094 * 33 23.878 * 37 24.503 * 38 27.624 * C 
Uppsala County 8 27.216 10 24.359 12 22.403 12 24.516 C 
Södermanlän County 11 22.583 11 22.958 9 28.404 10 25.603 C 
Östergötland County 17 22.510 17 23.105 17 23.707 17 24.197 M 
Jönköping County 13 23.588 13 23.320 11 28.026 13 23.937 M 
Kronoberg County 7 23.819 7 24.813 6 29.647 7 25.234 M 
Kalmar County 11 21.911 10 24.158 10 24.110 9 26.155 P 
Gotland County 2 26.862 2 27.673 2 28.554 2 28.657 P 
Blekinge County 6 25.598 6 25.590 6 25.094 6 25.065 P 
Kristianstad County 12 22.014 11 25.472 12 24.107 12 24.121 M 
Malmö, Helsingborg, 
Landskrona and Lund 
Cities 
21  21  20  18  M 
Malmöhus County 11 22.487 ** 11 23.228 ** 13 23.615 ** 13 27.096 ** M 
Halland County 8 24.139 10 23.092 11 23.157 12 22.917 M 
Göteborgs City 20  19  19  17  M 
Göteborg and Bohus 
County 
10 23.843 *** 11 23.707 *** 12 23.869 *** 13 26.439 *** M 
Älvsborg County, 
northern constituency 
9  9  11  12  M 
Älvsborg County, 
southern constituency  
7 25.232 **** 8 25.027 **** 6 25.964 **** 6 24.818 **** M 
Skaraborg County 11 23.391 10 26.973 11 25.166 10 27.141 M 
Värmland County 14 20.335 12 23.673 12 23.593 12 22.917 P 
Örebro County 12 23.067 12 22.863 11 24.774 13 21.047 C 
Västmanland County 11 23.663 11 23.594 10 25.849 10 25.689 C 
Kopparberg County 12 23.088 13 22.074 12 24.089 11 25.296 M 
Gävleborg County 13 22.574 13 22.617 12 24.108 12 23.272 P 
Västernorrland County 13 21.035 12 22.328 12 21.763 10 24.690 P 
Jämtland County 5 25.049 5 26.987 5 27.145 5 25.913 P 
Västerbotten County 10 23.313 10 24.386 10 25.197 12 21.303 P 
Norrbotten County 12 21.281 11 24.278 10 26.374 9 28.471 P 
Sum/ National average 
inhabitants per seat 
350 23.089 349 23.834 349 24.615 349 25.452  
Source: Allmänna valen 1970, Del 1. Riksdagsvalet den 20 september 1970, Sveriges offisiella statistik, 
Statistisk centralbyrå, Stockholm 1971:24 Tabell 6; Riksdagsledamöter efter region, parti, kön och tid 
[Online June 14th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp20046141555618ME0104A6.xls (1979); 
Riksdagsledamöter efter region, parti, kön och tid [Online June 14th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp200461415105587ME0104A6.xls (1988); 
Riksdagsledamöter efter region, parti, kön och tid [Online June 14th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp200461415144094ME0104A6.xls (1998). 1988 dataset 
supplementet with NSD’s sve88.por and sve88.txt files because of 1 missing member of Riksdagen 
(Environmental Party, Kristianstad County). * included Stockholm City. ** included the three-city 
constituency. *** included Gothenburg City. **** both Älvsborg County’s constituencies. 
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Table 3.8: Riksdagen’s First Chamber’s absolute and relative geographical 
representation 1950-1970, center, middle and periphery. 
Partition 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 
Center 38 25,33 41 27,15 43 28,48 
Middle 64 42,67 64 42,38 64 42,38 
Periphery 48 32,00 46 30,46 44 29,14 
Sum 150 100,00 151 100,00 151 100,00 
Table 3.9: Riksdagen’s Second Chamber’s absolute and relative geographical 
representation 1950-1970, center, middle and periphery. 
Partition 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 
Center 62 26,96 66 28,45 69 29,61 
Middle 104 45,22 104 44,83 104 44,64 
Periphery 64 27,83 62 26,72 60 25,75 
Sum 230 100,00 232 100,00 233 100,00 
Table 3.10: The unicameral Riksdagen’s absolute and relative geographical 
representation 1970-2000, center, middle and periphery. 
Partition 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % 
Center 106 30,29 108 30,95 109 31,23 111 31,81 
Middle 158 45,14 160 45,85 161 46,13 161 46,13 
Periphery 86 24,57 81 23,21 79 22,64 77 22,06 
Sum 350 100,00 349 100,00 349 100,00 349 100,00 
Table 3.11: Riksdagen’s First Chamber’s political representation 1950-1970. 
Party 1950 1960 1970 L, M, R 
Communist Party 3 2 1 L 
Social Democratic Party 81 78 79 L 
Liberal Party 19 32 27 M 
Agrarian Party 24 22 21 M 
Conservative Party 23 17 23 R 
Sum 150 151 151  
Sources: Riksdagsmatrikel 1950, Stockholm 1950; Riksdagsmatrikel 1960, Stockholm 1960; 
Riksdagsmatrikel 1970, Stockholm 1970. 
Table 3.12: Riksdagen’s First Chamber’s absolute and relative political balance 
1950-1970. 
Parties 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 
Left parties 84 56,00 80 52,98 80 52,98 
Middle parties 43 28,67 54 35,76 48 31,79 
Right parties 23 14,33 17 11,26 23 15,23 
Sum 150 100,00 151 100,00 151 100,00 
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Table 3.13: Riksdagen’s Second Chamber’s political representation 1950-1970. 
Party 1950 1960 1970 L, M, R 
Communist Party 8 5 3 L 
Social Democratic Party 112 111 125 L 
Liberal Party 57 38 34 M 
Agrarian Party 30 32 39 M 
Conservative Party 23 45 32 R 
Sum 230 231 233  
Source: Riksdagamannavalen åren 1949-52, Sveriges officiella statistik allmänna val, Statistiska 
centralbyrån, Stockholm 1953:74-75 Tab 3 (1948); Riksdagamannavalen åren 1957-58 I, Sveriges 
officiella statistik allmänna val, Statistiska centralbyrån, Stockholm 1958:10-11 Tab 2 (1958); 
Riksdagsmannavalen 1965-1968. Del 1. Andrakammarvalet 1968, hovudresultat, Statistiska centralbyrån, 
Stockholm 1969:20 Tabell 5 (1968); Riksdagens sammansättning 1929-2002 [Online April 18th 2005] - 
URL: http://www.scb.se; Riksdagsmatrikel 1969, Stockholm 1969. 
Table 3.14: Riksdagen’s Second Chamber’s absolute and relative political balance 
1950-1970. 
Parties 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 
Left parties 120 52,17 116 50,22 128 54,94 
Middle parties 87 37,83 70 30,30 73 31,33 
Right parties 23 10,00 45 19,48 32 13,73 
Sum 230 100,00 231 100,00 233 100,00 
Table 3.15: The unicameral Riksdagen’s political representation 1970-2000. 
Party 1970 1980 1990 2000 L, M, R 
Communist/Left Party 17 20 21 43 L  
Social Democratic Party 163 154 156 131 L 
Green Party   20 16 M 
Liberal Party 58 38 44 17 M 
Christian Party    42 M 
Agrarian Party 71 64 42 18 M 
Conservative Party 41 73 66 82 R 
Sum 350 349 349 349  
Source: Riksdagens sammansättning 1929-2002 [Online April 18th 2005] - URL: http://www.scb.se. 
Table 3.16: The unicameral Riksdagen’s absolute and relative political balance 
1970-2000. 
Parties 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % 
Leftwing parties 180 51,43 174 49,86 177 50,72 174 49,86 
Middle parties 129 36,86 102 29,23 106 30,37 93 26,65 
Rightwing parties 41 11,71 73 20,92 66 18,91 82 23,50 
Sum 350 100,00 349 100,00 349 100,00 349 100,00 
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Table 3.17: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1970-1973, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 2   2 
Middle 3, DL 4, L 2 9 
Periphery 3 1  4 
Sum 8 5 2 15 
Sources: Förteckning över Riksdagens utskott m.fl. 1971, Riksdagen, Stockholm 1971:34-35; Allmänna 
valen 1970, Del 1. Riksdagsvalet den 20 september 1970, Sveriges offisiella statistik, Statistisk 
centralbyrå, Stockholm 1971:24 Tabell 6. 
Table 3.18: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1973-1976, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 2   2 
Middle 2, DL 4, L 2 8 
Periphery 3 2  5 
Sum 7 6 2 15 
Sources: Förteckning över Riksdagens utskott m. fl. 1974, Riksdagen, Stockholm 1974:34-35; 
Riksdagsledamöter efter region, parti, kön och tid [Online June 14th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp20046141515287ME0104A6.xls   
Table 3.19: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1976-1979, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 3 1  4 
Middle 2, L 3 3, DL 8 
Periphery 2 1  3 
Sum 7 5 3 15 
Sources: Förteckning över Riksdagens utskott m. fl. 1978/79, Riksdagen, Stockholm 1978:34-35; 
Riksdagsledamöter efter region, parti, kön och tid [Online June 14th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp20046141543411ME0104A6.xls; SCB’s dataset has 
been corrected through NSD’s dataset “elswe45.por” because of one Agrarian representative too many in 
Västerbotten County (350 rather than 349 seats). 
Table 3.20: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1979-1982, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 3, L  1 4 
Middle 2 2 2, DL 6 
Periphery 2 3  5 
Sum 7 5 3 15 
Sources: Förteckning över Riksdagens ledamöter Riksdagens utskott m. fl. 1979/80, Riksdagen, 
Stockholm 1980:62; Riksdagen 1981/82. Uppgifter om ledamöter och riksdagsorgan, Riksdagen, 
Stockholm 1981:60; Riksdagsledamöter efter region, parti, kön och tid [Online June 14th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp20046141555618ME0104A6.xls  
Data Appendix 
439 
Table 3.21: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1982-1985, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 2 3, DL 2 7 
Middle 2  2 4 
Periphery 4, L   4 
Sum 8 3 4 15 
Sources: Riksdagen 1982/83. Uppgifter om ledamöter och riksdagsorgan, Riksdagen, Stockholm 
1982:96; Riksdagsledamöter efter region, parti, kön och tid [Online June 14th 2004] – URL: 
http://www.ssd.scb.se/databaser/makro/temp/tmp20046141574534ME0104A6.xls  
Table 3.22: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1985-1988, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 1 1 1 3 
Middle 4, L 1 2, DL 7 
Periphery 3 2  5 
Sum 8 4 3 15 
Source: Riksdagens förvaltningskontor, Fakta om folkvalda. Riksdagen 1985-1988, Liber Allmänna 
Förlaget, Stockholm 1986:330.  
Table 3.23: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1988-1991, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center  1 1 2 
Middle 6 3 2, DL 11 
Periphery 3, L  1 4 
Sum 9 4 4 17 
Source: Riksdagen, Fakta om folkvalda. Riksdagen 1988-1991, Liber Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm 
1989:336.  
Table 3.24: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1991-1994, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 1 1 1 3 
Middle 3 2 4, DL 9 
Periphery 3, L   3 
Sum 7 3 5 15 
Source: Riksdagens förvaltningskontor, Fakta om folkvalda. Riksdagen 1991-1994, Sveriges Riksdag, 
Stockholm 1992:343.  
Table 3.25: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1994-1998, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 2 1 2 5 
Middle 2 1 2. DL 5 
Periphery 6, L 1  7 
Sum 10 3 4 17 
Source: Riksdagens förvaltningskontor, Fakta om folkvalda. Riksdagen 1994-1998, Stockholm 1995:383.  
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Table 3.26: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 1998-2002, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 1 1 1 3 
Middle 2 3, DL 2 7 
Periphery 5, L 1 1 7 
Sum 8 5 4 17 
Source: Riksdagens förvaltningskontor, Fakta om folkvalda. Riksdagen 1998-2002, Stockholm 1999:402.  
Table 3.27: Riksdagen’s Standing Traffic Committee 2002-2006, geographical and 
political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing parties Middle parties Rightwing parties Sum 
Center 1, 1st DL 2 1 4 
Middle 4 2, L,  1, 2nd DL 7 
Periphery 3 2 1 6 
Sum 8 6 3 17 
Source: Riksdagens förvaltningskontor, Fakta om folkvalda. Riksdagen 2002-2006, Stockholm 2003:313.  
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Table 3.28: Approximate Swedish tax financed road investments 1936-2000. 
Year Road investments, millions current SEK Road 
investments 
1990 millions 
SEK 
Road 
investments 
1990 
millions 
PPP USD 
GDP 
millions 
1990 
Geary-
Khamis 
dollars 
Tax financed 
State road 
investments as 
% of GDP 
1936 338,1 3 844,80 435,42 27 949 1,56 
1937 270 3 070,38 347,72 29 272 1,19 
1938 287,6 3 270,53 370,39 29 759 1,24 
1939 264,4 3 006,70 340,51 31 813 1,07 
1940 169 1 921,83 217,65 30 873 0,70 
1941 157,1 1 786,51 202,32 31 395 0,64 
1942 152,6 1 735,33 196,53 33 309 0,59 
1943 146 1 660,28 188,03 34 789 0,54 
1944 141,3 1 606,83 181,97 35 972 0,51 
1945 138,7 1 577,27 178,63 36 947 0,48 
1946 140,6 1 598,87 181,07 41 001 0,44 
1947 176,3 2 004,85 227,05 42 011 0,54 
1948 220,5 2 507,48 283,97 43 316 0,66 
1949 NA NA NA 44 900 NA 
1950 160 1 712,89 193,99 47 269 0,41 
1951 233 2 455,11 278,04 49 148 0,57 
1952 346 3 118,73 353,20 49 845 0,71 
1953 450 3 783,72 428,51 51 237 0,84 
1954 400 3 343,25 378,62 53 395 0,71 
1955 451 3 735,89 423,09 54 944 0,77 
1956 509 4 117,51 466,31 57 032 0,82 
1957 577 4 445,33 503,43 59 591 0,84 
1958 655 4 828,95 546,88 59 887 0,91 
1959 883 6 241,48 706,85 61 714 1,15 
1960 920 6 451,41 730,62 64 986 1,12 
1961 930 6 264,68 709,48 68 710 1,03 
1962 1012 6 670,30 755,41 71 599 1,06 
1963 1293 8 132,09 920,96 75 411 1,22 
1964 1457 8 896,64 1 007,55 80 562 1,25 
1965 1536 9 097,02 1 030,24 83 643 1,23 
1966 1605 9 035,81 1 023,31 85 383 1,20 
1967 1788 9 442,84 1 069,40 88 272 1,21 
1968 1803 9 155,82 1 036,90 91 475 1,13 
1969 1903 9 474,15 1 072,95 96 056 1,12 
1970 1987 9 632,27 1 090,86 102 275 1,07 
1971 1983 8 992,41 1 018,39 103 241 0,99 
1972 2234 9 432,62 1 068,25 105 564 1,01 
1973 2151 8 568,08 970,34 109 794 0,88 
1974 2338 8 728,17 988,47 113 306 0,87 
1975 2489 8 454,85 957,51 116 198 0,82 
1976 2626 8 124,07 920,05 117 428 0,78 
1977 2613 7 322,33 829,26 115 553 0,72 
1978 3029 7 626,30 863,68 117 577 0,73 
1979 3229 7 384,06 836,25 122 092 0,68 
1980 3273 6 981,98 790,71 124 130 0,64 
1981 2943 5 526,42 625,87 124 113 0,50 
1982 2973 4 980,16 564,00 125 358 0,45 
1983 3651 5 636,77 638,37 127 555 0,50 
1984 3818 5 412,86 613,01 132 717 0,46 
1985 3145 4 128,46 467,55 135 277 0,35 
Data Appendix 
442 
1986 3119 3 812,22 431,74 138 381 0,31 
1987 3393 3 979,96 450,73 142 733 0,32 
1988 3853 4 337,37 491,21 145 946 0,34 
1989 4872 5 183,81 587,07 149 415 0,39 
1990 5500 5 500,00 622,88 151 451 0,41 
1991 NA NA NA 149 760 NA 
1992 3979,1 3 558,68 403,02 147 631 0,27 
1993 5621,9 4 802,20 543,85 144 353 0,38 
1994 8410,8 7 029,82 796,13 150 296 0,53 
1995 8949,6 7 297,71 826,47 155 843 0,53 
1996 7329 5 946,50 673,44 157 557 0,43 
1997 6509 5 254,91 595,12 160 830 0,37 
1998 7417 5 999,96 679,50 166 596 0,41 
1999 6398 5 149,89 583,23 174 077 0,34 
2000 5696 4 539,44 514,09 180 310 0,29 
Sources: 1936-1948 (1948 SEK), Kungliga Väg och Vattenbyggnadsstyrelsen bilagt Bilidustriföreningens 
protokoll 27. Mars 1950 in Blomkvist (2001:244 Tabell 1); 1950-1990, SCB in Larsson (1993:242 Tabell 
6); 1992-93, Vägverkets årsredovisning 1993, Borlänge 1994:I:5; 1994-95, Vägverkets Årsredovisning 
98, Borlänge 1999:27; 1996-2000, Vägverkets årsredovisning 2000, Borlänge 2001:29; GDP figures are 
from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, 2003:51-53 Table 1b. 
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Table 4.1: The Norwegian counties’ settlement and area 1950-2000. 
County 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Area (km2)  C, M, P 
Østfold 185.492 202.751 221.386 233 301 238.345 248.217 3889 C 
Akershus 183.116 234.323 324 390 369 193 418.114 467.052 4587 C 
Oslo 434.365 475.663 481.548 452 023 461.644 507.467 427 C 
Hedmark 173.167 177.324 179.204 187 223 187.314 187.103 26.120 P 
Oppland 160.496 166.303 172.479 180 765 182.593 182.701 23.827 P 
Buskerud 156.220 168.351 198.852 214 571 225.261 236.811 13.856 C 
Vestfold 154.670 174.382 175.402 186 691 198.354 212.775 2140 C 
Telemark 136.519 149.943 156.778 162 050 162.869 165.038 14.186 M 
Aust-Agder 75.811 77.066 80.389 90 629 97.314 102.178 8485 M 
Vest-Agder 96.942 109.083 124.171 136 718 145.091 155.691 6817 M 
Rogaland 211.512 239.052 268.684 305 490 337.906 373.210 8553 M 
Hordaland incl. Bergen 311.132 341.303 373.843 391 463 411.022 435.219 14.962 M 
Sogn and Fjordane 97.714 99.957 100.933 105 924 106.614 107.589 17.864 P 
Møre and Romsdal 19.1621 213.286 223.709 236 062 238.278 243.158 14.596 M 
Sør-Trøndelag 197.687 211.819 234.022 244 760 251.076 262.852 17.839 M 
Nord-Trøndelag 109.948 116.760 117.988 125 835 127.226 127.108 20.777 P 
Nordland 221.809 237.530 240.951 244 493 239.403 239.109 36.434 P 
Troms 117.564 127.771 136.805 146 818 146.816 151.160 25.015 P 
Finnmark 64.511 72.104 76.311 78 331 74.590 74.059 45.879 P 
Sum 3.280.296 3.594.771 3.887.845 4 092 340 4.249.830 4.478.497 306.253  
Source: Statistisk årbok 1970, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo 1970:6 Tabell 6; Statistisk årbok 1993, 
Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger, 1993:38 Tabell 15; Statistisk årbok 2000, Statistisk 
sentralbyrå, Oslo and Kongsvinger, 2000:69. 
Table 4.2: The Norwegian counties’ relative settlement and area 1950-2000. 
County 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % Area % C, M, P 
Østfold 5,65 5,64 5,69 5,70 5,61 5,54 1,27 C 
Akershus 5,58 6,52 8,34 9,02 9,84 10,43 1,50 C 
Oslo 13,24 13,23 12,39 11,05 10,86 11,33 0,14 C 
Hedmark 5,28 4,93 4,61 4,57 4,41 4,18 8,53 P 
Oppland 4,89 4,63 4,44 4,42 4,30 4,08 7,78 P 
Buskerud 4,76 4,68 5,11 5,24 5,30 5,29 4,52 C 
Vestfold 4,72 4,85 4,51 4,56 4,67 4,75 0,70 C 
Telemark 4,16 4,17 4,03 3,96 3,83 3,69 4,63 M 
Aust-Agder 2,31 2,14 2,07 2,21 2,29 2,28 2,77 M 
Vest-Agder 2,96 3,03 3,19 3,34 3,41 3,48 2,23 M 
Rogaland 6,45 6,65 6,91 7,46 7,95 8,33 2,79 M 
Hordaland incl. Bergen 9,48 9,49 9,62 9,57 9,67 9,72 4,89 M 
Sogn and Fjordane 2,98 2,78 2,60 2,59 2,51 2,40 5,83 P 
Møre and Romsdal 5,84 5,93 5,75 5,77 5,61 5,43 4,77 M 
Sør-Trøndelag 6,03 5,89 6,02 5,98 5,91 5,87 5,82 M 
Nord-Trøndelag 3,35 3,25 3,03 3,07 2,99 2,84 6,78 P 
Nordland 6,76 6,61 6,20 5,97 5,63 5,34 11,90 P 
Troms 3,58 3,55 3,52 3,59 3,45 3,38 8,17 P 
Finnmark 1,97 2,01 1,96 1,91 1,76 1,65 14,98 P 
Tot 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00  
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Table 4.3: Norway’s settlement and area 1950-2000, center, middle and periphery. 
Partition 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Area km2 
Center 1.113.863 1.255.470 1.401.578 1.455.779 1.541.718 1.672.322 24.899 
Middle 1.221.224 1.341.552 1.461.596 1.567.172 1.643.556 1.737.346 85.438 
Periphery 945.209 997.749 1.024.671 1.069.389 1.064.556 1.068.829 195.916 
Sum 3.280.296 3.594.771 3.887.845 4.092.340 4.249.830 4.478.497 306.253 
Table 4.4: Norway’s relative settlement and area 1950-2000, center, middle and 
periphery. 
Partition 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % Area % 
Center 33,96 34,92 36,05 35,57 36,28 37,34 8,13 
Middle 37,23 37,32 37,59 38,30 38,67 38,79 27,90 
Periphery 28,81 27,76 26,36 26,13 25,05 23,87 63,97 
Sum 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00 
Table 4.5: Stortinget’s geographical representation 1950. 
Constituency Seats Total no of seats 
per county * 
Inhabitants per seat 
per constituency 1950
Inhabitants 1950 
Østfold, rural areas 6 8 21.572 129.431 
Akershus, rural areas 7 9 25.740 180.177 
Hedmark, rural areas 7 8,5 22.772 159 403 
Opland, rural areas 6 7,5 24.618 147.707 
Buskerud, rural areas 5 8 23.308 116.538 
Vestfold, rural areas 4 8 27.137 108.548 
Telemark, rural areas 5 7,5 19.121 95.605 
Aust-Agder, rural areas 4 6,5 14.195 56.781 
Vest-Agder, rural areas 4 7,5 15.489 61.957 
Rogaland, rural areas 4 8,5 32.680 130.719 
Hordaland, rural areas 8 8 24.756 198.047 
Sogn and Fjordane 5 5 19.536 97.680 
Møre and Romsdal, rural areas 7 10 22.026 154.183 
Sør-Trøndelag, rural areas 6 8,5 23.515 141.089 
Nord-Trøndelag, rural areas 5 7,5 20.046 100.230 
Nordland, rural areas 8 10 23.828 190.626 
Troms, rural areas 5 6 20.464 102.320 
Finnmark, rural areas 3 4 18.160 54.481 
Cities in Østfold and Akershus 4  14.706 58.822 
Oslo  7 7 62.007 434.047 
Cities in Hedmark and Opland 3  8.793 26.378 
Cities in Buskerud 3  13.221 39.662 
Cities in Vestfold 4  11.509 46.034 
Cities in Telemark and Aust-Agder 5  11.955 59.773 
Cities in Vest-Agder and Rogaland 7  16.523 115.662 
Bergen  5 5 22.569 112.845 
Cities in Møre- and Romsdal 3  12.418 37.255 
Cities in Sør-Trøndelag and Nord-Trøndelag 5  13.260 66.299 
Cities in Nordland, Troms and Finnmark 4  14.062 56.247 
Sum/National average inhabitants per seat 150 150 21.857 3.278.546 
Source: Nordby (1985a:145-157) (seat allocation); Statistisk årbok for Norge 1960, Norges offisielle 
statistikk XII 24, Statistisk sentralbyrå, Oslo 1960:6 Tabell 5 (settlement). 
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Table 4.6 Stortingets’ geographical representation 1960-2000. 
Constituency/Seats 1960 Inhabitants 
per seat 
1960 
1970 Inhabitants 
per seat 
1970 
1980 Inhabitants 
per seat 
1980 
1990 Inhabitants 
per seat 
1990 
2000 Inhabitants 
per seat 
2000 
C, 
M, 
P 
Østfold County 8 25.344 8 27.673 8 29.163 9 26.483 8 31.027 C 
Akershus County 7 33.475 7 46.341 10 36.919 15 27.874 14 33.361 C 
Oslo County 13 36.589 13 37.042 15 30.135 16 28.853 17 29.851 C 
Hedmark County 8 22.166 8 22.401 8 23.403 8 23.414 9 20.789 P 
Opland County 7 23.758 7 24.640 7 25.824 7 26.085 7 26.100 P 
Buskerud County 7 24.050 7 28.407 7 30.653 7 32.180 7 33.830 C 
Vestfold County 7 24.912 7 25.057 7 26.670 7 28.336 7 30.396 C 
Telemark County 6 24.991 6 26.130 6 27.008 6 27.145 6 27.506 M 
Aust-Agder County 4 19.267 4 20.097 4 22.657 4 24.329 4 25.545 M 
Vest-Agder County 5 21.817 5 24.834 5 27.344 5 29.018 5 31.138 M 
Rogaland County 10 23.905 10 26.868 10 30.549 12 28.159 12 31.101 M 
Hordaland County 10 22.531  10 25.543 15 26.098 * 16 25.689 * 16 27.201 * M 
Bergen County 
(merged with 
Hordaland) 
5 23.076 5 25.118 -  -  -  M 
Sogn and Fjordane 
County 
5 19.991 5 20.187 5 21.185 5 21.323 5 21.518 P 
Møre and Romsdal 
County 
10 21.329 10 22.371 10 23.606 10 23.828 10 24.316 M 
Sør-Trøndelag 
County 
10 21.182 10 23.402 10 24.476 10 25.108 10 26.285 M 
Nord-Trøndelag 
County 
6 19.460 6 19.665 6 20.973 6 21.204 6 21.185 P 
Nordland County 12 19.794 12 20.079 12 20.374 12 19.950 12 19.926 P 
Troms County 6 21.295 6 22.801 6 24.470 6 24.469 6 25.193 P 
Finnmark County 4 18.026 4 19.078 4 19.583 4 18.648 4 18.515 P 
Sum/National average 
inhabitants per seat 
150 23.965 150 25.919 155 26.402 165 25.757 165 27.142  
Sources: Nordby (1985a:179-188, 212-221, 265-274); Torp (1990:200-235); Figved and Østbø 
(1998:208-250). * included Bergen. 
Table 4.7: Stortinget’s absolute and relative geographical representation 1950-
2000, center, middle and periphery. 
Partition 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % 
Center 40 26,67 42 28,00 42 28,00 47 30,32 54 32,73 53 32,12 
Middle 64 42,67 60 40,00 60 40,00 60 38,71 63 38,18 63 38,18 
Periphery 46 30,67 48 32,00 48 32,00 48 30,97 48 29,09 49 29,70 
Sum 150 100,00 150 100,00 150 100,00 155 100,00 165 100,00 165 100,00 
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Table 4.8: Stortinget’s political representation 1950-2000. 
Party 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 L, M, R 
Communist Party  1     L 
Socialist Left Party    2 16 9 L 
Labor Party 85 78 74 76 63 65 D 
Agrarian Party 12 15 20 12 11 11 D 
Liberal Party 21 15 13 2  6 D 
Christian People's Party 9 12 14 22 14 25 D 
Conservative Party 22 29 29 41 38 23 R 
Progress Party     22 25 R 
Others 1    1 1  
Sum 150 150 150 155 165 165  
Sources: Nordby (1985a:147-157, 179-188, 229-238, 265-274); Torp (1990:200-235); Figved and Østbø 
(1998:208-250). 
Table 4.9: Stortinget’s absolute and relative political balance 1950-2000. 
Parties 1950 % 1960 % 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 2000 % 
Leftwing parties 85 56,67 79 52,67 74 49,33 78 50,32 80 48,48 74 44,85 
Middle parties 42 28,00 42 28,00 47 31,33 36 23,23 25 15,15 42 25,45 
Rightwing parties 23 15,33 29 19,33 29 19,33 41 26,45 60 36,36 49 29,70 
Sum 150 100,00 150 100,00 150 100,00 155 100,00 165 100,00 165 100,00 
Table 4.10: Stortinget’s Standing Road and Railroad Committee 1946-1949, 
geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center   1 1 
Middle 3, L 2  5 
Periphery 3, DL 1, S 1 5 
Sum 6 3 2 11 
Source: Nordby (1985a:132-138, 141, 145). 
Table 4.11: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1950-1953, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center   2 2 
Middle 4, DL 3, S  7 
Periphery 3 1, L  4 
Sum 7 4 2 13 
Source: Nordby (1985a:147-153, 155-156, 160). 
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Table 4.12: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1954-1957, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1, (DL)   1 
Middle 4, DL, (L), S 2 1 7 
Periphery 2 2, L 1 5 
Sum 7 4 2 13 
Source: Nordby (1985a:163-170, 175). 
Table 4.13: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1958-1961, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1, DL   1 
Middle 4 3, L 1 8 
Periphery 2, S 1 1 4 
Sum 7 4 2 13 
Source: Nordby (1985a:179-187, 191). 
Table 4.14: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1961-1965, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1  1 2 
Middle 4, DL, (S) 2  6 
Periphery 2, S 2, L 1 5 
Sum 7 4 2 13 
Source: Nordby (1985a: 196-197, 200-202, 208). 
Table 4.15: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1965-1969, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1  1 2 
Middle 3 1, S  4 
Periphery 2, L 4, DL 1 7 
Sum 6 5 2 13 
Source: Nordby (1985a:212-214, 218, 220, 224). 
Table 4.16: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1969-1973, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1  1 2 
Middle 4, (L) 3, S  7 
Periphery 1(2), L 1, DL 1 (2) 3 (5) 
Sum 6 (7) 4 2 (3) 12 (14) 
Source: Nordby (1985a:229, 232-233, 235-237, 242). 
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Table 4.17: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1973-1977, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1  1 2 
Middle 2, DL 2, L 1, S 5 
Periphery 4 2 1 7 
Sum 7 4 3 14 
Source: Nordby (1985a:248-249, 254, 256, 260). 
Table 4.18: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1977-1981, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1  1 2 
Middle 3, DL 2, L 1, S 6 
Periphery 3 1 2 6 
Sum 7 3 4 14 
Source: Nordby (1985a:265, 269-270, 272-274, 278). 
Table 4.19: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1981-1985, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1  1 2 
Middle 2 1 2, S 5 
Periphery 3, L 1 2, DL 6 
Sum 6 2 5 13 
Source: Nordby (1985a:283, 286, 288, 290-291, 297). 
Table 4.20: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1985-1989, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1  1 2 
Middle 3 1 1 5 
Periphery 3, L 1, S 3, DL 7 
Sum 7 2 5 14 
Source: Torp (1986:32-33,40-41,49-50, 54-55, 92, 95-96, 98-99, 107, 111-112, 122-123, 127-128, 141, 
146-148, 187): 
Table 4.21: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1989-1993, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 2  3 5 
Middle 2 2, L 2 6 
Periphery 4, S  1, DL 5 
Sum 8 2 6 16 
Source: Torp (1990:74-76, 89, 94-95, 111-112, 115, 117, 123-125, 129, 130, 134, 138, 143-144, 150-151, 
180). 
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Table 4.22: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1993-1997, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 1, S  1 2 
Middle 4 3, L 2 9 
Periphery 2, DL 1  3 
Sum 7 4 3 14 
Source: Torp (1994:26-27, 34, 38, 60-61, 66, 111-112, 117, 126-128, 137, 143, 147, 172). 
Table 4.23: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
1997-2001, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 2  1 3 
Middle 2, (DL) 1, S 2, L 5 
Periphery 3, DL 3 1 7 
Sum 7 4 4 15 
Source: Figved og Østbø (1998:184); Komiteenes medlemmer”. [Online, September 13th 2001]. URL: 
http://www.stortinget.no/representantene/komiteer.html#SAMFERD. 
Table 4.24: Stortinget’s Standing Committee on Transport and Communications 
2001-2005, geographical and political representation. 
Constituencies/Parties Leftwing Middle Rightwing Sum 
Center 3 1 1 5 
Middle 1  2, L 3 
Periphery 2, 2nd DL 2, 1st DL 3 7 
Sum 6 3 6 15 
Source: Samferdselskomiteen 2001-2005 [Online June 28th 2005] – URL: http://www.stortinget.no  
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Table 4.25: Approximate Norwegian tax financed road investments 1934/35-2000  
Year Tax financed State 
road investments 
current millions 
NOK 
Approximately 
millions 1990 
NOK 
Approximately 
millions 1990 PPP 
USD 
GDP, millions 
1990 Geary-
Khamis dollars 
Tax financed road 
investment's % of 
GDP 
1934/35 12,3 253,6 26,69 11 302 0,24 
193/36 19,7 406,1 42,75 11 993 0,36 
1936/37 21,5 432,2 45,49 12 422 0,37 
1937/38 20 374,0 39,36 12 734 0,31 
1938/39 25,8 461,0 48,52 13 339 0,36 
1939/40 28,7 512,8 53,98 12 152 0,44 
1940/41 48,5 749,9 78,94 12 446 0,63 
1941/42 32,3 418,9 44,09 11 963 0,37 
1942/43 45,2 559,1 58,85 11 724 0,50 
1943/44 46,3 555,6 58,48 11 112 0,53 
1944/45 30,6 361,8 38,08 12 452 0,31 
1945/46 32,1 374,0 39,37 13 786 0,29 
1946/47 42,8 484,7 51,02 15 365 0,33 
1947/48 43,7 494,9 52,09 16 589 0,31 
1948/49 40,8 468,6 49,33 16 913 0,29 
1949/50 44,928 508,8 53,55 17 838 0,30 
1950/51 32,616 354,4 37,30 18 665 0,20 
1951/52 39,164 366,1 38,54 19 332 0,20 
1952/53 66,533 569,1 59,90 20 225 0,30 
1953/54 83,164 696,5 73,32 21 229 0,35 
1954/55 72,5 582,9 61,36 21 639 0,28 
1955/56 85,453 680,2 71,60 22 771 0,31 
1956/57 126,339 967,4 101,83 23 432 0,43 
1957/58 148,583 1106,1 116,43 23 218 0,50 
1958/59 216,687 1541,7 162,29 24 411 0,66 
1959/60 223,669 1550,3 163,19 25 813 0,63 
1961 228,584 1584,3 166,77 27 377 0,61 
1962 274,267 1853,0 195,06 28 159 0,69 
1963 308,269 1982,8 208,71 29 254 0,71 
1964 385,602 2422,1 254,95 30 662 0,83 
1965 447,933 2667,7 280,81 32 305 0,87 
1966 445,187 2538,5 267,21 33 556 0,80 
1967 516,037 2841,7 299,13 35 690 0,84 
1968 559,384 2958,8 311,46 36 498 0,85 
1969 752,272 3828,0 402,95 38 140 1,06 
1970 785,425 3898,0 410,32 38 902 1,05 
1971 857,760 3852,7 405,55 40 683 1,00 
1972 1011,931 4259,6 448,38 42 785 1,05 
1973 1070,609 4219,5 444,15 44 544 1,00 
1974 1233,710 4508,6 474,59 46 858 1,01 
1975 1323,440 4433,5 466,69 48 811 0,96 
1976 1552,706 4658,1 490,33 52 135 0,94 
1977 1781,472 4888,4 514,57 54 002 0,95 
1978 2003,252 5033,2 529,81 56 453 0,94 
1979 1934,229 4494,6 473,11 58 894 0,80 
1980 2102,655 4670,0 491,58 61 811 0,80 
1981 2173,821 4347,6 457,65 62 406 0,73 
1982 2235,934 3942,3 414,98 62 514 0,66 
1983 2463,243 3898,5 410,37 64 729 0,63 
1984 2529,656 3691,2 388,55 68 530 0,57 
1985 2620,923 3595,9 378,52 72 105 0,52 
1986 2690,657 3494,8 367,87 74 687 0,49 
1987 2863,900 3473,0 365,58 76 203 0,48 
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1988 2976,600 3319,3 349,40 76 117 0,46 
1989 3326,700 3478,1 366,12 76 818 0,48 
1990 3324,000 3324,0 349,89 78 333 0,45 
1991 4652,600 4496,8 473,35 80 774 0,59 
1992 4620,500 4365,0 459,47 83 413 0,55 
1993 4717,300 4358,0 458,74 85 694 0,54 
1994 4148,300 3778,2 397,70 90 400 0,44 
1995 4143,691 3681,8 387,56 93 879 0,41 
1996 4062,050 3567,6 375,54 98 479 0,38 
1997 4021,347 3441,6 362,27 103 079 0,35 
1998 4140,400 3465,5 364,79 105 614 0,35 
1999 4080,000 3338,1 351,38 106 740 0,33 
2000 3934,000 3121,2 328,54 109 181 0,30 
Sources: 1934/35-1945/46, Bjørnland (1989:360); 1946/47-1948/49, Statistisk bilag til Årsrapport for 
1950 fra Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken pr. 10/4-51 (Ajourført pr. 10/5 1951), Opplysningsrådet for 
Biltrafikken Oslo 1951:6 OVA; 1949/50-1953/54, Styrets beretning for 1956, Opplysningsrådet for 
Biltrafikken Oslo 1957:47 OVA; 1954-55, Styrets beretning for 1954, Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken 
Oslo 1955:39 OVA; 1955/56 – 1959/60, Bil- og veistatistikk 1962, Opplysningsrådet for Biltrafikken 
Oslo mai 1962:89, OVA; 1960-2000 own database derived from Directorate of Public Roads’ annual 
reports, VDA; GDP figures are from Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, 
Paris, 2003:51-53 Table 1b.  
The conversions to 1990 NOK and 1990 PPP in the years with fiscal years deviating from the calendar 
years are simplified and based on the last year, because these calculations are only approximations to 
indicate the investment level. 
